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This thesis investigates the profitability of the Momentum and Contrarian strategies in 
international equity markets. In particular, I introduce for the first time the use of countries’ 
indices performance to momentum and contrarian portfolio selection. I show that investors 
can switch back and forth from one country to the other in designing worldwide strategies. 
The global momentum strategy is consistently profitable between 1969 and 2014. The most 
successful momentum strategy selects stocks based on their previous performances over 9 
months and then holds the portfolio for the next 3 months. This strategy yields 3% per month 
(42.57% per year). Interestingly, countries’ indices’ portfolios formed based on prior 48 
months; prior losers outperform prior winners by 0.83% per month (10.40% per year) during 
the subsequent 60 months. The reversal effect is substantially stronger for emerging countries 
where it yields 1.37% per month (17.70% per year). It remains profitable in the period post-
globalization. In addition, I examine for the first time the role of world risks factors in 
explaining the global momentum and contrarian profits and find that the global momentum 
strategies obtain significant abnormal returns after adjusting consecutively for world Fama 
and French risks (0.9% per month or 11.35% per year), and world market states risks (1.31% 
per month or 16.76% year). Of particular interest, I find a strong relation between world 
macroeconomic risks factors, notably world industrial production and the momentum return. 
Second, I find no substantial relation between world risks factors and the contrarian profit. 
These results suggest that excess return can be earned in the long run by using global 
investment strategies based on historical prices, challenging the weak form of the Efficient 
Market Hypothesis. In Chapter 1, I explain the momentum and the contrarian strategies, 
motivate the importance of what I propose as global momentum and contrarian strategies, and 
present the results obtained. In chapter 2, I review the Efficient Market Hypothesis’ 
literatures in conformity with the Standard Finance theory. Additionally, I review the 
Behavioural Finance literatures with a focus on the psychology of investor decision, and the 
stock market under-reaction and overreaction approach of explaining the momentum and 
contrarian profitability. In chapter 3, I explain in details the main methodologies used to 
examine the global momentum and contrarian strategies profitability, and motivate the 
dataset used. In Chapter 4, I examine the new global momentum strategy profitability 
internationally. In Chapter 5, I examine the new contrarian strategy profitability 
internationally. In Chapter 6 I examine the role of global risks factors in explaining the 
momentum and contrarian profits. Finally, in Chapter 7 I conclude and highlights the 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Background 
Over the last two decades, financial globalization has become a crucial trend of the world 
economy. The financial perspective of this process, the correlation between international 
equity markets and international portfolio management become especially interesting topics 
that capture the attention of many scholars and investment practitioners. However, Scholars 
and Investment practitioners have not always agreed. The main sources of their disagreement 
have been the Efficient Market Hypothesis. The strength of the Efficient Market Hypothesis 
is questionable. If the weak form of the Efficient Market Hypothesis is correct, the existence 
of trading strategies will be pointless (Fama, 1991). The weak form of the Efficient Market 
Hypothesis suggests that it is not possible to use market data to make profits from investment 
analysis. According to the weak form, well-known trading strategies such as momentum and 
contrarian are not useful, but many investors including institutional investors use momentum 
and contrarian trading strategies to generate profit.  
For international investors, the understanding of how to achieve a portfolio reallocation 
across market and the factors that affect international portfolio returns are the crux of the 
success of global trading strategies. Chan et al. (2000) examined the momentum strategies 
based on individual stock market indices and found that momentum strategies could work 
well in international investing. In particular, they found that increasing portfolio weights in 
countries whose stock markets had recently performed well, and reducing weights in 
relatively poorly performing markets, could improve portfolio performance.  
The Contrarian strategy is a strategy that buys stocks that have performed badly in the past 
and sells stocks that have performed well in the past, based on their past excess return (De 
Bondt and Thaler, 1985). In contrast, the Momentum strategy is a strategy of buying stocks 
that have performed well in the past and selling stocks that have performed badly in the past. 
Evidences from Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) and many others studies converge to the result 
that, these strategies are profitable over 3 to 12-month horizon. The 6-month formation/6-
month holding period strategy produces returns of about 1% per month and that the 
profitability of these strategies is not due to their systematic risks or delays in stock price 
reactions from common factors.  
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De Bondt and Thaler (1985, 1987) provided evidences of the anomaly of price reversal in 3-
year returns. They suggested that the profitability of the momentum strategies could be 
associated to investors’ overreaction and reported that paradoxically, long-term past losers 
outperform long-term past winners over the subsequent three to five year periods; the losing 
stocks earned about 25% more than the winners’ stocks did. Chan et al. (1996) complimented 
their findings. They suggested that stock price over or under-react to information and that 
winners and losers often show reversal patterns, which are consistent with the overreaction 
hypothesis. 
Short-term return reversal in stock markets is also a well-established phenomenon; for many 
decades, it has been shown to be economically significant. For example, Jegadeesh (1990) 
studied a reversal strategy that buys losers and sells winners based on their prior-month 
returns, holds them for one month over 1934 to 1987, and found that the contrarian strategy 
generates a profit of about 2% per month. 
     Both contrarian and momentum strategies are considered to generate superior return 
compared to other strategies (Conrad and Kaul, 1998), implying a potential violation of the 
Efficient Markets Hypothesis and the contrarian profit is attributed to the overreaction 
phenomenon.  
    The overreaction phenomenon suggests that market has overreacted in the initial period, and 
that it subsequently corrects itself (Zarowin 1990), Shiller (1984) described the observed 
perverse behaviour of the price-dividend ratio in the short-term reversal strategies as evidence 
that market overreact to information, or fads. Another possible explanation for short-term 
reversal profits that received some attention in the literature is that price pressure occurs 
when the short-term demand curve of a stock is downward sloping and/ or the supply curve is 
upward sloping as demonstrated by Jegadeesh and Titman (1995). 
There have been many attempts to explain momentum and contrarian profits internationally 
with increasingly complex models. These attempts failed to support the idea of a global 
coordinated and generalised phenomenon and were mainly interested in international, 
regional, and countries comparison instead. For example, Chan et al. (2000) suggested that 
momentum strategies implemented based on individual stock market indices were 
internationally profitable in the short run, that the profits could be link to the exchange rate 
and that significant profit come from emerging markets as emerging markets are more 
predictable given the low liquidity. However, no test has been carried out that considers the 
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momentum and the reversal as global coordinated and generalized phenomenon, given that 
news motion may induce the return differences across countries. In addition, most studies 
focus on individual stocks on individual countries’ indices. There is relatively little research, 
which focuses on understanding of the practical risks faced by investment practitioners in the 
implementation of global momentum strategies (Griffin et al., 2004). 
1.2 Statement of the Purpose 
In this thesis, I examine whether a Global Momentum and Contrarian investment strategies 
based on countries indices is profitable. I posit that following indices’ performances, time-
variation in international equity market will lead to momentum and contrarian profit. 
Especially, I conjecture that switching back and forth investment from one country to the 
other in designing worldwide momentum and contrarian strategies while focusing on a global 
coordinated and generalized phenomenon is likely to generate extra profit.  
The key insight is that the concentration of equity in the hands of institutional investors 
(insurance, mutual and pension funds) activates the international equity trading, given that it 
offers the prospect of worldwide investment opportunities as institutional investors have the 
expertise and the logistic to trade globally. Haslam et al. (2013) reported the steadily 
increased of these funds in the advanced economies moving up from $22 trillion to $60 
trillion and from a position where these funds were equivalent to GDP to where they were 1.7 
times GDP. They established that in 2009 the global value of corporate equities under 
management within these main institutional sectors amounted to approximately $25 trillion, 
equivalent to two-thirds of the main economy stock market capitalizations in that year.  
Additionally, the emergence of new ways of trading such as Exchange Traded Funds (ETFs) 
offer investors the opportunity to invest worldwide. These investment funds provide exposure 
to a portfolio of financial instrument, but have the added benefit of been traded just like 
shares on a stock exchange.  
The logic is to construct a global strategy that allows contrarian investors to divest in selected 
well-performing countries (winners) and invest in selected poor-performing countries (losers) 
based on countries' past indices performances and inversely with momentum investors.  
To test this inference, I construct deciles and quintiles portfolios; overlapping and non-
overlapping portfolios using raw returns following countries indices performances, examine 
the international evidences of the long-term contrarian predictability in different market 
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states, and provide alternative explanations of the international profitability of the contrarian 
strategies.  
My expectation is that, the Global Momentum and Contrarian Strategies will be more 
profitable and less risky than the pure Momentum and contrarian strategies based on 
individual stocks as it focuses on indices which are often less risky than individual stocks. 
This leads to investors’ ability to detect any underlying long-tern reversal effect worldwide in 
different market states, allowing them to understand the international reversal phenomenon in 
different market states. Switching their strategies constituents and horizon to avoid resulting 
losses from negative contrarian payoff will help them earn consistent return. 
Consistent with my prediction on contrarian investing, I find that indices’ portfolios formed 
based on prior 48 months, prior losers outperform prior winners by 0.83% per month 
(10.40% per year) during the subsequent 60 months. Interestingly, the reversal effect is 
substantially stronger for emerging countries where it yields 17.70% per year. It remains 
profitable in the period post-globalization, countering the concern to whether the integration 
of equity markets synchronize the prices reversal worldwide. Returns’ differences consistent 
with portfolios formation approaches are also observed.  
Examining the profitability of the momentum strategies based on past countries indices’ 
returns; I find that the Global momentum is highly profitable. For portfolios formed based on 
prior 9 months, prior winners outperform prior losers and earn 3% per month (42.57% per 
year during the subsequent 3 months. Even more interesting, I did not find evidence of return 
continuation among countries indices. I also emphasise the point that investors may earn 
extra returns by investing internationally as the global momentum generates a return of about 
three times higher than the return indicated on Jegadeesh and Titman (1993 2001) and Chan 
et al. (2000). 
From a practical investment perspective, the contrarian strategies with non-overlapping 
portfolios are long-term strategies and results in a low turnover.  The optimum strategy 
generates a return of 10.40% per annum while the portfolios are rebalanced with 48 months’ 
intervals, while the optimum momentum strategy also result in a low turnover with 42.57% 
return per annum. On other hand Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), and Berkowitz, Logue and 
Noser (1988) estimate one-way transaction costs of 23 basis points for institutional investors 
suggesting that transaction cost of 0.5% per trade with a 6-month/6-month strategy is 
conservative. This implies and estimated transaction cost of 0.6% per annum which is not 
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negligible, suggesting a contrarian profit of 9.8% per annum, and a momentum profit of 
41.97 which does not undermine the high profitability of these strategies. However, 
investment firms must demonstrate that they have executed at the best possible trade 
condition conformably with the European regulation. 
Furthermore, ETFs are easy to access and simple to use. They can achieve diversification 
through one trade, allowing access to different investment and cover a broad range of asset 
classes. They often have lower cost than many other type of investments funds helping 
investors to keep more of their earnings. For example, a world equity ETFs with 5% turnover 
rate might incur transaction cost amounting to just 0.4 basis points per year (Morningstar, 
2016). ETF are flexible to investors’ needs, whether they want to invest in developed markets 
like US and UK, in emerging market like India and China or in commodity such as Oil and 
Gold. 
Next, I examine the role of global risk factor in explaining the global contrarian profit and 
find no systematic relation between variation in global risks factor and the contrarian profit. 
The evidences reveal significant adjusted contrarian return of 1% per month (12.68% per 
year) after controlling for the joint effect of Fama and French risks, market state factors, and 
macroeconomic risks factors on the contrarian profit. These results remain robust for 
subsample analysis (established, emerging, developed markets and during the globalization 
period). However, abnormal returns remain during currency and banking crisis but could be 
wiped-out by a stock market crash. Further analyses following business cycle indicate that 
contrarian investors earn positive abnormal return during expansion periods.  
Examining the role of global risks factors in explaining the global momentum profit, I find a 
strong systematic relation between variation in macroeconomic factors, notably industrial 
production and the adjusted momentum return. The evidence is that industrial production 
tends to contribute significantly in explaining the momentum return with a coefficient of 
1.05, a t-statistic 3.46 and a P-value of 0.00 when I control for all risks factors. This reveals 
that changes in economy growth or in industry’s output strongly affect the momentum profit. 
This positive relationship is quiet robust. For example, the findings survive with all holding 
periods. 6-month (0.10%), 9-month (0.00%) and 12-month (-0.40%). 
Of particular interest, the size of the abnormal return decreases when I increase the holding 
period suggesting that this abnormal return not only disappears in the long run after 
controlling for global risks, it may induce a negative momentum payoff. This particular 
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aspect attracts my curiosity given that I have a zero profit for horizon up to 9-month and a 
negative abnormal return (-0.40%) at 12-month. 
The positive impact of macroeconomic risks factors on the global momentum profit is also 
significant when the sample size is restricted to emerging countries, developed countries, 
established market and globalization indicating that the findings are not limited. Examining 
the impact of crisis on the momentum, I refer to the possibility that stock market is an 
indicator of the state of the economy as suggested by Naes et al. (2011), given that the global 
momentum are based on stock market indices prices. I also find substantial remaining 
momentum after account for the crisis and non-crisis period with the exception made on 
banking crisis when taken solely. My findings also strongly support that industrial production 
contributes significantly in explaining the momentum return following business cycle 
expansion, and disappears with contraction in line with Chordia and Shivakumar (2002) who 
suggested that variation in momentum payoffs reflect time varying over the business cycle. 
1.3 Research Hypotheses 
This study examines the Momentum and Contrarian trading strategies for international 
investors based on countries stock market indexes worldwide, given international investors 
will move back and forth from one market to another in designing their strategies. My 
primary aim is to compare the results of using both Momentum and Contrarian strategies in 
the international equity market. 
 More importantly, the data include financial market crisis, global risks factors allowing to 
compare the impact of the financial crisis in both strategies and to gauge the extent to which a 
financial shock can affect their profitability. The sample also includes countries indices 
prices; it includes Fama and French risks factors (Fama and Fench’s three factors), Market 
state factors (Liquidity, Default spread, Term spread, and the MSCI World Market return), 
and Macroeconomic factors (Oil price, Market volatility, and Industrial production). Which 
are considered global risks factors, and allow examining whether worldwide momentum and 
contrarian profits are explained by global risks. They also help in examining which of these 
factors are consistently dominant in the momentum (winners-losers), and the contrarian 
(losers-winners) profitability over time. 
This thesis intends to answer the following questions:     
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 Do momentum strategies work for international investors who target 47 stock market 
indices? 
 Do contrarian strategies work for international investors who target 47 stock market 
indexes? 
 Can the momentum and contrarian be explained by global risks factors? 
1.3.1 Hypothesis 1 of 3 
This hypothesis answers the first question of momentum strategies work for international 
investors by examining the momentum strategies performances over various construction and 
holding periods (3, 6, 9, and 12 month). 
Ho1: Global momentum strategy applied across the world financial market should generate 
positives and significant returns. 
1.3.2 Hypothesis 2 of 3 
This hypothesis answers the first question of contrarian strategies work for international 
investors by examining the contrarian strategies over various construction and holding 
periods (36, 48, and 60 month).  
Ho2: Global contrarian strategy applied across the world financial market should generate 
positives and significant returns.  
The purpose of these analyses is to determine the optimum strategies, which generate 
significant returns for the global momentum and contrarian trading strategies during the 
1969-2014 time-period with 47 countries indices. By doing this, I intend to discover that 
these strategies generate positive and significant profit over the sample period and that the 
optimum momentum strategies profit decrease gradually after financial shock appearance and 
the contrarian profit increase gradually after the shock. 
Robustness Test 
1. Does global momentum generate consistent and significant excess return in established 
market, developed market, emerging market, and during the globalization period? 
2. Does global contrarian generate consistent and significant excess return in established 
market, developed market, emerging market, and during the globalization period? 
3. Does the global portfolio issued from the momentum strategy generate consistent and 
significant cumulative excess return in bull and bear phase and in different period? 
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4. Does the global portfolio issued from the contrarian strategy generate consistent and 
significant cumulative excess return in bull and bear phase and in different period? 
1.3.3 Hypothesis 3 of 3 
The remaining hypothesis (Ho3) helps in examining whether the momentum and the 
contrarian return remain after adjusting for Fama and French’s risks factors (Fama and 
Fench’s three and five factors), Market state risks factors (Liquidity, Default spread, Term 
spread, and the MSCI World Market return), and Macroeconomic risks factors (Oil price, 
Market volatility, and Industrial production).  
 Ho3: Momentum and Contrarian profit are compensation for risks. 
1.4 Importance of the Study 
This thesis importance relies of the fact that it provides evidences of the profitability of the 
global momentum and contrarian strategies worldwide. It explains how the profit of the 
momentum and contrarian strategies varies in different market states the extent to which the 
initial effect dissipates or ceases to affect the momentum and the contrarian strategies 
profitability. It presents the Global Momentum and Contrarian Strategies as highly profitable 
strategies and examines the role of global crisis in explaining the momentum and contrarian 
profits; the results are consistent between subsample periods. 
I therefore contribute to several stands in Finance. First, I promote new momentum and 
contrarian strategies by suggesting the use of countries’ indices performances to momentum 
and contrarian portfolio selections. Investors can now move back and forth from one country 
to another in designing momentum or contrarian portfolios. My analysis includes a wider set 
of equity indices (47 countries indices), variety of parameters (3, 6, 9, and 12-month 
formation and holding periods for the momentum, and 36, 48, 60-month formation and 
holding periods for the contrarian), sub-periods’ analysis, and event-time analysis by sub-
period. The result is conclusive and rejects the weak-form efficiency that suggests excess 
returns cannot be earned in the long run by using investment strategies based on historical 
shared price or other historical data Fama (1970). 
Second, I provide evidence of greater return reversal internationally consistent with Jordan’s 
(2012) study that suggested that contrarian strategies are internationally profitable, but 
reported return based on national indices of about 5.60% per year with earning above the 
risk-free rate. My findings also endow with a greater return than Malin and Bornholt's (2013) 
study that suggested 0.46% contrarian return per month (5.66% per year) in developed 
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market and 0.68% per month (8.47 per year) in emerging market, and Richards's (1996) study 
that found 6.60% per year over 3 years holding period and 5.80% per year over 4 years, but 
focus on individual countries’ indices.  
Even more interesting, studying the global momentum does not show evidence of return 
continuation among countries indices. However, I must point out that my evidences are 
different from Chan et al.’s (2000) study based on individual countries’ indices, that suggest 
that, momentum strategies are internationally profitable on the point of view of U.S investor 
as they suggested that on average the momentum strategy generates 1% per month (12.68% 
per year). Which is significantly lower than the average momentum return in this study 
(42.57% per annum). I also emphasise the point that investors earn extra returns by investing 
internationally while considering the momentum as global coordinated and generalised 
phenomenon. Given that the global momentum generates a return of about three times higher 
than the return indicated on Jegadeesh and Titman (1993 2001). 
Third, I add to the literature on the motivation behind the overreaction hypothesis by 
suggesting a highly profitable contrarian strategy. In line with the proposal that, if stock 
prices systematically overshoot, then their reversal should be predictable from past return 
data alone, with no use of any accounting data such as earnings. A direct implication of these 
results is that international investors will be able to beat the market using common investment 









Chapter 2: Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
In this Chapter, I review the efficient market hypothesis literatures in conformity with the 
Standard Finance Theory. Additionally, I review the behavioural finance literatures with a 
primary focus on the psychology of investor decision and the stock market under-reaction 
and overreaction approach of explaining the momentum and contrarian profitability. I further 
assist us to know more about the relevant forms of arguments and models adopted over the 
years in support of the momentum and contrarian trading strategies. I explore preliminary 
evidences of the concept of momentum and contrarian trading strategies, its existence and 
profitability while examining evidences that seem to be significant and those, which have not 
been significant in determining and explaining the momentum phenomenon. More 
importantly, I review international momentum and contrarian articles in order to understand 
how momentum and contrarian strategies’ performances differ from one country to another 
around the world.  
I found that the momentum and contrarian strategies are well-documented strategies 
worldwide in individual countries the results suggest evidences of market inefficiency. 
Evidences also point to the fact that this profit could be result of investors under or 
overreaction to news. However, it is clear that   the impact of macroeconomic risk factor may 
have a decisive effect on determining the performance of the momentum and contrarian 
strategies.  
I argue that for international investors individual market are viewed as only one of a series of 
stock markets that provide investors opportunities. International investors will not just 
compare the equity markets against one another, they consider the fact that asset allocation 
also occurs across countries and indicate the success of global strategies that include multiple 
indices such as the global momentum and contrarian strategies. 
The following literature review is organized as follow. The first section looks at the efficient 
market hypothesis. In this part, I provide evidence supporting the weak and semi-strong form 
efficiency, evidence relating to the strong form of the efficient market hypothesis that 
emphasis on the Degrees of efficiency, the adaptive market hypothesis and the fractal market 
hypothesis. The second section of reviews the behavioural finance literatures with a primary 
focus on the psychology of investor decision, the stock market overreaction and mean 
Reversion and the gradual diffusion of information approach of explaining the momentum 
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and contrarian profitability. The last two sections look at evidences of the concept of 
momentum and contrarian trading strategies, their existence and profitability while 
examining evidences that seem to be significant and also those which have not been 
significant in determining and explaining the momentum and contrarian phenomenon. 
2.2 The Efficient Market Hypothesis/Standard Finance Theory 
2.2.1 Introduction 
Fama (1970) has provided a careful description of the efficient market that has had a lasting 
influence on practitioners and academics in finance. Markets are said to be efficient with 
respect to information set if price `fully reflects’ information set. The economical version of 
Efficient Market Hypothesis states that prices reflect all information to the point where the 
marginal benefits of acting on information do not exceed the marginal cost (Jensen, 1978). 
Fama (1991) also takes de view that security prices should fully reflect all available 
information. He emphasises the Grossman and Stiglitz’s (1980) point that the cost of getting 
price to reflect information are always zero. 
 Earlier study by Bachelier (1900) suggested  a Brownian motion that arises as a model of the 
fluctuations in stock prices. He suggested that the small fluctuations in price in the short term 
should be independent of its actual value. He also assumes implicitly that prices should be 
independent of their past behaviour. Considering the Central Limit Theorem he infers that 
increments of the process are independent and normally distributed. The Brownian motion 
was obtained as a diffusion limit of random walk. Since Bachelier’s (1900) findings, Studies 
on the beviour of security prices began to appear after 1950 suggesting that change in share 
prices followed a random pattern (Kendall 1953). In actual fact, this question is still clearly 
unanswered. How could investors outperform the market with trading strategies like the 
momentum and contrarian strategies, if the market is believed to be efficient and the stock 
prices reflect all information?   
The efficient market hypothesis is also associated with the idea of a “random walk”, which is 
a term loosely used in the finance literature to characterize a price series where all subsequent 
price changes represent random departure from previous prices. The logic of the random walk 
idea is that if information is immediately reflected in stock prices, tomorrow’s price changes 
will reflect only tomorrow’s news and will be independent of the price change today. But 
news is by definition unpredictable and, thus, resulting prices change must be unpredictable 
and random. As a result, prices fully reflect all information, and uniformed investors buying a 
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diversified portfolio at the market price will obtain a rate of return as generous as that 
achieved by the experts (Malkiel, 2003).   
I consider as a definition of efficient market, market that do not allow investors to earner 
above-average returns without accepting above-average risks (Malkiel, 2003). I do not argue 
is that the market is always inefficient or perfectly efficient. Above all I know that markets 
have made mistakes in the past, this can be gauge through evidence such as the the Internet 
bubble. 
However, I can not ignore that psychological factors could influence influence securities 
prices. in line with Malkield (2003), I am persuaded that Benjamin graham (1965) was 
correct in suggesting that while the stock market in the short run may be a voting mechanism, 
in the long run it might be a weighing mechanism.  Given that the true value will win out in 
the end. And before this happened there is always a way in which investors can reliably 
exploit any anomalies or patterns that might exist. I am optimistic that some of the 
“predictable patterns” that have been documented in the literature could help create profitable 
investment opportunities at lest for the short term. 
Critics of efficiency argue that there are several instances of recent market history where 
there is overwhelming evidence that market prices could not have played the dominant role. 
It is alleged, for example, that number of performances have been recorded for some well-
known figures who were able to beat the market consistently using market timing and stock 
picking techniques, for example Graham. He became a master at researching stock in 
microscopic or molecular detail. In April 1919 he earned around 250% return on his first day 
of trading and was able to survive any crisis.  History recorded that he gained at least 14.7% 
annually versus 12.2% for the market as a whole. Graham was able to build a successful 
long-term track record. He understood the concept of efficient market but he believed that it 
is probably fair to describe security market as nearly efficient (Graham, 1973). 
History also shows that there are compiling evidences to show that, while people are still 
debating, on the concept of market efficiency, some evidences are put forward that trading 
techniques like momentum and contrarian trading strategies can generate extra returns. 
Lofthouse (1994) suggested that if investors are eager to make money they will use every 
potential opportunity to make it, and prices will rise or fall in response to their  sales and 
purchases. This means that stocks will be priced at their fundamental value. But even if 
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stocks do not offer the same  expected return, investors may want additional return for taking 
extra risks. Stocks will then be priced randomly as the proper price allows risks.        
Lofthouse (1994) also made the assumptions that the model should work well if there is 
copious flow of information, investors will have to make rational decisions, and it must be 
possible to deal easily, frequently and cheaply. Which is generally the reflects of a typical 
modern market. In other words share prices should reflect all available information. 
In addition, he suggested that for news to have full effect on price, stock price should adjust 
relatively well when new information comes along. This means that news should be 
autonomous from any earlier factor or item. Rational profit-maximizing investors will then 
drive all prices to the level which reflects available information. Therefore change in share 
price should be random as information arrive radomly.  
The inconsistent paradox observed in the efficient market concept resided in the fact that it is 
worthless getting involved in a piece of research or seeking new information because the 
outcome will be reflected instantly in the general market prices. Conversly, if all researchers 
and analysts quit their profession, then share prices will become less efficient. Therefore 
markets will become efficient only if some participants believe that they are not efficient and 
base their trading decisions on something else or something other than new information. 
Mackinlay (1997) studied the effect of firm event and found that company anoncement 
information can affect the price movement before, during and after the event period. He 
established the abnormal return presence and considered the normal return issue as expected 
return without condition of the event being realized. Mackinlay went on to conclude that 
there is a perfect correlation between company information and the change in the market 
value. 
According to Cheol-ho and Scott (2004) empirical studies are divided into two different 
groups: the early group and the modern study group. Previous findings, indicate that 
directional trading strategies are profitable in foreign exchange markets and future markets, 
but not in stock markets. Modern studies indicate that technical trading strategies consistently 
generate economic profits in a range of speculative markets, at least until the early 1990s. 
Among 95 studies, 56 found that trading strategies were profitable. 20 results were negative 
and 19 studies indicated mixed results, but empirical studies were subject to various problems 
in their testing methods with the example of data snooping.  
28 
 
Fama (1970) suggested that the market is just efficient with respect to information set. He 
proposed degree of market efficiency, based on the definition of information set:   
 Weak form efficiency: where information set is limited to information contained in 
the historical market prices. 
 Semi-strong form efficiency: where all information publicly available and the history 
of the past prices are included.  
 Strong form efficiency: which includes all public and private information available. 
This explanation of the efficient market hypothesis was extended by Timmermann and 
Granger (2004) by specifying  how variables in the set are used to generate forecasts. They 
added search technologies and forcasting models to the efficient market definition.       
However, earlier study by Barberis and Thaler (2002) suggested that the efficient market 
hypothesis suggests that investment analysis is ineffective. This is because either share prices 
already reflect all relevant known information with the effect that they are already at their fair 
prices, or it is not possible to make profit from any mispricing. A semi-strong form efficient 
market is one in which security prices take account of all publicly available information. In 
addition to market information on past prices trading volumes, publicly available information 
includes macroeconomic data such as interest rates inflation rate, company data and non-
economic events. The implication is that asset prices immediately move to reflect any new 
information or that no one can make profits by means of purchases or sales based on 
analysing the new information (Readhead, 2008). 
2.2.2 Empirical Evidence on the Efficient Market Hypothesis 
Fama (1970) defined the weak form of the efficient market as a market in which the 
information set is limited to historical prices. However, Earlier study by Kendall (1953) 
attempted to identify cycles in stock indices and could not find any. One day’s level appeared 
to be the previous day’s level plus or minus a random amount. Osbone (1959) found that 
share price movements conformed to the Brownian motion of physics in that successive 
movements appeared to be random and the standard deviation of cumulative changes was 
proportional to the square root of time. Robert (1959) showed that a series of cumulative 
random numbers looked like a series of share prices such that observers believed that they 
could identify price pattern. 
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Fama (1965) confirmed the absence of serial correlation. He also employed run tests, which 
sought to ascertain whether runs of successive upward or downward price movements were 
longer or shorter than would be expected based on random price movements. He concluded 
that lengths of runs were consistent with random series of price movements. Therefore, there 
was no observable tendency for prices to trend upwards or downwards. 
There are counterviews and debates about the efficient market evidences. Shiller (1984, 
1988) has suggested that there may be fads and fashions in investment. If such fashions 
spread slowly, share price trends could emerge as result. Fashion is not the only possible 
driving force. Since the late 1990s, some people have argued that demographic trends are also 
having a similar effect. 
A study by Peters (1991), which analysed S&P 500 price change from 1928 to 1989, showed 
that securities markets exhibit fat tails in their returns distributions; the probabilities of very 
high and very low values are greater than would be predicted by normal distributions. This is 
consistent with markets trending in particular direction, which is inconsistent with price 
movements being related to previous price movements. Peters suggested that as few as three 
variables could accurately predict market movements. However, since these three variables 
frequently change, there may be no practical way of making profits from predicting market 
movements. In addition, fat tails in market returns distributions may have alternative 
explanations, such as the observed distribution being an amalgam of several different normal 
distributions this is because over a prolonged period a stock index would have been subject to 
numerous different distributions of returns. 
 In an investigation of intermediate horizon (3 to 12 month periods) stock price movements, 
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) found that stocks exhibit a momentum in which good or bad 
recent performance continues. They concluded that while the performance of individual 
stocks is insufficiently predictable, portfolios of the best performing stocks from the recent 
past appear to outperform other stocks with enough reliability to provide opportunity for 
profit. 
However, Niederhoffer and Osbone (1996) found slight evidence of serial correlation and 
runs using intra-day rather than weekly or daily data. Intra-day serial correlation appeared to 
be slightly negative.  
30 
 
Another approach to testing for efficiency is to ascertain whether trading rules, such as those 
used by chartists, have any predictive value. One trading rule that has been investigated is the 
filter rule. A typical filter rule might involve buying when a stock price is5% above its 
previous low point and selling when the stock price falls 5% from its previous high. Fama 
and Blume (1996) established that it was not possible to make profits by using filter rules to 
forecast price movements. Campbell et al (1997) found that daily stock returns contained a 
strong element of predictability. 
Technical analysts argue that tests of simple and mechanical trading rules cannot be used to 
draw conclusions about the complex and subtle techniques actually employed. There is also 
the point that it is impossible to test the infinite variety of trading rules, and hence it is always 
possible that effective trading rules exist among those that have not been tested. Furthermore, 
technical analyst would not publicise effective technique for fear that widespread knowledge 
of the technique would reduce the profits available to them. Perhaps it is only the effective 
trading rules that become widely known, and hence subject to testing (Redhead, 2008) 
Contrary to much of the other evidence, one study has suggested that some widely-known 
chartist techniques have predictive power. Lo et al. (2000) found that some technical analysis 
patterns occurred far more frequently than would be expected based on chance. The most 
common patterns were double top (and bottom), followed by head and shoulders (and 
inverted head and shoulders). Although the researchers ascertained that the charts provided 
information about future share prices, they did not investigate whether the information could 
be used to make trading profits. 
Most the evidences on the performance of professional fund managers support that returns 
net of costs are at best average (Blake and Timmermann, 1998). The literature on the 
performance of UK funds has failed to find evidence that information on past investment 
performance can be used as good guide by retail investors in choosing funds. The general 
pattern is one in which investment performance does not persist and small groups of funds 
may show some repeat performance over a short period, particularly poorly performing 
funds. However, the size of this effect and the fact that it is only very short-lived means that 
there is no investment strategy for retail investors that could usefully be employed (for a 
detailed survey please see Appendix G). The results of manager’s performance in the U.S. 
concurred with the earlier analyses of finding that there was no persistency in the 
performance of managed funds after 1987. There was evidence of repeat performance before 
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this point but it would be misleading to suggest that retail investors could use this finding in 
the present day (Redhead 2008). 
The weight of evidence is that retail investors cannot exploit information on past performance 
usefully. Against all this evidence is the observation that a few individuals seem to have 
records of accomplishment of persistently good investment performance. Such names include 
Warren Buffet, Anthony Bolton, George Soros, Peter Lynch, John Neff, John Templeton, and 
Neil Woodford. They present an unresolved anomaly from the perspective of the efficient 
market hypothesis. 
2.2.3 Level of Efficiency and the Adaptive Markets Hypothesis 
Arguably, the issue is not whether a market is, or is not, efficient. The issue is how efficient a 
particular market is. Market efficiency could be seen to parallel the perfectly competitive 
market of economy theory. They are rarely, if ever, achieved in reality. Nonetheless, they 
both constitute a useful benchmark against which to compare actual markets. They also serve 
to provide models that are useful for the interpretation and understanding of the real word. 
Simon (1995) argued that investors exhibited `bounded rationality’, which means that they 
have limited capacities to absorb and analyse information. They are not able to make the 
precise calculations, which would provide the optimum solutions to their investment 
problems. Correspondingly, market prices do not reach their fundamental levels. Instead, 
investors attain acceptable approximation to their optimum positions. Trial-and-error 
processes based on the use of behavioural heuristics when market participants have achieved 
such satisfactory portfolios, means that the market will approximate information efficiency 
that could achieve satisfying portfolios. 
Lo (2004) argue that, from time to time, circumstances would change. Changes in 
circumstance require new portfolios and new equilibrium prices. Market participants move 
towards the new satisfactory portfolios using heuristics in a trial-and-error process. 
According to this view, behavioural heuristics are not compatible with the efficient markets 
hypothesis. Behavioural heuristics are an aspect of the process whereby market move from 
one approximation of efficiency to another. Lo called this the `adaptive markets hypothesis’. 
Markets could be seen as following evolutionary paths wherein they adapt to change, 
circumstances by behavioural iterative process that mirror the survival of the fittest process of 
natural selection. Successive solutions to the problem of determining optimal portfolios are 
tried using heuristics, and the solutions that approximate most closely to the optimum are the 
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ones that survive. The heuristics of behavioural finance are the means of adjusting from one 
approximation to market efficiency to the next. Behavioural finance is complementary to, 
rather than a contradiction of, the efficient market hypothesis. 
An implication of the adaptive market efficiency is that the degree of market efficiency is not 
constant. Lo (2004) presented evidence showing that market efficiency, as measured by serial 
correlation, fluctuates over time. It is tempting to think that a market becomes steadily more 
efficient over time as the market participants become more sophisticated, but that does not 
appear to be the case. Degree of efficiency shows period of decline as well as periods of 
advance. This is consistent with the view that changes in circumstances disrupt (approximate) 
efficiency and that markets take time to reach a new (approximate) efficiency. 
Lo (2004) also explains how the new equilibrium positions can be path dependent. A new set 
of stock prices are path dependent if they are affected by the process, which achieve the new 
equilibrium. Therefore, a stock market crash could permanently deter some investors from 
the market. In consequence, the market will have fewer investors. The absence of those 
investors will also affect the risk preference of the market, and hence the equilibrium stock 
prices. A stock market crash does not simply cause a temporary deviation of stock prices 
from their ‘correct’ levels; it also changes the `correct’ levels towards which the market 
eventually tends to move. 
As far as the Efficient Market Hypothesis is concerned, broadly all market participants should 
have the same information at some point in time, there are compiling evidences to suggest 
that this is not always the case. The degree of efficiency shows period of decline as well as 
periods of advance (Lo, 2004); my intuition is that such market behaviour can lead to return 
predictability and perhaps helping investors to forecast time variations in stock markets.    
2.2.4 Summary 
From the Efficient Market literature, I recorded that there are two alternative meanings of the 
market efficiency. The first suggests that security prices fully reflect all relevant information 
Fama (1970). The second suggests that there is no opportunity for investors of making 
abnormal profits. Diverse evidences on the first meaning of the market efficiency support the 
idea that the degrees of efficiency matter, rather than the existence of the full efficiency. 
However, there are evidences of the second definition to provide strong support for market 
efficiency. Market Efficiency in the second sense supports the idea that investors are better 
off with index tracker funds than attempting to outperform the market using trading strategies 
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or even opting for actively managed fund, given that change in share prices are random 
(Lofthouse, 1994). The question remains to whether investors or fund managers could 
outperform the market with trading strategies such as global momentum and contrarian when 
they appear to be unable to do so. 
2.3 Behavioural Finance and Investment Decisions 
2.3.1 Introduction 
Behavioural finance is the finance field that applies the findings of psychological research on 
decision-making to investment decisions. Perceptible irrationalities in decision-making could 
be seen as rising from errors in processing of information in the stock market.  De Bondt and 
Thaler (1985) argue that investors are subject to representativeness bias, they become too 
optimistic about past winners and too pessimistic about past losers. They suggested that 
investment decision influenced by representativeness bias could move stock prices away 
from the level that reflect all information. 
Behavioural finance pleads that, with a consistent tendency to over-or under-reaction to new 
information, investors will profit from the information. Over-reaction would provide profits 
from selling after the news. Under-reaction would imply that investors could profit from 
buying subsequent to news. Lui et al. (2001) suggested that stock markets tend to underreact 
to information such as earnings reports. The prospect to make such profit will be inconsistent 
with the efficient market hypothesis.  
The behavioural finance psychology aspect covers a wide range of theories and concepts. In 
the following building blocks, I will elaborate upon, but as there is not unifying theory; 
several these theories will be introduced focussing on their potential economic means. 
2.3.2 Limit to Arbitrage 
The law of one price suggests that identical assets should have the same price in different 
markets. If prices differed between markets, arbitragers would buy in the cheaper market and 
sell in the expensive one. This would generate a profit, and would be inclined to move the 
price into equality. The extra demand in the low-price market would tend to raise the price at 
hand, and the supplementary supply in the high-price market would be inclined to reduce the 
price in that market. The efficient market hypothesis implies that the price of an asset should 




A related idea is that comparable financial assets should trade at comparable prices. If they 
did not, there would be an arbitrage opportunity available from buying the cheaper and 
consecutively selling the more expensive one. Such arbitrage would be inclined to bring the 
prices into fairness. Objections to this view go back to Friedman (1953). He suggested that 
rational trader always undo any displacements in the market. The efficient market hypothesis 
suggests that similar assets should trade at similar prices. The argument stands on the fact that 
rational investors and speculators’ under-reaction involve that investors profit from buying 
subsequent to news and they will always perceive mispricing quickly and therefore benefit 
from the situation by taking position on the market that will move back the price to its fair 
value. 
However, there are evidences to suggest that the arbitrage may not succeed. Supporters of 
behavioural finance argue that due to the presence of irrational investors, the stock market 
move away from its fundamental value, they agree that rational investors will take advantage 
of the opportunity of a mispricing in the market. However, the question arises to the issue on 
self- correction of the mispricing, as investors who suppose that growth stocks are overpriced 
will pay less for these stocks. If growth stocks still earn higher returns in the future, this will 
counter the low returns they are expected to earn. Therefore, it can be very unappealing for a 
rational investor to correct a mispricing due to soaring costs and risk (Barberis and Thaler, 
2002). 
Given that the fundamental risk is the most apparent type of risk that an arbitrageur will face 
by buying an apparently cheap asset, an arbitrageur faces the risk of the stock decreasing 
further in value due to bad news, which will lead to a further loss. To put off these 
circumstances, the arbitrageur can hedge the asset by selling an alternative security. 
Regrettably, there is not perfect or alternative substitute asset that exists and a fraction of the 
fundamental risk will remain un-hedged as a result. This un-hedged position is unpleasant as 
the arbitrageur is risk averse according to the theory; he does not need extra risk without 
additional return. The suggestion of risk aversion ensures that the mispricing will not fade 
away by a single large arbitrageur taking significant large position in the mispriced asset. 
Besides, the obvious problem that arise even if a perfect substitute asset exists is that, this 
stock might be mispriced as well which implies that the arbitrageur will back to the initial 
position. In the same way the mispricing of the original asset, being exploited can deteriorate 
in the short run; this is known as noise traders risk, and means that the arbitrageur will face 
the risk that the pessimistic, irrational investors get even more negative, lessening the price 
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even more. This could create massive losses for the investor. Noise trader risk is an important 
issue as it can force the arbitrageur to settle the position in advance than wanted in the first 
place. The reasoning is that, if a stock has lost a significant part of its value, investors tend to 
get anxious and therefore might settle early to avoid further losses. Furthermore, in reality 
investment and the separation of brains and capital are often associated with professional 
investment managers handling other people's money (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). 
The separation of brains and capital tend to create a principal-agent problem between the 
money manager and the investor, particularly when managers are primarily evaluated from 
their performance. If a known mispricing deepens, investor might withdraw their money and 
replace them due to lack of understanding of investment strategy. In other word, wherever 
investors get anxious more funds will be lost. To prevent such a situation, the fund manager 
may refrain from exploiting the mispricing in the first place. Accordingly, risk might affect 
the incentives of the manager; consequently, only short horizons arbitrage opportunities will 
be exploited instead of long runs, as these opportunities appear less risky. When investors 
faced with fundamental or noise trader risk or systematic risk, arbitrage effect will be limited 
in the sense that by adding small position of many individual arbitrageurs of the mispriced 
asset to their portfolios they will not successfully remove the mispricing (Barberis and 
Thaler, 2002).  
In addition, I consider additional costs, which occur when a mispricing is exploited, given 
that transaction costs are incurred when a trade is opened and closed; this includes bid-ask 
spreads, commissions and more. Even more the arbitrage strategy assumes short-sale position 
and as a result additional costs of the short sale constraints must be considered (legal 
constraints as many investment and mutual funds are forbidden to short sell by law, fee for 
borrowing the asset, Holding costs and opportunity costs). Finally, the costs of gathering 
information and this involves investors requiring resources to get update about the 
mispricing, which may not be considerably difficult (Barberis and Thaler, 2002). 
This are overall the arguments defining the existence of limits to arbitrage. Because of price 
moving away from the fundamental value, arbitrageurs may be unwilling to correct the 
mispricing due to excess risk and additional costs related to investment. This study may 
conclude that irrational investors' behaviour affects the prices and consequently the behaviour 
of the rational investors. In this sense the efficient market hypothesis does not hold at least at 
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the global stage the implication is that international investor could invest or divest 
internationally following indices performances. 
2.3.3 Psychology and Investor's Perception of the Market 
The second behavioural finance theory building block is the psychology of investor’s 
perception. This field is covering by a wide range of psychological concepts and theories. In 
this section, I will demonstrate how investors show irrational behaviour and why investors 
irrationality affect the market and that investor’s irrationality influence on the market does 
not happened by chance. By studying the reason for existence of irrational behaviour, through 
an examination of psychology and investors sentiment, I will have a greater understanding of 
how investor psychic can influence their preferences and thereby their behaviour on the 
market. In the following section, I aim to examine only terms that I find relevant for this 
analysis. 
Barberis and Thaler (2002) went over the main important points, such as systematic 
misconceptions that people tend to make, for example, overconfidence, optimism and wishful 
thinking, belief perseverance and availability biases, which to mention a few that can 
attenuate biases. The decision-making process of investors in selecting an asset can be 
affected by the above-mentioned factors. Investment experts tend to exhibit more 
overconfidence than private investors do, as they are more equipped with complex models 
(O' Shaughnessy, 2005).  
Camerer and Hogarth (1999) showed in several of their studies on this topic that incentives 
can only take away parts of this irrational behaviour. Although, incentives to some extent can 
reduce a biased output, the expansion in the information technology has worsened the 
investor's analytical ability. It is important to a greater extent to sort out the noise from the 
useful information. 
Deminer et al (2015) examined the impact of industry herding on the momentum profit and 
found that the profitability of industry momentum strategies depends on the level of herding 
in an industry. They show that loser industries with high level of herding yield significantly 
lower subsequent returns than losers industries with low level of herding but there is not 
significant difference for winner industries across low and high herding levels. They 




2.3.4 Frame Dependence and Loss Aversion 
Loss aversion and narrow framing also known as frame dependence or mental, are the two 
most important ideas in the experimental literature on decision-making process when risk is 
involved, both of which play a significant function on the behavioural finance in stock market 
setting. They predict that the concept of a gamble can be crucial when evaluating an outcome, 
as the gamble is framed in a positive (gain) or negative (loss) perspective. The positive 
framing will cause the investor to be risk averse and the negative framing will affect 
investor's norms and personal characteristics that will affect the outcome of investors' 
decision (Kahneman and Tversky, 1981). This implies that the effects on framing can be 
particularly influential. There are evidences on shifts in preferences due to the framing of the 
problem and this is a straight violation of the rational choice theory (Barberis and Thaler, 
2002). 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) studied the loss aversion; they suggested that people are more 
sensitive to losses than to gains of the same size. This simply indicates that losses hurt more 
than gains satisfy. When investors assess a gamble individually instead of evaluating the total 
value of all combined gambles, the effect of a gain or loss seems to be much more strong 
(Thaler, 1999). To illustrate this, Kahneman and Tversky demonstrated that the graph of the 
value functions is steeper for losses than for gains and implies loss aversion. A distinctive 
case of loss aversion is when people tend to reject gambles such as "win $110 with 
probability 1/2 lose $100 with probability 1/2" which is not only evidence of loss aversion 
but of narrow framing as well (Barberis, Huang and Thaler, 2003). Narrow framing refers to 
the tendency to perceive gambles independently from the original wealth. Loss aversion is 
often used side by side with narrow framing because people perform intuitively rather than 
through effortful reasoning (Kahneman, 2003). This means that, investors tend to appraise 
their gains and losses on a short-term basis, when framing decision is narrow.  
In this thesis, I started by introducing the Efficient Market Hypothesis under the assumption 
of full rationality of all agents and the limitation of the price determination of the Standard 
Finance Theory. However, the reality is that investors might have limited cognitive capacity, 
which prevent them from being entirely rational when managing information in decision-
making process since important and significant information may be under- or over-estimated 
or even neglected. Investors may under- or over-react to information, which may lead to the 
conclusion that market participants could exhibit irrational behaviour and cause strategy such 
as contrarian investment strategies to be profitable. Therefore, I can now focus on a strategy 
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such as the contrarian strategies that benefit from investors' irrationality and the fact that 
stocks prices deviate from their fundamental value. 
2.3.5 Stock Market Overreaction and Mean Reversion 
Overreaction is a market hypothesis stating that investors and traders react disproportionately 
to new information; overreaction means that prices rise too high and fall too low. It has often 
been suggested that the volatility of stock market is greater than might be expected from the 
efficient market hypothesis. Even though evidences of short-term serial correlation tend to 
show that returns significantly correlated, investigation of longer time periods have suggested 
that markets overreact to new information. De Bondt and Thaler (1985) have put forward an 
overreaction hypothesis. The overreaction hypothesis suggests that when investors react to 
unanticipated news, which will benefit a company’s stock, the price will initially be greater 
than it should be. There will be a subsequent price decline to the level justified by the new 
information. Conversely, the priced fall arising from adverse news will initially be 
exaggerated, requiring a subsequent correction.  
De Bondt and Thaler proposed a directional effect and magnitude effect. The directional 
effect is the tendency for an initial overreaction to be followed by moderating movement in 
the opposite direction. The magnitude effect is the tendency for the size of the correction to 
be related to the extent of the initial overreaction. A relative large initial overreaction will be 
followed by a relatively large compensating correction. Brown and Harlow (1988) added the 
intensity effect, which states that the shorter the duration of the initial price changes, the 
extreme the subsequent response will be. Brown and Harlow found that overreaction was 
most marked in the case of short-term responses to negative news. 
The very paper also investigated if individual decision-making and market behaviour are 
related. They tested whether investor overreactions affect stock prices and found sign of 
overreaction all over the length of the study and suggested that past winners and past losers 
realise excess return in January, but the loser’s portfolio experiences exceptionally large 
excess return compared to winners’ returns even with a portfolio formation period of up 5 
years. 
Later on De Bondt and Thaler (1987) re-evaluated the overreaction hypothesis considering 
the time-varying risk premium and the market efficiency. They found that the percentage of 
firms in the losers’ deciles portfolio that experience above-average earnings growth is 
significantly larger than equivalent in the winners’ deciles and that the earnings of winning 
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and losing firms show reversal patterns that are consistent with overreaction. However, the 
study did not provide satisfactory explanation of the January effect rational and their findings 
are consistent with Jegadeesh and Titman (1993). 
Summer (1986) simulated a series of share prices, which overreacted to new information. He 
went on to show that the techniques used in the early tests of serial correlation were not able 
to discriminate between an overreacting series and a random series and suggested that test 
could not identify the presence of overreaction, therefore, cannot be used to refute the 
proportion that markets are prone to overreaction. 
Fama and French (1988) found a tendency for prices to deviate from their fair value and then 
revert towards them, which is consistent with the idea that price overshooting is always 
followed by corrections that show apparent fluctuation around their fair values. 
However, it has often been suggested that the observed volatility of stock markets is greater 
than might be expected from the efficient market hypothesis. The stock market crash is an 
example of volatility that are difficult to explain in terms of new information coming into 
market. Share prices are seen as being the present values of expected future dividend receipts, 
but dividends show much less fluctuation than share prices. 
Shiller (1981) tested the hypothesis that stock price volatility exceeds what is justified based 
on variations in dividends. The basic premise of these studies is that stock prices should be 
more stable than dividends since stock prices reflect expectation of dividends.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
By considering an analogy with tossing a coin, if a coin is tossed 100 times the expectation is 
that there will be 50 heads. Each time the coin is tossed 100 times the forecast would be 50 
heads. The forecast does not vary; it has zero volatility. 
 However, on most occasions that the coin is tossed 100 times the actual number of heads will 
differ from 50. The observed numbers of heads will tend to form a normal distribution with a 
mean of 50. The observed number of heads is more volatile than the forecast number of 
heads. The implication of this reasoning for share prices is that they should exhibit greater 
stability than dividends. Share prices are based on expected dividends, which should be more 
stable than actual dividends. The volatility of share prices should be less than the volatility of 
dividends. Shiller’s research found that stock prices were much more volatile than dividends. 
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These studies have their critics. It has been suggested that the price fluctuation arises from 
variation in the required rate of return by which expected dividend streams are discounted, 
perhaps due to changes in the risk premiums (Cochrane 1991). 
Although studies of short-term serial correlation tended to find that there was no significant 
correlation coefficient, investigations of longer time-periods have suggested that markets 
overreact to new information. Tests covering periods of several years (Fama and French 
1988) have found a tendency for prices to deviate from their fair values and then revert 
towards them (mean reversion). In other words, significant negative serial correlation has 
been found over multi-year time horizons. This is consistent with Shiller’s (1984, 1988) view 
that fads appear to exist in securities markets. Episodes of apparent overshooting followed by 
corrections give the appearance of asset prices fluctuating around their fair value. Market 
prices seem to exhibit excess volatility. 
Research by Brown and Cliff (2005) is consistent with the view that fads or sentiment, 
influence stock prices. Brown and Cliff used a measure of sentiment based on the balance 
between bullish and bearish investment newsletters. Their results were consistent with the 
view that share prices initially overreact and then mean revert with the effect that, following 
positive sentiment, there are relatively low returns for a period as price mean revert. Prices 
initially show unjustified rises, but subsequently experience falls as the unjustified rises are 
corrected. Conversely, periods of negative sentiment are followed by relatively high returns 
as the under-pricing, caused by the negative sentiment, is subsequently corrected. 
Kang et al. (2002) in China put further evidences on overreaction forward. They who found 
that there is a significant abnormal return for some short and medium term momentum 
strategies and suggested that it was associated with overreaction to firm specific information 
in short term. In addition, they discovered that there was not a distinctive effect in medium 
term that was explained by the dominance of overreaction effect but they were able to 
demonstrate that the negative cross-serial correlation can lead to momentum profits. 
However, their analysis was based on data only accessible by local investors.  
Pan (2010) tested whether momentum in stock returns is not due to positive autocorrelation 
as behavioural models suggest. He found that when autocorrelations are calculated on 
monthly returns the results are positive, the averages and the cumulative sums of the first six-
and twelve-order autocorrelation are mostly positive and confirmed that the negative auto-
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covariance associated with momentum as documented are indeed consistent with the 
explanation of positive return autocorrelations offered by the behavioural theories. 
They also suggested that it is better to measure the relation between price momentums and 
return autocorrelation, by looking at autocorrelation of the short-term over various lags rather 
than autocorrelation of long-term, as the short-horizon stock returns show positive 
autocorrelation, but results appear to be plain. 
Moskowitz et al. (2012) examined the momentum effect on dozens of diverse futures and 
forward contracts that include equity indexes currencies, commodities and sovereign bonds 
worldwide, while using regression analysis and the exponentially weighted lagged squared. 
They found significant signs of “time series momentum effect” in equity index, that partially 
reverse over longer horizon and suggested that, this was consistent with under-reaction and 
delayed over-reaction relatively to the dynamics of different trading position, but did not 
explain why this happened. 
Gokecen, and Post (2013) tested the hypothesis that stock prices underreact to news. They 
found that short-term return continuation is strongest after recent increases in volume and or 
variability, and that a conditional trading strategy of buying high-information winners and 
selling higher-information losers leads to significantly larger profits than an unconditional 
version, but the study was limited to the NYSE and the AMEX. 
Conversely, Zarowin (1989) examined firm’s stock over 36 months relative to extreme 
earning years and found that the poorest earners do outperform the best earners. However, he 
was able to demonstrate that when poor earners are matched with good earners, there is not 
substantial evidence to suggest that the factor responsible for the overreaction phenomenon is 
the size and not investors overreaction to earnings; this argument rejects De Bondt and Thaler 
(1985) suggestion. However, this study made use of market adjusted excess return and not 
risk adjusted. 
Smith and Huynh (2013) tested the Hong and Stein’s (1999) under-reaction model on weekly 
momentum returns by employing the dataset of 19.9 million news items in the U.S., Europe, 
Japan, and Asia Pacific. They found that under-reaction to news is the main driver of 
momentum effects everywhere. By jointly examining two features of news namely staleness 
and stone, they documented a highly profitable trading strategy that buys winner stocks with 
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stale positive news in the past week and sells loser stocks with novel negative news over the 
same period. 
They suggested that, the news momentum portfolio’ gives economically and statistically 
significant returns in all markets including Japan where the normal momentum strategy does 
not work. However, they did not record any evidence to support Hong et al (2000) hypothesis 
that momentum returns are driven by the slow diffusion in of bad news in Europe and Japan 
but the 1-52 momentum portfolio formed using stock with negative news earns 15 bps per 
week compared to 7bps per week among positive news stocks in Asia. The 8bps difference 
was not statistically significant. These findings provide strong international supports for 
behavioural explanations of momentum. The persistent profitability of news momentum 
portfolios suggests that investors everywhere have similar bias of under-reaction to news. 
2.3.6 Gradual Diffusion of Information 
Hong et al. (2000) provide evidence to indicate that momentum in share prices is the result of 
gradual diffusion of information about a company, and that stocks with slower information 
diffusion provide more potential for momentum profits. They point out that over investment 
horizons of three to twelve months, there are opportunities to profit from trading strategies 
based on momentum given that winners continue to perform well and losers continue to 
perform poorly. They suggest that slow diffusion of information is particularly characteristic 
of poorly performing small companies whose shares are neglected by analysts. Company 
management do not enthusiastically publicise bad news, and few investors seek information 
about neglected small companies. In consequence, share prices adjust very gradually to new 
information and exhibit momentum during the adjustment process. 
Douglas and Mcknight (2005) used a sample of 13 European stock markets over the period 
1988-2001 to test the hypothesis that momentum was caused by slow diffusion of 
information. They also tested an alternative explanation of momentum, which is that it results 
from investor conservatism. Investor conservatism is a cognitive bias identified in 
behavioural finance. Conservatism causes investors to be slow to change their opinions. 
Therefore, even if information were provided quickly, investors would be slow to respond to 
it. The slow response results in a slow adjustment of stock prices to the new information. The 
information-induced trades that move prices to their new levels occur gradually over time, 
rather than immediately after the release of the information. Douglas and McKnight 
concluded that both hypotheses contributed to the explanation of the momentum effect. 
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Yan (2013) studied the momentum crashes and the asymmetry in return contributions from 
the winners and the loser stocks. He suggested that momentum is prone to crowded trades 
because it is a positive feedback trading strategy with no fundamental anchor. He argues that 
when informed traders under-react to fundamental information due to slow diffusion of 
information it gives rise to continuation at short-horizons, which creates an arbitrage 
opportunity and arbitrageurs exploit this by engaging in momentum trading. However, the 
uncertainty in the amount of capital devoted to the momentum trading makes it possible that 
arbitrageurs overcorrect to the initial under-reaction that generate losses, causing a fire-sale 
of the momentum strategy. By studying the U.S. equity market, Yan (2013), identified the 
loser stocks that are subject to overcrowding by momentum traders (Losers stocks sold 
heavily) and showed that the fire-sale effect is stronger for the loser stocks than the winners 
stocks through high frequency short sale transactions. 
Furthermore, handy evidences come from Chan et al. (1999) who used measures of prices 
momentum and earnings momentum, the earnings momentum measures considered the 
impact of unexpected earnings (profits) announcements on the behaviour of share prices and 
the impact of changes in analyst’ earnings forecasts. Unexpectedly good earning and upward 
revisions and the impact of changes in analysts’ earnings forecasts tend to cause share price 
rises; conversely, it was found that investing on the basis of price momentum and the two 
forms of earnings momentum could produce profits over six-month and one-year periods 
which is consistent with bad earnings and downward revisions.  
Moreover, no evidence of reversals or profitable contrarian strategies was found. It was 
suggested that the evidence was consistent with the view that information is gradually 
incorporated into share prices. An explanation proposed for the gradual incorporation of 
information was the procrastination of analysts in the adjustment of their forecast. Downward 
revisions of forecast may be particularly slow since analysts do not want to antagonise the 
companies whose shares are being evaluated. 
However, there could be multiple sources of momentum and contrarian profits as 
documented in the literatures, the need to explore the interaction between these sources is 
more acute in the global equity market as individual or small set of factors alone cannot 




Overall, there are significant evidences to support that stock market in the long term 
overreact to new information (De Bondt and Thaler, 1985). Empirical studies also offer 
strong evidence of stock market under-reaction (Smith and Huynh, 2013). The weight of 
empirical findings indicates a resilient support for stock market overreaction and under-
reaction. However, the persistent profitability of news motion suggests that investors 
everywhere have similar bias of under-reaction and overreaction to news. The question 
remains to whether these hypotheses could be tested internationally with countries indices 
given that most of the study are done at the firm’s level. 
2.4 Momentum Trading and Profitability 
2.4.1 Introduction 
Investment strategies based on the view that the recent direction of share price movement will 
continue are known as momentum strategies. There is evidence that technical trading rules 
based on momentum strategies might produce opportunities for profit. Several studies have 
divided stock into winner and loser portfolios. The winner portfolios contain those stocks that 
have performed well in the recent past; the loser portfolios contain those that have shown 
poor recent return. The studies have then investigated whether there is a significant difference 
in their subsequent performances (Jegadeesh and titman, 1993). By opposition to the 
contrarian is a strategy the momentum strategy buys past winners and sells past losers. In this 
I section, I examine empirical properties of the momentum strategies and assess the 
plausibility of the theory posed in the literature to explain the momentum profitability. 
2.4.2 Empirical Evidences Relating to the Momentum Profitability  
In general, this work supports the the view that the stock market has some sort of memory, 
the way that stocks prices behaved in the past is usefull in defining how it will behave in the 
future leading to short term momentum profit; for example, Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) 
found that, momentum strategies generate significant and positive abnormal return between 
1965 and 1989 and are profitable for 3 to 12 month holding period. When considering the 
optimum portfolio of 6-month formation and 6-month holding period, the momentum 
strategy appears to be consistently profitable and can generate a profit of up to 1% as the 
winner portfolios keep winning and significantly outperform loser portfolios. They suggested 




Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1995) analysed the extent to which mutual funds purchase 
stocks based on their past returns as well as their tendency to exhibit herding behaviour. They 
found significant evidences suggesting that large number of mutual funds earned positive 
risk-adjusted abnormal returns and that 77% of mutual were momentum investors, they tend 
to buy past winners, but there is little evidence to suggest that these funds systematically sell 
past losers. They also reiterated that mutual funds that use the momentum strategy tended to 
perform better than others did and that there is little evidence to suggest that funds tended to 
buy and sell the same stocks at the same time. 
Conrad and Kaul (1998) studied the momentum strategies in the US NYSE and AMEX stock 
market with methods similar to Lo and Mackinlay (1990), and Lehmann (1990) from 1926 to 
1989. The study decomposed securities’ profits into two components, the cross-sectional 
variation and time-varying components with different formation and holding periods. They 
tested 120 trading strategies and found that 50% of them generate significant profits, they 
suggested that, on average both momentum and contrarian strategies were equally profitable 
respectively at medium-term (3 to 12 months) and short-term (1week to 1 month) and long-
term (3 to 5 years) but they made the exception in for 1926-1947 period. They also 
demonstrated that the success of the momentum and contrarian strategies can also be 
attributed to the variation in mean returns. These results confirm that, event of random walk 
the momentum and contrarian strategies can still be profitable. 
Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999) studied industries momentum while ranking their data into 
twenty different industries groups. They found that the momentum strategies do not generate 
significant profit for individual industry. However, when the strategies buy the winners and 
sell the losers industries they tend to be significantly profitable. They also found that, in the 
short term the industry momentum seems to be stronger than the stock momentum and that 
the momentum profit persists in the medium term but dissipate after 12 months. Furthermore, 
they suggested that, industries factor have undeniable impact on the momentum strategy 
profitability. 
Jegadeesh and Titman (2001) reviewed the evidence of price earnings momentum and found 
that there is a substantial evidence to prove that stocks that perform well or badly over a 3 to 
12-month period tend to continue to perform well or badly over the next 3 to 12 months. 
They suggested that the strategies that make use of this type of phenomenon are consistently 
profitable in the United States and most developed markets. They examined the returns of the 
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winner and loser stocks in the month 13 to 60 and found that, the cumulative returns of 
momentum portfolio are negative, which is consistent with the behavioural theories. They 
advocate that there are substantial evidences to confirm that firm’s and market characteristics 
can determine momentum strength but the profit size issue from these factors depend on the 
extent to which they are incorporated in the firm or the market activities.  
Moreover, George and Huang (2004) adopted a different approach; they studied the 
momentum strategy with an investment strategy named “52-week high”. The strategy longs 
the winners and sorts the losers based on their previous month’s prices divided by their past 
12 months’ highest price. They found that this strategy could generate higher momentum 
return compare to the Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) and the Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999) 
strategies. After controlling for the size effect, the bid-ask bounce, and exclude the January 
return they found that the strategy profitability is two times the profit of previous momentum 
trading strategies, they concluded that, the 52-week high strategy predicts investors’ 
perception of the Losers and winners. 
The literature on the momentum strategy records that there could be multiple approach of 
testing the momentum phenomenon. There are also substantial evidences to confirm that 
firm’s and market characteristics can determine momentum strength. However, the weight of 
evidence indicates that most researches were done at the countries level, using individual 
firm. The perception is that, given the current stage of the globalization of the world economy 
investors will earn higher return by considering the momentum as a global and generalized 
phenomenon. 
2.4.3 Momentum Strategies International Evidence 
To restate, this thesis support the view that international equity market has some memory and 
suggests that, the way in which equities markets indices behaved in the past could be useful 
in defining how they will behave in the future at least in the short term. I extend the analysis 
of the momentum strategies to the global equity markets. The original empirical work 
supporting the internationalization of the momentum strategy looked at such strategies 
between successive and individual stock market prices changes. For example, Chan, et al. 
(2000) studied the profitability of the momentum strategies internationally. They formed 
momentum portfolios based on past stocks’ returns from different markets and examined 
whether these strategies are useful for country selection. They examine how the profitability 
of international momentum sytraties is affected by exchange rate movement. Considering a 
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US investor who implements momentum strategy that involves buying british stocks when 
the value of british stocks increase (in terms of U.S dollars). They found that the value of 
investor portfolio depends on how the equity and currency market affect each other. For 
example, if British pounds tends to appreciate following a rise in the British equity market, 
the U.S. investor profits when he liquidates british stock portfolio and convert to U.S. dollars. 
Similarly, if the value of British stocks tends to increase following British pound 
appreciation, the U.S. investor also profits. In both case, they suggested that the momentum 
profits do not come from return continuation in the equity market but from the 
interdependence between the currency and equity market. They also emphasised the link 
between momentum profit and trading volume and suggested that significant portion of the 
profit come from emerging markets as emerging markets are more predictable given the low 
liquidity. 
However, the study did not explore the possibility that momentum could be a global 
coordinated and generalized phenomenon among countries, and that the gloobal momentum 
could be captured through portfolios of countries’ indices and in different horizons given the 
prevalence of new ways of trading such as Exchange Traded Funds.  
The crucial evidence that led the way to this study comes from the fact that Chan et al. (2000) 
found that momentum strategies could work well in international investing. In particular, they 
suggested that increasing portfolio weights in countries whose stock market had recently 
performed well, and reducing weights in relatively poorly performing markets, could improve 
portfolio performance but the study selected winners and the losers according to their 
performance departure from the U.S market.  While, this thesis constructs winners and losers’ 
portfolios based on raw return from countries indicess.  
Empirical studies also demonstrated that European markets and US market are positively 
correlated. This correlation extends to the momentum strategy; for example, Rouwenhorst 
(1998) repeated the Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) study on non-US stock markets. He 
examined 12 European countries with an international portfolio that include The United 
Kingdom, the Switzerland, Sweden, Spain, Norway, The Netherlands, Italy, Germany, 
France, Denmark, Belgium, and Austria from 1980 to 1995 and found similar pattern. He 
found that the momentum strategies are as well as profitable in Europe as in United States, 
that the past winners outperformed the past losers by about 1% per month in the medium term 
and that the return continuation is present in all the countries after considering the firms’ 
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sizes. However, the study did not examine whether international investors could take 
advantage of the momentum strategies in both market.  
Schiereck et al. (1999) studied all major companies listed on the FSE from 1961 to 1991 and 
found that the momentum and contrarian strategies appeared to beat a passive approach that 
invested in the market index. They suggested that factors such as beta, risk, or firm size do 
not easily account for the results because several strategies require limited trading, that the 
implementation costs are modest which implies that the results are economically meaningful. 
From the behavioural finance point of view, they found that the results for Germany matched 
the findings for the United States even though equity markets are organized very differently 
and even though there are profound differences in the social, cultural, and economic 
environment. They pointed out the fact that general traits in human behaviour and psychology 
could overcome these differences and ultimately drive the speculative dynamics of asset 
prices in the world financial markets. However, they did not explore other market as the US 
and the German are all developed market and may have similar economical characteristics. 
The momentum strategies were also studied in the Asian market. For example, Fung (1999) 
studied the contrarian strategy in the Hong Kong’s Heng Sang Index (HSI) while using 
winners and losers’ portfolios formation period of 2 years. He found that, the loser portfolio 
significantly outperforms the winner portfolios by almost 10% a year. Which is significantly 
different from the approximately 8% reported by De Bondt and Thaler (1985) in the US 
equity market. However, the study reported different characteristics for the Hong Kong 
market, which include his difference in stock market capitalisation, high liquidity, the 
presence of a legal system and an accounting system, his similarity to the western standard, 
the dominance of mutual funds. Furthermore, Hong Kong market is also characterised by the 
fact that in most studies, selling some of the winner portfolios may be difficult if not 
impossible (the up-tick rule for short-selling was abolish after 25 March 1996 in Hong 
Kong). However, the study did not explain how international investors could take advantage 
of these characteristics while moving his momentum portfolio between the Hong Kong 
markets and other markets to consistently profit from the global momentum strategy.  
Hameed and Kusnadi (2002) investigated the profitability of the momentum investment 
strategy in six Asian stock markets (Thailand, Taiwan, Korea, Singapore, Malaysia and 
Hong). They found that the momentum investment strategies do not yield significant 
momentum profits. They suggested that a diversified country-neutral strategy generates small 
49 
 
but statistically significant returns of 0.37% per month over six month holding period and 
between 1981 and 1994 but after controlling for size and turnover they found that the country 
neutral profit dissipates. They concluded that factors that contribute to momentum 
phenomenon in the United State are not widespread in the Asian markets and that countries 
specifics characteristics effect are diversifiable internationally. However, the study was 
limited to Asian stock market and did not include the contribution of other markets, as the 
momentum tends to be profitable in western countries as well as in countries with low 
liquidity. 
Kang, Liu and Ni (2002) studied the stock-return behaviour in the Chinese stock market. 
They found that short-term contrarian and intermediate-term momentum generate significant 
profits. After further analysis, the suggested, that overreaction to firm-specifics information is 
the single source of short-term contrarian profits that, momentum profits are not distinct in 
the medium term, which is explained by the dominance of overreaction effect. They also 
reported that negative cross-serial correlation contributes to the momentum profits that large 
firms tend to lead small firms in holding periods 1 to 8 weeks, while the small firms lead 
large firms in the holding periods 12 to 26 weeks. They reported that with value-weighted 
portfolio strategies, the momentum profits become more distinct because of the unique lead-
lag structure in China as the large firms lead the small firms in short horizon while the small 
firms lead the large firms in relatively longer horizon. However, the study used the “A” 
shares, which are only accessible to local investors in China and did not said if the unique 
lead-lag effect can be seen as a sign to predict future momentum and contrarian profit. 
Hurn and Pavlov (2003) examined the momentum strategies in the Australian market, they 
analysed 200 stocks as the small were characterised by low liquidity issues; they established 
the existence of short to medium-term momentum. They found that momentum strategies 
yield significant profit of about 4.79% to 13% for the yearly holding period and they 
suggested that the result are even stronger for portfolio based within individual industries. 
They advocated that these figures were consistent with the momentum in stock returns 
reported in international markets and that the contrarian strategy does not provide significant 
abnormal return over the same time-period but the result was only applicable on the 




Mclnish et al. (2008) studied the sort-term momentum strategies in Asian pacific countries 
while taking into account the effects of trading activity, size/value characteristics, and 
asymmetric investor responses to news on stock market in Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia, 
Hong Kong, Korea, Taiwan, and Japan from 1990 to 2000. They provided evidences of 
trading strategies based on past price performance for 1, 2 and 4 weeks. They suggested that, 
trading strategies based on past price patterns are not effectively profitable in most pacific 
Basin markets and that trading strategies, that combining both winners and losers are not 
consistently profitable over a week, that in 5 out of seven countries, winners display price 
reversal patterns. 
However, they found that momentum profits are profitable only in Japan and Hong Kong. For 
the Japanese market, the results indicate that the winner stocks earn significant returns after 
adjusting for three-factor risk (0.30% per week for the traded stocks and 0.20% for the low 
volume). Which, are statistically significant and which contradict the findings of Lee and 
Swaminathan (2000) in United State that suggested that past volume helps to reconcile 
intermediate-horizon under-reaction and long-horizon overreaction effects, but the study did 
not test whether by combining momentum and contrarian, international investors will be able 
to generate consistent profit in Asian pacific countries and therefore worldwide. 
Furthermore, Naughton et al. (2008) examined the momentum and strategies in Shanghai 
Stock Exchange, while considering the effect of trading volume in portfolio formation. They 
used different formation and holding periods; they discovered that momentum strategy can be 
profitable in the short-term and can provide long horizon positive returns in the Shanghai 
stock market between 1995 and 2005. They suggested that, investors could generate superior 
returns by investing in strategies unrelated to market movements. The same past trading 
volume does not provide a strong link between momentum and value strategies, as they did 
not find any clear pattern in stock returns between high volume portfolio and low volume 
portfolios. However, they recorded that around earning announcement the momentum 
strategies earn high short-term returns but did not explain if this is linked to the country 
characteristics. 
A more recent work by Griffin et al. (2004) extended Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), Chan et 
al. (1996) study in the U.S in a global setting in 40 markets for price momentum and 34 for 
earning momentum by analysing several key issues: the separated the long-side positions 
from the short-side positions; the interaction between price and earnings momentum, the 
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relation between individual countries monentum strategies across markets; and momentum’s 
sensitivity to global market condition, extreme events, and seasonolity. They provided 
practical perspective for price and earnings momentum investing from 1975 to February 1995 
in individual countries’ stock markets internationally. They found that, momentum is 
potentially useful even for investors who are only able to take long positions. They also 
suggested that, ignoring transactions cost, an investor investing 1$ in European securities in 
1975 would have earned $15.06 in low past 6-month return securities, as compared to $66.01 
in market indices, or $192.66 in high past return securities as price and earnings momentum 
profits are large and positive on a global basis. However, Griffin et al.’s (2004) portfolio 
construction follows Chan et al. (1996) approach and is based on the performance of 
individual stocks within countries indices. And do not claim to test a global strategy nor 
considering the momentum as a global coordinate and generalize phenomenon. They attempt 
to show that price and earnings momentum profits are large and positive on a global basis 
result in countries comparison. Still, they did not explain why these return differences occur 
during this period and if they are consistent over time. 
Former and Marhuenda (2003) found sign of momentum and contrarian effects in the Spanish 
stock market. They concluded that momentum strategies could be profitable on the 12-month 
basis and that contrarian strategies offered profitable opportunities over 60-month periods but 
their analysis was restricted to the Spanish market and did not explore the global perspective. 
Momentum and contrarian strategies seem to be more effective where the degree of the 
market sensitivity is considered, Narajo and Porter (2010) studied the sources of cross-
country co-movement of momentum returns across developed and emerging markets. They 
found that country-neutral momentum returns are significantly correlated across countries, 
the correlation is time varying and that co-movement among industries cannot explain the co-
movement of country-neutral momentum returns but the study did not explain how 
international investor could take advantage of the country-neutral momentum returns 
correlation effect. 
Griffin et al. (2010) investigated the common perception that emerging equity markets are 
widely thought to be places of substantial trading profits and weak- and semi-strong-form 
market inefficiencies when compared to developed markets. They examined the short-term 
reversal, and momentum strategies, and found that short-term reversal, and momentum 
strategies earn similar returns in emerging and developed markets but the study did not 
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establish when and while the momentum and contrarian strategies alter in these markets and 
whether there are similitude and divergence in the momentum and reversal behaviour in both 
market. 
Avramov and Hameed (2014) studied the impact of the state of the market illiquidity on the 
momentum payoffs. They suggested that even if Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) found that the 
momentum strategy generate 1.18 percent return per month, the momentum payoff 
realizations could be significantly low, often due to massive negative payoffs. After 
examining the predictability power of previous markets states on the international momentum 
payoffs, they found that there are overwhelming evidences across the US, Japan and the Euro 
zone to show that market illiquidity predicts momentum payoffs. 
Avramov et al. (2015) examined the role of liquidity for arbitrage, they examine the 
systematic relation between variation in market liquidity and the strength of the momentum 
anomaly. They found that the effect goes in the opposite direction. The evidence is that 
momentum profits are large (weak) when the market are highly liquid (illiquid). One standard 
deviation increase in aggregate maret illiquidity reduces the momentum profits by 0.87 per 
month, over the 1928-2011 period. 
To examine the predictive role of market illiquididity in explaining temporal variation in 
momentum payoffs they consider a time-series regression were the predictive variable 
include three aggregate measure of market condition in the prior month. These include the 
level of market illiquidity, the state of market return, the agate market volatility, they also 
include they Fama-French three factors and hey found that there is an identical predictive 
effect of the lagged market state variable on the profitability of the momentum strategy. 
Earning momentum payoffs are significantly lower following periods of low market liquidity, 
reducing market valuation, and high market volatility. Their findings on the predictive effect 
of market illiquidity on momentum payoffs remains unchanged when they control for various 
measures of the macroeconomy. The liquidity is also robust to, and partially subsumes the 
recent evidence that momentum payoffs depend on inter-temporal variation in investor 
sentiment, as documented by Stambaugh et al. (2012). 
When they extend the analysis to non-U.S. of Japan and ten countries establishing the 
Eurozone, they found similar evidence of significant time-variation in momentum payoffs in 
relation to market illiquidity. Most importantly, even though it is well known that momentum 
is unprofitable in Japan (Griffin, et al., (2003) and Chui et al. (2010), they found that the 
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strategy yields substantial and significant profits following periods of low market illiquidity. 
They key factor on this thesis is whether the momentum anomaly is a global and general 
phenomenon that holds over time Avramov et al. (2015) study is conducted on individual 
stocks, their non-U.S. sample cover a limited period of 2001 and 2010, they also leave 
additional work using the aggregate liquidity state unexplored, allowing a scope for future 
research.   
Narayan, and Phan (2016) examined the profitability of the momentum strategies in Islamic 
stocks. They controlled for stock characteristics, the state of the market, and the seasonal 
patterns and found that momentum strategies work for Islamic stocks, but are characteristic-
dependent. They show that up and down phases of the market offer different degree of 
profitability and the risks factors do explain momentum profits. 
From the above review, international investors view individual markets as only one of a 
series of stock markets that provide investment opportunities. The global asset allocator will 
not just compare the equity markets of the world against one another, but he will consider the 
fact that asset allocation occurs within and across countries. Global asset allocation can be 
carried out at the strategy level, the time horizon being considered. Thus, arises the question: 
does a global momentum works for international investors. I find that it does. 
To answer the above question, I considered the empirical approach of implementing the 
momentum strategies with portfolios of countries’ indexes, focussing on portfolio 
construction approach similar to Jegadeesh and Titman (1993). The result is that, the global 
momentum strategy is consistently profitable between 1969 and 2014. The most successful 
momentum strategy selects stocks based on their previous performances over 9 months and 
then holds the portfolio for the next 3 months. This strategy yields 2.98% per month (42.24% 
per year) and suggests evidence of market inefficiency. However, there are several factors 
that should prevent us from interpretating the empirical resulst reported above as an 
indication that markets are inefficient. First, while the stock market may not be a 
mathematically perfect random walk, it is important to distinguish statistical significance 
from economic significance. The statistical dependencies giving rise to momentum are 
extremely small and are not likely to permit investors to realize excess returns. Anyone who 
pays transaction costs is unlikely to fashion a trading strategy on the kinds of momentum 
found in this studies that will beat the market. 
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2.4.4 Momentum Trading Strategies during Financial Crisis 
Choe et al. (1999) tested whether foreign investors’ activities affect stock return in Korea 
from November 30, 1996 to the end of 1997, period that match with the Asian crisis they 
used order and trade data and found that there are strong evidences of positive feedback 
trading and herding by foreign investors before the period of Korea’s economic crisis. They 
recorded that, during the crisis period, herding falls and positive feedback trading by foreign 
investors mostly disappears. They suggested that, there were no evidence of destabilizing 
effect of the foreign investors on the Korea stock market over their study period as the market 
adjusted quickly and efficiently to large sales by foreign investors. These sales were not 
followed by negative abnormal returns but the study did not extend this analysis to other 
equity market, to show whether adjustment process and speed is consistent across markets 
worldwide or it is just a feature of the Korean market. 
Otchere and Chan (2003) examined the overreaction phenomenon in the Hong Kong market 
from March 1996 to June 1998, which included the pre- and the post-Asian financial crisis 
and found that Hong Kong market overreacted to information prior to the Asian financial 
crisis period. They found that the overreaction tends to be more evident for winners than the 
losers. They also found evidence of the overreaction in the pre-financial crisis period but 
reported that abnormal return obtained by exploiting such phenomenon are economical 
insignificant after considering transaction cost. However, they indicated that after accounting 
for size effect, and the day-of-week effect, the results appear to be very significant. They 
advocated that the Chinese culture may have significant impact on investors’ view of the 
market, as they tend to perceive risks differently and are less risk adverse and less likely to 
overreact, but this study did not show how this feature of the Chinese market could help 
international momentum and contrarian investors in global portfolio allocation. 
Muga and Santamaria (2007) examined the characteristics of the momentum effect in the 
Spanish stock market, with particular emphasis on the time stability aspect. The results reveal 
that there was not significant momentum during the 1990’s that did not prove to be time-
stable, since it had begun to fade by September 1997 coinciding with the pick of the stock 
market crisis. The momentum has been associated with small-size/ high-turnover stocks. The 
relation with size appears to be consistent with slow diffusion of information, as suggested by 
Hong et al. (2000) but the results of these analyses were not extended to other markets 
worldwide.   
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Chen et al. (2012) studied the momentum and the contrarian trading strategies in the Chinese 
stock market from 1995 to 2010. They examined the performance of the trading strategies 
following different markets states and found that contrarian strategies are more profitable 
down market, especially after 2007 during the economic downturn. They suggested that 
market conditions are good predictors of the size of the contrarian profit. They also found that 
no significant profit is generated from both strategies in the medium term, they reiterated that, 
for practitioners and investors in general, these results provide good forecasting indicator 
especially during the post-crisis period. 
After consideration of the microstructure effect on the one to two-month formation and 
holding periods they found that the contrarian strategies generate on average 0.2% per week 
and even greater in `up’ market. However, the study indicated that these results might not 
apply in developed markets. 
These findings provide strong supports for the existence of a momentum phenomenon during 
crisis periods. The question remains to whether investors could exploit the momentum effect 
internationally during financial crisis.  
2.4.5 Summary 
The review of variety of studies related to the momentum strategies shows that there are 
compiling evidences in support of the hint that trading techniques like the momentum  can 
generate excess returns(Jegadeesh and Titman 1993). Examining the sources of  these 
strategies profitability shows that, there are sufficient evidence to support that momentum 
profit could be a result of investor under or overreaction consistent with Jegadeesh and 
Titman (2001) that found evidence of return continuation up to 36 months. 
Some studies also explain the overreaction effect in term of gradual diffusion of information 
as stocks with slower information diffusion provide more potential for momentum profits 
(Hong et al., 2000). This theory is also supported by the behavioural theory of investor 
conservatism, which caused investors to be slow in changing their opinions (Douglas and 
Mcknight, 2005). The international evidences of the momentum phenomenon imply that 
individual markets represent only one of a series of stock market that provide investment 
opportunity. 
These findings also provide strong international supports for the existence of a global 
momentum phenomenon, given that there might be disparity among investors reaction to 
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news across countries. The question remains to whether investors could exploit the 
momentum effect internationally given that news motion may induce the return differences 
across countries. In others words, does the momentum strategies work for international 
investors during financial crisis. I found that it does.  
The results show that investors can switch back and forth from one country to the other in 
designing worldwide strategies, that the global momentum strategy is consistently profitable 
between 1969 and 2014. The most successful momentum strategy selects stocks based on 
their previous performances over 9 months and then holds the portfolio for the next 3 months. 
This strategy yields 2.98% per month (42.24% per year) but the returns may vary 
considerably from one market condition to another. Largely, the result suggests more 
evidence of market inefficiency. 
2.5 Contrarian Strategy 
2.5.1 Introduction 
In this section, I define a theoretical outline that supports the analysis of the contrarian 
strategy premium's performance in international equity market and in different market states. 
I introduce the contrarian strategy and define the means behind the contrarian Phenomenon. 
After all, the behavioural finance theory is also introduced focusing on the underlying 
assumptions of full rationality of agents and the psychological issues that affect the decision-
making process of contrarian investors, which will help frame the main reasons for irrational 
behaviour of contrarian investors. 
This section also explores variety of contrarian trading strategies in the literature to gain 
insight on the existence of the contrarian strategy premium and the psychology behind the 
reversal phenomenon. In a prospect a contrarian investor could be an investor that believes 
that the route to superior returns lies in selling what others are buying and buying what others 
are selling.  Contrarian (Reversal) in equity market are well known phenomenon throughout 
the past decades. Stocks that performed poorly in the past rebound in the subsequent futures. 
2.5.2 Contrarian Trading and Profitability 
Since De Bondt and Thaler (1985) published their landmark paper "Does the Stock Market 
Overreact?" in 1985, researchers all over the world have argued but come to the consensus 
that contrarian investment strategies yield superior returns. Most of the controversies on the 
contrarian strategies topic are related to the source of profitability instead of the superior 
return itself and the debate includes two different explanations.  One possible explanation 
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relies on the fact that markets are efficient and the excess return from the contrarian is a 
reward from contrarian investors bearing extra risk. The second argument suggests that risk 
alone cannot explain the excess profit but point out different finance explanations (Jegadeesh 
and Titman, 1993).  
However, Overreaction was the main proposed reason; people make repeated and predictable 
errors, referring to why investors who are highly knowledgeable about market go off the deep 
end time after time. De Bondt and Thaler’s (1985) study was undertaken to investigate the 
possibility that both market behaviour and the psychology of individual decision making are 
related by more than just appearance while referring to investor’s overreaction, which, is the 
hub of contrarian strategies. 
They suggested that, the term overreaction carries an implicit comparison to some degree of 
reaction that is considered appropriate. They attributed the appropriate reaction to one of 
which has a well-established norm of probability revision problems for which Bayes' rule 
prescribes the correct reaction to new information of how individuals respond to new data 
while referring to Kahneman et al., (1982) findings. 
Kahneman et al. (1982) suggested that in revising their beliefs, individuals tend to overweight 
recent information and underweight prior information. People seem to make predictions 
according to simple matching rule such as the predicted value is selected so that the standing 
of the case in the distribution of outcomes matches its standing in the distribution of 
impressions. This rule-of-thumb was named the representativeness heuristic, as it violates the 
basic statistical principal that the extremeness of predictions should be moderated given the 
concept of predictability. 
There are evidences that the actual expectations of professional security analyst and 
economic forecasters display the same overreaction bias. One of the earliest observations 
about overreaction in markets was made by Keynes (1964); he suggested the day-to-day 
fluctuations in the profits of existing investments, which is obviously transitory and non-
significant character, and tends to have an altogether excessive, and even an absurd, influence 
on the market" (Keynes, 1964).  
Shiller (1981) investigated the excess volatility issue; he revised the Miller-Modigliani view 
of the stock prices and defined it as a constraint on the likelihood function of a price-dividend 
sample. He suggested that, at least over the last century, dividends simply do not vary enough 
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to justify observed aggregate price movements. More over Kleidon (1981) found that stock 
price movements are strongly correlated with the following year's earnings changes he 
suggested a clear pattern of overreaction despite the observed trendiness of dividends, and 
reiterated that investors tend to attach disproportionate importance to short-run economic 
developments. 
Arrow (1982) suggested that the work of Kahneman and Tversky materializes the accurate 
excessive reaction of investors to current information which is characterized in all the 
securities and future markets. Two specific examples of the research to which Arrow (1982) 
was referring are the excess volatility of security prices and the price earnings ratio anomaly. 
An alternative behavioural explanation for the anomaly based on investor overreaction is 
what Basu called the "price-ratio" hypothesis. Companies with very low P/E are thought to be 
temporarily "undervalued" because investors become excessive pessimistic after a series of 
bad earnings reports or other bad news. Once future earnings turn out to be better than the 
unreasonably forecasts, the price adjusts. Inversely companies with very high P/E are thought 
to be "overvalued," before falling in price (Dreman, 1982). However, investor overreaction is 
only one way that people repeatedly swing widely away from rational behaviour.  
Overall, the review of evidence on the profitability of the contrarian point to the view that 
contrarian profit  result from the excessive reaction of investors to current information. Shiler 
(1981) suggested that investors tend to attach disproportionate importance to short-run 
economic developments. Investors could be acting implicitly in a coordinated means leading 
to a generalized reversal following a global news motion. However, past researchers did not 
examine the reversal effect internationally as global and generalized phenomenon. My 
intuition is that global news motion will induce the return differences across countries leading 
to contrarian profit. 
2.5.3 Contrarian Investment and Psychological Factors 
The psychological pressures that this study will be discussing next might also account for 
anomalies. Dreman (1998) suggested that the gentlest peer pressure could lead us to bad 
decision, even when the facts are straightforward and easy to distinguish. When the reality is 
complex and the situation is hard to read, "Social reality" the consensus of the group, no 
matter how unbelievable, can take a grip on the mind, and turn strong, rational, independent 
people into sheep. 
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The psychological findings on group peer behaviour provide only a part of the answer. 
Investors, even professionals, are victim of important logical psychological failings. These 
psychological pressures affect decisions under conditions of uncertainty in a very predictable 
manner in the market place. The bottom line is that these powerful forces lead most people to 
make the same mistakes repeatedly. Understanding them is the best protection against flying 
with the crowd, and perhaps profiting from their mistakes instead.  
Dreman suggested that despite what many economist and financial theorists assume that, 
people are not good intuitive statisticians, particularly under difficult conditions. They do not 
calculate likelihood properly when making investment decisions, which, causes consistent 
errors. This study will help understand why such mistakes occur so frequently. Once their 
nature is understood, the study will then explain how the contrarian strategies are anchored 
upon these intuitive statistical limitations. 
To review the limitations of man's information-processing capabilities, the hole that is 
constantly exerting great force on his decisions. Dreman suggested that people are swamped 
with information and react consciously to only a small part of it, he affirmed that when 
overwhelmed with fact, people select a small part of them and usually reach a different 
conclusion from what the entire data set would suggest. 
Researchers have found that people react to sudden large amount of data by adopting 
shortcuts or rules of thumbs rather than formally calculating the actual likelihood of a given 
outcome. This is known to psychologists as judgmental heuristics; these shortcuts are leading 
and simplifying strategies that people use for managing large amounts of information. 
Backed by the experience of a lifetime, most of these judgement shortcuts work exceptionally 
well, and allow investors to cope with data that would otherwise overwhelm them. People 
also use selective processes in dealing with probabilities. In many decisions and judgements, 
investors tend to be intuitive statisticians. However, being an intuitive statistician has 
limitations as well as blessings; the very simplifying processes that are normally efficient 
time-savers lead to systematic mistakes in investment decisions. They make investors believe 
that the likelihood is dramatically different from what they are. The distortions produced by 
the subjectively calculated probabilities are large, systematic, and difficult to eliminate, even 
after they have been made fully aware of them (Dreman, 1998). 
Earlier study by Kahneman and Tversky (1982) suggested the most common of the cognitive 
biases call the "representativeness". They show that it is a natural human tendency to draw 
60 
 
analogies and see identical situations where none exists. In the market, this means labelling 
two market environments, as the same when the actual resemblance is superficial. When 
people are providing with a little information and they tend to pull out a picture they are 
familiars with, though it may only remotely represent the current situation. 
An example was the aftermath of the 1987 crash. Dreman (1998) recorded that in five trading 
days the Dow fell 742 points, culminating with 508 points decline on Black Monday, October 
19. This wiped out almost $1 trillion of value, and many investors taking this heuristically 
shortcut cowered in cash, were caught up in the false parallel between 1987 and 1929. 
In recounting how often crashes occurred, Victor Niederhoffer, noted that after the panic of 
1837 "Prices dropped to zero." he reiterated that the panic of 1857 was much more severe, 
but do not say whether in the latter panic sellers had to pay buyers to carry away their stocks 
or bonds. So, crash and depression were not identical. 
More important, it is apparent that the economic and investment climate are entirely different. 
The representativeness heuristic also covers several common decision-making errors. 
Kahneman and Tversky defined this heuristic as a subjective judgment of the extent to which 
the event in question "is similar in essential properties to its parent population" or "reflects 
the salient features of the process by which it is generated". People often judge probabilities 
"by the degree to which A is representative of B, that is, by the degree to which A resembles 
B".  A and B depend on how people estimate the probability that, A, came from B, A might 
be a person and B might be a group. The judgment people want to make in this case is the 
probability A is also part of the group. Alternatively, A might be an event and B might be a 
potential cause. Again, people are judging the probability that A comes from B. A, for 
example, would be the similarity or representativeness in people's minds of the 1987 crash to 
B which, in this case, would be the 1929 crash and depression. 
Because the definition of representativeness is abstract and a little hard to understand, this 
study looks at some more concrete examples of how this heuristic works, and how it can lead 
to major mistakes in many situations. Given that it may give too much emphasis to the 
similarities between events but not to the probability that they will occur, and may reduce the 
importance of variables that are critical in determining the event's probability. I may explore 
some example in the market following Dreman’s findings. 
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The representativeness bias occurs repeatedly in the market place. People can see the 
representativeness bias resulted in a near identical investor reaction to the Gulf crisis as it did 
to the 1987 crash. First, people put undue weight on the surface similarities between the 
potential oil crisis of 1990 and those of 1973/1974 and 1980. Secondly, investors again 
downplayed the critical differences between the two periods, which were far more important 
than the casual resemblances. Again, the bias contributed to major investor errors in decision-
making. 
The representativeness bias is responsible at least for number of other major and oft-repeat 
errors. All mutual fund organizations work from the principle that investors flock to better -
performing mutual funds even though financial researchers have shown that the "hot" funds 
in one-time period are often the poorest performers in another. The final verdict on the 
sizzling funds in the 1982/1983 market was disastrous. For the aggressive-growth funds of 
1991 to 1997, Investors lost billions of dollars in these funds. Many, although fare riskier, 
could not hold a candle to the long-term records of many conservative, blue-chip mutual. 
Still, people are continually enticed by such "hot" performance, even if it lasts for brief 
periods. Because of this susceptibility, brokers or analysts who have had one or two stocks 
moving up sharply, or technicians who call one turn correctly, are believed to have 
established credible records. Therefore, they can readily find market followers. Taking us to 
another important probability error that falls under the broad rubric of representativeness 
(Dreman, 1998) 
Tversky and Kahneman suggested the law of small numbers.  Examining some journals in 
psychology and education, they found that researchers systematically overstated the 
importance of findings taken from small samples. The statistically valid "law of large 
numbers" states that large samples will usually be highly representative of the population 
from which they are draw on large and representative groups. The smaller the sample used, 
however, the more likely the findings are chance rather than meaningful. 
Another flaw parallel to the previous one also indicates man's shortcomings as an intuitive 
statistician. In making decisions, Investors become overly immersed in the details of a 
situation. They neglect the outcome of similar situations in experience. These past outcomes 
are called "prior probabilities", and logically should help to guide similar choices in the 
present. This shows up clearly in the stock market by the emphasis people put on the outlook 
for each exciting initial public offering or concept stock, even though the substantiating data 
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is usually flimsy at best. Still, investors rarely examine the high probability of loss in such 
issues (the base rate). Instead, Dreman (1998) established that, most buyers of hot IPOs in the 
1980s and 1990s focused on the individual story and forgot that over 80% of these issues had 
dropped in price after the 1962 and 1968 market breaks. Here again, the prior probabilities, 
although essential, were ignored. However, it is essential to reiterate that impact of 
psychological pressure apply to investors worldwide indicating the need of a global study.  
2.5.4 Anchoring and Hindsight Biases 
I look at two other systematic biases that are relevant to the contrarian investment scene and 
tend to fix investment errors in place. They are also difficult to correct, since they reinforce 
the others. The first is known as anchoring, another simplifying heuristic. In a complex 
situation, such as the marketplace, investors choose some natural starting point, such as 
stock's current price, as a first cut at its value, and will adjust from there. The adjustments are 
typically insufficient. Thus, Dreman (1998) suggests that an investor in 1977 might have 
thought a price of $91 was too high for cascade Communications, a leader in PC networking, 
and that $80 was more appropriate. However, Cascade Communications was grossly 
overvalued at $91 and dropped to $22 before recovering modestly. 
The final bias is interesting. In looking back at past mistakes, researchers have found that, 
people believe that each error could have been seen much more clearly, if only they had not 
been wearing dark or rose-coloured glasses. The inevitability of what happened seems 
obvious in retrospect. "Hindsight" bias seriously impairs proper assessment of past errors and 
significantly limits what can be learned from experience.  
I find that the implications of cognitive biases are enormous, in investment. The tendency to 
underestimate or ignore prior probabilities in decision-making is undoubtedly the most 
significant problem of intuitive prediction for investors. 
2.5.5 Contrarian Strategies and Investor Overreaction Hypothesis 
Investors Overreaction Hypothesis predicts that after earnings or other surprises, investments 
previously considered to be "best" underperformed, while those considered being "worst" 
significantly outperformed, as both regress towards an average valuation. The hypothesis also 
states that the maximum price swing is produced by negative surprise on "best" stocks and 
positive surprises on "worst." On the other hand, positive surprise on favoured stocks and 
negative surprise on out-of-favour stocks reinforcing events corroborate the market's opinion 
of these stocks and have a lesser impact on price movements than event-triggers. 
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The overreaction hypothesis holds that even without the occurrence of an event trigger, the 
"best" and "worst" investments regress towards the market average. Because the Investor 
Overreaction Hypothesis is based on psychological principles, it is likely to apply in other 
markets and in field outside of investments and economics where risk and uncertainty exist. 
The Investor Overreaction Hypothesis makes these predictions: best stocks underperform the 
market, while "worst" stocks outperform. For long periods; Positive surprise boost "worst" 
stocks significantly more than they do "best" stocks; Negative surprise knock "best" stocks 
down much more than "worst" stocks; There are two distinct categories of surprise: "event 
triggers" (positive surprise on "worst" stocks, and negative surprises on "best"), and 
"reinforcing events" (negative surprise on "worst" stocks and positive surprises on "best"). 
Event triggers result in much larger price movements than do reinforcing events; the 
differences will be significant only in the extreme quintiles, with minimal impact on the 60% 
of stocks in the middle. 
The hypothesis states that overreaction occurs before the announcement of an earnings or 
other surprise. A correction of the previous overreaction occurs after the surprise. "Best" 
stocks move lower relative to market while "worst" stock move higher, for a relatively long 
time following a surprise. This may fall as commandants for contrarians, but it can be 
remembered that, all five predictions of the investor overreaction hypothesis have been 
confirmed earlier to a high level of statistical probability (Dreman, 1998). 
Contrarian strategies is a broad variety of different strategies that attempt to make profits by 
going against the usual consensus in the market. This thesis, considers the contrarian 
investment strategies that are designed to take long positions in loser countries' indices and 
when applicable short positions in winner countries' indices. 
It is necessary to make a distinction between a contrarian strategy and other trading 
strategies. The risk on contrarian strategy is measured as the risk on a value investment 
strategy. The payoff on a contrarian investment strategy is therefore often referred to as a 
value premium. The contrarian strategy premium will be positive as long as the loser or the 




2.5.6 Types of Contrarian Strategies 
An investor who wants to make money in stock exchange using contrarian investment has 
two different types available (prior-returns, and valuation measure strategies). The simplest 
and the most common is the prior-returns strategy. This strategy assumes that, extreme stocks 
prices movements in the one direction is followed by extreme stocks price movements in the 
opposite direction.  Past winners are believed to become future losers while past losers 
become futures winners. Following this view De Bondt and Thaler's (1985) study earned 
substantial academic interest in this field. They suggested that three to five years after a past 
performance based portfolio formation, former loser stocks outperform the winner stocks. 
From the perspective of investors, I argue that the expectations of futures stock return are an 
extrapolation of the past stock performance without taking into account the mean reversion 
effect as suggested by Lakonishok et al (1994). The implication is that past stock 
performance will be replicated in the future which are prompt to naive investor but the 
contrarian will always bet against this belief and therefore will buy the losers' stocks and sells 
the winners'. 
This approach of the contrarian investing requires stock market overreaction as investors will 
become exceptionally excited about previous winner stocks, and thus bid their prices up till 
these winner stocks become overpriced and trade above their fundamental values (Barberis 
and Thaler, 2002). Correspondingly, investors will also overreact to previous poor 
performing stock and therefore oversell the previous loser stocks until they become under-
priced and trade below their fundamental values. When the overreaction is corrected, poor 
performing stock adjust to high return while well performing stock have a low return.  
A second contrarian investment is known as the valuation measure strategy. This strategy 
includes analysis based on different ratios (share price or book and market value) that proxy 
for past performance or alternatively disclose information about market expectation. But the 
basic idea remains the same. Contrarian investment strategies suggest that loser stocks should 
be chosen on criteria such as poor past performance versus good past performance and 
inversely (Dreman, 1998). It is therefore expected that the two types of contrarian strategies 
should perform well given that the two strategies involve classifying more or less the same 
stocks as losers and winners. However, the aim of this study is to test the contrarian 
investment strategies internationally based on prior returns 
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2.5.7 Contrarian Investment Strategies Based on Prior Returns 
De Bondt and Thaler (1985, 1987) provided evidence of the anomaly of the price reversal in 
the US stock market. Their study was inspired by the behavioural psychology of Kahneman 
and Tversky (1982) that suggested that people tend to overweight recent information and 
underweight past data when dealing with probability revision. With reference to the stock 
market, they suggested that people behaviour would imply that the market would overreact to 
unexpected information or news, causing stock price to be mispriced from their fundamental 
values and then reverts in the futures, which make stock price reversal predictable from past 
returns. 
They reported that paradoxically, long-term past losers outperform long-term past winners 
over the subsequent three to five years’ period. The losing stock earned about 0.694% per 
month more than the winners did over three years on the US stock market from 1926 to 1982, 
and suggested that the profitability of the contrarian strategies can be associated with 
investor’s overreaction. They also demonstrated that risks measured, as betas could not 
explain why past losers after portfolio formation make higher excess returns. Chan et al. 
(1996) complimented these findings. They suggested that stock price over- or under-react to 
information and that winners and loser often show reversal patterns, which are consistent 
with the overreaction hypothesis. 
However, Chan (1988) suggested alternative explanation of the overreaction hypothesis. He 
put forward the risk-based explanation of the return generated by contrarian strategy as the 
risk of the winner and the loser's stocks change over time. Using the same sample as De 
Bondt and Thaler (1985), he found a considerable change in betas from the formation to the 
holding period but suggested that the change in betas alone cannot explain the losers' 
portfolio excess return. 
Later on, De Bondt and Thaler (1987) re-evaluated the overreaction hypothesis with regards 
to the time-varying risk premium and the market efficiency. They accounted for Chan's 
suggestions and estimated betas in the test period as opposed to the formation period. They 
found that the losers' portfolios are subject to higher beta than the winners' portfolio but they 
suggested that differences in betas sizes alone could not explain the losers' portfolio superior 
return. 
Following these findings further evidence on return reversal behaviour of the stock market 
and the overreaction effect occurred in different countries around the world with different 
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time series. Kulpmann (2002) suggested that the overreaction effect was present on the 
German market. He documented that, in conformity with the overreaction hypothesis as 
suggested by De Bondt and Thaler, stocks with relative great capital losses or gains 
experienced subsequent great reversal. 
He acknowledged that the CAPM-betas as a measure of risk could not explain his results. 
Alternatively, he suggested that for most winner firms in Germany after the period of glory 
their profits were invested in less profitable projects. Consequently, the winners' 
performances fell during the test period and reiterated that the loser firms experience a 
successful reengineering after period of bad performance and become triumphant during the 
test period.  
Other studies of the return reversal behaviour of stock prices suggested that the prior period’s 
worst stock return performers do outperform the prior period’s best return performers in the 
subsequent period and that, contrarian strategies can be profitable in the short term 
(Jegadeesh, 1990). Jegadeesh (1990) studied a reversal strategy that buys losers and sell 
winners based on their prior-monthly returns and holds them for one month over 1934 to 
1987. They found that the contrarian strategy generated a profit of about 1.99% per month 
and 1.75% percent per month outside January, which appears striking and suggests to which 
extent security return can be predictable. 
Zarowin (1990) suggested that the losers tend to be small and that small firms outperform 
large firms (Zarowin, 1990). Other explanations support that the contrarian returns reflect 
changes in equilibrium required rate of returns (Chan, 1988; Chopra et al., 1992). 
Contrarian strategies are considered to generate superior return compared to other strategies 
(Conrad and Kaul, 1998) which is a potential violation of the efficient markets hypothesis. 
Several explanations for the contrarian phenomenon have been put forward. The behavioural 
explanations centred on whether overreaction to past performance contributes to contrarian 
return, but one of the rational explanations attributes the contrarian return is the tax-
avoidance incentives (Wu and Li, 2011)).  
While researchers are still debating, on whether stock value and growth features reflect risk 
or mispricing, further studies of the overreaction hypothesis suggest that the overreaction is a 
consequence of the size effect. Wu and Li. (2011) investigated whether long-term contrarian 
performance on the UK market is driven low-priced stock and found that contrarian 
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performance at low, middle, low price levels is positive. The suggested that low-priced stock 
are not fully responsible for contrarian performance and that the findings were consistent 
with the overreaction hypothesis.  
2.5.8 Contrarian Strategies Empirical Evidences 
Since the contrarian returns may differ from developed to emerging countries, I examine 
empirical evidence of the performance of the contrarian strategies in equity market 
internationally, and review number of related findings consecutively in developed markets 
and emerging markets. 
2.5.8.1 Contrarian Strategies in Developed Markets 
De Bondt and Thaler (1985) first encountered the long-run reversal phenomenon in 
developed market in US stock market. They suggested that 3 to 5 years after a past 
performance based portfolio formation, losers' portfolios outperformed winners' portfolios by 
approximately 0.694% per month over 3 years and 0.6% per month for 5 years post-ranking 
period. Following these findings, subsequent research gathered around the profitability of the 
contrarian strategy in stock market. 
Chopra et al. (1992) investigated stock return overreaction on the NYSE stock returns from 
1926 to 1986 with monthly and annually returns. Their method included event time-varying 
betas created on an estimate market compensation per unit beta risk basis, which, is relatively 
smaller compared to the Sharp-Lintner model adopted by Ball and Kothari (1989), they found 
that the losers outperform the winners by approximately 0.542% per month on annual return 
and 0.792% per month on monthly returns. They also demonstrated that size alone could not 
explain the contrarian return. They suggested that a mutual consideration of size, prior return 
and beta could explain the contrarian return to avoid omitted variable bias. 
Clare and Thomas (1995) studied the reversal strategies in the UK market using 1000 stocks 
from 1955 to 1990 to examine the Overreaction Hypothesis. They found that losers 
outperform winners by approximately 0.142% per month. After controlling for firm size, they 
suggested that the overreaction hypothesis is linked to the size effect. 
Galariotis et al. (2007) found evidences of contrarian profitability in the London Stock 
Exchange listed stocks from 1964 to 2005. Using 64 strategies for 6531 stocks and 
controlling for key potential explanations of the strategies' profitability, they found that, the 
lowest size quintile outperforms the highest size quintile by a figure ranging from 0.7% per 
month for the 60-month formation period to 1.84% per month. They suggested that for each 
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of the holding periods there is a clear tendency for returns to rise as the market capitalization 
falls.  
Li et al. (2009) studied value and growth stocks in UK stock market from July 1969 to June 
2006 and found that growth portfolio has low mean return of 0.81% per month, that the value 
portfolio has high mean returns of 1.39% per month, and that the value premium is 0.57% per 
month. They suggested that superior return or value premium of value stocks in UK are a 
result of high return volatility between 1963 and 2006.  
Dissanaike and Kim-Hwa Lim (2010) studied the reversal strategies while referring to the 
residual income model. They used variety of variables to form contrarian portfolio, ranging 
from book-to-market, cash flow-to-price, earnings-to-price and past returns, to more 
sophisticated measures based on the Ohlson model and residual income model. They found 
that, most of the portfolio formation methods based on raw and size-adjusted returns yield 
economically important contrarian profits. They suggested that, the raw returns portfolios fall 
from 1.689% per month in the test period year 1 to 0.778% per month in test period year 2 
and finally to 0.049% per month in test period year 3and suggested that book-to-market based 
contrarian model outperform the contrarian strategies based on accounting information. 
However, these studies were solely based on UK market.  
Moever, Wu and Li (2011) combined three approaches of the contrarian strategies: the value-
growth approach, the past performances approach as suggested by De Bondt and Thaler 
(1985), and the capital lock-in approach as suggested by George and Hwang (2004, 2007) on 
the FTSE-All Share between 1974 and 2009. They show that the losers outperform the 
winners by 0.21% per month over a 5-year horizon. Also, suggested that value-growth 
provides better explanation of the reversal phenomenon than past performance. The winner 
and loser effect diminish when the strategies include firms' characteristics (book-to-market, 
cash flow-to-price and earning price) but Wu and Li (2011) did not explore whether this 
could apply at a global level when using countries' indices. 
Some researchers have found that contrarian strategies portfolios chosen based on the price 
changes during one-week exhibit contrarian behaviour in the following week. A relatively 
good performance of one week tends to be followed by a relatively bad performance the next 
week, and vice versa (Lehmann 1990). Using securities listed on the New York and the 
American Stock Exchange from 1962, he found that the weekly mean return of the two one-
week portfolio strategies were of opposite sign, and the mean return of the winner's portfolio 
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were about one-half the magnitude of the mean return of the loser's portfolio. The sample 
correlation of the weekly return of the one-week portfolio strategies were large and positive 
(0.851) for the full-week strategy and 0.873 for the four-day strategy. A short position in the 
winner's portfolio had a large negative correlation with a long position in the loser's portfolio 
but the study did not specify if these findings could be relevant at a global level. 
Lo and Mackinlay (1990) studied the contrarian strategies while using US market weekly 
data from 1962 to 1987 and found that the average weekly long-short profit generated by the 
contrarian strategy over the sample periods for all stocks is $1.69 with the average weekly 
long-short position of $152. In contrast, the sample of small stocks yields an expected profit 
of $4.53 per week, but required only $209 long and short each week. They divided the 
contrarian return into three aspects. In the first part, they identified the of-diagonals of auto 
covariance matrix also known as the cross-auto correlation among stock components. In a 
simple term it is the difference of autocorrelation amongst stock in a portfolio between the 
past and the current period. Which is also called lead-lag effect. When the lead-lag relation is 
positive, Lo and Mackinlay explain that, the short-term stock return reversal with a regular 
pattern is a consequence of the delayed reaction to common factor and not investor 
overreaction to news or stock prices as suggested by De Bondt and Thaler (1985). This imply 
that the contrarian strategies’ profits result from the investor’s overreaction to news and 
related information.  
The second aspect in explaining the return reversal is related to the auto correlation of 
individual stock during different periods. They assume that the negative autocorrelation show 
positive contribution to the contrarian strategy returns and can explain the market 
overreaction. Lo and Mackinlay concluded that stock return’s time varying are good 
predictors of the contrarian portfolio return. 
The third aspect is the cross-sectional variation of the expected return of individual stocks. 
They found evidences of the volatility-clustering phenomenon that shows that large stocks 
return tended to lead small stocks with the lead lag effect, which, tend to have negative effect 
on the contrarian strategies return. Overall findings contradict the traditional behavioural 
finance hypothesis as suggested by De Bondt and Thaler (1985) and Lehmann (1990).  
Further evidence on contrarian strategies in the U.S. stocks have arisen from consideration of 
returns consecutively over one month and the following month (Jegadeesh 1990). He 
suggested that the negative first-order serial correlation in monthly stock returns is highly 
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significant and found that the difference between the risk-adjusted excess return on the 
extreme deciles portfolios is 2.49% per month over the period 1934 to 1987, 2.20% per 
month excluding January, and 4.37 % per month when the month of January is considered 
separately. It is also found that the difference between the risk-adjusted excess returns on the 
extreme deciles portfolios formed based on one-month lagged return is 1.99% per month over 
the sample period and 1.75% percent per month outside January. However, Jegadeesh and 
Titman (1995) suggested that the cross-sectional analysis of profit was not good indicator for 
investor overreaction to news. By analysing firm-specific characteristics, they found that 
short-term contrarian profit could be explained by investor’s overreaction to firm-specific 
information. 
Lakonishok et al. (1994) defined two categories of stocks those with bad past performances 
or value stocks and those with better past performance or glamour. They claimed that value 
stocks have been undervalued and glamour stocks have been overvalued. They then defined a 
contrarian strategy that buys values stock and sells glamour stocks based on whether the 
stocks have a high book-to-market, a high sales growth in the past and low price relative to 
cash flow and earnings. They found that, for a five-year holding period between 1963 and 
1990 value stocks could generate an excess of 0.83 to 0.916% per month compared to the 
glamour stocks and that the result cannot be explained by systematic risk but, the study was 
conducted on US stock only and did not looks at the global implication of this results. 
Doan et al. (2016) examine the coexistence of momentum and contrarian strategies in the 
Australian equity market from 1992 to 201. They found that contrarian strategies prevail in 
the intermediate and long-term. They show that short-term contrarian strategies significantly 
outperform the simple buy-and-hold strategy of investing in the market index. the Australian 
mining sector undermines the momentum performances but enhance the contrarian strategies 
profitability. However, their analysis was based on Australian stocks solely and the 
momentum and contrarian profits could not be explained by standard return-generating 
models. 
2.5.8.2 Contrarian Strategies in Emerging Markets 
Evidences of contrarian strategies were also reported in emerging market: Choe et al. (1999) 
tested whether foreign investor activities affect stock return in Korea from November 30, 
1996 to the end of 1997, period that matches with the Asian crisis. They used order and trade 
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data, and found that there are strong evidences of positive feedback trading and herding by 
foreign investors before during the period of Korea’s economic crisis.  
They recorded that during the crisis period, herding falls, and positive feedback trading by 
foreign investors mostly disappears. They suggested that there was no evidence of 
destabilizing effect of the foreign investors on the Korea stock market over their study period 
as the market adjusted quickly and efficiently to large sales by foreign investors. These sales 
were not followed by negative abnormal returns. They suggested that the losers earn about 
0.068% per month more than the winner for institutional order before the Korean crisis. 
However, the study did not extend this analysis to other equity market, to show whether 
adjustment process and speed are consistent across markets worldwide or it is just a feature of 
the Korean market. 
Kang et al. (2002) studied the contrarian strategy in China using stock prices from the period 
of January 1993 to January 2000, testing methods like Lo and Mackinlay (1990), and found 
that there is a significant abnormal return for some short and medium term contrarian 
strategies. They reported up to 0.744% return for portfolio formed based on previous 1-week 
returns and held for 1-week and suggested that it was associated with overreaction to firm 
specific information in short term. In addition, they discovered that there was not a distinctive 
effect in medium term, which was explained by the dominance of overreaction effect, but 
they were able to demonstrate that the negative cross-serial correlation can lead to contrarian 
profits. However, their analysis was based on data only accessible by local investors.  
Otchere and Chan (2003) examined the overreaction phenomenon in the Hong Kong market 
from March 1996 to June 1998 that includes the pre- and the post-Asian financial crisis and 
found that Hong Kong market overreacted to information prior to the Asian financial crisis 
period. They also found that the overreaction tends to be more evident for winners than the 
losers. They also found evidence of the overreaction in the pre-financial crisis period but 
reported that abnormal return obtained by exploiting such phenomenon are economically 
insignificant after considering transaction cost (0.124% per month). 
 However, they indicated that after accounting for size effect and the day-of-week effect, the 
results appear to be very significant. They advocated that the Chinese culture may have 
significant impact on investors’ view of the market as they tend to perceive risk differently 
and are less risk averse and less likely to overreact but this study did not show how this 
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particular feature of the Chinese market could help international momentum and contrarian 
investors in global portfolio allocation. 
Chen et al. (2012) studied the contrarian trading strategies in the Chinese stock market from 
1995 to 2010. They examined the performance of the trading strategies following different 
markets states and found that contrarian strategies are profitable following down market 
especially during the economic downturn. They suggested that market conditions are good 
predictors of the size of the contrarian profit. In addition, they found that no significant profit 
is generated from both strategies in the medium term. They reiterated that, for practitioners 
and investors in general, these results provide good forecasting indicator especially during the 
post-crisis period. After consideration of the microstructure effect on the one-to-two-month 
formation and holding periods they found that the contrarian strategy generates on average 
approximately 0.8% per month and even greater in `up’ market. However, the study indicated 
that these results may not apply in developed markets and did not examine the reversal as a 
global phenomenon. 
2.5.8.3 Contrarian Strategies International Evidences 
Further studies of contrarian strategy examined its profitability internationally. Jordan (2012) 
examined the profitability of the long-term contrarian strategy using 81 years of data from 
1925 to 2005and found that the contrarian based on 36 month holding period generate 
approximately 0.492% return per month when analysing 8 countries and even greater 0.586 
per month for 16 countries. He reported that the long-term contrarian anomaly disappears 
when time-varying alpha are considered. He suggested that the benefits from the trades on 
long-term reversal do not go against a strategy based on diversification, but the method used 
in the construction of the losers and winners' portfolios and the test are based on 25% lowest 
(losers) and the 25% top (winners) or adjust for return. However, He reported contrarian 
results based on monthly stocks performance of 8 and 16 countries only.   
Malin and Bornholt (2013) studied the profitability of the contrarian strategies on 
international equity markets from January 1970 to January 2011, using recent short-term 
performance (monthly). They proposed the late-stage strategy that buys long-term losers with 
relatively good recent short-term performances and sells long-term winners with relative poor 
recent short-term performances. They found that, with the 60-month formation period in 
developed countries, past long-term losers gain an average of 1.31% per month over the 6-
month holding period and that long-term winner’s gain an average of only 0.86% per month 
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over the same period. The difference between long-term losers and long-term winners is 
0.46% per month with a t-statistic of 2.28. In emerging countries, the strongest pure 
contrarian profit using 60-month formation and 6-month holding period generate 0.68% per 
month with a t-statistic of 1.69.  
They also found that, for the late-stage strategies in developed countries the contrarian 
strategy generated 0.58% per month with a t-statistic of 2.48. In emerging market, they 
reported a return of 1.24% per month with a t-statistic of 2.47. They suggested that, the late-
stage strategy is consistently more profitable than the traditional pure contrarian strategy. 
They suggested that the late-state strategies it provides significant evidences of reversal in 
long-term returns for both the developed and the emerging markets, but the study did not look 
at the contrarian strategy as a global and generalize phenomenon following different market 
state (bear and bull) and did not test whether the short-term contrarian is also profitable. 
Conversely, Zarowin (1989) examined firm’s stock over 36 months relative to extreme 
earning years and found that the poorest earners do outperform the best earners. He was able 
to demonstrate that when poor earners are matched with good earners, there is not substantial 
evidence to suggest that the factor responsible for the overreaction phenomenon is the size 
and not investor’s overreaction to earnings, this argument reject De Bondt and Thaler (1985) 
suggestion. However, the study made use of market adjusted excess return and not risk 
adjusted and did not examine the long-term contrarian strategy as a global phenomenon. 
2.5.9 Summary  
In this section, I review variety of studies related to the profitability and the sources of  the 
contrarian strategies' profit. The findings support that they could be a result of investor 
overreaction over the long run as suggested by De Bondt and Thaler (1985). These theories 
also support the behavioural theory of investor sentiment, as investor’s sentiment influence 
stock prices (Brown and Cliff, 2005). However, study by Barberis and Thaler (2002), 
Dreman (1998) showed that investor’s irrational behaviour influence on the market is most 
likely not a coincidence. Investor can make profit by going against the crowd. Other 
explanations of the contrarian returns reflect the changes in equilibrium required rate of 
returns (Chan, 1988; Chopra et al., 1992). In addition, number of studies also found 
evidences of the contrarian strategies profitability in different countries and regions around 
the world: Choe, et al. (1999) in Korea; Otchere and Chan (2003) in the Hong Kong market; 
Chen, et al. (2012) in China; Li et al. (2009) in the UK.  
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Overall, there are significant evidences of the contrarian profitability in individual country 
around the world. But none of the past studies consider the contrarian strategy as a global 
coordinated and generalized phenomenon. The question remains to whether investors could 
exploit the reversal effect internationally given that news motion may induce the return 
differences across countries. In other words, does the contrarian strategies works for 
international investors that target many stock market indices? 
2.6 Are Momentum and Contrarian Profits due to Compensation for Risk? 
2.6.1 Introduction 
In this section, I review the literature on the relationship between macroeconomic risk factors 
and the momentum and contrarian profitability.  I focus primarily in examining the 
theoretical outline that supports or rejects the link between individual variable and the stock 
market outcome. First, I define set of risk factors in the literature that could possibly affect 
the stock market worldwide. I further study the variable referring to whether they are 
evidences in the literature in support to their relation the momentum or the contrarian strategy 
profitability. Finally, I identify risk factors used in the study according to their nature; I 
assign each variable to a specific group depending on whether they are standard risk factors, 
stock market related or pure macroeconomic risk factors. In this prospect, I seek a prior 
assessment of the strength of individual variable in explaining either the momentum or the 
contrarian strategies. 
2.6.2 Momentum and Contrarian Risk-based Explanation 
Jegadeesh and Titman (2001) present evidence that U.S. momentum returns quickly dissipate 
after the investment period. Which is a finding difficult to reconcile with the standards 
notions of priced financial risk (Griffin, 2003). The principal goal of this study to investigste 
on a global basis the relation between global momentum returns and macroeconomic risks. I 
analyse whether international evidence on the dissipation of momentum and contrarian profit 
is consistent with risk-based models of momentum. Large number of researchers has studied 
the relationship between macroeconomic factors and change in stock prices. This is not 
surprising given that they are likely to exert important influences in stock return. Chen, et al. 
(1986) employed for the first time in time series specific macroeconomic factors namely, the 
industrial production, change in the risk premium, twists in the yield curve and, some 
measures of unanticipated inflation and changes in expected inflation as proxies for the 
theoretically undefined state variable in the Arbitrage pricing model. Macroeconomic 
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variables are assumed to have influenced either future cash flows or the risk-adjusted 
discount rate. 
However, financial researchers suggest that macroeconomic factors affect investment 
opportunities, as they are key state variables in the time series study of asset-pricing 
(Campbell and Cochrane, 1999). This is in line with arguments in favour of the Efficient 
Market Hypothesis. Macroeconomic factors can represent priced factors in Arbitrage Pricing 
Theory (Ross, 1976).  
A more recent by Griffin et al. (2003) investigate on a global basis the relation between 
momentum returns and macroeconomic risks. They examined whether international evidence 
on the dissipation of these profits is constent with risk-based or behavioural model of 
momentum using data in 40 countries, and build upon the literature studying the relation 
between stock returns and macroeconomic risk through use of the time-tested and widely 
cited approach of Chen, Roll, and Ross (1986). They explore both abroad and in the US., the 
performance of a forecasting model based on lagged macroeconomic instrument. They 
examine momentum profits on a country-specific basic in 17 markets and found that 
momentum profits have basically no statistically or economic significant relation to the Chen, 
Roll and Ross (1986) macroeconomic factors. They also document that the forecasting model 
proposed by Chordia and Shivakumar (2002) has very low explanatory power for momentum 
profits when taken internationally. However, they found positive momentum profit in both 
sorts of economy compatible with the idea that momentum profit is a reward for priced 
business cycle risk. The also documented strong international evidence of reversals of 
momentum profits.  
While I make no attempt to present a complete survey of the relation between momentum, 
contrarian strategies and macroeconomic risk factors, I describe the major factors’ 
investigation in the existing empirical literature includes many factors that I name as global 
risks factors and use in this thesis given their empirical endorsement. I build upon the 
literature studying the relation between stock returns and macroeconomic risk through of the 
time-tested and widely cited approach of Chen, et al. (1986). I also explore the performance 
of forecasting model on lagged macroeconomic variable and the Fama and French risk factor 
following Avramov et al. (2015). 
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2.6.2.1 Global risk factors 
Market Volatility, some articles report a connection between equity return volatility and 
macroeconomic conditions. Hamilton and Susmel (1994), and Sinha (1996) estimate GARCH 
models of monthly U.S. equity returns in which the probability of switching from a high- to a 
low-volatility regime depends on broad economy conditions. They concluded that 
macroeconomic conditions significantly affect equity returns, in the sense that equity 
volatility is more likely to become and remain high during a recession.  
Bekaert and Harvey (1995) suggested that volatility is one of the underlying forces affecting 
stock market but emphasised the fact that macroeconomic data are unfortunately spared or 
non-existent in some of the emerging markets, given that the data are quite difficult to obtain 
and even if when published data are used, they are highly suspect in several countries. They 
advocate that political risks are also likely to influence the cross-section of volatility, but long 
time-series of political risk rating are difficult to obtain. 
Errunza and Hogan (1998) estimated VAR models for European stock returns for 1959-1993 
period. They found that Money Supply volatility granger causes equity volatility in Germany 
and France, and that the volatility of Industrial Production Granger causes equity volatility in 
Italy and the Netherlands. However, they found no evidence that past macroeconomic 
variables performance can affect equity returns in the United Kingdom, Switzerland, Belgium 
or the United States. 
Using a very different methodology, Schwert (1989) tested whether the volatility of inflation, 
monetary growth, or real economic variables can explain the time-variation in monthly return 
volatilities over 1859-1987 period. Instead of finding that greater macro volatility source less 
stable financial return, he suggested that, it is more likely that financial asset volatility helps 
to predict future macroeconomic volatility. 
Interest rate, the effect of nominal interest rates on stock prices is also expected to be 
negative. In this argument (Chen et al. 1986). Campbell (1987) suggested that the term 
structure of interest rates predicts excess stock returns, as well as excess return on bills and 
bonds. They examined some asset pricing models with US data from 1959 to 1979 and found 
that when realized excess return on bill, bonds, and stocks are regressed on information 
variables that measure the state of the term structure of interest rate, the fitted values are far 
from constant. Instead, they vary with a standard deviation for the period at 25% per month 
on annualized basis for two-month bills, and 75% for six-month bills, and almost 17% for 
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stock. Although the same variable predicts returns on the different asset, the fitted values for 
bills and stock have a rather low correlation. Fama and Schwert (1977) showed that the three-
month T-bill rate is negatively related to future market returns and acts as a proxy for 
expectations of future economic growth. 
Term and default spreads, the default spread has been known to track long-term business 
conditions. They are higher during recessions and lower during expansions (Fama and 
French, 1989). Rahman and Mustafa (1997) investigated the relationship between the 
Standard-&-Poor’s 500 and short-term corporate bond rates in the United States. They found 
that short-term rates and U.S stock prices tend to approach each other in the long run. They 
suggested that, this might be due to the substitutability between U.S common stocks and 
short-term corporate bonds, in terms of average holding periods, liquidity, convertibility, and 
risk structures. They also reiterate that, a two-way Granger causality and reversible feedback 
between these markets is observed in the short run. In their analysis, short-term corporate 
bonds were considered very close substitutes for common stocks, in terms of average holding 
period, liquidity risk, and default-risk.  
Campbell (1987) shows that more generally the state of the term structure of interest rates 
predicts stock returns. In addition, he demonstrates that, the risk premia on stock move 
closely together with those on 20-year treasury bonds, while risk premia on treasury bills 
move somewhat independently. Average returns on 20-year bonds is very low relative to 
average return on stocks. He used this observation to test some simple asset pricing models 
and find that, expected stock returns have a negative relationship with the conditional 
variance of stock returns, but that 2-month bill return move positively with their conditional 
variance. He finally suggested that uncertainty about short-term nominal interest rate, as 
measured by the conditional variance of 2-month bill returns, is important in both treasury 
bills and long-term assets. In addition, the uncertainty about stock return by contrast seems to 
have a negative relationship with expected stock returns and does not help to explain returns 
in the term structure. 
Fama and French (1992) identify common risk factors in the returns on stocks and bond. 
They show that three stock-market factors and two bond-market factors are related to 
maturity and default risk. They documented that, for stocks, the slope on the two term-
structure returns are around 0.8, the standard deviations is 3.03 per month and suggested that 
the term-structure accounts for similar variation in the return on all the stock portfolios. 
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Furthermore, they find that, the average p-value of the term-structure return are 0.06% 
indicating that they do not explain the average excess returns on stock market. However, they 
discover that the expected term-structure vary through time with business conditions. This 
supports the argument put forward by Chen, et al. (1986) suggesting that, the term premia 
could be considered as a priced risk factor. 
Industrial Production, Chen, Roll, and Ross (1986) examine the relation between state 
variable and stock return and find that the yearly production series was not significant in any 
sub-period. They suggested that deleting it has no substantial effect on the remaining state 
variables, although, the coefficients have the same signs as in the overall period but they 
conclude that industrial production is a strong candidate for being a risk factor. Cutler et al. 
(1989) find that Industrial Production growth is significantly and positively correlated with 
real stock returns over the period 1926-1986, but not in the 1946-1985 sub-period, which 
substantially overlaps with Chen, Roll, and Ross’s (1986) sample period.  
Market Indices, Chen, et al. (1986) find that market indices are not priced by the financial 
market. They tested the pricing influence on the market indices using macroeconomic state 
variables and found that the market indices failed to have a statistically significant effect on 
pricing in any sub-period. They suggested that the insignificance for pricing of the stock 
market indices contrasts sharply with their significance in time series. Although stock market 
indices explain much of the inter-temporal movements in other stock portfolios, their 
estimated exposures or their betas do not explain cross-sectional differences in average 
returns after the betas of the economic state variables have been included. This suggests that 
the explanatory power of the market indices may have less to do with economics and more to 
do with the statistical observation, that large positively weighted portfolios of random 
variables are correlated. 
Oil prices, seen as an important economic factor, Chen, et al. (1986) suggested that oil prices 
are not priced by the financial market they advised that, stock returns are exposed to 
systematic economic news that is priced by market. To confirm this assertion, they referred to 
oil price as series of realized monthly first differences in logarithm of the producer Price 




2.6.2.2 Other Risk Factors 
This thesis also reviews empirical evidences on factors, which may have significant impact 
on the stock market outcome but are not of particular interest in this study given they may 
have none or less effect on the momentum and contrarian profitability. These factors include: 
Market capitalization, Diacogiannis (1986) find that the probability value for market 
capitalization is 0.12 greater than a 0.05, which implies that they do not have significant 
influence on the firms in different sectors’ return. 
Consumption, Chen, et al. (1986) also examined a time series of percentage change in real 
consumption, which was the real per capital and includes service flows. They found that 
consumption is not priced by the financial market. They examined the influence of the real 
consumption series in an inter-temporal asset-pricing model and found that the rate of change 
in consumption does not seem to be significantly related to asset pricing, they also found that 
the estimated risk premium is insignificant and has the wrong sign. 
Inflation, the relationship between inflation and stock returns is highly controversial. 
However, empirical studies have mainly documented a negative relationship between 
inflation and stock returns. They suggested that an increase in inflation has been expected to 
increase the nominal risk-free, which in turn will rise the discount rates used in valuating 
stocks (Fama and Schwert, 1977). 
Studies such as Bodie (1976), Fama (1981), Geske and Roll (1983), and Pearce and Roley 
(1983, 1985) document a negative impact of inflation and money growth on equity values. 
Diacogiannis (1986) find that the probability value for inflation is 0.29 greater than a 0.05, 
which implies that they do not have significant influence on the firms in different sectors’ 
return. The inflation has the highest probability value, which implies that, out of the three 
predictors of the sectorial returns, inflation has more level of non-influence on the Nigerian 
stock return. Moreover, Cutler et al. (1989) provide no support for the hypothesis that 
Inflation, Money supply, and long-term Interest rates reliably affect stock returns. 
Chen, et al. (1986) suggested that inflation effects are included in other variables that after 
long-term real decrease, there is subsequently a lower real return on any form of capital. 
Investors who want protection against this possibility will place a relatively higher value on 
assets whose price increases when long-term real rates decline. Such assets will carry a 
negative risk premium thus, stock whose returns are correlated with long-term bond returns, 
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abstracting from unanticipated changes in inflation or in expected inflation and holding all 
other characteristic equal, will be more valuable than stock that are uncorrelated or negatively 
correlated with long term bond returns. Chen, et al. (1986) reiterated that there is weaker 
evidence to support the inflation claim to the status of risk factor. 
Graham (1996) investigated the relationship between stock returns and inflation for the 
United States during the period 1953-90. He suggested that the relationship between stock 
return and inflation is unstable, in the sense that it was negative before 1976 and after 1982, 
and positive in between those years. They suggested that this instability might result from a 
shift in counter-cyclical to pro-cyclical monetary policy in 1982. 
Aggregate output, Cutler (1989) estimate and access the respective roles that, aggregate 
supply and demand disturbances have in causing business cycle in the U.S. He finds that 
aggregate demand disturbances have been the primary cause of business cycles in the United 
State since the early 1960. In the same line, Balvers et al. (1990) study the relation between 
inter-temporal asset pricing and macroeconomic fluctuation, in a simple equilibrium model 
relating output to consumption opportunities. They suggested that, as consumption 
opportunities vary following variations in aggregate output, investors are faced with a less 
smooth consumption pattern. In attempting to smooth consumption, investors adjust their 
required rate of return on stock because of this linkage; returns should be predictable to an 
extent related to the predictability of aggregate output.  
Exchange rate, Geske and Roll (1983) show that exchange rates have significant influence in 
stock price through the terms of trade effect. The depression of domestic currency increases 
the volume of exports, if the demand for exported goods is elastic; this in turn causes higher 
cash flows for domestic companies, and thus causes stock prices to increase. 
Diacogiannis (1986) also find that the probability value for exchange rate is 0.16 greater than 
a 0.05, which implies that they do not have significant influence on the firms in different 
sectors’ return. Bailey and Chung (1995) studied the systematic influence of exchange rate 
fluctuations and political risk on stock returns in Mexico. The major finding is consistent 
with time varying equity market premium. Abdalla and Murinde (1996) investigated the 
interactions between exchange rates and stock prices in India, Korea, Pakistan, and the 
Philippines using Granger causality, and monthly data over the period from January 1985 to 
July 1994. Unidirectional causality is observed from exchange rates to stock price in all 
countries except the Philippines, where stock prices Granger cause stock prices.  
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Ajayi and Mougoue (1996) studied the dynamic relationship between stock prices and 
exchange rates, employing a bivariate error-correction model. They investigated both the 
short-run relationships between the variables in 8 stock markets; this includes Canada, 
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The 
results reveal an increase in domestic currency. They suggested that a sustained increase in 
the domestic stock prices in the long run will appreciate the domestic currency, since the 
demand for the currency will be driven up. 
Unemployment rate, Boyd et al. (2001) found that on average, an announcement of rising 
unemployment is good news for stocks during economic expansions and bad news during 
economic contractions, thus stock prices usually increase on news of rising unemployment, 
since the economy is usually in an expansion phase. They suggested that unemployment news 
bundles two primitive type of information relevant for valuing stocks: information about 
future interest rate and future corporate earnings and dividends. They also demonstrated that 
a rise in unemployment could typically signals a decline in interest rates, which is good news 
for stocks, while a decline in future corporate earnings and dividends, is bad news for stocks. 
The nature of the bundle and hence the relative importance of the two effects changes over 
time depending on the state of the economy. For stocks as a group, and in particular for 
cyclical stocks, information about interest rates dominates during expansions and information 
about future earnings dominates during contractions. 
Announcement surprise, McQueen and Roley (1993) suggested that a given announcement 
surprise may have different implications at different points in the business cycle. For 
example, an increase in employment might be a bullish sign as the economy emerges from 
recession, but a bearish sign near a cyclical peak. They estimated a model in which each 
series’ effect depends on overall economic conditions, defined according to the monthly 
growth rate of Industrial production. They found that only two of their eight announcement 
series significantly affect the S&P 500 portfolio in a constant-coefficient model, but six carry 
significant coefficients in at least one of the economic regimes. 
Boyd et al. (2001) also found that macro news has distinctly time varying effects on equity 
returns. They examined the impact of unemployment announcement surprises on the S&P 
500 return over 1948-1995, and concluded that surprisingly high unemployment raises stock 
prices during economic expansion but lowers stock values during a contraction. They 
hypothesized that higher unemployment predicts both lower interest rates and lower 
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corporate profits, and concluded that the relative importance of these two effects vary over 
the business cycle 
The level of real economic activity is expected to have a positive effect on future cash 
flows, and thus will affect stock prices in the same direction (Fama 1990). Following this line 
of thought, recent works on the relationship between stock returns and macroeconomic 
variables have employed techniques, such as VAR and VECM, which take into account 
dynamic linkages. Lee (1992) for example, investigated the causal relations and dynamic 
interactions among asset returns, real activity and inflation in the post-war in the United 
States. Lee’s main results indicated that; real stock returns help explaining movements in real 
activity. Inflation is not explained by real stock returns. Real stock returns explain little 
variation in inflation, but interest rates explain little variation in real activity. Lee’s findings 
are compatible with Fama’s (1990) explanation for negative stock return-inflation 
relationship. 
Trading Volume, Campbell, Grossman, and Wang (1993) argued that because the variation 
in the aggregate demand of liquidity traders also generate large levels of trade, volume 
information can help distinguish between price movement that are due to fluctuating demands 
of liquidity traders and those that reflect changes in expected returns. An implication of the 
model is that price changes accompanied by large trading volumes tend to be reversed. 
Blume, Easley and O’Hara (1994) showed that volume provides information that cannot be 
deduced from the price statistic. They demonstrated that traders who use information 
contained in the volume statistic will do better than traders who do not. They investigated the 
information role of trading volume its applicability for technical analysis, and showed that 
trading volume provides information on information quality that cannot be deduced from the 
price statistic. 
Wang (1994) examined the link between the nature of heterogeneity among investors and the 
behaviour of trading volume and its relation to prices dynamics. In his model, he assumes 
that, uninformed investors trade against informed investors and will revise their positions 
when they realize their mistakes. He suggested that, when returns are high in the previous 
period, it could be due to private information of informed investors or simply buying pressure 
for non-informational reasons. If it is due to private information, the high realized return 
accompanied by high volume in the past will be followed by high futures returns. If it is due 
to non-informational reasons, the high realized return will be followed by low future returns. 
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Money supply, Hashemzadeh and Taylor (1998) examined the direction of causality between 
the money supply, stock prices, and interest rates in the U.S. They showed that the 
relationship between money supply and stock prices is characterized by a feedback system, 
where money supply induces some of the observed variation in stock price levels, and vice 
versa. They reiterated that, causality runs from interest rates to stock prices, but not the other 
way.  
The mixed results in the extant literature make it difficult to determine which particular 
macroeconomic variable (if any) are indicators of stock returns. However, there are reliable 
evidences to suggest that some macro variables may have effect on future stock market 
performance (Chen, et al., 1986) as well as current and future economic growth (Chen, 1991) 
I name them Global Risk Factors. They could affect investment strategies such as momentum 
and contrarian trading worldwide, through investment opportunities (Campbell and 
Cochrane, 1999).  
2.6.3 Impact of Macroeconomic Factors on Momentum Profit 
Since the predictability of short-term stock market returns might be affected by 
macroeconomic factors, this study examines whether macroeconomic factors information 
could affect the momentum profits. I focus on the potential set of macroeconomic 
fundamental suggested as sources of the momentum profits. Given that most macroeconomic 
fundamentals reflect or at least partially reflect the state of the economy, they are often highly 
correlated. This opens up the possibility that a set of specific macroeconomic variables could 
explain a change in Global momentum and contrarian performance. Jegadeesh and Titman 
(1993) show that the simple investing strategy of buying prior winners and selling prior losers 
generate significant profits both statistically and economically. Their initial finding has been 
confirmed by subsequent studies, suggesting that data mining is an unlikely explanation. One 
potential explanation behind momentum anomaly is that momentum profits might be a 
reward for risk.  
Aretz, et al. (2009) show that most of the macroeconomic factors are priced. They suggested 
that the performance of an asset-pricing model based on macroeconomic factors is 
comparable to the performance of the Fama and French model, that a downward revision in 
economic growth expectations often coincides with increase aggregate default risk due to 
more conservative consumer behaviour and decrease interest rates to revive the economy. In 
this situation, an analysis of related macroeconomic fundamentals will offer some insights on 
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whether the benchmark factor captures economic growth, default risk or interest rate risk.  
However, they found that the momentum factor contains incremental information for asset 
pricing. 
Scherer and Kessler (2013) analysed the performance of the momentum return across asset 
classes and found evidence that momentum across asset is driven by macroeconomic state 
variables by reacting to changes in the macroeconomic environment. They suggested that, the 
strategy performs well in times of economic distress and established the link between 
momentum and more sophisticated predictive regressions. 
2.6.3.1 Empirical Evidence of the Global Risk Factors 
Most empirical studies have so far failed to document evidence that macroeconomic risks can 
be sources of return to a momentum strategy. However, one of the explanation of the 
momentum anomaly is that momentum might be a reward for business cycle risk. 
Business cycle, Griffin et al. (2003) study the relation between momentum and the 
macroeconomic factors worldwide using data from 40 countries and four principal techniques 
to detect evidence of business cycle risk in momentum portfolios. They find that momentum 
portfolio profits have only a weak co-movement among countries, whether within regions or 
across continents. They suggested that if momentum is driven by risk, the risk is largely 
country-specific. They examine the ability of the Chordia and Shivakumar (2002) forecasting 
model to explain momentum profits abroad and in the US. They find that, expected 
momentum profits are close and that the predicted momentum returns estimated and 
generated in a manner consistent with Chordia and Shivakumar are extremely noisy. They 
show that, there is actually no correlation between observed momentum profits and the model 
predictions suggesting that, macroeconomic variables cannot predict momentum profits 
internationally. Related literature on momentum and macroeconomic risk factor include. 
GDP growth, Griffin et al. (2003) provide international evidence that macroeconomic risk 
cannot explain momentum profits.  They define economic states in terms of the realized 
market returns and GDP growth; they identify good states with high and bad states with low 
ex-post market return or GDP growth. They show that average momentum profit is positive 
during GDP growth and even larger and positive during negative market return than during 
positive market returns in the United States and conclude that there is no evidence that, the 
profitability of momentum strategies is related to risk arising from macroeconomic states. As 
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a result, the momentum literature has mostly followed interpretation of Jegadeesh and Titman 
(1993) that irrational agents drive momentum payoffs.  
Liew and Vassalou (2000) test whether the profitability of business variable such as HML, 
SMB and the momentum variable can be linked to future Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
growth, using data from ten countries, they find that business cycle variable contains 
significant information about future GDP growth but little evidence to suggest that 
momentum is related to future GDP growth. 
Petkova and zhang (2005) argue that more precise measure for aggregate economic 
conditions are default spread, the term spread and the short-term interest rate, and 
macroeconomic variable that are common instrument used to model expected market risk 
premium. They classify the economic states of the world based on the expected market risk 
premium as follow: state “peak” that, stand for the lowest 18% periods of the expected risk 
premium. State “expansion” that, stand for the periods with the negative risk premium other 
that the 10% lowest. State “recession” that, stand for the periods with the positive risk 
premium except the 10% highest and states “trough” that, stands for the highest 10% periods 
of the expected market risk premium. 
Avramov and Hameed (2014) study the impact of the state of the market illiquidity on the 
momentum payoffs, they suggested that even if Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) found the 
momentum strategy generate 1.18 percent return per month, the momentum payoff 
realizations could be significantly low, often due to massive negative payoffs. After 
examining the predictability power of previous market states on the international momentum 
payoffs, they found that there are overwhelming evidence across the US, Japan and the 
Eurozone to show that market illiquidity predicts momentum payoffs. 
The default spread, defined as the difference between the average yield of bonds rated BAA 
by Moody’s and the average yield of bonds with a Moody’s rating of AAA, it is included to 
capture the effect of default premiums, to track the long-term business cycle conditions. This 
variable tends to be higher during recessions and lower during expansions. 
The term spread, measured as the difference between the average yield of Treasury bonds 
with more than 10 years to maturity and the average yield of T-bills that mature in three 
months. Under the suspicion that momentum strategies might embed compensation consistent 
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with forward term premium, Durham (2013) find that momentum returns do correlate to a 
degree with portfolio returns based on Gaussian arbitrage-free affine term spread models. 
T-bill yield, Cooper et al. (2004) tested whether the macroeconomic multi-factor model can 
capture the asymmetries relation of lagged market return. They found that, the lagged market 
return is a proxy for changes in the macroeconomic variables notably. The lagged dividend 
yields of the CRSP value weighted index, the lagged yield spread between Baa-rated bonds 
and Aaa-rated bonds the lagged yield spread between ten-year treasury bonds and six-month 
treasury bills, and the lagged yield on the T-bill with three months to maturity can explain the 
momentum profit. They suggested that, macroeconomic factors are unable to explain 
momentum profits after simple methodological adjustment of microstructure concerns. 
However, they reiterated that the lagged 3-year market return does predict momentum profits. 
Specifically, the momentum strategy generates significant positive return following positive 
market returns, but insignificantly negative returns following negative market returns. 
Market volatility, Wang and Xu (2010) investigated the time-series predictability of the 
momentum return with the focus on the predictive power of market volatility. They found a 
significant and robust link between market volatility and the momentum return. They show 
that the time-series predictability of momentum is rather different from the aggregate stock 
market predictability of the momentum return. They suggested that the momentum profits 
tend to be higher following periods of low market volatility. In particular, the momentum 
strategy generates especially low average monthly returns during down market and high 
volatility states. 
2.6.3.2 Firms’ Specific Risk Factors 
I also review the literature on empirical studies that record factor which may have great or 
direct effect on individual company trading activities, this includes risk factors such as. 
Trading volume, Chan, et al. (2000) study the momentum with individual stock in indices in 
the international equity market and documented that, the price change accompanied by higher 
trading volume tend to be reversed in the following period. Their results also indicate 
evidence of momentum profits that are statistically and economically significant, especially 
for short holding periods.  
Size, Schmidt, et al. (2015) study the link between the profitability of momentum strategies 
and firm size in international stocks markets, covering 23 stock markets across the globe. 
They find that there is not significant size effect for any of the countries covered while 
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considering the average return on the Small-Minus-Big factors. However, they also 
considered the difference between the biggest and the smallest deciles based on market 
capitalization and find that, the size effect is well pronouncing in most of the countries. They 
demonstrated that, international momentum profitability declines sharply with market 
capitalization, and that, momentum premiums are also considerably diminished by trading 
costs, when considering the portfolio turnover.  
Exchange rate, although the momentum profits could be increased by exploiting exchange 
rate information, Chan, et al. (2000) studied the profitability of the momentum strategy 
international they buy stocks in foreign countries when these countries’ equity market 
acquired higher value compared to the US market. The show that the exchange rate 
component has a negative contribution to the momentum profits for the 12-week and 26-
week holding periods, indicating a negative relationship between lagged exchange rate return 
and equity returns. They suggested that considering exchange rate fluctuation does not add 
much to momentum profits but the major source of momentum profits arises from price 
continuations in in individual stock indices.  
Chordia and Shivakumar (2002) show that macroeconomic variable can explain a large 
portion of momentum profits. They study the profitability of the momentum strategy using 
standard macro variable and include the yield on the three-month T-bill. Fama (1981) and 
Fama and Schwert (1977) show that this variable is negatively related to future stock market 
returns and that it serves as a proxy for expectations of futures economic activity.  
The dividend yield is defined as the total dividend payments accruing to the CRSP value-
weighted index over the previous 12 months divided by the current level of the index. It has 
been shown to be associated with slow mean reversion in stock returns across several 
economic cycles by Campbell and Shiller (1988), and Fama and French (1988). This variable 
is included as a proxy for time variation in the unobservable risk premium, since a high 
dividend yield indicates that dividends are being discounted at a higher rate.  
Fama and French (1996) show that momentum is the only anomaly unexplained by their 
three-factor model. That this anomaly is a spurious result of data snooping. They suggested 
that the weak continuation of short-term return in the 1931-1963 period preceding their asset 
pricing regressions is suggestive. Suggesting the need of further out-of-sample tests, for 
example on international data. 
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Time-varying exposure, Grundy and Martin (2001) report that stock selection method of a 
momentum strategy and time varying factor exposure will be borne in accordance with the 
performance of the common risk factors during the periods in which stocks were ranked to 
determine their winner or loser status. They suggested that because factors themselves 
display trivial momentum, extreme factor realizations induce noise, which obscures the study 
of the momentum phenomenon. This noise is penetrated in many ways. They adjusted raw 
returns for factor risk and found that the momentum phenomenon is remarkably stable across 
sub periods in their entire time series of post 1926 stock returns; and factor models can 
explain around 95% of the returns variability on portfolios of top and bottom ten percent of 
prior winners and losers, but cannot explain their mean returns.  They concluded that 
controlling for time-varying exposures to three-factors fail to explain the profitability of the 
momentum strategy. 
Hwang and Rubesam (2015) investigated if the momentum premium has continued to exist 
since it became publically well known in the USA. They generalized the model used by 
Pastor and Stambaugh (2001), and suggest a model that, allows for multiple structural breaks. 
A regime-switching model that can identify statistically significant change in the relation 
between momentum returns and risk factors. They find that, momentum is significantly 
positive only during some periods, notably from 1940s to the mid-1960s and from the mid-
1970s to late 1990s, and it has disappeared since late 1990s, in a process, which was delayed 
by the occurrence of the high-tech and telecom stock bubble of the late 1990s. They 
suggested that, the bubble accounted for at least 50% of momentum profit. 
2.6.4 Contrarian Investment and Macroeconomic Factors 
It is now widely accepted that the contrarian investment strategies deliver superior returns. 
However, even if these strategies appear to be profitable, the reason for superior performance 
is far from clear. Under the rational pricing model, the contrarian strategies are profitable 
because they are fundamentally riskier in some sense. This subsection reviews empirical 
findings related to risk factors, which might affect the contrarian. 
Fama and French three factors, Lakonishok et al. (1994) investigated the characteristics of 
the contrarian strategies in the U.S. They found that, even though, the excess returns to value 
investment strategies could in general be explained by the three-factor model of the Fama and 
French (1993 and 1996), there is little evidence to suggest that, value stocks are 
fundamentally riskier than glamour stocks. 
89 
 
Size, Gregory et al. (2001) examined the performance of contrarian investment strategies in 
the UK and found that, the contrarian excess returns persist even after controlling for size 
effects in stock returns. They suggested that the Fama and French’s three-factor model could 
not explain all of the excess returns to value strategies. They advocated that, when portfolios 
are formed based on past sales growth and the current book-to-market value equity, there are 
substantial difference between value and glamour portfolios that cannot be explained by their 
loading on the market, their book-to-market and their size factors. 
Gregory et al. (2003) show that, the risk of the contrarian strategies as measure by their 
volatility and Sharpe ratios do not provide evidence that value portfolios are riskier than 
glamour portfolios. They suggested that, while the standard deviation of any value strategy is 
greater than that of the HML factor, the Sharpe ratio of some value strategies is almost 
certainly too high to be consistent with rational risk pricing. They also examined the return on 
the contrarian strategies using both sales growth and a combination of sale growth and book-
to market and found that these returns remain significantly positive even after controlling for 
SMB, HML and other factors. They advocated that, these returns are not compensation for 
risk. Following this reasoning, the literature relates to the relation between contrarian 
strategies profit and macroeconomic risk factor, involves the following variables. 
GDP, HML and SMB, Gregory et al. (2003) show that both HML and SMB are positively 
correlated with future GDP growth. They suggested that there is no evidence of correlation 
between contrarian strategy returns and future GDP growth once HML and SMB are included 
as risk factors. They also reiterated that, in the context of the Fama-French model some value 
strategies return exhibit negative relationships with GDP growth. However, Liew and 
Vassalou (2002) argue that, the HML and SMB contain information about future growth in 
GDP, and contradict the preceding findings. 
Volatility, De Haan and Hakes (2011) analyse the contrarian investment strategies of 
different types of Dutch institutional investors and find that, for pension funds, there is a 
negative impact of the volatility variables on the contrarian returns, suggesting that contrarian 
trading is stronger during periods of market stress. They argue that pension sector’s 
stabilising role is strongest when this is needed the most.   
Monetary environment, Garcia‐Feijoo and Jensen (2014) published a paper in which they 
link monetary environment and the contrarian return. Their data consists of monthly stock 
returns for winners and losers from 1963 to 2010. They followed the portfolio formation 
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approach of Fama and French base on the evaluation period starting from month-60 through 
month-13 or five-year performance interval with a one-year skip period. This formation 
approach proves to be the one where long run reversal is most persistent per Fama and 
French. Their holding period is only one month after the skip period of one year. They 
demonstrated that, losers reverse in expansionary monetary environments, whereas winners 
only reverse in restrictive monetary conditions. 
Jordan (2012) studies the long-term reversal in international market, examining whether 
investors should continue to diversify across international markets and finds that the long-
term contrarian anomaly disappears when time varying alphas are considered, which is even 
true without transaction costs. They suggested that for marginal trader, conservative 
transaction costs subsume the long-term profits. Their results show that benefits from trades 
on long term reversal do not negate a strategy based on diversification and that 
macroeconomic factors are important for understanding the long-term reversal and their 
associated risk. 
2.6.5 Risk Factors Description 
I then identify in the literature several possible macroeconomic factors that might proxy for 
systematic variables. Using these factors themselves, I implicitly assume that, variables that 
proxy for risk factors for the momentum and contrarian strategies exist (Chen et al., 1986). 
Doing this, I examine some macroeconomic variables seeing as precise measures of the 
global aggregate economic conditions (World Industrial production, and market volatility). I 
also extend the literature by examining the possible impact of a basic indicator of the world 
economy (oil price). This is important given that the change in oil price could have a direct 
impact on other significant factor, which are not accounted in the study.  
I allow for market variables that serve as proxy for expectation of futures economic or market 
activity (liquidity, Term Spread, Default spread, and world market indices) to understand 
their influences on momentum and contrarian strategies returns over time. I consider how 
crisis could affect momentum and contrarian investors’ profit and how the impact of pre-
determined variables on momentum and contrarian return can change during crisis period 
(business cycle). I assess the impact of unobservable market risk premium that could affect 
the momentum and contrarian return using macroeconomic variables which are known for 




I, then refer to the multifactor model notably the Fama and French’s three-factors as potential 
source of systematic risk (Fama and French, 1993). I put considerable emphasis on 
explaining the detailed procedure to allow the reader to follow these steps, given that my 
approach differ from previous empirical specifications by focussing on risk factors that have 
a global sway. 
Following the above specification, I separate the variables that have the potential to explain 
the momentum and contrarian return in different sets as indicated above. Having proposed the 
set of relevant variables, I now shield the purpose and the measurements of these factors 
following individual group.  
2.6.5.1 Fama and French risks 
I refer to the multifactor model that occupies centre stage these days, the three-factor model 
introduced by Fama and French (1993). The systematic factors in the Fama-French’s model 
are firm size and book-to-market ratio as well as the market index these factors are 
empirically motivated by the observations that historical average returns on stock of small 
firms and on stock with high ratios of book equity to market equity are higher than predicted 
by the security market line of the CAPM. These observations suggest that size or the book-to-
market ratio may be proxies for exposures to source of systematic risk not captured by 
CAPM beta and thus results in the return premiums that previous studies see associated with 
these factors. 
To make their model operational, Fama and French proposed to measure the size factor in 
each period, as the differential return on small firms versus large firms. This factor is usually 
called SMB (for small minus big). In the same way, the other extra market factor is typically 
measured as the return of the firms with high book-to-market ratios minus those of firms with 
low ratios, or HML (Fama and French, 1993).  
2.6.5.2 Market State Factors 
To represent a broad category of factors that, serve as proxy for expectation of futures market 
activity as discussed in the extended literature, I include the following variables based either 
on empirical evidence or on their natural justification as macroeconomic risk factors.  
Liquidity, Liquidity risk is the possibility of a loss when less liquid assets must be sold to 
meet the liquidity need. Foreign investment are dominant factors in the global equity market 
and liquidity risk are extremely high. Buying or selling large number of shares might cause a 
substantial supply and demand imbalance; this implies that market will collapse if everyone 
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pulls out at the same time, given that market trading volume are often relatively thin with 
wider bid and ask spread. Skjeltorp and Odegaard (2011) showed that, the market liquidity 
was pro-cyclic, that liquidity interact with the cost of capital and relate to liquidity of trading 
in the secondary market. They suggested that investment decision significantly affects the 
term at which new capital are raised. The implication is that emerging market investments 
should be viewed as long-term investments rather than a source of trading profits. 
Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) established the link between asset’s market liquidity and 
traders’ funding liquidity. They suggested that traders provide market liquidity, and their 
ability to do so depend on assets’ market liquidity. They show that margins are destabilizing, 
and market liquidity and funding liquidity are mutually reinforcing, leading to liquidity 
spirals, which, can be gauged at a world level. This study utilises Pastor-Stambaugh level of 
the aggregate liquidity factors (LIQ_PS) to measure the effect of the liquidity cycle on the 
momentum and contrarian returns as indicated in Pastor-Stambaugh (2002) study. 
As I noted, market state variables can capture greater difference in momentum and contrarian 
return. To verify the conditional nature of the momentum and contrarian strategies profit, I 
refer to a series of variables, indicators of the market state such as the Pastor-Stambaugh 
(2003) level of the aggregate liquidity factors (LIQ_PS), to measure the effect of the liquidity 
cycle on the momentum and contrarian returns. This refer to an aspect of liquidity associated 
with temporary price fluctuations induced by order flow. The monthly aggregate liquidity 
measure is a cross-sectional average of individual-stock liquidity measure. Each stock’s 
liquidity in a given month estimated using that stock’s within-month daily returns and 
volume represents the average effect that a given volume on day d has on the return for day 
d+1, when the volume is given the same sign as the return on day d. 
 Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) suggested that if signed volume is viewed roughly as order 
flow then lower liquidity is reflected in a greater tendency for order flow in each direction on 
day d to be followed by a price change in the opposite direction on d+1 which imply that 
lower liquidity corresponds to stronger volume-related return reversals. 
Term Default and Spread, the literature on stock market return predictability shows that 
expected market risk premium is higher in bad times, and is correlated with business cycle 
(Fama and Schwert, 1989). This is consistent with the modern asset pricing theories that 
indicate the countercyclical price of risk (Zang, 2005). The momentum and contrarian return 
also follow similar outline given that they rely on performance of the determinants of the 
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market to move in the short run and reverse in the long term in conformity with the expected 
market risk premium. To model the unobservable market risk premium, I use the United State 
macroeconomic variables, which are known for their ability to predict market returns such as 
the default spread (DEF), the term spread (TERM) and the three-month T-bill (RF). 
The motivation of the Default Spread is standard from the time-series predictability literature. 
It is the yield spread between BAA and AAA corporate bonds. The Term Spread captures the 
effect of the shape of the term structure on the momentum and contrarian return. I will 
employ another interest rate variable, the term structure that represents the difference 
between the long-term government bond yield measured as the average yield of Treasury 
bonds with more than 10 years to maturity (LGB) and the average yield of the T-bills that 
matures in three months (TB). TS (t) = LGB (t) – TB (t-1); Chen, et al (1986) identified this 
variable as a measure of the unanticipated return on long bonds under the assumption of risk 
neutrality (only to isolate the pure term-structure effects).  The Treasury constant maturity 
historical values and the 3-month Treasury bill are based upon the Federal Reserve Board’s 
H.15 release that contains selected interest rate for U.S.  
2.6.5.3 Macroeconomic Factors 
Most relevant to my work, and on how economic conditions affect the momentum and 
contrarian returns, Griffin et al. (2003) define economic states in terms of the realized market 
returns and GDP growth. They identify good states with high and bad states with low ex-post 
market return or GDP growth. They found that, on the average momentum profits are positive 
during GDP growth and larger during negative market return. One possible explanation of 
this disparity can be the rise of finance as a macro-level phenomenon also known as 
financializing (Krippner, 2005). Similarly, the financializing of the world economy here will 
be seen as shaping patterns of accumulation in which profits accrue primarily through 
financial channels rather than through trade and commodity production (Arrighi, 1994). 
Industrial Production, I consider the monthly industrial production output as the historical 
value of the world industrial production index. Pinegar and Chang (1989) suggested that, the 
coefficients on one–month lead growth rates in industrial production for small firms are 
positive and significant in times-series regressions even in the presence of the market factor, 
whereas returns on large firms’ stocks unidirectional granger predict future growth rates in 
industrial production. This approach is in line with Chen et al. (1986) where the basic series 
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is the growth rate in world industrial production index. It is the average global world 
international not seasonally adjusted, originated by Oxford Economics. 
In addition, Chen et al. (1986) also find that, yearly production series are independent from 
other state variables, although, the coefficients have the same signs as in the overall period; 
they suggested that industrial production is a strong candidate for being a risk factor. Cutler et 
al. (1989) find that, Industrial Production growth is positively correlated with real stock 
returns. However, Bai and Green (2008) suggested that, changes in these macroeconomic 
variables are responsible for at least part of any country effect on national stock market 
indices. 
Monthly growth rates are examined because the equity market is related to change in 
industrial activity in the long term. Since stock market prices involve the valuation of cash 
flows over long periods in the future, monthly stock returns may be highly related to 
contemporaneous monthly changes in rates of industrial production, although such changes 
might capture the information pertinent for pricing. This month’s change in stock prices 
probably reflects changes in industrial production anticipated many months into the future 
(Chen, et al., 1986).  
Oil Prices, I also expect oil price to have a significant impact on the momentum and 
contrarian trading strategies profitability. Chen, et al. (1986) suggested that, stock returns are 
exposed to systematic economic news that is priced by the market. A change in oil prices 
may then have indirect impact in stock prices and consequently on these strategies return. To 
test this hypothesis, Chen, et al. (1986) referred to oil prices as series of realized monthly first 
differences in logarithm of the producer price Index/Crude Petroleum series. Following the 
practice established by Chen, et al (1986), I refer to the oil price as a series of the world crude 
oil Index, FBO SPOT Brent denominate in U.S. Dollard and seasonally adjusted. 
Market volatility, stock volatility may have considerable impact on the global momentum 
and contrarian return. Wang and Xu (2010) suggested that the aggregate market volatility 
significantly predicts momentum profit. They found that, momentum strategy tends to 
perform poorly following periods of high market volatility. De Haan and Hakes (2011) find a 
negative impact of market volatility on contrarian returns. This study uses the standard 
deviation of daily value-weighted of the MSCI global market indexes over the previous 
month as my measure of aggregate market volatility in conformity with Doron et al (2013). 
The MSCI World Index captures large and mid-cap representation across 23 developed 
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countries with 1643 constituents. It covers approximately 85% of the free float-adjusted 
market capitalization in each country. 
2.6.5.4 Financial Crisis 
Business cycle, I turn my attention to the crisis period. Another candidate to the risk based 
explanation of the momentum and contrarian return is the Business Cycle Risk. Griffin, Ji, 
Martin (2003) established the relation between momentum and business cycle risk. They 
suggested that if momentum is driven by business risk, the risk is largely country-specific. It 
represents unanticipated change in the level of real business activity. The expected values of 
a business activity index are often computed both at the beginning and at end of the month, 
using only information available at those times. Business Cycle Risk (NBC) is calculated as 
the difference between the end-of-month value and the beginning-of-month value. A positive 
realization of Business Cycle Risk indicates that, the expected growth rate of the economy, 
measured in constant dollars, has increased. Under such circumstances, firms that are more 
positively exposed to business cycle risk for example will do well when business activity 
increases. As the economy recovers from a recession, they will outperform those that do not 
respond greatly to increased levels in business activity. This scenario may have considerable 
implications on the momentum and contrarian profitability given that the aggregate output of 
the overall economy may vary from one-time to another as the world enter a period of 
recession or expansion. To capture the impact of such variation this study uses the United 
State Leading Index of the National Bureau of Economic Research Business cycle, namely 
the NOBER business cycle that takes the value 1 when the economic is in recession and 0 
when the economic is in expansion.  
Crisis, I go further by allowing a deeper analysis of the underlying pattern between the global 
momentum and contrarian returns over time, and global shocks or international crisis. I 
address this deficiency by adopting the comprehensive historical time series data on debt and 
banking crises, inflation, and currency crashes as suggested by Carmen and Kenneth (2010). 
The range of variables encompasses the currency crises, inflation crises, stock market crises 
the sovereign debt crises (domestic and external), the Banking crises and the total crises 
computed as the aggregate value of the number of crises in each period. 
Carmen and Kenneth (2010) defined the inflation crisis as an annual inflation rate of 20 
percent or higher. They also consider the incidence of more extreme cases where inflation 
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exceeds 40 percent per annum; Currency crashes as the annual depreciation versus the US 
dollar (or the relevant anchor currency) of 15 percent or more. 
Banking crisis, are characterised by two types of event: the banks’ runs that lead to the 
closure, merging or takeover by the public sector of one or more financial institutions. If 
there are no runs, the closure, merging, takeover, or large-scale government assistance of an 
important financial institutions (or group of institutions) that marks the start of the string of 
similar outcomes for other financial institutions. 
External debt crises, is a sovereign default, defined as the failure to meet a principal or 
interest payment on the due date (or within the specified grace period). The episodes also 
include instances where rescheduled in terms less favourable than the original obligation. 
Domestic debt crisis includes definition given above for external debt. In addition, domestic 
debt crises have involved the freezing of bank deposits and or forcible conversions of such 
deposits from dollars to local currency. 
2.6.6 Summary  
I examined the extent to which momentum and contrarian returns can be affected by 
macroeconomic variables with the aim of acquiring a better understanding of the actual 
nature of the global momentum return predictability internationally. My examination has 
three key features. I examined the literature on the predictability of stock returns using a set 
of macro variables. The macro variables I consider constitute a set of standard macro 
variables, including the market volatility, oil price, liquidity risk, the MSCI world market 
return, term spread, default spread, industrial production, unemployment rate and many more. 
By considering a set of standard macro variables, I examined whether common patterns of 
return predictability using macroeconomic variables emerge worldwide. I also considered the 
impact of these variables in both momentum and contrarian strategies and find that, there is a 
limited set of macroeconomic variables which could have significant impact on either 
momentum or contrarian strategies worldwide, namely, the market volatility, the exchange 
rate and the GDP growth, even though the variable is positively correlated to the HML and 
SMB. 
I finally examine the effect of each potential macroeconomic variable (default spread, the 
term spread and the three-month T-bill oil price, GDP growth and the World Industrial 
production, liquidity, volatility, and exchange rate, crises) to proxies for exposures to source 
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of systematic risk for the global momentum and contrarian risk factors. I found that the 
impact of these macroeconomic risks factors might have a decisive effect on determining the 
performance of the momentum and contrarian strategies. 
2.7 Conclusion  
I review variety of studies related to the Efficient Market Hypothesis. Eugene Fama (1970) 
has provided a careful description of the efficient market, that has had a lasting influence on 
practitioners and academics in finance, the efficient market theory states that all prices should 
reflect all information up to the point where the benefits of acting on the information is 
equivalent to the cost of collecting it. However, there are compiling evidences to show that, 
while people are still debating on the concept of market efficiency that trading techniques like 
the momentum and the contrarian strategies can generate extra return. 
Examining the sources of  these strategies profitability, evidences to support that momentum 
and contrarian profits could be a result of investor under or overreaction. Jegadeesh and 
Titman (1993, 2001) found evidence of return continuation in stock prices. Some studies also 
explain the overreaction effect in term of gradual diffusion of information as stocks with 
slower information diffusion provide more potential for momentum profits (Hong, Lim and 
Stein 2000). The international evidences of the momentum phenomenon suggest that 
individual market represent only one of a series of stock market that provide investment 
opportunity. These findings also provide strong international supports for the existence of a 
global momentum phenomenon, given that there might be disparity among investors reaction 
to news across countries.  
The findings also support that contrarian profit could be a result of investor overreaction over 
the long run as suggested by De Bondt and Thaler (1985). These theories also support the 
behavioural theory of investor sentiment, as investors’ sentiments influence stock prices 
(Brown and Cliff, 2005). Other explanations of the contrarian returns reflect the changes in 
equilibrium required rate of returns (Chan, 1988; Chopra et al., 1992). In addition, number of 
study also found evidences of the contrarian strategies profitability in different countries and 
regions around the world: Choe, et al. (1999) in Korea; Otchere and Chan (2003) in the Hong 
Kong market; Chen, et al. (2012) in China; Li et al. (2009) in the UK.  
By examining the extent to which momentum and contrarian returns can be affected by 
macroeconomic variables I find that, there is a limited set of macroeconomic variables which 
could have significant impact on either momentum or contrarian strategies worldwide. I also 
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found that the momentum and contrarian strategies are well-documented strategies worldwide 
in individual countries the results suggest evidences of market inefficiency. Evidences also 
point to the fact these profits could be result of investors under or overreaction to news. 
However, the impact of macroeconomic risk factor may have a decisive effect on determining 
the performance of the momentum and contrarian strategies. 
I argue that for international investors individual market are viewed as only one of a series of 
stock markets that provide investors opportunities. International investors will not just 
compare the equity markets against one another, they consider the fact that asset allocation 
also occurs across countries and indicate the success of global strategies that include multiple 
indices such as the global momentum and contrarian strategies. 
For international investors, watching the increasing development of the globalization of the 
equities market, it appears obvious that the correlation between international equity markets 
and international portfolio management become especially interesting for investment 
practitioners.  
One natural question is whether the correlation between equity markets internationally 
following the globalization of the world economy offers the prospect of global momentum 
and contrarian profit. In more simple words: Do the global momentum and contrarian 
strategies work for international investors? I find that they do. Can the global momentum and 
contrarian profit be explained by global risks? 
To answer this question, I propose an alternative way of generating extra return while 
focusing on a global coordinate contrarian phenomenon. I suggest strategy that allows 
investors to invest in selected well-performing countries (winners) and in selected poor-
performing countries (losers) and inversely. Based on countries' past indices performances. I 
construct deciles and quintiles portfolios and re-examine the international evidences for the 
long-term contrarian predictability in different market states.  
The results suggest that, the global momentum and contrarian strategies work for 
international well for international investors that target 47 countries indices. The strategies 
are more profitable and less risky than the pure momentum and contrarian strategy as it 
focusses on indices and select only the extreme losers and winners. These results also show 
that the global momentum strategy is consistently profitable between 1969 and 2014. The 
most successful momentum strategy selects stocks based on their previous performances over 
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9 months and then holds the portfolio for the next 3 months. This strategy yields 2.98% per 
month (42.24% per year) but the returns may vary considerably from one market condition to 
another. Studying the contrarian strategy internationally reveal an economically-important 
and predictive reversal effect after considering the price reversal among countries’ indices as 
a global, coordinated and generalized phenomenon. Countries’ indices’ portfolios formed 
based on prior 48 months; prior losers outperform prior winners by 0.83% per month 
(10.40% per year) during the subsequent 60 months. Interestingly, the reversal effect is 
substantially stronger for emerging countries where it yields 1.37% per month (17.70% per 
year). It remains profitable in the period post-globalization. 
More importantly to test whether global momentum and contrarian profit can be explained by 
global risk factors (oil price, market volatility, industrial productuction, MSCI world market 
return). I use monthly observation of the world risk factors that could jointly explain the 
changes on momentum and contrarian profitability. Referencing to the above literature there 
are limited data available on world risk factors. Because this thesis uses historical data to 
estimate the expected momentum and contrarian returns, I get around this problem by using 
the U.S. macroeconomic risks factors (liquidity, default spread and term spread) when 
necessary as a proxy for the world risk factors, due to the multinational nature of many U.S. 
companies and due to the enormous global diversity of asset holdings of U.S. companies, the 
U.S. equity market is a fair proxy of world asset market (Chako and Evans, 2014). The 
variables (Liquidility, default spread, term spread) are available. Because US treasuries are 
free of default risk, other bond are compared to treasuries in order to get an idea of their 
credit risk. Investors look at the yield of bond in terms of where it is trading compared to 
treasuries. This gives them more context on how risky the market view this. Instead of simply 






Chapter 3: Methodology and Data 
3.1 Introduction 
The research’s aim is to examine the profitability of the momentum and contrarian strategies 
internationally. I consider a variety of momentum and contrarian portfolios construction 
approaches with different combinations of formations and holding periods. I adopt an 
empirical research approach given that I use a large sample data consisting of 47 countries’ 
indices 10 macroeconomic variables. The data are made with high reliability quantifiable and 
measurable, the testing hypothesis of the momentum strategies are extracted from the theories 
following Jegadeesh and Titman (1993). I also follow a deductive research approach 
following a logical reasoning process of the contrarian strategies (De Bondt and Thaler, 
1985). The research strategy is quantitative given my reliance on testing theory-derived 
hypothesis, manipulation and constructing causality relationships between macroeconomic 
variables and the momentum and contrarian profits. The data horizon is cross-sectional and 
longitudinal given the monthly frequency. This section is organised as follow: first, I define 
the variables, examine the data for their availability and discuss their distributional 
characteristics. Second, I present the methods use in examining the momentum and contrarian 
profitability.   
3.2 Data 
3.2.1 Introduction 
To answer the research question: ‘does the momentum strategies work for international 
investors?’, `does the contrarian strategies work for international investors?’, `can momentum 
be explained by risk factors?’ data have been collected from two mains categories of 
quantitative sources: world market stock indices prices, and world risk factors. To my 
knowledge, regarding empirical literatures on momentum, contrarian and risks a 
comprehensive study of this kind has not been done before due to the internationalization of 
the risk factors impact on momentum and contrarian profits. Given that, I test whether global 
momentum and contrarian profit can be explained by global risk factors (oil price, market 
volatility, world industrial productuction, MSCI world market return) and I only use U.S 
factor when necessary for example I use U.S. macroeconomic risks factors (liquidity, default 
spread and term spread) when necessary as a proxy for the world risk factors, due to the 
multinational nature of many U.S. companies and due to the enormous global diversity of 
asset holdings of U.S. companies, the U.S. equity market is a fair proxy of world asset market 
(Chako and Evans, 2014). In addition, this thesis also assumes US investors. Because US 
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treasuries are free of default risk, other bond are compared to treasuries in order to get an idea 
of their credit risk. Investors look at the yield of bond in terms of where it is trading 
compared to treasuries. This gives them more context on how risky the market view this. 
Instead of simply looking at a yield in isolation.    
3.2.2 World Market Stock Indices Prices 
I consider global momentum portfolios of international investors. Data are collected from 
DataStream. The data are composed of 47 countries equity market price indices (value 
weighted rebalanced quarterly but we deal with the change in the structure by including time 
dummies in the GMM estimation), and comprised of 23 developed markets and 24 emerging 
markets. The length of the sample period is from December 1969 to February 2014.The 
dataset will include all available countries’ indexes constituent of the MSCI world index in 
DataStream. The developed countries are listed as follow: USA, Japan, UK, Australia, 
France, Germany, Italy, Canada, Hong Kong, Singapore, Spain, Switzerland, Belgium, 
Sweden, Austria, Ireland, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Denmark, Finland, 
and Israel. The emerging markets are listed as follow: Brazil, China, India, Korea, Russia, 
Turkey, Indonesia, South Africa, Mexico, Taiwan, Thailand, Argentina, Malaysia, Chile, 
Colombia, Egypt, Poland, CZECH Rep, Hungary, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Morocco, Peru, and 
Jordan.  This analysis is conducted based on stock indices denominated in US dollars and 
assumes the transactions on the stand of U.S. investors. The indices are based on the MSCI 
Global investable market indices and the study is conducted in differents time period with 
different subsample and different portfolios size (full sample: 1969-2014 47 countries, 
develop market: 1969-2014 23 countries, emerging countries: 1987-2014 24 countries, period 
post 1994: 1994-2014 47 countries). 
Monthly observations from all market indexes are used. The purpose of this is to be able to 
compare the momentum return as medium versus long run. The analysis is conducted with 
sample date from 1969 to 2014. I examine different time points as the sample expands to 
include new countries following their historical appearances. Indexes levels will be used to 
compute the periodical continuous compounding returns as: 
(1)                                                𝑟𝑖,𝑡 = ln(𝑝𝑡) − ln⁡(𝑝𝑡−1) 
Where, 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 is the monthly return on indices. 
𝑝𝑡, Is the indices level at time t and 𝑝𝑡−1is the index price at time t-1. 
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This study defines indices level, as the value of a section of the stock market. It is computed 
from the prices of selected stocks typically the weighted average. It is often used by fund 
managers, and investors to describe the market and compared the return on specific 
investment.  
 [Insert Table 3.1 Here] 
Table 3.1 above presents the distributional characteristics, average return, standard deviation, 
Skewness, Kurtosis and the results from the Shapiro-Wilk test of normality for 47 countries’ 
price indices. The Developed countries price indices returns' statistics characteristics are 
presented in Panel A and the Emerging countries statistic characteristics in Panel B. The 
sample is from December 1969 to January 2014.The first monthly return is measured in 
January 1970 for the firsts eighteen countries (USA, Japan, UK, Australia, France, Germany, 
Italy, Canada, Hong Kong, Singapore, Spain, Switzerland, Belgium, Sweden, Austria, 
Netherlands, Norway, and Denmark); these indices are available for the full sample period. 
Two developed countries indices (New Zealand and Finland) start in December 1981. Two 
developed countries indices (Ireland and Portugal), and eleven Emerging countries indices 
(Brazil, Korea, Turkey, Indonesia, Mexico, Taiwan, Thailand, Argentina, Malaysia, Chile, 
and Jordan) start in December 1987. One developed countries indices (Israel) and eight 
Emerging countries indices (China, India, South Africa, Colombia, Poland, Pakistan, Sri 
Lanka, and Peru) start in December 1992, and five Emerging countries indices (Russia, 
Egypt, CZECH Rep, Hungary, and Morocco) start in December 1994.  
I can see from the Table 3.1 that, the highest mean return recorded in developed countries is 
0.92% (Finland) compared to 1.33% in Emerging market (Mexico). The lowest mean return 
is recorded in Developed countries 0.01% (Portugal) compared to 0.21% in Emerging 
countries (China). The highest standard deviation in developed countries is 0.10 (Hong Kong) 
compared to 0.16 in Emerging market (Turkey). The lowest standard deviation in Developed 
countries is 0.04 (USA) compared to 0.07 in Emerging countries (Chile). This indicated that 
the most volatile countries are in emerging markets and the largest price change is recorded 
in Emerging market. 
For most countries, the Skewness coefficients are negative and further away from zero which 
indicates that on average the data in my sample are not normally distributed the same. The 
Kurtosis coefficient are also different from 3 in most cases indicating fat tails.  
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I refer to the Shapiro-Wilk test as a test for normality as it considers Both Skewness and 
Kurtosis. It shows that, out of 47 countries indices only two developed countries indices 
prices (Japan and Italy) have passed the normality test (significant above 0.10) and one 
Emerging country indices India (significant above 0.05). The results also show that on 
average the standard deviation is relatively large (0.07) with respect to the mean (0.53%) in 
developed countries and even larger in Emerging countries (0.14) with a mean return of 
(0.61%). This indicates that the return value in the distributions of indices prices in my 
dataset are dispersed and non-normal between 1969 and 2014 for the Developed countries 
indices prices, and even more for the Emerging countries with the exception made on Japan, 
Italy and India. 
To test whether the momentum strategy is profitable internationally, this study uses the 
Jegadeesh and Titman’s (1993, 2001) approach and long winner stock indices and short loser 
stock indices over the full sample period 1969-2014 (47 counties); then I divide the data-set 
into different subsets for further analysis as follow. 
1. The 1969-2014 sample that contains all countries indices price available from 1969 only 
18 countries, I call them Established Market subset. 
2. The 1994-2014 sample that contains all countries including Emerging countries with data 
available from 1994, 47 countries, I call this globalization period subset. 
3. The developed countries sub-set, that contains all developed countries only with data 
available from 1969 (23 countries) I call this developed countries subset. 
5. The Emerging countries sub-set, that contains all Emerging countries and start in 
December 1987 only 24 countries, I call them emerging counties subset. 
6. The sample that includes only periods affected by banking crisis, currency crisis and stock 
market crash I call this crisis period subset.  
7. The sample that includes only period not affected by crisis, I call this Non-crisis period 
8. The sample that includes only periods affected by banking crisis only, I call this Banking 
crisis subset. 




10. The sample that includes only periods affected by stock market crashes, I call this stock 
Market crash subset. 
11. The sample that includes periods of world economy contraction, I call this contraction 
period subset. 
12. The sample that includes periods of world economy expansion, I call this contraction 
period subset. 
This is to enhance the robustness of my results, to test if the results of these analyses are 
similar and consistent in different periods and different markets conditions and to check 
whether the results hold under different sample specifications, given that investors might 
have different geographic preferences for investment. 
3.2.3 Variable Definition 
My goal is to test whether global momentum and contrarian profit can be explained by global 
risk factors. I use monthly observation of the world risk factors (oil price, MSCI market 
volatility, world industrial production, MSCI world market return) that could jointly explain 
the changes on momentum and contrarian profitability. I restate that there are limited data 
available on world risk factors. I can only have satisfactory data on them (one or two decades 
at best). Because this thesis uses historical data to estimate the expected momentum and 
contrarian returns, I would like to have historical data going a long way back to 1969. In 
practice, I get around this problem by using the U.S. macroeconomic risks factors (liquidity, 
default spread and term spread) when necessary as a proxy for the world risk factors as stated 
earlier. Due to the multinational nature of many U.S. companies and due to the enormous 
global diversity of asset holdings of U.S. companies, the U.S. equity market is a fair proxy of 
world asset market (Chako and Evans, 2014). The variables are available over 45-year period 
from 1969 to 2014 to match with the study period. I also conduct additional analysis using 
the Fama and French global risk factors to proxies for global risks, the EURIBOR: OIS 
Spread (difference between the rate at which European banks lend to each other (EURIBOR) 
and the overnight’ risk free’ swap rate (EONIA) among the same banks for 3-month period), 
given that this informs investor on whether risk is rising or falling in credit market and it is a 
good indicator of stress in the banking system and the TED Spread or the difference between 
the London Interbank Offered Rate (Libor) and the 3-month Treasury Bill, given that rising 
TED Spread is commonly known as a bearish indicator and it is evidence that liquidity is 
being withdrawn from the financial market. EURIBOR: OIS Spread start in 1999, while the 
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TED Spread start 1990 and cover a limited period but the test is conducted for robustness. I 
classify world risk factors in three different groups.  
3.2.3.1 Fama and French Risk Factors 
The first group includes the excess return on the market, calculated as the value-weight return 
of the MSCI World index minus the one-month Treasury bill rate (own calculation). The 
Small-Minus-Big (SMB) or the average return on the three smallest portfolios minus the 
average return on the three biggest portfolios. The High-Minus-Low (HML) or the average 
return of the two value portfolios minus the average return on the growth portfolios on the US 
market. These are available from Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS), and known as 
Fama and French Risk. I then refer to the U.S. Fama and French risk factor series as proposed 
by Fama and French (1993) to proxy for world Fama and French risks. All these variables are 
available for 45 years’ period from 1969 to 2014. (For detailed definition of the variable, 
please see Appendix E4). For robustnes I also conduct a separate analysis with the global 
Fama and French factor (3 and 5 factors), the global Fama and French excluding the U.S., the 
European and the Asia Pacific excluding Japan. 
The results of the distributional statistics of the Fama and French risks factors notably the 
excess return on the market (ERM or MKT), Small-Minus-Big Return (SMB), High-Minus-
Low Return (HML) are indicated in Table 3.2.  
[Insert Table 3.2 Here] 
The results in Table 3.2 Panel A show that the average value of the ERM (the average 
premium per unit of market) is 0.50% per month. This is low from an investment perspective 
(about 5% per year), but it is marginal. The average value for the SMB factors are rather low 
and amount to 0.20% per month. The SMB values cover a range of -16.70 to 22.30%. 
Therefore, the estimated spread in expected returns due to the size factor is consistent. The 
book-to market factor HML produces an average premium of 0.30 per month, which is low in 
both practical and statistical terms by comparison to Fama and French (1993). However, the 
HML values range from -13.10 to 13.90 in line with the suggestion that Higher Book to 
market ratios yield poor earning Fama and French (1995). 
 As for the three factors, HML, SMB and the ERM. The ERM is more volatile than SMB and 
HML. The ERM has the highest standard deviation (0.059). This indicated that the dispersion 
of the market premium around the mean is the most the volatile while. I also have 
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considerable number of observations given the study period and compared to Fama and 
French (1993) sample size. It is also noticeable that on average the standard deviation is 
relatively low (0.029 for HML to 0.059 for the ERM) by comparison to the mean value of the 
variable. This indicates that, the value in the distributions in my dataset are dispersed. It also 
indicates some signs of non-normality of the variable between 1969 and 2014. 
For all variables, the Skewness are away from zero, which indicates that on average the data 
in my sample are not normally distributed. On average the Kurtosis are different from 3. In 
the cases of the kurtosis and the Skewness are significantly high indicating further deviation 
from the central distribution. The Shapiro-Wilk test that seems more appropriate here as a test 
for normality as it considers Both Skewness and Kurtosis shows that none of the variable is 
normally distributed given that all the P-values are below 0.05. More importantly, both ERM 
and MKTRF follow similar pattern. 
Table 3.2 Panel B shows the correlation coefficients between Fama and French risks factor. 
The MKTRF return is positively related to the HML and negatively related to SMB. 
Although I have some sort of correlation between MKTRF, HML and SBM these correlations 
are weak. Considering the above factors, I refer to the Variance Inflation Factor (Index that 
measures how much variance of an estimated regression coefficient is increased because of 
collinearity) to spot any sign of multicollinearity, which may exist among variables. The test 
result in Table 3.2 Panel C and Panel D indicate that the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) 
values are below 3 for all the variables, this suggests that the multicollinearity among these 
factors are less likely or do not exist. In sum the common risks factor during the 1969 to 
2014, closely replicate the properties of the benchmark of common risks factors. Suggesting 
that the data series are suitable for further risks based analysis. Results in the Table 3.2 Panel 
E below indicate sign of homoscedasticity in the residual given that the probability value 
issued from the Breush-Pagan (0.850) is greater than 5% with a test statistic of 0.040. 
However, the Q test indicates the presence of serial correlation of first order for the MKTRF 
and HML variables. The distributions of Fama and French risks factors during the 1969 to 
2014 are random, and do not indicate any sign of multicollinearity and predictability. This 
suggests that the data series that include variables such as MKTRF, SMB, and HML will be 
suitable for further risks adjustment analysis. This is clearly illustrated from Appendix F1, 
which represents the scatterplot of the Fama and French risks variables and indicates dense 
dispersions in for all variables. This can be observed in Appendix F2-5 which depicts kernel 
distributions of entries or a nonparametric representation of the probability density function 
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of random variable, used in this study to avoid making assumptions about the distribution of 
the variables MKTRF, SMB, the HML, and the expected normal distribution density of each 
factor across the subsample.  
3.2.3.2 Market State Risk Factors 
As I noted earlier, market state variables can capture greater difference in momentum and 
contrarian return. To verify the conditional nature of the momentum and contrarian strategies 
profit, I refer to a series of variables, indicators of the market state such as the Pastor-
Stambaugh (2003) level of the aggregate liquidity factors (LIQ_PS), to measure the effect of 
the liquidity cycle on the momentum and contrarian returns. This refers to an aspect of 
liquidity associated with temporary price fluctuations induced by order flow. The monthly 
aggregate liquidity measure is a cross-sectional average of individual-stock liquidity measure. 
Each stock’s liquidity in a given month, estimated using that stock’s within-month daily 
returns and volume. It represents the average effect that a given volume on day d has on the 
return for day d+1 when the volume is given the same sign as the return on day d. 
Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) suggested that, if signed volume is viewed roughly as order 
flow then lower liquidity is reflected in a greater tendency for order flow in a given direction 
on day d to be followed by a price change in the opposite direction on d+1. Which, implies 
that lower liquidity corresponds to stronger volume-related return reversals. 
To investigate the time variation of the global momentum and contrarian premium using 
change in default and term premium. I refer to the default spread calculated as the difference 
between the average yields of bonds rated BAA by Moody’s and the average yield of bonds 
with Moody’s rating of AAA (please see Appendix E4 for detailed definition). I also refer to 
the Term spread calculated as the difference between the average yield of the Treasury bonds 
with more than 20 years to maturity and the average yield of the T-bill that mature in three 
months. The three-month T-bill monthly value, the BAA and AAA corporate bonds data, the 
long-term government bond yields and the Treasury constant maturity historical values with 
more than 20 years to maturity are collected from WRDS. These variables are available for 
45 years’ period from 1969 to 2014 (for detailed definition please see Appendix E4). 
Recent literature proxies for term factor using principal component analysis thus considering 
the entire curve instead of arbitrary selected maturities. Note that, principal component 
analysis uses a single correlation matrix to identity dominant pattern of yields shifts and 
result only informs about the correlations themselves. For instance, the existence of a global 
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parallel shift that explains around 50% of variation in global bond yields suggests that 
correlations should, on average, be positive. However, in global markets, correlations are 
notoriously time-varying. For example, there are consistent evidence that short term 
correlation between 10-year bond yields in different countries are significantly less stable 
than correlations between yields at different maturities within a single country. This means 
that, at least for short time horizons, one must be especially cautious in using the results of 
principal component analysis to manage a global bond position (Phoa, 2000).   
I also acknowledge that principal component analysis might have the advantage that it makes 
any scenario analysis more meaningful by keeping local factors, which have important 
economic interpretations as shift, twist and butterfly moves of the yield curve (Phoa, 2000). 
However, this thesis follow Chan et al. (2000) and assume U.S. investors. Investors often 
look at the yield of bond in terms of where it is trading compared to treasuries. This gives 
them more context on how risky the market view this. Instead of simply looking at a yield in 
isolation. 
I also discuss the results of the distributional statistics issued from the market state risk 
factors. The liquidity factor (LIQ), Default spread ((DS), the Term spread (TS) and the MSCI 
world index return (MKT). 
[Insert Table 3.3 Here] 
The results in Table 3.3 Panel A show that the average risk premiums for the liquidity factor 
(-0.031) is trivial the lowest compared to the term structure; the default spread factor (1.112), 
the market return (0.133), the term spread (0.003). Therefore, the estimated spread for the 
liquidity factor range from -0.461 to 0.201. Indicating that the average premium of the 
liquidity factor is low in statistical term. Such value may hide a reasonable level of dispersion 
given their spread around the means. 
As for the four risks factors: LIQ, the DS, the TS and the MKT. The LIQ factor is the most 
volatile. It has a negative mean this is not surprising given that the smallest value is also 
negative (-0.4610). I also have considerable number of observations given the study period 
(1970 to 2013), and compare to Fama and French’s (1993) study (1963-1991 period). I note 
though, that the LIQ is not only highly volatile but has a Low means premium. This might 
prevent LIQ from explaining much of the cross-sectional variation in average returns of the 
global strategies, but high volatility also implies that the LIQ factors can capture substantial 
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common variation in returns. This is in line with Fama and French’s (1993) study that 
suggested that the low means and high volatilities is more appropriate in variables 
characteristics. It is also noticeable that on average the standard deviations are relatively 
moderated by comparison to the mean value of the variables, except in the case of the 
liquidity factor. This indicates that, the distributions in my dataset are reasonably dispersed 
around the mean value. It also indicates considerable level of density of the variable between 
1969 and 2014. 
For all variables, the Skewness are away from Zero, which indicates that on average the data 
in my sample are not normally distributed. The same, on average the Kurtosis departs from 3 
and does not converge with the Skewness indicating that the variables are not obviously 
normally distributed by means of skewness and kurtosis values.  
I also refer to the Shapiro-Wilk test that seems more appropriate as a test for normality as it 
considers Both Skewness and Kurtosis. The results show that none of the variables is 
normally distributed given that all the P-values are below 0.05.  
Table 3.3 Panel B shows the correlation coefficient between the four factors series. The 
liquidity factor (LIQ) series is negatively related to the DS factor, but this correlation is not 
strong. The remaining correlation coefficient among the variable are positive. These 
correlations are weak and do not indicate any sign of multicollinearity. I suggest that the 
resulting collinearity trends are less likely able to weaken individual factor impact on the 
global momentum and contrarian return given that, even if correlations are not negligible the 
variables are far from perfectly correlated.  
Considering the above factors, I do not want the standard error of individual variable to be 
inflated more than twice his basics size or minimum size by the effect of other factors in the 
set I then refer to the Variance inflation factor to spot any sign of multicollinearity, which 
may exist among variables. The test results in Table 3.3 Panel C indicate that all Variance 
Inflation Factor values are below 3 among the variables suggesting that, the multicollinearity 
between these factors are less likely to or do not exist. Moreover, the results in the Table 3.3 
Panel D indicate sign of some sort of homoscedasticity in the regression given that the 
probability value from the Breush-Pagan test (0.708) is greater than 5%, and the presence of 
autocorrelation of first order for the DS only (please see Appendix E1 for detailed definition 
of the Breush-Pagan test). 
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In sum the distribution of market risks factors during the 1969 to 2014 are random, and do 
not indicate any sign of multicollinearity and predictability. This suggests that the data series 
that include variables such as liquidity, default spread and term spread might be suitable for 
further risk-based analysis. This is clearly illustrated in Appendix F8, which represents the 
scatterplot of the market variables and indicates denser dispersions for the liquidity and the 
Term Spread factors. This can be observed in Appendix F9-12 which depicts kernel 
distributions of entries of the variables liquidity factor (LIQ), Market return (MKT), Default 
spread ((DS), and the Term spread (TS), and the expected normal distribution density of each 
factor across the subsample. Appendix F 9 shows a leptokurtic distribution of the liquidity 
factor. This indicates that small changes in liquidity are less likely to happen; it means that 
investors can overestimate the impact of this factor at low level of significance. Appendix 
F10 also demonstrates that the default spread variable has a negative skew. However, the 
terms spread shows a uniform distribution with a high pick (Appendix11). Lastly, the 
distribution of the market returns skew or lurch in slightly in the right (Appendix F12), 
indicating a lower mean compared to the mode and the median.  
3.2.3.3 Macroeconomic Factors 
To examine the extent to which macroeconomic variables explain the profits of the 
momentum and the contrarian strategies. I refer global factors that capture the aggregate 
change in the world economy as macroeconomics risks factors. The available macroeconomic 
variables that I consider are in monthly frequencies, and I match the frequency of the 
estimated macroeconomic risks and the global momentum and contrarian trading payoffs, all 
in the effort to use macro variables series that are stationary finite and constant over time.  
For instance, I use world industrial production index level (Total Industrial production and 
Manufacturing production index value SDDS+) from the Federal Reserve database, the Oil 
Price as a series (Producer price index crude petroleum series) obtained from the Bureau of 
Labour Statistics database, and the return on the MSCI world index prices from DataStream 
for the study time period. For all I calculate the percent change or the growth rate. All 
macroeconomic data are available for 45 years’ period 1969 to 2014. (For detailed definition 
of macroeconomic variables, please see Appendix E4). 
I consider the distributional statistics and the graphical analysis of individual macroeconomic 
factors. To confirm the explanatory power of the macroeconomic factors in my sample, I 
evaluate the dispersion of the entries in the distributions through the standard deviations, 
minimum, maximum, mean, skewness, and kurtosis. Using the correlation coefficient and the 
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variance inflation factor (VIF) I also examine the likelihood of a multicollinearity between 
factors. I extend my analysis by examining the distributions for normality through the 
Shapiro-Wilk test. I present the results of the descriptive statistic (minimum, maximum, 
mean, standard deviations, skewness and the kurtosis) as well as the result of the Shapiro-
Wilk test on the economic factors. I also present the variance inflation factor and the 
correlation coefficient results for the time series of monthly value of the Oil price (∆OP), 
Market volatility (WVOL), Industrial production (∆IP). The corresponding results are shown 
in Table 3.4 below. 
[Insert Table 3.4] 
The results in Table 3.4 Panel A show that the oil price ranges from -0.40% return to 50%, 
with a mean value of 0.6%. The world market volatility ranges from -4.40% to 2.40% with a 
mean value of 0.2%. The level of industrial production index also ranges from 0.3% to 3.90%. 
These perceived spreads in economic variables indicate that most observations depart 
considerably from the mean in statistical term. As for the factors (∆OP, WVOL, and ∆IP) the 
standard deviations of all the factors are positives and significantly low indicating that 
macroeconomic are slightly just volatile. Low means values in industrial production might 
allow the ∆IP factors to provide more information in explaining much cross-sectional 
variation of the global momentum and contrarian returns. The higher volatility compared to 
the mean might imply that these factors may capture substantial common variations in the 
momentum and contrarian strategies returns which is in line with Fama and French’s (1993, 
1995) findings. 
For all variables the Skewness are different from Zero which indicates that on average the 
data in my sample are not normally distributed. On the average the Kurtosis are different from 
3 and does not converge with the Skewness indicating that the variables are not obviously 
normally distributed by means of the Skewness and Kurtosis values.  
I refer to the Shapiro-Wilk test that seems more appropriate as a test for normality as it takes 
into account Both Skewness and Kurtosis. It shows that none of the variable is normally 
distributed given that all the P-values are below 0.05.  
Table 3.4 Panel B shows the correlation results between the four series. Market volatility and 
the industrial production are negatively correlated. Oil price and industrial production are 
positively correlated this is not surprising given that high oil price, high production level and 
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market uncertainty may suggest concern over global growth, but this correlation is not strong. 
Oil price are positively correlated with the market volatility but these correlations are far 
from perfect and unlikely to indicate any sign of multicollinearity or to weaken the individual 
impact of these variables on the global momentum and contrarian return.  
Considering the above factors (∆OP, WVOL, and ∆IP) I do not want the standard error of 
individual variable to be inflated more than twice its basics size or minimum size by the 
effect of other factors in the set I then refer to the Variance inflation factor to spot any sign of 
multicollinearity which may exist among variables. The test results in Table 3.4 Panel C 
indicate that the VIF values are below 3 for all the variables suggesting that, the 
multicollinearity among these factors are less likely or do not exist. In sum the 
macroeconomic risks factors do not indicate any sign of multicollinearity and predictability 
during the 1970 to 2013 period suggesting that the data series that include these factors might 
be suitable for further risk based analysis. The results in the Table 3.4 Panel D indicate sign 
of homoscedasticity in the regression given that the probability value from the Breusch-Pagan 
test (0.67) is greater than 5%. These results also indicate the presence of autocorrelation of 
first order for all macroeconomic factors. These analyses also hold when the variables are 
jointly examined (Table 3.5 and 3.6). 
Indeed, these points are made clear in Appendix F15, which represents the scatterplot of the 
three macroeconomic variables suggesting that, the variables are moderately dispersed. 
Appendix F16-19 depicts the kernel distributions of entry and the expected normal 
distribution density across my subsample these graphs obviously confirm my suggestions. 
Appendix F16 Appendix F9 shows a leptokurtic distribution of the oil factor, which appears 
to show a significant high and slim pick indicating. Appendix F17 shows a skewed 
distribution of industrial production that lurches in the right or a slight negative skew 
indicating that the mean is lower than the mode and the median of the series. However, 
Appendix F18 also indicates that market volatility has a positive skew.  
3.2.3.4 Crisis 
The construction of my dataset on global crisis builds on the works of scholars such as 
Carmen and Kenneth’s (2010) study and includes considerable amount of time series. For 
instance, the currency crises, stock market crash, and the Banking crises. I collected the 
currency crisis, banking crisis and stock market crash series from Carmen Reinhart’s website 
available from 1969 to 2010. The business cycle series are also available online from the 
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National Bureau of Economic Research’s website from 1969 to 2014 (for detailed definition 
of the variable please see Appendix E4). These variables take the value 1 when the event 
(crisis) occurs and 0 for non-occurrence. I also use the National Bureau of Economic 
Research (NBER) definitions of recessionary periods in U.S. 
Exploiting the multi-decade’s span of these data, I study the role of repeated crises in 
explaining the observed patterns in momentum and contrarian return that characterise these 
global strategies at the global level. I use U.S data in these analyses, because comparable data 
are not published at the world level. In addition, Bordo et al. (2010) showed that the shocks to 
the global economy, particularly those from the U.S. real GDP, have a decisive effect on 
Individual County’s GDP growth around the world. The same, the international equity market 
behaviour mimics those of the U.S. The recessionary period here, includes all crises periods 
from the end of December 1969 to the beginning of February 2014.  
3.2.4 Summary  
In sum the distribution of Fama and French, market state and macroeconomic risks factors 
during the 1969 to 2014 do not indicate any sign of multicollinearity and predictability. This 
suggests that the data series that include all these variables might be suitable for further risks 
adjustment analysis.   
3.3 Methodology 
3.3.1 Introduction 
This thesis relies on the momentum trading strategies to examine the historical data of 47 
countries worldwide. The methodology is designed as follow: First the study examines the 
global stock market state over the study period and defines the starting and the ending period 
of the bull and bear phase, while taking into consideration the differences, which may be 
apparent among the 47 countries, selected in the study sample. Second, this study will build 
the hypothesis based on the theory and the available and tested theoretical models. Third, I 
collect 47 countries indexes data and conduct statistical test and analysis. The study assumes 
that there is not restriction for investors in trading portfolios of stocks in individual markets 
worldwide. The US dollar is considered as the currency of reference, and the study is 
conducted from the perspective of US investor.  
3.3.2 Global Trading Strategy 
A momentum trader will divide countries' indexes by their past returns into ten deciles and 
rank them in ascending order, he will define the best index return or the bottom deciles as the 
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"winner" and worst as the "Loser". Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) defined the momentum 
trading strategies as buying the winner and selling the Loser, and the contrarian strategy is 
defined as buying the Loser and selling the Winner. In this thesis, I follow the same 
approach. I construct the global momentum portfolio the same as Jegadeesh and Titman 
(1993). In addition, the contrarian portfolios like De Bondt and Thaler (1985). For each 
month t, I rank all 47 countries indices into deciles based on their J-month formation period. 
Deciles portfolios are formed by equally weighting all indices in the deciles ranking. The 
global momentum strategy is to take along position in the top decile portfolio (the winners) 
and short position in the bottom deciles portfolio (the losers). While the global contrarian 
takes a long position in the bottom deciles portfolios (the losers) and short position in the top 
deciles portfolios (the winners) (please see Appendix A and B for the momentum and 
contrarian flowchart, the breakdown structure, and MATLAB programming).  
3.3.3 Momentum Strategy 
To examine the momentum profitability, the first stage is to designate two-time period for the 
construction of the portfolio, which are not necessarily the same. The first-time horizon could 
be denoted (J) which means time of the portfolio construction and (K), which means the 
holding period of the portfolio. The formation or the construction period is defined as the 
length of time that investors observe indexes in order to compute past indexes returns and 
rank them into different groups of portfolios according to their past performances. The 
holding period is defined as the length of time that investors hold their constructed portfolio 
before the constituents are sold. Various formation periods (J = 3, 6, 9 and 12 month), could 
be considered when portfolios are constructed with various holding periods (K = 3, 6, 9 and 
12 month), the choice of these horizons are conformed to empirical test (Jegadeesh and 
Titman 1993). 
Given the combinations of the portfolio’s construction period and the portfolio’s holding 
period (J, K) where J = 3, 6, 9, and 9; K = 3, 6, 9, and 12 the sample computed returns are 
ranked in ascending order following countries’ strength where the first 10% represent the 
lowest past performances and the last 10% represent the highest past performances. This 
approach is following Jegadeesh and Titman (1993). In other words, a portfolio, which 
comprises of the last lowest past performances, is regarded as the loser portfolio while the 
first portfolio, which constitutes of the highest past performance, is regarded as a winner 
portfolio. The formation period starts from the month T1-J and ends at month T = T1. The end 
of T1 is the starting date of the study-holding period and the study rebalances the portfolio at 
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the end of each holding period all over the length of the sample period. The process is 
repeated 𝑁 times. By doing this, the thesis adopts a non- overlapping portfolio approach for 
holding period and reports the average monthly return for the K-month holding period as 
equal-weighted average of the portfolio returns. For example, for the 6-month/6-month 
momentum strategy, at the beginning of each month all countries indices with returns from t 
– 6 (01/1790) to t (6/1970) = 0 are allocated to deciles based on their continuously 
compounded excess returns between t - 6 and t = 0. The portfolio is reformed monthly at t 
and hold until the end of the holding (12/1976) period and the strategy is repeated N time 
until the end of the sub-sample period. 
3.3.3.1 Momentum Time line 
     
Next, an equally weighted average return for each of the portfolio will be computed over the 
next K-month respectively for the monthly analysis where K is the holding period. 
















𝑘, is the holding period 
𝑅𝐿, represents the loser portfolio average return in t month 
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𝑅𝑊, represents the winner portfolio average return in t month 
𝑁𝑝, is the number of losers or the winners in the portfolios. 
This analysis is performed 𝑁 time for each of the momentum strategies. The study will 
continue by computing the sum of all of the average returns of the winner and loser portfolios 
consecutively as follows. 













The next step is to compute the momentum strategies, which can be defined as a strategy of 
buying stocks that have performed well in the past and selling stock that have performed 
badly in the past. (Jegadeesh and Titman 1993) and the returns are computed as follows. 
(6)                                                    𝑀𝑜𝑚 = 𝐴𝑅𝑊 − 𝐴𝑅𝐿 
3.3.3.2 Hypothesis testing: Hypotheses 1of 3  
This hypothesis answers the first question: do momentum strategies work for international 
investors by examining the momentum strategies performances over various construction and 
holding periods (3, 6, 9, and 12 month). 
Ho1: Global momentum strategy applied across the world financial market should generate 
positives and significant returns. 
For the momentum strategies, the T statistics can be computed as follows. 
(7)                                                  𝐻0: (𝐴𝑅𝑤 − 𝐴𝑅𝐿) > 0 
(8)                                          𝑇𝑀,𝑡 =⁡(𝐴𝑅𝑤 − 𝐴𝑅𝐿)/√2𝑆𝑀,𝑡
2 /𝑁 
With the variance of the difference of two samples of equal size N equal to 2𝑆𝑡
2/𝑁 where 
𝑆𝑀,𝑡
2  is computed as. 
(9)                   𝑆𝑀,𝑡
2 = [∑ (𝑅𝑤 − 𝐴𝑅𝑤−)






After all, the final step is to check if the difference between the returns of the winners’ 
portfolios and the losers for portfolios during the N horizon changes in sign (altering point). 
If the cumulative average return of the winner portfolio at this point is higher than the loser 
portfolio’s return, I conclude that I have a momentum profit but if it is lower, I may conclude 
that it is a contrarian profit. I further examine the momentum with a time lag between 
formation and holding periods. For example, to implement the 6-month/6-month strategy, at 
the beginning of each month all countries indices with returns from t – 6 (01/1970) to t = 0 
(6/1970) are allocated to deciles based on their continuously compounded excess returns 
between t - 6 and t = 0. Portfolios are reformed monthly at t+1 (08/1970 and hold till the end 
of the holding (01/1971) period. The strategy is repeated N time until the end of the sub-
sample period. To increase the power on the test, I also perform similar analysis with 
overlapping portfolios where momentum deciles portfolio in any month holds indices ranked 
in the deciles in any of the previous J months, and quintiles portfolios. The winners and the 
loser’s portfolios are constructed using MATLAB Programming; The Script files are 
provided in appendix A3 to A6. 
3.3.4 Contrarian Strategy 
To test the contrarian strategy profitability internationally, the global contrarian strategy is 
designed as follow. The later analysis is repeated for the contrarian strategies (please see 
equation 1-5 for the winners and losers’ portfolios construction). The contrarian strategies 
can be defined as a strategy of buying stocks that have performed badly in the past and 
selling stocks that have performed well in the past (Winners). (De Bondt and Thaler, 1985). I 
implement the contrarian strategy as follow. At the beginning of the month, the indices are 
ranked based on their past F-month returns (F=36, 48, or 60 months). At each month t, the 
strategy buys the long-term loser portfolio consisting of the 10% indices that have the lowest 
past F-month returns (extreme losers) and sells the long-term winner portfolio comprised of 
the 10% of indices that have the highest past F-month returns (extreme winners). The 
contrarian arbitrage portfolio (loser-winner) buys the long-term losers and sells the long-term 
winners.  
Portfolios are held for H-month holding period where (H= 36, 48, or 60 months) in keeping 
with De Bondt and Thaler (1985). By doing this, the thesis adopts a non-overlapping 
portfolio approach for holding periods and reports the average monthly return for the H-
month holding period as equal-weighted average of the portfolio returns. For example, to 
implement the 36-month/36-month strategy, at the beginning of each month all countries 
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indices with returns from t – 36 (01/1970) to t (12/1972) = 0 are allocated to deciles based on 
their continuously compounded excess returns between t - 36 and t = 0. Portfolios are 
reformed monthly at t and hold till the end of the holding (01/1976) period and the strategy is 
repeated N time till the end of the sub-sample period.  
(10)                                                      𝐶𝑜𝑛 = 𝐴𝑅𝐿 − 𝐴𝑅𝑊 
3.3.4.1 Hypothesis Testing: Hypothesis 2 of 3 
This hypothesis answers the second question: do momentum strategies work for international 
investors by examining the momentum strategies performances over various construction and 
holding periods (36, 48, and 60 month). 
Ho2: Global contrarian strategy applied across the world financial market should generate 
positive and significant returns. 
For the momentum strategies, the T statistics can be computed as follows. 
(11)                                                 𝐻0: (𝐴𝑅𝐿 − 𝐴𝑅𝑊) > 0 
(12)                                        𝑇𝐶,𝑡 =⁡ (𝐴𝑅𝐿 − 𝐴𝑅𝑊)/√2𝑆𝐶,𝑡
2 /𝑁 
With the variance of the difference of two samples of equal size N equal to 2𝑆𝐶,𝑡
2 /𝑁 where 
𝑆𝐶,𝑡
2  is computed as. 
(13)                    𝑆𝐶,𝑡
2 = [∑ (𝑅𝐿 − 𝐴𝑅𝐿)




After all, if the cumulative average return of the winner portfolio at this point is higher than 
the loser portfolio’s return, I conclude that I have a contrarian profit but if it is lower, I may 
conclude that it is a contrarian profit. I further examine the contrarian strategies that skip a 
month between the formation and the holding periods. For example, to implement the 36-
month/36-month contrarian strategy, at the beginning of each month all countries indices 
with returns from t - 36 to t = 0 are allocated to deciles based on their continuously 
compounded excess returns between t - 36 and t = 0. Portfolios are reformed monthly at t and 
hold until the end of the holding period and the strategy is repeated N times till the end of the 
sub-sample period. To increase the power on the test, I perform similar analysis on contrarian 
strategies with overlapping portfolios where contrarian deciles portfolios in any particular 
119 
 
month hold indices ranked in the deciles in any of the previous F months, and quintiles 
portfolios. 
3.3.5 Global Risk Factors, Momentum and Contrarian 
I test whether investors earn significant return after adjusting for Fama and French risks, 
markets state risks and macroeconomic risks. To implement the risks adjustment test, I start 
the analysis by regressing the initial global momentum portfolios returns on the Fama and 
French’s three-factor model, and account for time variation through a time dummy. This 
allows a better understanding of the ability of the Fama-French (1993) factors model to 
subsume the Global momentum payoff. Hence, I test the ability of the three-factor model to 
explain returns across momentum portfolios by regressing the global momentum returns on 
the three-factor model. The equation can be illustrated as follow: 
(14)                   𝑀𝑜𝑚𝑡 =⁡𝛼0 +⁡𝛽1(𝑅𝑀 − 𝑅𝐹)𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 ⁡+ 𝛽3𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 +⁡𝑒𝑡 
Where: 𝑀𝑜𝑚𝑡 are the returns of the momentum portfolio at time t, 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 (high minus low) is 
the return to portfolio that is long on high book-to-market stocks and short on low book-to-
market stocks in US, and 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡(small minus big) is returns to long-short portfolios 
constructed using size in US market.⁡𝑅𝑀 − 𝑅𝐹 market premiun on the U.S. market returm 
(market premium), and beta the factors loading are the slopes in the times-series regression. 
I further regress global momentum portfolios’ returns on the market state factors, and account 
for time variation through a time dummy. This allows testing the ability of market state 
factors to explain returns across momentum portfolios. The equation can be illustrated as 
follow: 
 (15)                   𝑀𝑜𝑚𝑡 =⁡𝛼1 +⁡𝛽1𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐷𝑆𝑡−1 ⁡+ 𝛽3𝑇𝑆𝑡−1 ⁡+ 𝛽4𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡−1 +⁡𝑒𝑡 
Where: 𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑡−1 is the liquidity factor at time t-1, 𝐷𝑆𝑡−1 is the Default spread at time t-1, TS is 
the Term spread at time t-1, the 𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡−1is the return on the MSCI world index at time t-1, 
and beta the factors loading are the slopes in the times-series regression. I take the first lag to 
avoid spurious regression by including non-stationary variables. 
So far, the predictive variables have been macroeconomic in nature, but derived from 
financial market, which has the advantage of being forward looking with zero measurement 
error, see equation (9). Now I extend the analysis with the use of three pure macroeconomic 
factors. This results in the following regression model. 
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(16)                   𝑀𝑜𝑚𝑡 =⁡𝛼2 + 𝛽2∆𝑂𝑃𝑡−1 ⁡+ 𝛽3𝑊𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑡−1 ⁡+ 𝛽4∆𝐼𝑃𝑡−1 +⁡𝑒𝑡 
Where: ∆𝑂𝑃𝑡−1 is the percent change in monthly oil price, 𝑊𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑡−1 is the market volatility 
(standard deviation of the return on the MSCI world indices), and ∆𝐼𝑃𝑡−1⁡ is the (percent 
change) in monthly value of the US Industrial production. I take the first lag to avoid 
spurious regression by including non-stationary variables. 
3.3.5.1 How does of Global Risk Affect the Momentum Profit 
Having examined evidence for changing performance of the global momentum strategies, I 
adopt a risk factor model similar to Avramov et al. (2015) in order to explore deeply the 
dynamic relation between the momentum strategies, and macroeconomic risk factors. I use 
monthly observation of the world risk factors (MSCI market volatility, world industrial 
production, and MSCI world market return) that could jointly explain the changes on 
momentum and contrarian profitability. I use the U.S. macroeconomic risks factors (oil price, 
liquidity, default spread and term spread) when necessary as a proxy for the world risk factors 
as stated earlier. Due to the multinational nature of many U.S. companies and due to the 
enormous global diversity of asset holdings of U.S. companies, the U.S. equity market is a 
fair proxy of world asset market (Chako and Evans, 2014). However, Avramov et al. (2015) 
found that changing the state of macroeconomic factor do not affect the variation of the 
momentum profit in U.S. and non-U.S. countries. (Japan, and Eurozone countries). I also 
conduct additional analysis using non-U.S. variable such as euribo interest rate and the Fama 
and French global risk factors, the global Fama and French factor excluding the U.S., Asia 
pacific excluding Japan. The euribo interest rate start in 1999 while the global Fama Factor 
start in 1990 and cover a limited period but the test is conducted for robustness. The 
limitation is that it is not this thesis to demonstrate how local macroeconomic factors will 
explain the momentum at the counties level which could be done with a more complete study 
for the all the countries where such data are available.  
(17) 𝑀𝑜𝑚𝑡 =⁡𝛼3 +⁡𝛽1(𝑅𝑀 − 𝑅𝐹)𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 ⁡+ 𝛽3𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 ⁡+ 𝛽4∆𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝐷𝑆𝑡−1 ⁡+
𝛽6𝑇𝑆𝑡−1 ⁡+ 𝛽7𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡−1 + 𝛽8∆𝑂𝑃𝑡−1 ⁡+ 𝛽9𝑊𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑡−1 ⁡+ 𝛽10𝐼𝑃𝑡−1⁡ +⁡𝑒𝑡 
Where: 𝑀𝑜𝑚𝑡 is the momentum returns at time t,  𝑅𝑀 − 𝑅𝐹 is the market premium return,  
𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 (High minus low) is the return to portfolios that, is long on high book-to-market stocks 
and short on low book-to-market stocks in US, and ⁡𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡(Small minus big) is the returns to 
long-short portfolios constructed using size in US market. The 𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑡−1is the liquidity factor at 
time t-1, 𝐷𝑆𝑡−1 is the Default spread at time t-1, 𝑇𝑆𝑡−1 is the Term spread at time t-1, and 
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⁡𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡−1is MSCI world indices’ returns at time t-1. ∆𝑂𝑃𝑡−1 is the percent change in monthly 
oil price at time t-1, 𝑊𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑡−1 is the market volatility at time t-1 and ∆𝐼𝑃𝑡−1⁡ is the percent 
change in monthly value of the US Industrial production at time t-1. I estimate (17) Using the 
GMM method with historical data available information at the time of this study. 
I go further by examining the role of crises in explaining the momentum profit. To test the 
link between crises and the momentum, I construct a subsample that includes only 
momentum during crisis period and global risks factors’ observations during the crisis period 
and a subsample for non-crisis periods (currency crisis banking crisis and stock market 
crash). I conduct this analysis separately for the three different crisis factors. As in equation 
(17), I test the null hypothesis that the estimated intercept is equal to zero across all 
momentum and contrarian portfolios when the crisis effect and all macroeconomic risks 
factors effect are taken into account against the alternative that the estimated intercept is 
different from zero.  
I examine the link between the performance of the global momentum and contrarian 
strategies and the economic development. I concentrate on the impact of business cycles on 
strategies performances according to the NBER business cycle definition. The sample covers 
7 expansions and 7 contractions periods. While I have limited number of expansions and 
contractions, I aim to shed the light on the impact of business cycles on this strategies’ 
performance.  
I examine how the global momentum strategies returns vary in both expansion and 
contraction periods. To study the link between business cycles and the momentum strategies 
performance, I construct a subsample that includes only momentum during expansion periods 
and global risks factors observations during the expansion period and a subsample for 
contraction period. The selection of the period is based on NBER business cycle definition 
specifications. I examine how change in business cycle affects the momentum and the 
contrarian profit. As in equation (17), I test the null hypothesis that the estimated intercept is 
equal to zero across all momentum and contrarian portfolios during contraction, and 
expansion period when all global risks factors effects are considered against the alternative 
that the estimated intercept is different from zero. 
One possible explanation for the momentum and contrarian profits is that investors that opt 
for these strategies bear extra risks. My previous results show that a significant portion of the 
momentum profits comes from emerging markets. This is in line with Harvey (1995) and 
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Bekaert et al. (1997) who showed that emerging market returns have higher autocorrelation 
and are more predictable. Naranjo and porter (2007) suggested that investment strategies that 
diversify across countries provide lower portfolio standard deviation and increased expected 
return. Theses returns generate form portfolios diversifications are larger when adding 
emerging market. Given the cultural differences, the political instability and the low liquidity 
of these emerging markets, there are query about the viability of the momentum strategies or 
the strategies being bogus. To examine the possibility that there could be disparity in risk 
adjustment between emerging and developed markets, I regress the strategies returns issued 
from the emerging market subset on risk factors discarding all developed countries effect and 
subsequently, the momentum strategies issued from the developed market subset, established 
market subset and the globalization subset. As in equation (17), I test the null hypothesis that 
the estimated intercept is equal to zero across all momentum portfolios against the alternative 
that the estimated intercept is different from zero in developed, emerging markets, in 
established market and during the globalisation period. 
3.3.5.2 How does Crisis Affect the Momentum and Contrarian Profit? 
For robustness, I add a dummy variable to my regression model to control for the impact of 
crisis period, the dummy variable takes the value one when the economy is in crisis mode and 
zero otherwise. I also conduct a separate analysis with crisis period subset (Banking crisis, 
currency crisis, and stock market crash) and non-crisis. I examine how crises affect the 
momentum and the contrarian profit using the following equation. 
 (18) 𝑀𝑜𝑚𝑡 =⁡𝛼8 + 𝛽1𝐷𝑡 +⁡𝛽2(𝑅𝑀 − 𝑅𝐹)𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 ⁡+ 𝛽4𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑡−1 +
𝛽6𝐷𝑆𝑡−1 ⁡+ 𝛽7𝑇𝑆𝑡−1 ⁡+ 𝛽8𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡−1 + 𝛽9∆𝑂𝑃𝑡−1 ⁡+ 𝛽10𝑊𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑡−1 ⁡+ 𝛽11∆𝐼𝑃𝑡−1⁡ +⁡𝑒𝑡 
Where: 𝑀𝑜𝑚𝑡 is the momentum returns, 𝐷𝑡 is the Dummy variable that is one if the 
economic is in crisis at time t and zero otherwise, 𝑅𝑀 − 𝑅𝐹 is the market premium. 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 
(High minus Low) is the return to portfolios that is long on high book-to-market stocks and 
short on low book-to-market stocks in US, and 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡(Small minus big) is returns to long-
short portfolios constructed using size in US market. The 𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑡−1is the liquidity factor at time 
t-1, 𝐷𝑆𝑡−1 is the Default Spread at time t-1, 𝑇𝑆𝑡−1 is the Term spread at time t-1, and 
⁡𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡−1 is the MSCI world indices return at time t-1. ∆𝑂𝑃𝑇−1 is the change in monthly oil 
price at time t-1, 𝑊𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑡−1 is the market volatility at time t-1, and ∆𝐼𝑃𝑌𝑇−1⁡ is the change in 
monthly value of the US Industrial production at time t-1. I estimate (18) using OLS and 
Newey West procedure consecutively with historical data available information at the time of 
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the study, I also estimate the above regression for currency crises, debt crises cycle, and 
banking crises.  
3.3.5.3 How do Business Cycle Affect Momentum and Contrarian Profit? 
I concentrate on the impact of business cycles on strategies performances according to the 
NBER business cycle definition. The sample covers 7 expansions and 7 contractions periods. 
While I have limited number of expansions and contractions, I aim to shed the light on the 
impact of business cycles on these strategies performance. I examine how changes in 
business cycle and global risks factors affect the global momentum and contrarian strategies 
returns. To study the link between business cycles and the momentum and contrarian 
strategies performance, add a dummy variable to my regression model to control for the 
business cycle period. The dummy that takes the value one when the economy is in 
expansions mode and zero otherwise. I also conduct a separate analysis with subset of 
contraction, and expansion periods. 
(19) 𝑀𝑜𝑚𝑡 =⁡𝛼9 + 𝛽1𝛿𝑡 +⁡𝛽2(𝑅𝑀 − 𝑅𝐹)𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 ⁡+ 𝛽4𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 ⁡+ 𝛽5𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑡−1 +
𝛽6𝐷𝑆𝑡−1 ⁡+ 𝛽7𝑇𝑆𝑡−1 ⁡+ 𝛽9𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡−1 + 𝛽10∆𝑂𝑃𝑡−1 ⁡+ 𝛽12𝑊𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑡−1 ⁡+ 𝛽13∆𝐼𝑃𝑡−1⁡ +⁡𝑒𝑡 
Where: 𝑀𝑜𝑚𝑡 are the momentum returns,⁡𝑅𝑀 − 𝑅𝐹 is the market premium, 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 (High 
minus low) is the return to portfolios that is long on high book-to-market stocks and short on 
low book-to-market stocks in US, ⁡𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡(Small minus big) are returns to long-short 
portfolios constructed using size in US market, 𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑡−1is the liquidity factor at time t-1, 𝐷𝑆𝑡−1 
is the Default spread at time t-1, 𝑇𝑆𝑡−1 is the Term spread at time t-1,⁡𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡−1is the MSCI 
world indices return at time t-1, ∆𝑂𝑃𝑇−1 is the change in monthly oil price at time t-1, 
𝑊𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑡−1 is the market volatility at time t-1, and ∆𝐼𝑃𝑌𝑇−1⁡ is the change in monthly value of 
the US Industrial production at time t-1. I estimate (14).  
3.3.5.4 Do Risks Factors Explain the Global Momentum and Contrarian Excess Returns? 
 I also examine whether momentum and contrarian investors earn significant return in excess 
of the US risk free rate, after adjusting for macroeconomic risks factors. To examine the 
possibility that there could be abnormal returns generated from the momentum and contrarian 
strategies, I regress the excess global momentum, and contrarian portfolios returns on the 
macroeconomic risks factors. 
(20) 𝑀𝑜𝑚𝑡 − 𝑅𝐹𝑡 =⁡𝛼7 +⁡𝛽1(𝑅𝑀 − 𝑅𝐹)𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 ⁡+ 𝛽3𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝐷𝑆𝑡−1 ⁡+
𝛽6𝑇𝑆𝑡−1 ⁡+ 𝛽7𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡−1 + 𝛽8∆𝑂𝑃𝑡−1 ⁡+ 𝛽9𝑊𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑡−1 ⁡+ 𝛽10∆𝐼𝑃𝑡−1⁡ +⁡𝑒𝑡 
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Where: 𝑀𝑜𝑚𝑡 are the momentum returns, 𝑅𝐹𝑡 is the risk free rate at time t,⁡𝑅𝑀 − 𝑅𝐹 is the 
market premium, 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 (High minus low) is the return to portfolios that is long on high 
book-to-market stocks and short on low book-to-market stocks in US,⁡𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡(Small minus 
big) are returns to long-short portfolios constructed using size in US market, 𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑡−1is the 
liquidity factor at time t-1, 𝐷𝑆𝑡−1 is the Default spread at time t-1, 𝑇𝑆𝑡−1 is the Term spread 
at time t-1, ⁡𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡−1is the MSCI world indices return at time t-1, ∆𝑂𝑃𝑇−1 is the change in 
monthly oil price at time t-1, 𝑊𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑡−1 is the market volatility at time t-1, and ∆𝐼𝑃𝑌𝑇−1⁡ is 
the change in monthly value of the US Industrial production at time t-1.  
With this approach, I measure how global macroeconomic risks factors affect the profitability 
of the momentum and contrarian strategies and the changes over time. As in equation (20), I 
test the null hypothesis that the estimated intercept is equal to zero across all momentum 
portfolios against the alternative that the estimated intercept is different from zero. 
3.3.5.5 Hypothesis Testing: Hypothesis 3 of 3 
The remaining hypothesis (Ho3) seeks to answer the question: do momentum and contrarian 
profits can be explained by risks factors? 
Ho3: Momentum and Contrarian profit are compensation for risk. 
I test the null hypothesis that the estimated intercepts (Alpha) of regressions are equal to zero 
across all momentum portfolios against the alternative that the estimated intercept is different 
from zero. 
𝐻𝑜:⁡𝛼3 = 0 
𝐻𝑜:⁡𝛼3 ≠ 0 
More precisely, I consider all possible combinations of predictive macroeconomic risks 
factors. The predictive variables include all Fama and French risks factors, all market states 
factors, and all macroeconomic variables included in the previous equations (14-17); starting 
with model (14) which drops all predictive market states and macroeconomic risks variables 
and ending with all-inclusive model (17). After all, If Alpha is equal to zero, I will conclude 
that I have a risk adjusted profit but if Alpha is different from zero I may conclude that global 
risks factor does not explain momentum profit. 
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3.3.6 Estimation Method 
I start the estimation with Ordinary Least Square (OLS), follow by the Newey West 
estimation procedure (Avramov and Chan, 2015) with the aim to examine whether 
momentum and contrarian investors earn significant profit after adjusting for risks factors. 
Concerned with inferences that there are deviations from the assumption that the variables are 
jointly normal.  I consider a test, which accommodates non-normality, heteroscedasticity, and 
temporal dependence of returns; such tests are of interest given that, without the normality 
assumption, finite-sample properties of asset pricing model tests are difficult to derive 
(Campbell, Lo, and Mackinglay, 1997). Furthermore, departures of monthly observation in 
the sample are clearly documented. There is also abundant evidence of temporal dependence 
in the sample. It is therefore desirable to consider the effects of relaxing these statistical 
assumptions. Considering the linear regression model, the estimation can be formulated using 
the development of the Generalized Method Moment (Zivot and Wang, 2006) as: 
(21)                                                  𝑀𝑜𝑚𝑡 = 𝑧𝑡
′𝛿0 + 𝜖𝑡, 𝑡 = 1,… , 𝑛                                            
 Where, 𝑧𝑡 is an L × 1 vector of explanatory variables (Fama and French, market state and 
macroeconomic factor), 𝛿0 is a vector of unknown coefficients and 𝜖𝑡 is a random error term. 
The model (1) allows for the possibility that some or all of the elements of 𝑧𝑡 may be 
correlated with the error term 𝜖𝑡, i.e., 𝐸[𝑧𝑡𝑘𝜖𝑡] ≠ 0 for some k. If 𝐸[𝑧𝑡𝑘𝜖𝑖] ≠ 0 then 𝑧𝑡𝑘 is 
called an endogenous variable. This analysis considers the time variation as endogenous 
given the lend of my sample period. It is well known that if 𝑧𝑡 contains endogenous variables 
then the least squares estimator of  𝛿0 in (1) is biased and inconsistent. 
Associated with the model (1), it is assumed that there exists a K × 1 vector of instrumental 
variables𝑣𝑡,  which  contain some or all the elements of 𝑧𝑘. Let 𝑤𝑡 represents the vector of 
unique and non-constant elements of {𝑀𝑜𝑚𝑡,𝑧𝑡, 𝑣𝑡}. It is assumed that {𝑤𝑡} is a stationary 
and ergodic stochastic process. The instrumental variables 𝑣𝑡 , satisfy the set of K 
orthogonality conditions. 
(22)                                 𝐸[𝑔𝑡(𝑤𝑡, 𝛿0)] = 𝐸[𝑣𝑡𝜖𝑡] = 𝐸[𝑣𝑡(𝑀𝑜𝑚𝑡,−⁡𝑧
′
𝑡⁡𝛿0)] = 0                         
 Where 𝑔𝑡(𝑤𝑡, 𝛿0) =⁡⁡𝑣𝑡𝜖𝑡 =  𝑣𝑡(𝑀𝑜𝑚𝑡,−⁡𝑧
′
𝑡⁡𝛿0) = 0.   Expanding (2), gives the relation 
Σ𝑣𝑀𝑜𝑚 = Σ𝑀𝑜𝑚𝑧𝛿0 
Where, Σ𝑣𝑟 = 𝐸[𝑣𝑡𝑀𝑜𝑚𝑡]⁡𝑎𝑛𝑑⁡Σ𝑣𝑧 = 𝐸[𝑣𝑡𝑧′𝑡]. For identification of 𝛿0, it is required that the 
K × L matrix  𝐸[𝑣𝑡𝑧′𝑡] = Σ𝑣𝑧⁡be of full rank L. This rank condition ensures that 𝛿0 is the 






A necessary condition for identification of  𝛿0 is the order condition 
(23)                                                                𝐾 ≥ 𝐿                                                                    
Which simply states that the number of instrumental variables must be greater than or equal 
to the number of explanatory variables (1). If 𝐾 = 𝐿 then 𝛿0is said to be (apparently) just 
identified; if 𝐾 ≥ 𝐿 then  𝛿0 is said to be (apparently) over-identified; if  𝐾 < 𝐿  then 𝛿0 is 
not identified. The world “apparently” in parentheses is used to remind the reader that the 
rank condition 
 (24)                                                        ⁡rank⁡(Σ𝑣𝑧) = L                                                           
Must also be satisfied for identification. In the regression model (1), the error terms are 
allowed to be conditionally heteroscedastic as well as serially correlated. For the case in 
which 𝜖𝑡 is conditionally heteroscedastic, it is assumed that {𝑔𝑡} = {𝑣𝑡𝜖𝑡} is a stationary and 





2] = 𝑆 
Where S is a non-singular 𝐾×𝐾 matrix. The matrix S is the asymptotic variance-covariance 
matrix of the sample moment?̅? = 𝑛−1∑ 𝑔𝑡(𝑤𝑡,
𝑛
𝑡−1 𝛿0). This follows from the central limit 








Where avar (?̅?) = S denotes the variance-covariance matrix of the limiting distribution of 
√𝑛?̅?. 
For the case in which 𝑡is serially correlated and possibly conditionally heteroscedastic as 















Where, 𝕣𝑗 = 𝐸[𝑔𝑡𝑔𝑡−𝑗
′ ⁡] = ⁡𝐸[𝑣𝑡𝑣𝑡−𝑗
′ ⁡𝜖𝑡𝜖𝑡−𝑗
′ ]. In the above avar (?̅?) = S is also referred to as 
the long-run variance ?̅?. 
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The generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator of 𝛿 in (1) is constructed by 
exploiting the orthogonality conditions (2), the idea is to create a set of estimating equations 
for 𝛿 by making sample moments match. 
The population moments are defined by (2). The sample moments based on (2) for an 



































These moment conditions are a set of K linear equations in L unknowns. Equating these 
sample moments to the population moment 𝐸[𝑣𝑡𝜖𝑡] = 0 gives the estimating equations 
(25)                                                           𝑆𝑣𝑟 = 𝑆𝑣𝑧𝛿 = 0                                            
Where  𝑆𝑣𝑀𝑜𝑚 = 𝑛
−1∑ 𝑣𝑡𝑀𝑜𝑚𝑡
𝑛
𝑡=1  and  𝑆𝑣𝑀𝑜𝑚 = 𝑛
−1∑ 𝑣𝑡𝑧𝑡
′𝑛
𝑡=1  are the sample moments. 
If K= L (𝛿0 is just identified) and 𝑆𝑣𝑧 is invertible then the GMM estimator of 𝛿 is: 
𝛿 = 𝑆𝑣𝑧
−1𝑆𝑣𝑀𝑜𝑚 
Which is also known as the indirect least squares estimator. If K > L, then there may not be a 
solution to the estimating equations (5). In this case, the idea is to do try to find 𝛿 that makes 
𝑆𝑣𝑟 = 𝑆𝑣𝑧𝛿  as close to zero as possible. To do this, let ?̂? denotes a 𝐾×𝐾 symmetric and 
positive definite weight matrix, possibly dependent on the data; such that ?̂? → 𝑊as 𝑛 → ∞ 
with 𝑊 symmetric and positive definite then the GMM estimator 𝛿 denote 𝛿?̂? is defined as  
𝛿?̂? = argmin 𝐽 (𝛿, ?̂?) 
Where  
(26)                                                𝐽(?̂?, ?̂?) = 𝑛𝑔𝑛(𝛿)′⁡?̂?𝑔𝑛(𝛿)                                                
                      = 𝑛(𝑀𝑜𝑚 − 𝑆𝑣𝑧𝛿)′?̂?(𝑆𝑣𝑀𝑜𝑚 − 𝑆𝑣𝑧𝛿) 
Since 𝐽(𝛿, ?̂?) is a simple quadratic form in 𝛿, straightforward calculus may be used to 
determine the analytic solution for 𝛿(?̂?): 




′ ?̂?𝑆𝑣𝑧)                                    
3.3.7 Summary 
The aims of the study are to demonstrate the global momentum and contrarian investment 
profitability and the reasons explaining their survival. I do this by introducing the strategies 
and constructing a robust test of momentum and contrarian risk adjustment using a 
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generalized Method of Moments (GMM) framework. Within the GMM framework, given 
that the distribution can be both serially dependent and conditionally heteroscedastic. I need 
only to assume that the momentum returns are stationary (Campbell et al., 1997). 
The later risk adjustment analysis on momentum is subsequently repeated step by step for the 
contrarian strategies risk adjustment. The following analyses draw on the above general 
development of the GMM. However, I also report results based on OLS and Newey West 
procedure (please see Appendix C1-16).  
3.4 Conclusion 
In this section I explain in details the main methodologies used to examine the global 
momentum and contrarian strategies profitability, and motivate the dataset used. I implement 
the global momentum and contrarian strategies the same as Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) to 
examine whether the global momentum and contrarian strategies work for international 
investors. I also adopt a risk factor model similar to Avramov et al. (2015) in order to explore 
deeply the dynamic relation between the momentum and contrarian strategies, and 
macroeconomic risks factors. However, previous researchers have attempted to explain the 
momentum and the contrarian profit, namely behaviourists and those who support the rational 
pricing and the Efficient Market Hypothesis. They suggested significant number of models. 
Referring to the momentum and contrarian strategy. In addition, the efficient market seems to 
be less challenging, the literature recorded that the three-factor asset-pricing model of Fama 
and French is likely to capture the reversal effect implying that the abnormal contrarian return 
could be a compensation for risk. Nevertheless, there is a deficiency of asset pricing model to 
explain the momentum and contrarian profits. Macroeconomics risks factors, the momentum 
and contrarian profit have been actively studied at the firm level. The global approach could 
be worth of further study. It is notable; however, that using multi-factors model as indicated 
in this thesis shows a less controversial result. The contrarian generates statistical and 
significant abnormal return 1% monthly (12.68% per year) after adjusting for global risk, 







Chapter 4: Momentum on International Equity Indices 
4.1 Introduction 
In this Chapter, I examine the profitability of the global momentum profit; I implement the 
strategy with non-overlapping portfolios on the full sample using methodology from 
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993). I also examine a set of strategies that skip a month between the 
formation and the holding period. By doing this I avoid some of the bid-ask spread, price 
pressure, and lagged effects that inspire the evidences short-term price pressure or lack of 
liquidity in the market documented in Jegadeesh (1990). I then show how the profitability of 
the global momentum vary from one market state to another by examining the global 
momentum profit with the established markets, then during the globalization period, with 
developed countries, and the emerging countries. In the second section, I increase the power 
of the test by examining the profitability of the momentum strategies with overlapping 
portfolios; this includes monthly rebalancing Winners Minus Losers. In both cases, I consider 
the impact of return continuation by examining a second set of strategies that skip a month 
between the formation and the holding periods. 
The overlapping portfolios demonstrate a strong consistently and significantly profitable 
global momentum for international investors on average over the full sample period (1969-
2014). The most successful momentum strategy selects stocks based on their previous 
performances over 9 months and then holds the portfolio for the next 3 months. This strategy 
yields 3% per month (42.57% per year) but the returns may vary considerably from one 
market condition to another. Evidences also indicate that the momentum strategies are highly 
profitable in developed country that the contribution of emerging country are less significant, 
although the highest momentum return could be observed in emerging country with the 9-
month/3-month strategy when there is not time lag between the portfolio formation period 
and the holding period. The success of the global momentum strategies presented in this 
chapter demonstrate that trading on indices performances worldwide while considering the 
momentum as global coordinated a generalised phenomenon provide more evidences to 
challenge the Efficient Market Hypothesis.  
4.2 Momentum Strategies using non-overlapping Portfolios 
4.2.1 Introduction 
In this section, I examined the profitability of the momentum strategies based on past returns 
of countries indices in international equity markets. I construct non-overlapping portfolios 
130 
 
where the end of the formation period is the starting date of holding period and rebalance the 
portfolio at the end of each holding period all over the length of the sample period as 
indicated in section 3.3.3. I show how the profitability of the global momentum vary from 
one market state to another by examining the global momentum profit on the full sample 
1969-2014, then with the established markets only, during the globalization period, with 
developed countries only, and the emerging countries only.  
4.2.2 Momentum strategies for International Investors: full sample 1969-2014 
I start the analysis by implementing the basic momentum strategies firstly, on the entire times 
series data. In period `t’ I buy the winner countries and sell the loser countries. The winners 
and the losers’ portfolios are constructed based on their past performances. I use four 
different formation periods 'J' and four for different holding periods 'K’, where J equals 3, 6, 
9, and 12 months and K equal 3, 6, 9, and 12 months as indicated in Table 4.1.1. Thus, I have 
16 strategies in total.  The average monthly returns of the winners and the losers’ portfolio 
are indicated in the table below. The momentum portfolios in Table 4.1.1 panel A are formed 
immediately after the formation period, but I also examine a second set of 16 momentum 
strategies that skip a month between the formation and the holding period as indicated in 
Table 4.1.1 Panel B. The t-statistics are reported in the parentheses and the p-values are 
reported next. The sample period is from December 1969 to January 2014.  
[Insert Table 4.1.1 Here] 
Table 4.1.1 reports the results for the whole sample period, the winner, the loser, and the 
momentum portfolio (winner-loser) returns are reported for the 32 strategies. All the 
momentum strategies’ returns are positive except the 12-month/3-month and the 12-month/3-
month that skip one month. The most successful momentum strategy selects stocks based on 
their previous performances over 9 months and then holds the portfolio for the next 3 months. 
This strategy yields estimated 3% per month (42.57% per year) with a t-statistic of 4.50 and a 
p-value of 0.00 (Table 4.1.1 Panel A), when there is not time lag between the portfolio 
formation period and the holding period.  
Testing out whether skipping a time lag is beneficial, I find that skipping a month between 
the formation and the holding period does not improve the strategy performance as the 
equivalent holding period returns are lower. The winner portfolio outperforms the loser 
portfolio to generate positive average effective compounded momentum return of 1.46% per 
month (18.99% per year) with a t-statistic of 2.36 and a p-value of 0.02 (Table 4.1.1 panel B). 
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By doing this, I avoid some of the bid-ask spread, price pressure, and lagged effects that 
inspire the short-term price pressure or lack of liquidity in the market as documented in 
Jegadeesh (1990).  Antti (2016) suggested that ETFs often exhibit similar behaviour and the 
difference in premiums in the short run are driven by mean-reverting shock to prices, which 
means that it is enormously important for investor to correctly pick which fund to trade each 
time. The 9-month formation period is the most profitable formation period regardless of the 
holding period for both set of strategies. 
These results also show that the momentum strategies’ returns are positive in most of the 
strategies, and that the returns are highly significant in most cases mainly when the strategies 
skip one month between the formation and the holding period. I may suggest that the 
momentum strategies are on average profitable internationally, that the winner portfolio 
outperforms the loser portfolio to generate positive average momentum profits. I then 
establish that the most profitable strategy is the 9-month/3-month that does not skip a month 
(Table 4.1.1 Panel A) and when the strategy skips a month, it remains highly and 
significantly profitable in all the holding period (Table 4.1.1 Panel B).  
My results support Jegadeesh and Titman’s (1993) findings, which suggest that the strategies 
that buy past winners and sell past losers, are consistently profitable and generate positive 
return of about 0.95% with a significant t-statistic of 3.07 in the US with the 6-month/6-
month strategies. These findings also indicate a better momentum return than Chan et al. 
(2000) study that suggest that momentum strategies are internationally profitable on the view 
point of US investor as they suggested that on average the momentum strategy generates 1% 
per month which is significantly lower than the average momentum return in this study 
2.98% per month. 
However, Chan et al. (2000) weighted countries indices based on the deviation of their return 
in the previous period from the cross-sectional average return, and this thesis’s results help 
restate the fact that momentum strategies returns are even higher if investors apply the initial 
momentum strategy as by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) at the global level. In comparison to 
the Jegadeesh and Titman (1993, 2001) momentum strategies on individual stocks in US 
market, the momentum study on countries indices indicate that the profitability of these 
strategies is also function of the time horizon as the 9-month shows to generate superior 
return in any given horizon. 
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4.2.3 Momentum Strategies Return on Established Markets 
In addition to the momentum strategies implemented on the on the full sample period as 
shown in the above analysis, I also implement the momentum strategies in a more stable 
sample period (1969-2014). Where all countries indices start and end in the same date to 
avoid any blunder, which may occur, from variation among the starting dates of countries 
indices and to gauge the effect of the variation in the sample size. 
To implement the basic momentum strategies on the subsample1969-2014 (18 countries), at 
't' I buy the winner countries and sell the loser countries. The winners and the losers’ 
portfolios are constructed based on their past performances. I use 4 different formation 
periods 'J' and 4 for different holding periods 'K', where 'J' equal 3, 6, 9, and 12 months and 
'K' equal 3, 6, 9, and 12 months as indicated in Table 4.1.2 below. This gives a total of 16 
strategies.  The average monthly returns of the winners and the losers’ portfolio are indicated 
in the table below. The momentum portfolios in Table 4.1.2 panel A, are formed immediately 
after the formation period, but I also examine a second set of 16 momentum strategies that 
skip a month between the formation and the holding period as indicated in Table 4.1.2 Panel 
B. The t-statistics are reported in the parentheses and the p-values are reported next. The 
sample period is from December 1969 to January 2014.         
[Insert Table 4.1.2 Here] 
Table 4.1.2 reports the results for the whole sample period, the winner, the loser, and the 
momentum portfolio (winner-loser) returns are reported for the 32 strategies. All the 
momentum strategies’ returns are positives. The most successful momentum strategy selects 
stocks based on their previous performances over 9 months and then holds the portfolio for 
the next 3 months. This strategy yields 1.77% per month (23.43% per year) with a t-statistic 
of 3.19 and a p-value of 0.00 (Table 4.1.2 Panel A), when there is not time lag between the 
portfolio formation period and the holding period. 
Testing out whether skipping a time lag is beneficial, I find that skipping a month between 
the formation and the holding period does not improve the strategy performance as the 
equivalent holding period returns are lower. The winner portfolio outperforms the loser 
portfolio to generate positive average effective compounded momentum return of 1.04% per 
month (13.209 per year) with a t-statistic of 1.88 and a p-value of 0.06 (Table 4.1.2 panel B). 
By doing this, I avoid some of the bid-ask spread, price pressure, and lagged effects that 
inspire the short-term price pressure or lack of liquidity in the market as documented in 
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Jegadeesh (1990). The 9-month formation period remains profitable regardless of the holding 
period for both set of strategies.  
Given that the momentum strategies return are positive in most of the case and that, the 
returns are highly significant in most cases mainly when the strategies skip one month 
between the formation and the holding period. I suggest that the momentum strategies are on 
average profitable internationally, that the winner portfolio outperforms the loser portfolio to 
generate positive average momentum profits. I then establish that the most profitable strategy 
is the 9-month/3-month that does not skip a month between the formation and the holding 
period (Table 4.1.2 Panel A). These results are complementary to the findings in Table 4.1.1 
and support Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) findings, which suggest that the strategies that buy 
past winners and sell past losers are consistently profitable and generate positive return of 
about 0.95% with a significant t-statistic of 3.07. These findings also indicate a better 
momentum return than Chan et al. (2000) study, that suggest that, momentum strategies are 
internationally profitable on the view point of US investor as they suggested that the 
momentum strategy generate 1% per month, which is significantly lower than the result 
reported in this study (1.77% per month). In comparison to the Jegadeesh and Titman (1993, 
2001) the momentum strategies is tested on individual stocks with the 6-month/6-month 
strategies, while the momentum result on this thesis are profitable regardless of the sample 
size and the time horizon. 
4.2.4 Momentum Returns since Globalisation 1994-2014 
I consider alternatively a set of momentum portfolios, which are formed on the 1994-2014 
subsamples (47 countries), given that, since MSCI launched the Emerging Market Index in 
1988, which consisted of just 10 countries representing less than 1% of world market 
capitalization. From 1994 to 2014 the MSCI Emerging Market Index consist of 23 countries 
representing 10% of world market capitalization. The Index is now available for a number of 
regions, market segments or sizes and covers approximately 85% of the free float-adjusted 
market capitalization each of the 23 countries. In other words, there was a significant change 
in 1994 in terms of volume and intensity and we can perfectly “assume” that the origins of 
Globalisation can be traced to 1994. In addition, this year is associated with the onset of 





 At 't' I buy the winner countries and sell the loser countries. The winners and the losers’ 
portfolios are constructed based on their past performances. I use 4 different formation 
periods 'J' and 4 for different holding periods 'K', where 'J' equal 3, 6, 9, and 12 months and 
'K' equal 3, 6, 9, and 12 months as indicated in Table 4.1.3 below, this give a total of 16 
strategies.  The average monthly returns of the winners and the losers’ portfolio are indicated 
in the Table 4.1.3. The momentum portfolios in Table 4.1.3 panel A are formed immediately 
after the formation period, but I also examine a second set of 16 momentum strategies that 
skip a month between the formation and the holding period as indicated in Table 4.1.3 Panel 
B. The t-statistics are reported in the parentheses and the p-value are reported next. The 
sample period is from January 1994 to January 2014.       
[Insert Table 4.1.3 Here] 
In Table 4.1.3., my attempt to examine the momentum strategies on the stock market indices 
with 47 counties from 1994 to 2014, which, include the global finance crisis 2007-2008 raise 
the alarm. It shows that the momentum strategies remain profitable on average by 9 out of 16 
strategies. The optimum strategies 6-month/6-month generates positive payoffs 0.60% per 
month (7.44% per year) with a t-statistic of 1.39 and a p-value of 0.17 (Table 4.1.3 Panel A). 
The result also indicates that the 9-month/3-month portfolio of countries indices remains 
significant and generates negative return -1.52% per month (19.84% per year) with a t-
statistic of -1,82 and a p-value of 0.08 during the globalization period. 
Testing out whether skipping a time lag is beneficial, I find that skipping a month between 
the formation and the holding period does improve the strategy performance as the equivalent 
holding period returns are higher. The winner portfolio outperforms the loser portfolio to 
generate positive average effective compounded momentum return of 1.05% per month 
(13.35% per year) with a t-statistic of 2.80 and a p-value of 0.01 (Table 4.1.3 Panel B) By 
doing this, 
I avoid some of the bid-ask spread, price pressure, and lagged effects that inspire the short-
term price pressure or lack of liquidity in the market as documented in Jegadeesh (1990). 
These results are in line with Avramov et al.’s (2014) study which suggested that momentum 
strategies can generate a negative return of- 0.69 percent in period of illiquidity and a 
significant 1.09 percent when the market is relatively liquid, but Avramov et al. (2014) are 
based on 5 portfolio (quintiles) while this thesis rang indices into deciles portfolios.  
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4.2.5 Momentum in Developed Market 
To assess the contribution of the Developed countries on global momentum strategies, since 
the momentum profit may differ from developed to emerging countries. I implemented the 
momentum strategy on the developed countries subsample (23 countries) over 1969-2014.  
At 't' I buy the winner countries and sell the loser countries. The winners and the losers’ 
portfolios are constructed based on their past performances. I use 4 different formation 
periods 'J' and 4 for different holding periods 'K', where 'J' equal 3, 6, 9, and 12 months and 
'K' equal 3, 6, 9, and 12 months as indicated in Table 4.1.4 below, this give a total of 16 
strategies.  The average monthly returns of the winners and the losers’ portfolio are indicated 
in Table 4.1.4 below. The momentum portfolios in Table 4.1.4 panel A are formed 
immediately after the formation period, but I also examine a second set of 16 momentum 
strategies that skip a month between the formation and the holding period as indicated in 
Table 4.1.4 Panel B. The t-statistics are reported in the parentheses and the p-values are 
reported next. The sample period is from December 1969 to January 2014. 
[Insert Table 4.1.4 Here] 
Table 4.1.4 reports the momentum results of developed countries for the whole sample 
period, the winner, the loser, and the momentum portfolio (winner-loser) returns are reported 
for the 32 strategies. All the momentum strategies’ returns are positives 16 out of 16 
strategies (Table 4.1.4 Panel A) the most successful momentum strategy selects stocks based 
on their previous performances over 9 months and then holds the portfolio for the next 3 
months. This strategy yields 2.17% per month (29.38% per year) with a t-statistic of 4.31 and 
a p-value of 0.00 Table 4.1.4 Panel A, when there is not time lag between the portfolio 
formation period and the holding period. 
Testing out whether skipping a time lag is beneficial, I find that skipping a month between 
the formation and the holding period does not improve the strategy performance as the 
equivalent holding period returns are lower. The winner portfolio outperforms the loser 
portfolio to generate positive average effective compounded momentum return of 0.93% per 
month (11.75% per year) with a t-statistic of 1.66 and a p-value of 0.10 Table 4.1.4 panel B, 
when there is a month lag between the formation period and the holding period. 16 out of 16 
strategies are positive (Table 4.1.4 Panel B).  
These results are in line with my initial findings that the momentum strategies are 
consistently profitable internationally. These findings also indicate a better momentum return 
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than Chan et al.’s (2000) study that suggest that momentum strategies are internationally 
profitable on the view point of US investor. They suggested that on average the momentum 
strategy generate 1% per month, which is significantly lower than the average momentum 
return in this thesis of 3% per month (42.57 per year).  
The result helps reiterate the fact that momentum strategies returns are profitable in 
developed countries if investors apply the momentum strategy as initiate by Jegadeesh and 
Titman (1993) at the global level.  
4.2.6 Momentum in Emerging Market 
If the momentum strategies are profitable in the full sample, in different time period and 
consistent with the variation on the sample size with the 9-month/3-month, I will expect the 
momentum strategies to be also profitable in emerging market. It is understandable that there 
may be serious concern over the fact that emerging market might be on average illiquid and 
unstable and seriously segmented but this analysis is more interested in the practicality of the 
momentum strategies than the market condition. To test the sensitivity of the momentum 
strategies on the emerging market, I implement the momentum strategies on the emerging 
market subsample (December 1987 to January 2014) given that the first emerging market 
enters the sample in December 1987. 
At 't' I buy the winner countries and sell the loser countries. The winners and the losers’ 
portfolios are constructed based on their past performances. I use 4 different formation 
periods 'J' and 4 for different holding periods 'K', where 'J' equal 3, 6, 9, and 12 months and 
'K' equal 3, 6, 9, and 12 months as indicated in Table 4.1.5 below, this gives a total of 16 
strategies.  The average monthly returns of the winners and the losers’ portfolio are indicated 
in the table below. The momentum portfolios in Table 4.1.5 panel A are formed immediately 
after the formation period, but I also examine a second set of 16 momentum strategies that 
skip a month between the formation and the holding period as indicated in Table 4.1.5 Panel 
B. The t-statistics are reported in the parentheses and the P-values are reported next. The 
sample period is from December 1987 to January 2014. 
[Insert Table 4.1.5 Here] 
The momentum strategies result on emerging countries are reported in Table 4.1.5. By 
comparison, to those of the full sample and the Developed countries, the momentum 
strategies in emerging countries appear to be less significant on average (2 strategies out 16 
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generate momentum returns that are significant). The 9-month/3-month remain the most 
profitable strategy 3.28% per month (47.30 per year) with a t-statistic of 1.98, and a p-value 
of 0.06 Table 4.1.5 Panel A. 
Testing out whether skipping a time lag is beneficial, I find that skipping a month between 
the formation and the holding period does not improve the strategy performance as the 
equivalent holding period returns are lower. The winner portfolio outperforms the loser 
portfolio to generate positive average effective compounded momentum return of a 
considerably lower 0.64% per month (7.96% per year) with a t-statistic of 0.47 and a p-value 
of 0.64 Table 4.1.5 panel B, when there is a month lag between the formation period and the 
holding period.  
The momentum strategies’ returns are not positive in most of the strategies when there is not 
time lag between the portfolio formation period and the holding period, the returns are less 
significant, given that few strategies generate significant momentum return. I may suggest 
that the momentum strategies are on the average less reliable but highly profitable in 
emerging countries. The 9-month/3-month remain the most profitable strategy 3.28% per 
month (47.30% per year) with even greater return than the full sample period month 3% per 
month (42.57% per year). These results have a direct implication of the Efficient Market 
hypothesis given that international investors can now beat the market consistently using 
common investment strategy such as the global momentum. 
4.2.7 Summary 
In this section, I examined the profitability of the momentum strategies based on past returns 
of countries indices in international equity markets. My findings indicate evidences of 
momentum profitability. The momentum strategies have shown to be consistently and 
significantly profitable on average over the full sample period, and the 9-month/3-month 
strategy generates return as high as 3% per month (42.57% per year). A greater return come 
from the emerging markets 3.28% per month (47.30 per year). This strategy also performs 
well in established yields 1.77% per month (23.43% per year). However, the 9-month/3-
month portfolio of countries indices remains significant but generates a negative return -
1.52% per month (-19.84% per year) during the globalization period. The optimum strategies 
during this period is the 6-month/6-month, it generates a positive payoff of 0.60% per month 
(7.44% per year). Meanwhile, the momentum return could diminish considerably when the 
strategy skip a time lag between the portfolio formation period and the holding period 
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suggesting evidence of return continuation. The exception is made on the post 1994 period 
when the 9-month/3-month strategy generates a negative payoff. Evidences also indicate that 
the momentum strategies are highly profitable in developed country that the contribution of 
emerging countries are great but less significant. 
Even more interesting, this thesis did find evidence of return continuation among countries 
indices when considering the full sample. However, I must point out that, my evidences are 
different from Chan et al. (2000) study that suggest that momentum strategies are 
internationally profitable on the view point of US investors. They suggested that on average 
the momentum strategy generate 1% per month, which is significantly lower than the average 
momentum return in this study 3% per month (42.57 per year). I also emphasis the point that 
investors may earn extra returns by investing internationally as the global momentum 
generate a return of about three time higher the than the return indicate on Jegadeesh and 
Titman (1993, 2001).  
Furthermore, from a practical investment perspective, it is important to indicate that the 
global momentum strategies will be profitable after accounting for transaction costs. On 
average, the momentum strategies with non-overlapping portfolios are rebalanced every 9 
months and results in a low turnover.  The optimum strategy generates a return of 42.57% 
return per annum. On other hand Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), and Berkowitz, Logue and 
Noser (1988) estimate one-way transaction costs of 23 basis points for institutional investors 
suggesting that transaction cost of 0.5% per trade with a 6-month/6-month strategy is 
conservative. This implies and estimated transaction cost of 0.6% per annum which is not 
negligible, suggesting a momentum profit of 41.97 which does not undermine the high 
profitability of these strategy. 
Overall, the success of the global momentum strategies with non-overlapping portfolios 
presented in this chapter demonstrated that trading on indices performances worldwide might 
provide more evidences of market inefficiency when international investors invest in 
winners’ countries and divest on losers’ countries. 
4.3 Momentum Strategies and Overlapping Portfolios 
4.3.1 Introduction 
In this section, I examine whether momentum strategies earn significant return after 
increasing the power of the test. I construct overlapping portfolios, where momentum deciles 
portfolio in any month holds stocks ranked in those deciles in any of the previous k ranking 
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months as indicated in section 3.3.3. I show how the profitability of the global momentum 
vary from one market state to another by examining the global momentum profit in the 
established markets, during the globalization period, in developed countries, and emerging 
countries. My findings indicate evidences of momentum profitability. The momentum 
strategies are significantly profitable on average over the full sample period, and the 9-
month/3-month strategy generates the highest returns 0.95% per month (11.20% per year), 
but these returns may vary considerably from one market condition to another. More 
importantly, the momentum strategies remain on average profitable in the period post-1994. 
My findings also indicate that the momentum strategies’ returns are on average low with the 
overlapping portfolios than the non-overlapping portfolios. 
4.3.2 Momentum strategies for International Investors: full sample 1969-2014 
I start the analysis by implementing the basic momentum strategies first, on the entire times 
series data. In period ’t’ I buy the winner countries and sell the loser countries. The winners 
and the losers’ portfolios are constructed based on their past performances. I use 4 different 
formation periods 'J' and 4 for different holding periods 'K', where 'J' equal 3, 6, 9, and 12 
months and 'K' equals 3, 6, 9, and 12 months as indicated in Table 4.1.6 below. This gives a 
total of 16 strategies.  The average monthly returns of the winners and the losers’ portfolio 
are indicated in the table below. The momentum portfolios in Table 4.1.6 panel A are formed 
immediately after the formation period, but I also examine a second set of 16 momentum 
strategies that skip a month between the formation and the holding period as indicated in 
Table 4.1.6 Panel B. The t-statistics are reported in the parentheses and the p-values are 
reported next. The sample period is from December 1969 to January 2014.         
[Insert Table 4.1.6 Here] 
Table 4.1.6 reports the results for the whole sample period, the winner, the loser, and the 
momentum portfolio (winner-loser) returns are reported for the 32 strategies. All the 
momentum strategies’ returns are positive. The 9-month/6-month that is the most successful 
momentum strategy. It selects stocks based on their previous performances over 9 months 
and then holds the portfolio for the next 6 months. This strategy yields 0.95% per month 
(12.01% per year) with a t-statistic of 5.97 and a p-value of 0.00 (Table 4.1.6 Panel A) when 
there is not time lag between the portfolio formation period and the holding period. However, 
the 9-month/3-month remain highly profitable 0.95% per month (12.01% per year) with a t-
statistic of 4.16 and a p-value of 0.00 (Table 4.1.6 Panel A).  
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Testing out whether skipping a time lag is beneficial, I find that skipping a month between 
the formation and the holding period does not improve the strategy performance as the 
equivalent holding period returns are lower. The winner portfolio outperforms the loser 
portfolio to generate positive average effective compounded momentum return of 0.95% per 
month (12.01% per month) with a t-statistic of 5.97 and a p-value of 0.00 (Table 4.1.6 Panel). 
The 9-month/3-month yields much greater return 1.12% per month (14.30% per month) with 
a t-statistic of 5.05 and a p-value of 0.00 rejecting the argument that the momentum return 
could be due to return continuation.  
By doing this, I avoid some of the bid-ask spread, price pressure, and lagged effects that 
inspire the short-term price pressure or lack of liquidity in the market as documented in 
Jegadeesh (1990). Given that the momentum strategies returns are positive in most of the 
strategies and that the returns are highly significant in most cases mainly when the strategies 
do not skip a month between the formation and the holding period. I may suggest that the 
momentum strategies are on average profitable internationally when using overlapping 
portfolios of stock indices, that the winner portfolio outperforms the loser portfolio to 
generate positive average momentum profits. I then establish that the most profitable 
strategies on average is still the 9-month/3-month (Table 4.1.6 Panel A) as to when the 
strategy skip a month it remains highly and significantly profitable (Table 4.1.6 Panel B).  
These results support Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) findings, which suggest that the strategies 
that, buy past winners and sell past losers are consistently profitable and generate positive 
return of about 0.95% per month with a significant t-statistic of 3.07. These findings are also 
indicative of a positive momentum return as Chan et al. (2000) study that suggest that 
momentum strategies are internationally profitable on the view point of US investor as they 
suggested that on average the momentum strategy generate 0.25% per week. 
 However, Chan, et al. (2000) weight countries’ indices based on the deviation of their return 
in the previous period from the cross-sectional average return, and this study results help 
reaffirm the fact that momentum strategies returns are even higher if investor apply the basic 
momentum strategy as initiated by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) at the global level. In 
comparison to the Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) momentum strategies on individual stocks, 
the momentum study on countries’ indices indicate that the profitability of these strategies is 
also a function of the time horizon as the 9-month show to generate superior return in any 
given horizon.    
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4.3.3 Momentum Returns for International Investors: Established Markets 
Next, I turn to a more stable sample period; I implement the momentum strategies in the 
1969-2014 subsample, where all countries’ indices start and end in the same date to avoid any 
blunder which may occur from non-synchronized starting dates among countries’ indices. 
I implement the basic momentum strategies on the established market sub-set 1969-2014 
period (18 countries). At 't', I buy the winner countries and sell the loser countries. The 
winners and the losers’ portfolios are constructed based on their past performances. I use 4 
different formation periods 'J' and 4 for different holding periods 'K', where 'J' equals 3, 6, 9, 
and 12 months and 'K' equals 3, 6, 9, and 12 months as indicated in Table 4.1.7 below. This 
gives a total of 16 strategies. The average monthly returns of the winners and the losers’ 
portfolio are indicated in the table below. The momentum portfolios in Table 4.1.7 Panel A 
are formed immediately after the formation period, but I also examine a second set of 16 
momentum strategies that skip a month between the formation and the holding period as 
indicated in Table 4.1.7 Panel B. The t-statistics are reported in the parentheses and the p-
values are reported next.       
[Insert Table 4.1.7 Here] 
Table 4.1.7 reports the results for the whole sample period, the winner, the loser, and the 
momentum portfolio (winner-loser) returns are reported for the 32 strategies. All the 
momentum strategies returns are positive. The most successful momentum strategy selects 
stocks based on their previous performances over 9 months and then holds the portfolio for 
the next 6 months. This strategy yields 0.78% per month (9.77% per year) with a t-statistic of 
5.94 and a p-value of 0.00 (Table 4.1.7 Panel A) when there is not time lag between the 
portfolio formation period and the holding period. 
Testing out whether skipping a time lag is beneficial, I find that skipping a month between 
the formation and the holding period does improve the strategy performance as the equivalent 
holding period returns are lower. The winner portfolio outperforms the loser portfolio to 
generate positive average effective compounded momentum return of 0.82% per month 
(10.30% per year) with a t-statistic of 6.22 and a p-value of 0.00 (Table 4.1.7 panel B), when 
there is a month lag between the formation period and the holding period. By doing this, I 
avoid some of the bid-ask spread, price pressure, and lagged effects that inspire the short-
term price pressure or lack of liquidity in the market as documented in Jegadeesh (1990). The 
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9-month formation period remains profitable regardless of the holding period for both set of 
strategies. 
Given that the momentum strategies’ returns are positive in most of the strategies and that the 
returns are highly significant in all cases, I may suggest that the momentum strategies are on 
average profitable internationally, and that the winner portfolio outperforms the loser 
portfolio to generate positive average momentum profits. I then establish that the most 
profitable strategies remain the 9-month/6-month that does not skip a month (Table 4.1.7 
Panel A). The results here are complementary to the findings in Table 4.1.1 in the sense that 
the momentum strategies remain profitable with overlapping portfolios. These results also 
support Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) findings, which suggest that the strategies that buy past 
winners and sell past losers, are consistently profitable. Contrary to what I found in my 
earlier analysis with non-overlapping portfolios, the findings indicate worse momentum 
return than Chan et al.’s (2000) study that suggests that momentum strategies are 
internationally profitable on the view point of US investors. They suggested that on average 
the momentum strategy generates 0.25% per week, which is significantly higher than the 
results with overlapping portfolios in this thesis of 0.78% and 0.86%. In comparison to the 
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993, 2001) the momentum results in here indicate that 9-month/3-
month strategies are profitable regardless of the sample size and the time horizon but the 
profits diminish with the overlapping portfolios approach. 
4.3.4 Momentum Returns with overlapping portfolios since Globalisation 
To ascertain whether the momentum strategies remain profitable with overlapping portfolio 
after 1994, I examine alternative sets of momentum portfolio, which are formed on the 1994-
2014 subsample (47 countries). At 't' I buy the winner countries and sell the loser countries. 
The winners and the losers’ portfolios are constructed based on their past performances. I use 
4 different formation periods 'J' and 4 for different holding periods 'K', where 'J' equals 3, 6, 
9, and 12 months and 'K' equals 3, 6, 9, and 12 months as indicated in Table 4.1.8 below. 
This gives a total of 16 strategies.  The average monthly returns of the winners and the losers’ 
portfolio are indicated in the table below. The momentum portfolios in Table 4.1.8 Panel A 
are formed immediately after the formation period, but I also examine a second set of 16 
momentum strategies that skip a month between the formation and the holding period as 
indicated in Table 4.1.8 Panel B. The t-statistics are reported in the parentheses and the p-
values are reported next.     
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[Insert Table 4.18 Here] 
Table 4.1.8 shows the results of the momentum strategies implemented on the stock market 
indices of 47 counties for 1994 to 2014, which include the global finance crisis 2007-2008. It 
shows that the momentum strategies remain profitable on average (16 out of 16 strategies) 
without time lag and (16 out of 16 strategies) for the strategies with a month lag. The 12-
month/3-month is the most profitable strategies. It generates a positive and significant payoff 
1.03% per month (13.08% per year) with a t-statistic of 3.11 and a p-value of 0.00. When 
there is not time lag between the portfolio formation period and the holding period.  
Testing out whether skipping a time lag is beneficial, I find that skipping a month between 
the formation and the holding period does not improve the strategy performance as the 
equivalent holding period returns are lower. The winner portfolio outperforms the loser 
portfolio to generate positive average effective compounded momentum return of 0.93% per 
month (11.75% per year) with a t-statistic of 3.07 and a p-value of 0.00 (Table 4.1.8 panel B), 
when there is a month lag between the formation period and the holding period. By doing 
this, I avoid some of the bid-ask spread, price pressure, and lagged effects that inspire the 
short-term price pressure or lack of liquidity in the market as documented in Jegadeesh 
(1990). The 9-month/3-month generates a positive and significant payoff 0.88% per month 
(11.09% per year) with a t-statistic of 2.77 and a p-value of 0.01 and a relatively high return 
when there is a time lag between the formation and the holding period.  
This indicates that even with the impact of the financial crisis the momentum strategies can 
still be profitable with the overlapping approach as the 1994-2014 period exhibit momentum 
with the 9-month/3-month portfolio of countries’ indices generating a relative high return. 
This is contrary to Chordia et al. (2013) findings that show that, momentum payoffs are on 
average insignificant in the period starting after April 2001. It also rejects the Avramov et al. 
(2014) finding that suggested that momentum strategies can generate a negative return of -
0.69 percent in period of illiquidity and a significant 1.09 percent when the market is 
relatively liquid. However, it is important to reiterate that Avramov at al. (2014) findings are 
based on 5 portfolios while this thesis rang indices into deciles portfolios.  
4.3.5 Momentum with overlapping portfolios in Developed countries 
To better understand which of the developed and the emerging market may be driving the 
return on the global momentum strategies, I implemented the momentum strategy with 
overlapping portfolio on the developed counties subsample (23 countries) over 1969-2014.  
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At ‘t' I buy the winner countries and sell the loser countries. The winners and the losers’ 
portfolios are constructed based on their past performances. I use 4 different formation 
periods 'J' and 4 for different holding periods 'K', where 'J' equals 3, 6, 9, and 12 months and 
'K' equals 3, 6, 9, and 12 months as indicated in Table 4.1.9 below and this gives a total of 16 
strategies.  The average monthly returns of the winners and the losers’ portfolio are indicated 
in table 10 below. The momentum portfolios in Table 4.1.9 Panel A are formed immediately 
after the formation period, but I also examine a second set of 16 momentum strategies that 
skip a month between the formation and the holding period as indicated in Table 4.1.9 Panel 
B. The t-statistics are reported in the parentheses and the p-values are reported next.  
[Insert Table 4.1.9 Here] 
Table 4.1.9 reports the momentum results of developed countries for the whole sample 
period, the winner, the loser, and the momentum portfolio (winner-loser) returns are reported 
for the 32 strategies. My findings of the momentum strategies in every strategy indicate that 
almost all the momentum strategies’ returns are positive 16 out of 16 strategies in Table 4.1.9 
Panel A and 16 out of 16 strategies for the strategies with a month lag. The most successful 
momentum strategy selects stocks based on their previous performances over 9 months and 
then holds the portfolio for the next 6 months. This strategy yields 0.90% per month (11.35% 
per year) with a t-statistic of 6.85 and a p-value of 0.00 (Table 4.1.9 Panel A), when there is 
not time lag between the portfolio formation period and the holding period. 
Testing out whether skipping a time lag is beneficial, I find that skipping a month between 
the formation and the holding period does improve the strategy performance as the equivalent 
holding period returns are lower. The winner portfolio outperforms the loser portfolio to 
generate positive average effective compounded momentum return of 0.94% per month 
(11.88% per year) with a t-statistic of 6.94 and a p-value of 0.00 (Table 4.1.9 Panel B), when 
there is a month lag between the formation period and the holding period. By doing this, I 
avoid some of the bid-ask spread, price pressure, and lagged effects that inspire the short-
term price pressure or lack of liquidity in the market as documented in Jegadeesh (1990). The 
9-month/3-month strategy remains highly profitable and the 9-month formation period is the 
most profitable formation period regardless of the holding period for both sets of strategies.    
Given that the momentum strategies’ returns are positive in most of the strategies and that the 
returns are highly significant, I may suggest that the momentum strategies are on average 
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profitable internationally for developed countries, and that the winner portfolio outperforms 
the loser portfolio to generate positive average momentum profits.  
These findings in their most basic form imply that knowing how indices performed in the 
past in developed countries should be informative about how the global momentum strategies 
will perform in the future. However, the momentum returns here are slightly lower than those 
of the Chan et al.’s (2000) study that suggests that momentum strategies are internationally 
profitable on the view point of US investor as they suggested that on average the momentum 
strategy generate 0.25% per week. This result here helps reiterate the fact that momentum 
strategies’ returns are consistently profitable in developed countries if investor apply the 
basic momentum strategy as initiated by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) at the global level.  
4.3.6 Momentum in Emerging Market 
I reformulate the momentum strategies in the same manner in emerging counties as in 
developed countries. I consider a strategy that buys the winners and sell the losers’ portfolio 
of countries indices. I implement the momentum strategies on the emerging market 
subsample (December 1987 to January 2014) given that the first emerging market enters the 
sample in December 1987. 
At 't' I buy the winner countries and sell the loser countries. The winners and the losers’ 
portfolios are constructed based on their past performances. I use 4 different formation 
periods 'J' and 4 for different holding periods 'K', where 'J' equals 3, 6, 9, and 12 months and 
'K' equals 3, 6, 9, and 12 months as indicated in Table 4.1.10 below and this gives a total of 
16 strategies.  The average monthly returns of the winners and the losers’ portfolio are 
indicated in the table below. The momentum portfolios in Table 4.1.10 Panel A are formed 
immediately after the formation period, but I also examine a second set of 16 momentum 
strategies that skip a month between the formation and the holding period as indicated in 
Table 4.1.10 Panel B. The t-statistics are reported in the parentheses and the p-values are 
reported next.  
[Insert Table 4.1.10 Here] 
Table 4.1.10 reports the momentum strategies results on emerging countries. By comparison, 
to those of the full sample and the developed countries, the momentum strategies in emerging 
countries appear to be less profitable on average. 9 out of 16 strategies generate positive 
return without a time lag and 8 out of 16 strategies generate positive return for the momentum 
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strategies with a month lag, none of the positive return is significant. The 9-month/3-month is 
profitable but not significant and it generates about 0.32% per month (3.91% per year) with a 
t-statistic of 0.69, and a p-value of 0.49 (Table 4.1.10 Panel A), when there is not time lag 
between the portfolio formation period and the holding period. The most profitable strategy is 
the 6-month/6-month and it yields a return of 0.39% per month (4.78% per month) with a t-
statistic of 1.30 and a p-value of 0.20 (Table 4.1.10 Panel B), when there is a month lag 
between the formation period and the holding period.  
Testing out whether skipping a time lag is beneficial, I find that skipping a month between 
the formation and the holding period does improve the strategy performance as the equivalent 
holding period returns are lower. The winner portfolio outperforms the loser portfolio to 
generate positive average effective compounded momentum return of 0.60% per month 
(7.44% per month) with a t-statistic of 2.06 and a p-value of 0.04 (Table 4.1.10 Panel B). By 
doing this, I avoid some of the bid-ask spread, p rice pressure, and lagged effects that inspire 
the short-term price pressure or lack of liquidity in the market as documented in Jegadeesh 
(1990).  
Given that the momentum strategies’ returns are positive in most of the strategies when there 
is not time lag between the portfolio formation period and the holding period and that the 
returns are less significant. I may suggest that the momentum strategies are on average less 
and not consistently profitable for emerging countries with overlapping portfolio, that the 
winner portfolio do not always outperform the loser portfolio to generate positive average 
momentum profits. However, the 9-month/3-month remains profitable, but do not generate 
the highest return. 
4.3.7 Summary 
I examined the profitability of the momentum strategies with overlapping portfolios based on 
past returns of countries’ indices in international equity markets. My findings indicate 
evidences of momentum profitability. The momentum strategies have shown to be 
consistently and significantly profitable on average over the full sample period, and the 9-
month/3-month strategy shown to generate the highest returns 0.95% per month (11.20% per 
year) on the average, but these returns may vary considerably from one market condition to 
another. More importantly, the momentum strategies remain on average profitable in the 
period post-1994. The 12-month/3-month is the most profitable strategies. It generates a 
positive and significant payoff 1.03% per month (13.08% per year). These evidences also 
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indicate that the momentum strategies’ returns are on average low with the overlapping 
approach. 
Even though the momentum strategies remain in some case profitable in emerging countries 
for example the most profitable strategy (6-month/6-month) yields a return of 0.39% per 
month (4.78% per month), it is important to reiterate that on average they are less significant. 
Even more interesting, this study did not find evidence of consistent return continuation 
among countries’ indices when using overlapping portfolio. I may point out that my 
evidences, is different from Chan et al. (2000) study that suggests that momentum strategies 
are internationally profitable on the view point of US investor as they suggested that on 
average, the momentum strategy generates 0.25% per week, which is slightly greater than the 
average momentum return with overlapping portfolios in this study 0.95% per month 
(11.20% per year). Overall, a direct implication of these results is that international investors 
will be able to beat the market using common investment strategy such as the global 
momentum with overlapping portfolios. 
4.4 Momentum Strategies in Different Market phases 
The reader may note that up to now the study has examined the momentum strategies in 
different market conditions and different time horizon. The next step is to examine the 
momentum profit in different market phases. This section starts by examining the returns of 
the momentum in different market phases (crisis and non-crisis periods). I track the average 
portfolio formation returns in each of the holding period of 3-month following the formation 
period 9-month and provides additional insights about the riskiness of the strategy. 
Significant positive returns in the months beyond the holding period would indicate that the 
momentum portfolio systematically selects stocks that have higher than average 
unconditional returns either because of their risk or for other reasons such as stock market 
crisis or other global exposures. Significant negative returns in the months following the 
holding period would suggest that the indices’ price changes during the holding period are at 
least partially temporary (Jegadeesh and Titman 1993). The returns of the 9-month/ 3-month 
momentum strategy are recorded in the Table 4.1.11 below.  
[Insert Table 4.1.11 Here] 
Table 4.1.11 presents the average monthly returns of the 9-month/3-month strategy in event 
time, the average return in each period is positive in the first 5 years. The first negative return 
occurs in period 7, the 31/03/1972 where the return is -1.89%, then at period 12 (-1.21%), the 
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29/12/1978. After this, the average return remains positive in each period in the next 
following years until period 16. Where, I record a negative return of -3.14%, the 31/12 1981. 
I then subsequently record: in period 25 (-6.37% return) the 30/09/1988. In period 27 (-6.03% 
return) on the 30/03/1990; period 32 (-13.99%) the 31/12/1993, period 35 (-6.41%) the 
29/03/1996, period 41 (-1.75%) the 29/ 09/2000, period 45 (-1.66%) the 30/09/2003, period 
52 (-3.88%) the 31/12/2008 and in the first half of 2011 period 55 (-0.31%) the 31/03/2011. 
Thereafter the study records negative returns for the next two periods. It is also interesting to 
note that the momentum strategy return reach a minimum of (-0.90%) at the end of 2012 
months before rising to 2.46 in 2013. 
The negative returns recorded over the study period are on average associated with 
international stock market crisis dates and indicate that the momentum strategy does not pick 
stocks that have high unconditional expected returns, as the selected indices are conditional to 
the information available at the time of the trade. The observed pattern of initially positive 
momentum returns and then negative returns of the strategy, or the switch between positive 
and negative momentum payoffs at different time point also suggests that indices’ price 
changes after the formation period are not permanent over time. 
These results clearly demonstrate how major global shocks in recent history affect the 
momentum performances. It also illustrates that since 1969, the global equity market has 
experienced a strong upward trend and therefore, much of the momentum strategy returns are 
positive, 46 out of 58 periods. The return turns down and the negative momentum payoffs are 
strongly associated with the post-stock market events. This includes secondary banking crisis 
of 1973-1975, the Latin American debt crisis originated in the end of the1970s to 1982, the 
Japanese asset price bubble 1986-2003, the black Monday 1987, the European currency crisis 
1992-1993, the Asian financial crisis during 1997-98, the Russian financial crisis 1998, the 
burst of the technology bubble in 2000, and the 2008 financial crisis. The three consecutive 
negative momentum payoffs after the first half of 2011 period 55, (-0.31%) are also 
associated with the perceived effect of the delay recovery after the 2008 financial crisis, 
which may suggest that the longer the recovery period, the stronger the trim down 
momentum strategy returns continuation. These findings support the general association 
between momentum payoffs and the lagged market performances as suggested by Siganos, 
and Chelley-Steeley (2006). 
[Insert Figure 1 Here] 
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Fig. 24 presents the momentum profit trend from 1969 to 2014 and provide an indication of 
the consistent rise of the momentum return in periods of good state and the sharp fall after the 
bad market state. In general, the good state tends to predict good future momentum 
performances while the bad state predicts worsened. One possible explanation of this pattern 
as indicated by the return from (1994 to 1995) is that the momentum strategy selects very 
risky indices and the risk change over time (Gonzalez et al. 2005). Although the results of 
this study strongly support that the risk of the indices selected by the 9-month/3-month does 
change over time, the direction of the change and the reason behind the change in momentum 
returns are the focus of the next section.  
4.5 Momentum Returns Following Bear and Bull Markets 
There is a popular agreement that the bull markets are associated with persistently rising 
share prices but it can be noted that there still does not exist a consensus as to the objective 
definition of a bull market (Gonzalez et al. 2005). This thesis utilizes a formal procedure to 
identify bear and bull phases in stock index series that indicate the meaningful time intervals 
corresponding to a bear or a bull phase. The thesis then examines the magnitude of the 
momentum profitability achieved following bull and bear markets using data from the MSCI 
World Indices, as it appears to be a good representation of the world equity markets. 
To test out whether the Global momentum generates superior momentum gains following 
stock market state, this study examines how the performances of the optimum strategy 9-
month/3-month are associated with different phases of the world equity market, because the 
bull and the bear markets are broad market movements and would best capture the impact of 
market state changes.        
The bull and bear phases are defined based on the global market return (MSCI World 
Indices) over various time horizons. My expectation is that the global momentum should earn 
more return following down markets. The sample period is divided into bear and bull phase 
following Siganos and Chelley-Steeley (2006) approach. This paper defined bull phase as the 
period when the market return is positive for 9 months before the test period, and the bear 
state when the market return is negative for 9 months before the test and the results are shown 
in the Table 4.1.12 below. 
[Insert Table 4.1.12 Here] 
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Table 4.1.12 presents the bear and bull market performances between December 1969 and 
January 2014, and the average momentum profits accomplished after bull and bear markets, 
and the 9-month market performance of the defined phases. This study noted that the longer 
the duration employed to define the up and down states the smaller the number of bear and 
bull periods.  The lowest the duration used to describe the down market generate the strongest 
the negative market return that arise in bear phase. The optimum strategy 9-month/3-month is 
associated with the 9-month duration where the bull market performance (1.28% per month) 
is relatively higher than the equivalent bear market (-1.13% per month) in absolute value and 
the bear frequency (35.59%) is the lowest while the bull frequency (64.41%) is the highest 
compare to another horizon (3, 6, and 12). These observations suggest that the momentum 
strategy generates superior gains when the market rise quickly in bull and/or fall slowly in 
bear phase as the high market performance indicate a high and positive change in Indices 
prices and inversely. Therefore, a forecast of a slow recovery could be bad news for 
momentum investors while the inverse is not necessary a news good for global momentum 
investors comparatively. These results are in line with Gonzalez et al. (2005) that suggested 
that investors can achieve superior returns by adopting the momentum strategy after a bear 
phase, but this study reiterates that the return on the momentum strategy will depend upon 
speed of the of the rising and the falling market phases. 
4.6 Conclusion 
I examined the profitability of the momentum strategies with overlapping and non-
overlapping portfolios, based on past returns of countries’ indices in international equity 
markets. My findings indicate evidences of the profitability of the global momentum that 
select countries based on their past indices performances. The momentum strategies have 
shown to be significantly profitable on average over the full sample period, and the 9-
month/3-month strategy has shown to generate the highest returns of 3% per month (42.57% 
per year). After examining the 9-month/3-month in different market states, I found that 
investors can achieve superior returns by adopting the momentum strategy after a bear phase, 
but the study also found a strong link between the rising market performances in bull market 
and the momentum profits. This indicates that the return on the momentum strategy will 
depend upon the speed of the recovery. More importantly, the momentum strategies’ returns 
are high when the bull market performance is relatively higher than the equivalent bear 
market in absolute value and that the overall global momentum strategy generated significant 
abnormal return in long horizon. I may point out that my evidences are complementary to 
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Gonzalez et al. (2005) findings that suggested that momentum profit tend to stem up after 
bear market phases and Chen et al. (2012) that suggests that market conditions are good 
predictors of the size of the momentum profit. These findings are crucial, since investors can 
gain extra return following cycle and avoid undesirable losses. A direct implication of these 
results is that international investors will be able to beat the market using common investment 



















Chapter 5: Contrarian Strategies in International Equity Market 
5.1 Introduction 
In this Chapter, I examine the profitability of the global contrarian strategies; I implement the 
strategy with non-overlapping deciles portfolios on the full sample exactly like De Bondt and 
Thaler (1985). I show that these strategies are highly profitable and the profitability varies 
from one market state to another. I demonstrate this by examining the global contrarian profit 
with established markets, during the globalization period, with developed countries, and the 
emerging countries. In the second section, I increase the power of the test by examining the 
profitability of the contrarian strategies with overlapping portfolios; this includes monthly 
rebalancing the contrarian portfolio. In both cases, I consider the impact of return 
continuation by examining a second set of strategies that sky a month between the formation 
and the holding periods. In the third and the four section, I repeat these analyses with quintile 
portfolios to capture differences in portfolios size. 
My findings indicate that contrarian strategies are highly profitable with the full sample 0.83 
per month (10.40 per year). The contrarian strategies generate in emerging countries return as 
high as 1.38% per month (17.70% per year) with the 60-month/ 48-month strategy. The 
developed countries' contributions are less significant, still a consistent contrarian return of 
0.93% per month (11.72% per year) could be observed in developed countries with the 60-
month/48-month strategy when the strategy skips a time lag between the portfolio formation 
period and the holding period. My findings also show that contrarian strategies’ yield on 
average higher return with the non-overlapping portfolio than the equivalent overlapping 
approaches for both deciles and quintiles portfolios and that the contrarian strategy are on the 
average considerably greater with deciles portfolios than quintiles portfolios. 
5.2 Contrarian Strategies with Deciles Portfolios 
5.2.1 Introduction 
This section investigates the performances of the contrarian strategy with deciles portfolios 
on the international equity market, based on countries' indices past performances. Consistent 
with the predictions of the overreaction hypothesis, that suggested that portfolios of prior 
"losers" do outperform prior "winners", three to five years after portfolio formation, the 
losing stocks earned about 25% more than the winners and 8% annually for 5 years post-
ranking period even though the latter are significantly riskier (De Bondt and Thaler, 1985). 
This section also discusses the empirical results of my study based on raw return for both 
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overlapping and non-overlapping portfolios, following the pure contrarian strategies approach 
and concludes with a discussion of these strategies' sub-period results. Given the long 
research history in this field, I focus on a global coordinated contrarian phenomenon. I 
construct deciles portfolios and carefully re-examine the international evidences for the long-
run reversal predictability in different market states and provide alternative explanations of 
the international profitability of the contrarian strategy. The contrarian investors will buy 
stocks in the losers' countries and sell stocks in the winners' countries that replicate indices 
performances or invest in index-trackers in these countries respectively to generate extra 
profit.    
5.2.2 Contrarian Strategies Returns with Non-Overlapping Portfolios 
5.2.2.1 Contrarian Strategies for International Investors: full sample 1969-2014 
I start the analysis by implementing the basic contrarian strategies first, on the entire time 
series data. In period `t’ I buy the losers countries and sell the winners countries. The winners 
and the losers’ portfolios are constructed based on their past performances. I use 3 different 
formation periods 'F' and 3 different holding periods 'H', where 'F' equals 36, 48, and 60 
months and 'H' equals 36, 48, and 60 months as indicated in Table 4.2.1, this gives a total of 9 
strategies. The contrarian portfolios in Table 4.2.1 panel A are formed immediately after the 
formation period, but I also examine a second set of 9 contrarian strategies that skip a month 
between the formation and the holding period as indicated in Table 4.2.1 Panel B. The 
average monthly returns of the winners and the losers' portfolio are indicated in the table, the 
t-statistics are reported in the parentheses and the p-values are reported next. 
 [Insert Table 4.2.1 Here] 
Table 4.2.1 contains the results of the contrarian strategies for the whole sample period; the 
winner, the loser, and the contrarian portfolio (loser-winner) returns are reported for the 18 
strategies. These results show that the contrarian strategies’ returns are positive in most of the 
cases, 4 strategies are statistically significant. The most successful contrarian strategy selects 
stocks based on their previous performances over 48 months and then holds the portfolio for 
the next 60 months. This strategy yields 0.83% per month (10.40% per year) with a t-statistic 
of 3.16 and a p-value of 0.01 (Table 4.2.1 Panel A), when there is not time lag between the 
portfolio formation period and the holding period. The 48-month/60-month is consistently the 
most profitable strategy. 
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Testing out whether skipping a time lag is beneficial, I find that skipping a month between 
the formation and the holding period improve the 48-month/60-month strategy performance 
as the equivalent holding period returns are slightly greater. The loser portfolio outperforms 
the winner portfolio to generate positive average effective compounded contrarian return of 
10.40% per year (0.83% per month) with a t-statistic of 3.63 and a p-value of 0.01 (Table 
4.2.1 Panel B). This is in sequence with the initial findings by Fama and French (1996) that 
suggested that when the preceding months/year is included in the test, short-term 
continuation tends to offset long-term reversal, and past losers have lower future returns than 
past winners for portfolios formed with up to four years past returns. It also points to a greater 
return given that Fama and French suggested 1.16%average return per month for the loser 
portfolio and 0.42 % per month for the winner portfolio. This implies that the loser minus 
winner portfolio yields 0.74% per month (9.25% per year) on the average. 
I also uncover that the 48-month formation period generates significant return for both the 
48- and the 60-month holding periods, with the exception made on the 36-month holding 
period. This indicates that the price started to reverse consistently sometimes after 36-month 
and continue to reverse throughout the first 60-month of the post-formation period. 
Overall, the results in Table 4.2.1 validate the initial tests hypothesis that long-term 
contrarian strategies are profitable internationally. They are consistent with other studies such 
as De Bondt and Thaler (1985) in US stock market that suggested that 3 to 5 years after a past 
performance based portfolio formation, Losers' portfolios outperformed winners' portfolios 
by approximately 25% over 3 years (8.33 per year) and 8% annually for 5 years post-ranking 
period. They indicate a better contrarian return than Jordan’s (2012) study that suggested that 
contrarian strategies are internationally profitable; he reported about 5.60% per year with 
earning above the risk-free rate, and that the long-term contrarian profits is not a robust 
phenomenon internationally. 
My findings also endow with a greater return than Malin and Bornholt's (2013) study that 
suggested 0.46% contrarian return per month (5.66% per year) in developed markets and 
0.68% per month (8.47 per year) in emerging markets, and Richards's (1996) study that found 
6.60% per year over 3 years holding period and 5.80% per year over 4 years. In general, the 
tests on the contrarian strategies with overlapping portfolios, should of course, be regarded 
only as illustrative, since alternative techniques would yield somewhat different critical 
values (Richards, 1996). I must acknowledge that the short data set allows only a small 
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number of non-overlapping tests for the longer horizons. Therefore, the lack of significance 
in the face of some larger profits with non-overlapping portfolio is driven by the length of the 
sample period (number of observation).  
In addition, these findings are essential and deviate from previous studies on contrarian 
trading, in the sense that I use deciles portfolio to demonstrate how trading on extreme losers 
and winners (deciles Portfolios), contrarian investors could generate superior return 
compared to other approaches. The effective yearly return is calculated using the monthly-
compounded return over 12 months rather than the arithmetic average of percentage return. 
They are also complementary given that Jordan (2012) and De Bondt and Thaler's (1985) 
study did not look at the contrarian phenomenon as a generalized phenomenon. Jordan's 
study was initially done on individual market index where stocks are sorted by their past 3-
year buy-and-hold return and the losers and winners represented respectively the 25% bottom 
and 25% top, while De Bondt and Thaler (1985) and Fama and French (1996) studies were 
conducted on US stocks only. 
5.2.2.2 Contrarian Strategies Return on Established Markets 
The study of the full sample examines 47 countries’ indices with different strating date that 
make sample umbalance. I also examine the contrarian strategies in a more stable sample 
period (1969-2014), where all countries indices start and end in the same date to avoid any 
blunder, which may occur, from variation among the starting dates of countries indices and to 
gauge the effect of the variation in the sample size. 
To implement the basic contrarian strategies on the subsample1969-2014 (18 countries), at `t' 
I buy the loser countries and sell the winner countries. The winners and the losers’ portfolios 
are constructed based on their past performances. I use 3 different formation periods 'F' and 3 
different holding periods 'H', where F equals 36, 48, and 60 months and H equals 36, 48, and 
60 months as indicated in Table 4.2.2; thus, I have 9 strategies in total.  The contrarian 
portfolios in Table 4.2.2 Panel A are formed immediately after the formation period, but I 
also examine a second set of 9 contrarian strategies that skip a month between the formation 
and the holding period as indicated in Table 4.2.2 Panel B. The average monthly returns of 
the winners and the losers’ portfolio are indicated in the table below, the t-statistics are 
reported in the parentheses and the p-values are reported next. The sample period is from 
December 1969 to January 2014. 
[Insert Table 4.2.2 Here] 
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Analyses of the contrarian strategies on the established markets reveal some very interesting 
aspects of the reversal effect. Table 4.2.2 shows that the contrarian strategies’ returns are 
positive in most of the cases, 6 strategies are significant. The most successful contrarian 
strategy selects stocks based on their previous performances over 48 months and then holds 
the portfolio for the next 36 months. This strategy yields 0.84% per month (10.49% per year) 
with a t-statistic of 2.59 and a p-value of 0.029 when there is not time lag between the 
formation period and the holding period (Table 4.2.2 Panel A). The 48-month/36-month is 
consistently the most profitable strategy. 
Testing how skipping a time lag affect the contrarian return, I find that skipping a month 
between the formation and the holding period (Table 4.2.2 Panel B), do not improve the 48-
month/36-month strategy performance and generate 0.80% per month (11.16% per year) with 
a t-statistic of 2.43 and a p-value of 0.04. This contradicts the initial findings by Fama and 
French (1996) that suggested that when the preceding months/year is included in the test, 
short-term continuation tends to offset long-term reversal, and past losers have lower future 
returns than past winners for portfolios formed with up to four years past returns. It also 
points to greater returns given that Fama and French suggested 1.16% average return per 
month for the loser portfolio and 0.42 % per month for the winner portfolio (0.74% per 
month or 9.25 per year for the loser minus winner portfolio). 
This thesis also reveals that the 48-month formation period generate significant return for all 
the holding period 36-, 48- and the 60-month holding periods, this indicate that the price 
started to reverse consistently sometime before or during the first 36-month and continue to 
reverse throughout the first 60-month of the post-formation period. 
These results demonstrate that the contrarian strategies generate positive and significant 
return internationally and suggest that when the strategies select indices based of their 48-
month past performances and hold them for 48 months, the loser portfolios tend to 
outperform the winner portfolios to generate high positive average contrarian returns. I then 
establish that the most profitable strategy is the 48-month/48-month that skip a month (Table 
4.2.2 Panel B) with an effective return of 11.16% per year (0.89% per month) with a t-
statistic of 3.25 and a p-value of 0.01.  
Overall, my results are consistent between unbalanced sample and the established market 
sub-set; they validate the initial tests hypothesis that long-term contrarian strategies are 
profitable internationally. They are consistent with studies such as De Bondt and Thaler 
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(1985) in US stock market that suggested that 3 to 5 years after a past performance based 
portfolio formation, losers' portfolios outperformed winners' portfolios by approximately 
25% over 3 years and 8% annually for 5 years post-ranking period. They indicate a better 
contrarian return than Jordan’s (2012) study that suggested that contrarian strategies are 
internationally profitable (5.60% per year) with earning above the risk-free rate; and that the 
long-term contrarian profits is not a robust phenomenon internationally. 
My findings also provide with a greater return than Malin and Bornholt's (2013) study that 
suggested 0.46% contrarian return per month (5.66% per year) in developed markets and 
0.68% per month (8.47 per year) in emerging markets, and Richards's (1996) study that found 
6.60% per year for 3 years holding period and 5.80% per year over 4 years. In general, the 
significance tests on these contrarian strategies with overlapping portfolios, should of course, 
be regarded only as illustrative, since alternative techniques would yield somewhat different 
critical values (Richards, 1996). I must acknowledge that the short data set allows only a 
small number of non-overlapping tests for the longer horizons. Therefore, the lack of 
significance in the face of some larger profits with non-overlapping portfolio is driven by the 
length of the sample period (number of observation).  
Additionally, these findings are essential and deviates from previous studies in the sense that 
I use deciles portfolio to demonstrate how trading on extreme losers and winners (deciles 
Portfolios), contrarian investors could generate superior return compared to other approaches. 
The effective yearly return is calculated using the monthly-compounded return over 12 
months rather than the arithmetic average of percentage return. 
These findings are also complementary given that Jordan (2012) and De Bondt and Thaler 
(1985) studies did not look at the contrarian phenomenon as a generalized phenomenon. 
Jordan's study was initially done on individual market index where stocks are sorted by their 
past 3-year buy-and-hold return and the losers and winners represented respectively the 25% 
bottom and 25% top, while De Bondt and Thaler (1985) and Fama and French (1996) studies 
were conducted on US stocks only. 
5.2.2.3 Contrarian Returns since Globalisation 1994-2014 
The MSCI launched in 1988 the Emerging Market Index, which consisted of just 10 countries 
representing less than 1% of world market capitalization. Following the MSCI 
reclassification in 1994 we saw a significant rise in emerging market to the strength of the 
globalisation. From 1994 to 2014 the MSCI Emerging Market Index consist of 23 countries 
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representing 10% of world market capitalization. The Index is now available for several 
regions, market segments or sizes and covers approximately 85% of the free float-adjusted 
market capitalization each of the 23 countries. I consider alternative set of contrarian 
portfolios, which are formed on the 1994-2014 subsamples (47 countries all starting with the 
same date). I focus on common practice of analysing the contrarian strategies. I buy the 
winner countries and sell the loser countries.  The winners and the losers’ portfolios are 
constructed based on their past performances. I use 3 different formation periods 'F' and 3 
different holding periods 'H', where F equals 36, 48, and 60 months and H equals 36, 48, and 
60 months as indicated in Table 4.2.3. Thus, I have 9 strategies in total. The contrarian 
portfolios in Table 4.2.3 panel A are formed immediately after the formation period, but I 
also examine a second set of 9 contrarian strategies that skip a month between the formation 
and the holding period as indicated in Table 4.2.3 Panel B. The average monthly returns of 
the winners and the losers’ portfolio are indicated in the Table 14 the t-statistics are reported 
in the parentheses and the p-values are reported next. The sample period is from December 
1994 to January 2014.  
[Insert Table 4.2.3 Here] 
Table 4.2.3 shows that contrarian strategies on the stock market indices of 47 countries for 
1994 to 2014, which include the global finance crisis 2007-2008, remain profitable, all 
returns are positive, but none is significant. The most successful contrarian strategy selects 
stocks based on their previous performances over 36 months and then holds the portfolio for 
the next 60 months. It yields 0.64% per month (7.90 per year) with a t-statistic of 1.32 and a 
p-value of 0.28 (Table 4.2.3 panel A) which appears inconsistent with the overall findings. 
This indicates that, even though different market conditions and different time periods exhibit 
contrarian profit, this return varies with the study time horizon, which may arise in the period 
post-globalisation as the evidences suggest here. 
Focussing on results using common practice of skipping a month between portfolio ranking 
and investment period, I find no substantial evidence to suggest that the new strategies will 
generate greater return in period post globalization (Table 4.2.3 Panel B). This contradicts the 
initial findings by Fama and French (1996) that suggested that when the preceding month is 
included in the test, short-term continuation tends to offset long-term reversal, and past losers 
have lower future returns than past winners for portfolios formed with up to four years past 
returns. It also points to greater returns given that Fama and French (1996) suggested 1.16% 
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average return per month for the loser portfolio and 0.42 % per month for the winner 
portfolio (0.74% per month or 9.25% per year for the loser minus winner portfolio). 
These results support Jordan’s (2012) findings that suggested that contrarian strategies are 
internationally profitable but the long-term contrarian profit is not a robust phenomenon. The 
contrarian strategies’ returns are also lower than the 8% per year as suggested by De Bondt 
and Thaler (1985). They are also complementary given that Jordan’s (2012) and De Bondt 
and Thaler’s (1985) study did not look at the contrarian phenomenon as a generalized 
phenomenon. Jordan's study was initially done on individual market index where stocks are 
sorted by their past 3-year buy-and-hold return and the losers and winners represented 
respectively the 25% bottom and 25% top, while De Bondt and Thaler (1985) and Fama and 
French (1996) studies were conducted on US stocks only. 
5.2.2.4 Contrarian Return in Developed Market 
To gauge the contribution of the Developed countries on global contrarian strategies, since 
the contrarian profit may differ from developed to emerging countries, I implemented the 
contrarian strategy on the developed countries sub-sample (23 countries) over 1969-2014.  At 
`t’ I buy the winner countries and sell the loser countries. The winners and the losers’ 
portfolios are constructed based on their past performances. I use 3 different formation 
periods 'F' and 4 for different holding periods 'H', where 'F' equals 36, 48, and 60 months and 
'H' equals 36, 48, and 60, this give a total of 9 strategies. The contrarian portfolios in Table 
4.2.4 panel A are formed immediately after the formation period, but I also examine a second 
set of 9 contrarian strategies that skip a month between the formation and the holding period 
(Table 4.2.4 Panel B). The average monthly returns of the winners and the losers’ portfolio 
are indicated in Table 4.2.4 below the t-statistics are reported in the parentheses and the p-
values are reported next.  
[Insert Table 4.2.4 Here] 
Other factors important in influencing the contrarian profitability are the markets states 
(Develop and emerging market). Table 4.2.4 reports the contrarian results of developed 
countries for the whole sample period, the winner, the loser, and the contrarian portfolio 
(winner-loser) returns are reported for the 18 strategies. All the contrarian strategies’ returns 
are positive (9 out of 9 strategies) and (9 out of 9 strategies) for the strategies with a month 
lag. One strategy is significant.  The most successful contrarian strategy selects indices based 
on their previous performances over 60 months and then holds them for the next 48 months. 
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This strategy yields 0.93% per month (11.72% per year) with a t-statistic of 2.49 and a p-
value of 0.04 (Table 4.2.4 Panel A).  
Investigating whether skipping a time lag is beneficial in developed counties, I find that after 
skipping a month between the formation and the holding, the 60-month/48-month remain 
profitable although, none of the strategy is significant (Table 4.2.4 Panel B) when there is a 
month lag between the formation period and the holding period. This contradicts the initial 
findings by Fama and French (1996) that suggested that when the preceding months/year is 
included in the test, short-term continuation tends to offset long-term reversal, and past losers 
have lower future returns than past winners for portfolios formed with up to four years past 
returns. It also points to greater returns, given that, Fama and French (1996) suggested 1.16% 
average return per month for the loser portfolio and 0.42 % per month for the winner 
portfolio (0.74% per month or 9.25% per year for the loser minus winner portfolio). I then 
suggest that the contrarian strategies are profitable internationally and establish that the most 
profitable strategy is the 60-month/48-month that does not skip a month (Table 4.2.4 Panel 
A). The loser portfolio outperforms the winner portfolio to generate positive average 
effective compounded contrarian return of that yield an effective compounded return of 
11.72% per year. 
Overall, the results in Table 4.2.4 verify the initial tests hypothesis that long-term contrarian 
strategies are profitable internationally. They are consistent with studies such as De Bondt 
and Thaler (1985) in US stock market, that, suggested that, 3 to 5 years after a past 
performance based portfolio formation, losers' portfolios outperformed winners' portfolios by 
approximately 25% over 3 years and 8% annually for 5 years post-ranking period. These 
results also indicate a better contrarian returns than Jordan's (2012) study that suggested that 
contrarian strategies are internationally profitable (5.60% per year) with earning above the 
risk-free rate; and that the long-term contrarian profits is not a robust phenomenon 
internationally. 
My findings also prove that, the contrarian strategies can yield greater returns than Malin and 
Bornholt's (2013) study that suggested 0.46% contrarian return per month (5.66% per year) in 
developed market, and 0.68% per month (8.47% per year) in emerging market. Even more 
than Richards's (1996) study that found 6.60% contrarian return per year for 3 years holding 
period and 5.80% per year over 4 years. 
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However, the significance tests on the contrarian strategies with non-overlapping portfolios 
should be regarded only as illustrative, since alternative techniques would yield somewhat 
different critical values (Richards, 1996). I must acknowledge that the short data set allows 
only a small number of non-overlapping tests for the longer horizons. Therefore, the lack of 
significance in the face of some larger profits with non-overlapping portfolio is driven by the 
length of the sample period (number of observation).  
Moreover, these findings are essential and deviate from previous studies in the sense that I 
use deciles portfolio to demonstrate how trading on extreme losers and winners (deciles 
Portfolios), contrarian investors could generate superior return compared to others 
approaches. The effective yearly return is calculated using the monthly-compounded return 
over 12 months rather than the arithmetic average of percentage return. They are also 
complementary given that Jordan (2012), De Bondt and Thaler's (1985) study did not look at 
the contrarian phenomenon as a generalized phenomenon. Jordan's study was initially done 
on individual market indices where stocks are sorted by their past 3-year buy-and-hold return 
and the losers and winners represented respectively the 25% bottom and 25% top, while De 
Bondt and Thaler's (1985) and Fama and French's (1996) studies were conducted on US 
stocks only. 
5.2.2.5 Contrarian in Emerging Market 
Given that contrarian strategies are significantly profitable in the full sample and, on average, 
positive in different period, I will expect the contrarian strategies to be profitable in emerging 
markets. It is understandable that there may be serious concern over the fact that emerging 
markets might be on average illiquid and unstable and seriously segmented (Chan, et al., 
2000) but this analysis is more interested in the practicality of the contrarian strategies than 
the market condition. To test the sensitivity of the contrarian strategies on the emerging 
market, I implement the contrarian strategies on the emerging markets sub-sample (December 
1987 to January 2014) given that the first emerging market enters the sample in December 
1987. 
At `t' I buy the loser countries and sell the winner countries. The winners and the losers’ 
portfolios are constructed based on their past performances. I use 3 different formation 
periods 'F' and 3 for different holding periods 'H', where 'F' equals 36, 48, and 60 months and 
'H' equals 36, 48, and 60 months as indicated in Table 4.2.5 below. This gives a total of 9 
strategies. The contrarian portfolios in Table 4.2.5 panel A are formed immediately after the 
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formation period. I also examine a second set of 9 contrarian strategies that skip a month 
between the formation and the holding period as indicated in Table 4.2.5 Panel B. The 
average monthly returns of the winners and the losers’ portfolio are indicated in the table. 
The t-statistics are reported in the parentheses and the p-values are reported next. The sample 
period is from December 1987 to January 2014. 
[Insert Table 4.2.5 Here] 
The emerging market state is arguably significant in influencing the international contrarian 
strategies. For instance, Table 4.2.5 shows that for the contrarian strategies for emerging 
countries, 4 strategies are positive and significant for the contrarian strategies without a 
month lag and 3 strategies are positive and significant for the contrarian strategies with a 
month lag. The most successful contrarian strategy selects stocks based on their previous 
performances over 60 months and then holds the portfolio for the next 48 months. This 
strategy yields 1.37% per month (17.69% per year) with a t-statistic of 5.15, and a p-value of 
0.01 (Table 4.2.5 Panel A). 
Examining whether skipping a time lag has an added benefit, I find that skipping a month 
between the formation and the holding period did not improve the 60-month/48-month 
strategy performance as the equivalent holding period returns are slightly lower. The loser 
portfolio outperforms the winner portfolio to generate positive average contrarian return of 
1.20% per month (15.33% per year) with a t-statistic of 3.16 and a p-value of 0.05 (Table 
4.2.5 Panel B). This contradicts the initial findings by Fama and French (1996) that suggested 
that when the preceding months/year is included in the test, short-term continuation tends to 
offset long-term reversal, and past losers have lower future returns than past winners for 
portfolios formed with up to four years past returns. It also points to a greater return given 
that Fama and French suggested 1.16% average return per month for the loser portfolio and 
0.42 % per month for the winner portfolio. This implies that the loser minus winner portfolio 
yields 0.74% per month (9.25% per year) on average. 
This indicates that, even though different market conditions and different periods exhibit 
contrarian profit, the highest return might be observed in emerging market with an effective 
compounded return of 17.70% per year as the evidences suggest with the 60-month/ 48-
month. Overall, the results in Table 4.2.5 validate the initial tests hypothesis that long-term 
contrarian strategies are profitable internationally. They are consistent with other studies such 
as De Bondt and Thaler (1985) in US stock market that suggested that 3 to 5 years after a past 
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performance based portfolio formation, losers' portfolios outperformed winners' portfolios by 
approximately 25% over 3 years (8.33% per year) and 8% annually for 5 years post-ranking 
period. They also indicate a better contrarian return than Jordan's (2012) study that suggested 
that contrarian strategies are internationally profitable and generate 5.60 % per year with 
earning above the risk-free rate; and that the long-term contrarian profits is not a robust 
phenomenon internationally. 
My findings also endow with a greater return than Malin and Bornholt's (2013) study that 
suggested 0.46% contrarian return per month (5.66% per year) in developed market and 
0.68% per month (8.47% per year) in emerging market, and Richards's (1996) study that 
found 6.60% per year for 3 years holding period and 5.80% per year over 4 years. In general, 
the significance tests on these contrarian strategies with non-overlapping portfolios should be 
regarded only as illustrative, since alternative techniques would yield somewhat different 
critical values (Richards, 1996). I must acknowledge that the short data set allows only a 
small number of non-overlapping tests for the longer horizons. Therefore, the lack of 
significance in the face of some larger profits with non-overlapping portfolio is driven by the 
length of the sample period (number of observations).  
These findings are fundamental and deviate from previous studies in the sense that I use 
deciles portfolio to demonstrate how trading on extreme losers and winners (deciles 
Portfolios), contrarian investors could generate superior return compared to others 
approaches. The effective yearly return is calculated using the monthly-compounded return 
over 12 months rather than the arithmetic average of percentage return. They are also 
complementary given that Jordan's (2012) and De Bondt and Thaler's (1985) study did not 
look at the contrarian phenomenon as a generalized phenomenon. Jordan's study was initially 
done on individual market index, where stocks are sorted by their past 3-year buy-and-hold 
return and the losers and winners represented respectively the 25% bottom and 25% top, 
while De Bondt and Thaler's (1985) and Fama and French's (1996) studies were conducted on 
US stocks only. 
5.2.2.6 Summary 
In this section, I examined the profitability of the contrarian strategies based on past returns 
of countries' indices in international equity markets. My findings indicate evidences of 
contrarian profitability. The contrarian strategies have shown to be profitable on average over 
the full sample period, and the 48-month/60-month strategy being the most profitable strategy 
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with the whole sample period (10.40% per year). Although the contrarian return could rise 
considerably when the strategy skips a time lag between the portfolio formation period and 
the holding period, the overall result is not exceptionally significant as it appears that only 4 
strategies out of 18 are significant at 5% level. Evidences also indicate that the contrarian 
strategies are highly profitable in emerging countries where the highest returns might be 
observed with an effective compounded return of 17.70% per year as the evidences suggest 
with the 60-month/ 48-month. developed countries' contribution are less significant and 
inconsistent, even though a consistent contrarian returns 11.72% per year could be observed 
in developed countries with the 60-month/48-month strategy when there is a time lag 
between the portfolio formation period and the holding period. 
Even more interesting, this thesis overall did not find evidence of return continuation among 
countries' indices. However, I must point out that my evidences are in line with Jordan's 
(2012) study that, suggest that contrarian strategies are internationally profitable (5.69% per 
year) and that the long-term contrarian profits are not a robust phenomenon. I also emphasise 
the point that investors may earn extra returns over time by investing internationally as the 
global contrarian strategy generates a return higher than the 8% per annum as reported by De 
Bondt and Thaler (1985). It is important to indicate that the global contrarian strategies will 
be profitable after accounting for transaction costs. On average, the contrarian strategies with 
non-overlapping portfolios are long-term strategies and results in a low turnover.  The 
optimum strategy generates a return of 10.40% per annum while the portfolios are rebalanced 
with 48 months’ intervals. On other hand Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), and Berkowitz, 
Logue and Noser (1988) estimate one-way transaction costs of 23 basis points for 
institutional investors suggesting that transaction cost of 0.5% per trade with a 6-month/6-
month strategy is conservative. This implies and estimated transaction cost of 0.6% per 
annum which is not negligible, suggesting a contrarian profit of 9.8% per annum, which does 
not undermine the high profitability of these strategy.  
A direct implication of these results is that international investors might be able to beat the 
market using common investment strategy such as the global momentum with non-
overlapping portfolio. 
To increase the power of the test, this thesis also performs similar analysis on contrarian 
strategies with overlapping portfolios where, contrarian deciles portfolio in any particular 
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month holds indices ranked in the deciles in any of the previous F months. The results are 
reported in the next section. 
5.2.3 Contrarian Strategies with Overlapping Deciles Portfolios 
In this section, I examine whether contrarian strategies earn significant return after increasing 
the power of the test. To increase the power of the test, I construct overlapping portfolios, 
where contrarian deciles portfolio in any particular month holds stocks ranked in those 
deciles in any of the previous H ranking months. In sequence with the initial findings by 
Fama and French (1996) that suggested that when the preceding months/year is included in 
the test, short-term continuation tends to offset long-term reversal, and past losers have lower 
future returns than past winners do. I also test the contrarian strategies that sky a month 
between the formation and the holding periods. I examine the contrarian profitability in the 
full sample period 1969-2014 and in different market states. 
5.2.3.1 Contrarian Strategies for International Investors: Full Sample 1969-2014 
I examine the international contrarian strategy initially, on the entire time series data. 
Investors the loser’s countries and sell the winners countries. The winners and the losers’ 
portfolios are constructed based on their past performances. They use 3 different formation 
periods 'F' and 3 different holding periods 'H', where 'F' equals 36, 48, and 60 months and 'H' 
equals 36, 48, and 60 months as indicated in Table 4.2.6, this gives a total of 9 strategies. The 
contrarian portfolios in Table 4.2.6 panel A are formed immediately after the formation 
period. However, I also examine a second set of 9 contrarian strategies that skip a month 
between the formation and the holding period as indicated in Table 4.2.6 Panel B. The 
average monthly returns of the winners and the losers' portfolio are indicated in the table 
below, the t-statistics are reported in the parentheses and the p-values are reported next. The 
sample period is from December 1969 to January 2014.        
[Insert Table 4.2.6 Here] 
The contrarian strategy can also be presented with the overlapping to support my initial 
findings and inform the reader on the strength of the test on return reversal. To illustrate these 
points, Table 4.2.6 reports the results for the whole sample period: the winner, the loser, and 
the contrarian portfolio (loser-winner) returns are reported for the 18 strategies. All the 
contrarian strategies’ returns are positive and significant. The most successful contrarian 
strategy and selects stocks based on their previous performances over 48 months and then 
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holds the portfolio for the next 48 months. This strategy yields 0.55% per month (6.80% per 
year) with a t-statistic of 11.30% and a p-value of 0.00 (Table 4.2.6 Panel A). 
Investigating whether skipping a time lag is beneficial, I find that skipping a month between 
the formation and the holding period did not improve the 48-month/48-month strategy 
performance as the equivalent holding period returns are slightly lower. When there is a time 
lag between the portfolio formation period and the holding period the 48-month/48-month 
yields 0.55% % per month (6.80% per year) with a t-statistic of 11.27 and a p-value of 0.00 
(Table 4.2.6 panel B). This contradicts the initial findings by Fama and French (1996) that 
suggested that when the preceding months/year is included in the test, short-term 
continuation tends to offset long-term reversal, and past losers have lower future returns than 
past winners for portfolios formed with up to four years past returns. 
Given that the contrarian strategies' returns are positive in most of the cases and that the 
returns are highly significant in all cases, I suggest that the contrarian strategies are on 
average profitable internationally when using overlapping portfolios of stock indices, and that 
the loser portfolio outperforms the winner portfolio to generate positive average contrarian 
profits. I establish that the most profitable strategy is the 48-month/48-month (Table 4.2.6 
Panel A) with an effective compounded return of 6.80% per year (0.55% per month). 
However, the 48-month/48-month (Table 4.2.6 Panel A) is different and less profitable than 
the 48-month/60-month documented with the non-overlapping strategies (Table 4.2.1 Panel 
A) (10.37% per year) and the 8% per year previously suggested by De Bondt and Thaler 
(1985). 
This indicates that skipping a month lag between the formation and holding period do not 
increase the portfolios returns and using overlapping portfolio do improve the test on return 
reversal, but lessen the portfolio return. These findings have another notable aspect as they 
point to an observable pattern that shows that increasing the holding period does increase the 
portfolio return. The results remain comparatively greater than Jordan's (2012) study that 
suggested that contrarian strategies are internationally profitable (5.60 % per year); 
conversely, the results with overlapping portfolio indicate signs of robustness for the long-
term contrarian phenomenon internationally. 
Furthermore, this part of the study contributes substantialy to the literature given that, I use 
deciles portfolio to demonstrate how trading on extreme losers and winners (deciles 
Portfolios), contrarian investors could generate superior return compared to other approaches. 
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The effective yearly return is calculated using the monthly-compounded return over 12 
months rather than the arithmetic average of percentage return. They are also complementary 
given that Jordan's (2012), and De Bondt and Thaler's (1985) study did not look at the 
contrarian phenomenon as a generalized phenomenon. Jordan's study was initially done on 
individual market index where stocks are sorted by their past 3-year buy-and-hold return and 
the losers and winners represented respectively the 25% bottom and 25% top, while De 
Bondt and Thaler (1985) and Fama and French's (1996) studies were conducted on US stocks 
only. 
5.2.3.2 Contrarian Returns for International Investors: Established Markets 
Next, I turn to a more stable sample period, I implement the contrarian strategies with 
overlapping portfolio in the 1969-2014 subsample, where all countries' indices start and end 
in the same date to avoid any blunder which may occur from non-synchronized starting dates 
among countries' indices. To implement the basic contrarian strategies on the sub-set 1969-
2014 period (18 countries) at `t', I buy the loser countries and sell the winner countries. The 
winners and the losers’ portfolios are constructed based on their past performances. I use 3 
different formation periods 'F' and 3 for different holding periods 'H', where 'F' equals 36, 48, 
and 60 months and 'H' equals 36, 48, and 60 months as indicated in Table 4.2.7 below; this 
gives a total of 9 strategies. The contrarian portfolios in Table 4.2.7 panel A are formed 
immediately after the formation period, but I also examine a second set of 9 contrarian 
strategies that skip a month between the formation and the holding period as indicated in 
Table 4.2.7 Panel B. The average monthly returns of the winners and the losers’ portfolio are 
indicated in the table below the t-statistics are reported in the parentheses and the p-values are 
reported next. The sample period is from December 1969 to January 2014.       
[Insert Table 4.2.7 Here] 
Contrarian analyses on established market reveal very interesting aspect of the reversal effect. 
Table 4.2.7 reports the results for the whole sample period of established market, the winner, 
the loser, and the contrarian portfolio (loser-winner) returns are reported for the 18 strategies. 
All the contrarian strategies’ returns are positive. These results show that, the contrarian 
strategies’ returns are positive in most of the cases, all strategies are significant. The most 
successful contrarian strategy selects stocks based on their previous performances over 48 
months and then holds the portfolio for the next 48 months. This strategy yields 0.45% per 
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month (5.59% per year), with a t-statistic of 11.28 and a p-value of 0.00 (Table 4.2.7 Panel 
A), when there is not time lag between the portfolio formation period and the holding period. 
Examining whether skipping a time lag is beneficial, I find that skipping a month between the 
formation and the holding period did not improve the 48-month/48-month strategy 
performance as the equivalent holding period returns are slightly lower. It yields 0.45% per 
month (5.59% per year) with a t-statistic of 11.21% and a p-value of 0.00 (Table 4.2.7 panel 
B). When there is a month lag between the formation period and the holding period. This 
contradicts the initial findings by Fama and French (1996) that suggested that when the 
preceding month is included in the test, short-term continuation tends to offset long-term 
reversal, and past losers have lower future returns than past winners for portfolios formed 
with up to four years past returns. It also points to greater returns given that Fama and French 
(1996) suggested 1.16% average return per month for the loser portfolio, 0.42 % per month 
for the winner portfolio and 0.74% per month (9.25% per year) for the loser minus winner 
portfolio). However, the 48-month formation period remains profitable regardless of the 
holding period for both sets of strategies.   
Given that the contrarian strategies returns are positive in most of the strategies and that the 
returns are highly significant in all cases, I may suggest that the contrarian strategies are on 
average profitable internationally, and that the loser portfolio outperforms the winner 
portfolio to generate positive average contrarian profits. I then establish that the most 
profitable strategy is the 48-month/48-month that does not skip a month (Table 4.2.7 Panel 
A); it yields an effective compounded return of 5.59% per year.  The returns here are 
significantly lower than the 8% return per year suggested by De Bondt and Thaler (1985).  In 
addition, these findings are essential and deviate from other studies in the sense that I use 
deciles portfolio to demonstrate how trading on extreme losers and winners (deciles 
Portfolios), contrarian investors could generate superior return compared to other approaches. 
The effective yearly return is calculated using the monthly-compounded return over 12 
months rather than the arithmetic average of percentage return. 
These results are also complementary given that Jordan's (2012) and De Bondt and Thaler's 
(1985) study did not look at the contrarian phenomenon as a generalized phenomenon. 
Jordan's study was initially done on individual market index where stocks are sorted by their 
past 3-year buy-and-hold return and the losers and winners represented respectively the 25% 
bottom and 25% top, while De Bondt and Thaler's (1985), and Fama and French's (1996) 
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studies were conducted on US stocks only. The results here highlight the fact that contrarian 
strategies returns are lower if investors apply the standard contrarian strategy with 
overlapping portfolios. 
5.2.3.3 Contrarian Returns with Overlapping Portfolios since Globalisation 
To ascertain whether the contrarian strategies remain profitable with overlapping portfolio 
after 1994, I examine an alternative set of contrarian overlapping portfolio, which are formed 
on the 1994-2014 subsamples (47 countries). At 't' I buy the loser countries and sell the 
winner countries. The winners and the losers' portfolios are constructed based on their past 
performances. I use 3 different formation periods 'F' and 3 different holding periods 'H', 
where 'F' equals 36, 48, and 60 months and 'H' equals 36, 48, and 60 months as indicated in 
Table 4.21 below, and this gives a total of 9 strategies.  The contrarian portfolios in Table 
4.2.8 panel A are formed immediately after the formation period, but I also examine a second 
set of 9 contrarian strategies that skip a month between the formation and the holding period 
as indicated in Table 4.2.8 Panel B. The average monthly returns of the winners and the 
losers’ portfolio are indicated in the Table 4.2.8. The t-statistics are reported in the 
parentheses and the p-values are reported next. The sample period is from January 1994 to 
January 2014.       
[Insert Table 4.2.8 Here] 
The contrarian strategy return can also be influenced by the effect of the globalisation. Table 
4.2.8 shows the results of the contrarian strategies implemented on the stock market indices 
of 47 countries for 1994 to 2014, which include the global finance crisis 2007-2008. It shows 
that the contrarian strategies remain profitable on average (9 out of 9 strategies) for the 
strategies without time lag and (9 out of 9 strategies) for the strategies with a month lag. All 
the returns are significant. The 48-month/48-month generates a positive and significant 
payoff 0,45% per month (5.59% per year) with a t-statistic of 5.43 and a p-value of 0.00 
(Table 4.2.8 Panel A). Testing out whether skipping a time lag is beneficial, I find that 
skipping a month between the formation and the holding period improves the 48-month/48-
month strategy performance as the equivalent holding period returns are slightly greater. The 
loser portfolio outperforms the winner portfolio to generate a relatively higher return 0.45% 
per month with a t-statistic of 5.56 and a p-value of 0.00 when there is a time lag between the 
formation and the holding period (Table 4.2.8 Panel B).  
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This indicates that, even with the impact of the financial crisis and the globalization the 
contrarian strategies can still be profitable with the overlapping approach. The 1994-2014 
period exhibits contrarian profit with the 48-month/48-month portfolio of countries' indices 
generating and effective return of 5.56% per year at its best (Table 4.2.8 Panel B); but the 
degree of profitability is considerably lower than the 8% return per year with the 36-month 
holding period presented by De Bondt and Thaler (1985). My findings also endow with a 
greater return than Malin and Bornholt's (2013) study that suggested 0.46% contrarian return 
per month (5.66% per year) in developed market and 0.68% per month (8.47% per year) in 
emerging market, and Richards's (1996) study that found 6.60% per year for 3 years holding 
period and 5.80% per year over 4 years. 
In sum, contrarian strategies are quite profitable during the 1994-14 period. I use deciles 
portfolio to demonstrate how trading on extreme losers and winners (deciles Portfolios), 
contrarian investors could generate superior return compared to other approaches. The 
effective yearly return is calculated using the monthly-compounded return over 12 months 
rather than the arithmetic average of percentage return. This study is also complementary 
given that Jordan's (2012) and De Bondt and Thaler's (1985) study did not look at the 
contrarian phenomenon as a generalized phenomenon. Jordan's study was initially done on 
individual market index where stocks are sorted by their past 3-year buy-and-hold return and 
the losers and winners represented respectively the 25% bottom and 25% top, while De 
Bondt and Thaler’s (1985) and Fama and French’s (1996) studies were conducted on US 
stocks only. 
5.2.3.4 Contrarian Returns with Overlapping Portfolios in Developed Countries 
To better understand which of the developed and the emerging market may be driving the 
return on the global contrarian strategies, I implemented the contrarian strategy with 
overlapping portfolio on the developed countries subsample (23 countries) over 1969-2014.  
At `t' I buy the loser countries and sell the winner countries. The winners and the loser’s 
portfolios are constructed based on their past performances. I use 3 different formation 
periods 'F' and 3 different holding periods 'H', where 'F' equals 36, 48, and 60 months and 'H' 
equals 36, 48, and 60 months as indicated in Table 4.2.9 below, this gives a total of 9 
strategies.  The contrarian portfolios in Table 4.2.9 panel A are formed immediately after the 
formation period, but I also examine a second set of 9 contrarian strategies that skip a month 
between the formation and the holding period as indicated in Table 4.2.9 Panel B. The 
average monthly returns of the winners and the losers’ portfolio are indicated in Table 4.2.9 
171 
 
below, the t-statistics are reported in the parentheses and the p-values are reported next. The 
sample period is from December 1969 to January 2014. 
[Insert Table 4.2.9 Here] 
Table 4.2.9 reports the contrarian results of the developed countries for the whole sample 
period, the winner, the loser, and the contrarian portfolio (loser-winner) returns are reported 
for the 18 strategies. The results in every strategy indicate that the contrarian strategies 
returns are positive and significant (9 out of 9 strategies) for the strategies without time lag 
and (9 out of 9 strategies) for the strategies with a month lag. The most successful contrarian 
strategy selects stocks based on their previous performances over 48 months and then holds 
the portfolio for the next 48 months. This strategy yields 0.59% per month (7.33% per year) 
with a t-statistic of 11.69 and a p-value of 0.00 when there is not time lag between the 
portfolio formation period and the holding period (Table 4.2.9 Panel A).  
Studying how skipping a time lag affects the contrarian return, I find that skipping a month 
between the formation and the holding period improves the contrarian strategy. It yields 
0.59% per month (7.33% per year) with the 48-month/48-month strategy when there is not 
time lag. It also generates 0.62% per month (7.66% per year) at it best with a t-statistic of 
(11.26) and a p-value 0.00 with the 60-month/36-month (Table 4.2.9 Panel B), when there is 
a month lag between the formation period and the holding period. This is in line with the 
initial findings by Fama and French (1996) that suggested that when the preceding 
months/year is included in the test, short-term continuation tends to offset long-term reversal, 
and past losers have lower future returns than past winners for portfolios formed with up to 
four years past returns. It also points to greater returns given that Fama and French suggested 
1.16% average return per month for the loser portfolio and 0.42 % per month for the winner 
portfolio (0.74% per month or 9.25% per year for the loser minus winner portfolio). 
Given that the contrarian strategies returns are positive in most of the strategies and that the 
returns are highly significant, I may suggest that the contrarian strategies are on average 
profitable internationally for developed countries, and that the loser portfolio outperforms the 
winner portfolio to generate positive average contrarian profits. This also validates my initial 
result, and the most profitable strategy is the 60-month/36-month with a month lag. These 
results support my initial findings that, the contrarian strategies are consistently profitable 
internationally with overlapping portfolio, but generate significantly low effective return of 
7.66% per year. Which is lower compared to De Bondt and Thaler’s (1985) findings that 
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suggest 8% per year contrarian return in the US market; this result helps reiterate the point 
that the long-term contrarian strategies that use overlapping portfolio are consistently 
profitable in developed countries. My findings also endow with a greater return than Malin 
and Bornholt's (2013) study that suggested 0.46% contrarian return per month (5.66% per 
year) in developed market and 0.68% per month (8.47% per year) in emerging market, and 
Richards's (1996) study that found 6.60% per year for 3 years holding period and 5.80% per 
year over 4 years. 
Still, these findings are essential and deviate from previous contrarian studies in the sense 
that I use deciles portfolio to demonstrate how trading on extreme losers and winners (deciles 
Portfolios), contrarian investors could generate superior return compared to other approaches. 
The effective yearly return is calculated using the monthly-compounded return over 12 
months rather than the arithmetic average of percentage return. They are also complementary 
given that Jordan’s (2012) and De Bondt and Thaler’s (1985), and Fama and French’s (1996) 
study did not look at the contrarian phenomenon as a generalized phenomenon. Jordan's 
study was initially done on individual market index where stocks are sorted by their past 3-
year buy-and-hold return and the losers and winners represented respectively the 25% bottom 
and 25% top, while De Bondt and Thaler’s (1985) and Fama and French’s (1996) studies 
were conducted on US stocks only. 
5.2.3.5 Contrarian Returns with Overlapping Portfolios in Emerging market 
 I implement the contrarian strategies on the emerging market subsample (December 1987 to 
January 2014) given that the first emerging market enters the sample in December 1987.At `t' 
I buy the loser countries and sell the winner countries. The winners and the losers’ portfolios 
are constructed based on their past performances. I use 3 different formation periods 'F' and 3 
different holding periods 'H', where 'F' equals 36, 48, and 60 months and 'H' equals 36, 48, 
and 60 months as indicated in Table 4.2.10 below and this gives a total of 9 strategies.  The 
contrarian portfolios in Table 4.2.10 panel A are formed immediately after the formation 
period, but I also examine a second set of 9 contrarian strategies that skip a month between 
the formation and the holding period as indicated in Table 4.2.10 Panel B. The average 
monthly returns of the winners and the losers’ portfolio are indicated in the table, the t-
statistics are reported in the parentheses and the p-values are reported next. The sample 
period is from December 1987 to January 2014. 
[Insert Table 4.2.10 Here] 
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The emerging market state is arguably significant in influencing the international contrarian 
strategies. Table 4.2.10 reports the contrarian strategies’ results on emerging countries. By 
comparison, to those of the full sample and the developed countries, the contrarian strategies 
in emerging countries appear to be more profitable on average. 9 out of 9 strategies generate 
positive return for strategies without a time lag and 9 out of 9 strategies generate positive 
return for the contrarian strategies with a month lag. The most successful strategy selects 
stocks based on their previous performances over 48 months and then holds the portfolio for 
the next 36 months. This strategy yields 0.71% per month (8.91% per year) with a t-statistic 
of 0.7.64, and a p-value of 0.00 (Table 4.2.10 Panel A), 
Testing out whether skipping a time lag is beneficial, I find that skipping a month between 
the formation and the holding period did not improve the 48-month/36-month strategy 
performance. It yields a return of 0.69% per month (8.65% per year) with a t-statistic of 7.46 
and a p-value of 0.00 (Table 4.2.10 panel B). This contradicts the initial findings by Fama 
and French (1996) that suggested that when the preceding months/year is included in the test, 
short-term continuation tends to offset long-term reversal, and past losers have lower future 
returns than past winners for portfolios formed with up to four years past returns. It also 
points to greater returns given that Fama and French suggested 1.16% average return per 
month for the loser portfolio and 0.42 % per month for the winner portfolio (0.74% per 
month or 9.25% per year for the loser minus winner portfolio). They are consistent with 
studies such as De Bondt and Thaler (1985) in US stock market that suggested that 3 to 5 
years after a past performance based portfolio formation, losers' portfolios outperformed 
winners' portfolios by approximately 25% over 3 years and 8% annually for 5 years post-
ranking period. They also indicate a better contrarian return than Jordan’s (2012) study that 
suggested that contrarian strategies are internationally profitable (5.60 % a year) with earning 
above the risk-free rate; and that the long-term contrarian profits is not a robust phenomenon 
internationally. 
My findings also endow with a greater return than Malin and Bornholt's (2013) study that 
suggested 0.46% contrarian return per month (5.66% per year) in developed market and 
0.68% per month (8.47% per year) in emerging market, and Richards's (1996) study that 
found 6.60% per year for 3 years holding period and 5.80% per year over 4 years.  
These findings are essential and deviate from other studies in the sense that I use deciles 
portfolio to demonstrate how trading on extreme losers and winners (deciles Portfolios), 
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contrarian investors could generate superior return compared to other approaches. The 
effective yearly return is calculated using the monthly-compounded return over 12 months 
rather than the arithmetic average of percentage return. 
Given that the contrarian strategies’ returns are all positive when there is not time lag 
between the portfolio formation period and the holding period, and that the returns are 
significant. I may suggest that the contrarian strategies are on average consistently profitable 
for emerging countries with overlapping portfolio, that the loser portfolio always outperforms 
the winner portfolio to generate positive average contrarian profits. However, contrary to the 
developed and the whole sample analysis, the 48-month/36-month generate the highest 
effective compounded return of 8.91% per year. They are also complementary given that 
Jordan (2012) and De Bondt and Thaler (1985) study did not look at the contrarian 
phenomenon as a generalized phenomenon. Jordan's study was initially done on individual 
market index where stocks are sorted by their past 3-year buy-and-hold return and the losers 
and winners represented respectively the 25% bottom and 25% top, while De Bondt and 
Thaler (1985) and Fama and French (1996) studies were conducted on US stocks only. 
5.2.3.6 Summary 
The test of return reversal with overlapping portfolios based on past returns of countries’ 
indices in international equity markets, indicate evidences of contrarian profitability. The 48-
month/60-month strategy has shown to generate the highest effective contrarian return of 
10.401% per year (0.828% per month) over the full sample period. However, the contrarian 
strategies are on average positives and the returns may vary considerably from one market 
condition to another. More importantly, the contrarian strategies remain on average profitable 
but not significant in the period post-1994 with the non-overlapping portfolios. These 
evidences also indicate that the contrarian strategies’ returns are on average lower but 
significant with the overlapping approach. Moreover, the contrarian strategies remain 
profitable in emerging countries, but it is important to reiterate that on average they are more 
significant with overlapping portfolios. 
Even more interesting, this thesis did not find evidence of consistent return continuation with 
the contrarian strategies among countries’ indices when using overlapping portfolio and the 
contrarian strategies are highly profitable in emerging countries and that developed countries' 
contribution are less significant. These results are in line with Jordan's (2012) study 
suggested that suggested contrarian strategies are internationally profitable and that the long-
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term contrarian profits are not a robust phenomenon. I also emphasise the point that investors 
may earn extra returns over time by investing internationally as the global contrarian 
generates a return higher than the 8% per annum reported by De Bondt and Thaler (1985). 
5.3 Contrarian strategies with Quintile Portfolios 
5.3.1 Introduction 
This section investigates the performances of the long-run contrarian strategy with quintile 
portfolio on the global equity market, based on countries' indices past performances. 
Consistent with the predictions of the overreaction hypothesis, that suggested that portfolios 
of prior "losers" do outperform prior "winners" three years after portfolio formation, the 
losing stocks earned about 25% more than the winners and 8% annually for 5 years post-
ranking period even though the latter are significantly riskier (De Bondt and Thaler, 1985). 
This section also discusses the empirical results of my study based on raw return for both 
overlapping and non-overlapping portfolios, following the pure contrarian strategies approach 
and concludes with a discussion of these strategies' sub-period results. 
Given the long research history in this field, I focus on a global coordinated contrarian 
phenomenon. I construct quintile portfolios and carefully re-examine the international 
evidence for the long-run reversal predictability in different market states. I also provide 
alternative explanations of the international profitability of the contrarian strategy. 
International contrarian investors will buy stocks in the losers' countries and sell stocks in the 
winners' countries that replicate indices performances or invest in index-trackers in these 
countries respectively to generate extra profit.    
5.3.2 Contrarian Strategies with Non-overlapping Quintiles Portfolios 
5.3.2.1 Contrarian Strategies for International Investors: Full Sample 1969-2014 
To ascertain whether the global contrarian strategies based on quintile portfolio work in the 
global equity market, I implement the basic contrarian strategies, firstly, on the entire times 
series data. In period `t’ I buy the losers’ countries indices and sell the winners’ countries 
indies. The winners and the losers’ portfolios are constructed based on their past 
performances. I use 3 different formation periods 'F' and 3 for different holding periods 'H', 
where F equals 36, 48, and 60 months, and H equals 36, 48, and 60 months; thus, I have 9 
strategies in total. The contrarian portfolios in Table 4.2.11 panel A are formed immediately 
after the formation period, but I also examine a second set of 9 contrarian strategies that skip 
a month between the formation and the holding period as indicated in Table 4.2.11 Panel B. 
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The average monthly returns of the winners and the losers’ portfolio are indicated in the 
Table 4.2.11. The t-statistics are reported in the parentheses and the p-values are reported 
next. The sample period is from December 1969 to January 2014.  
[Insert Table 4.2.11 Here] 
Table 4.2.11 provides the estimated results of the contrarian strategies for the whole sample 
period; the winner, the loser, and the contrarian portfolio (loser-winner) returns are reported 
for the 18 strategies. All the contrarian strategies’ returns are positives; 9 strategies are 
significant. The most successful contrarian strategy selects stocks based on their previous 
performances over 60 months and then holds the portfolio for the next 48 months. This 
strategy yields 0.71% per month (8.89% per year) with a t-statistic of 4.78 and a p-value of 
0.00 when there is not time lag between the portfolio formation period and the holding period 
(Table 4.2.11 Panel A).  
Testing out whether a time lag is beneficial between the formation and the holding period. I 
find that skipping a month between the formation and the holding period did not improve the 
60-month/48-month strategy performance as the equivalent holding period returns are slightly 
lesser when the strategies skip a month between the formation and the holding period, it 
yields 0.70% per month (8.76% per year) with a t-statistic 5.70 and a P-value 0.00 (Table 
4.2.11 Panel B). This contradicts the initial findings by Fama and French (1996) that 
suggested that when the preceding months is included in the test, short-term continuation 
tends to offset long-term reversal, and past losers have lower future returns than past winners 
for portfolios formed with up to four years past returns. This also points to greater returns 
given that Fama and French (1996) suggested 1.16% average return per month for the loser 
portfolio and 0.42 % per month for the winner portfolio (0.74% per month or 9.25% per year 
for the loser minus winner portfolio). 
These results show that the contrarian strategies’ is on average profitable; the 60-month 
formation period is exceptionally profitable in all cases. I then establish that the most 
profitable strategy is the 60-month/48-month that does not skip a month with an effective 
compounded return of 8.89% per year (Table 4.2.11 Panel A) and suggest that indices choice 
should be based on substantial range of performances. 
Overall, the results in Table 4.2.11 validate the initial tests hypothesis that long-term 
contrarian strategies are profitable internationally. They are consistent with studies such as 
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De Bondt and Thaler (1985) in US stock market that suggested that 3 to 5 years after a past 
performance based portfolio formation, losers' portfolios outperformed winners' portfolios by 
approximately 25% over 3 years and 8% annually for 5 years post-ranking period. They 
indicate a better contrarian return than Jordan’s (2012) study that suggested that contrarian 
strategies are internationally profitable (5.60% per year) with earning above the risk-free rate; 
and that the long-term contrarian profits is not a robust phenomenon internationally. 
My findings also endow with a greater return than Malin and Bornholt's (2013) study that 
suggested 0.46% contrarian return per month (5.66% per year) in developed market and 
0.68% per month (8.47% per year) in emerging market, and Richards's (1996) study that 
found 6.60% per year for 3 years holding period and 5.80% per year over 4 years. Moreover, 
my findings are essential in the sense that i use quintile portfolios to demonstrate how trading 
on quintile portfolios, the contrarian investors could generate significant return but lower 
return compared to the contrarian strategies based on deciles portfolios approaches. They are 
also complementary evidences given that Jordan's (2012), and De Bondt and Thaler's (1985) 
study did not look at the contrarian phenomenon as a generalized phenomenon. Jordan's 
study was initially done on individual market index where stocks are sorted by their past 3-
year buy-and-hold return, the losers and winners represented the 25% bottom and 25% top, 
and did not established the performance differences between quintile and deciles portfolios' 
approaches, while De Bondt and Thaler’s (1985) study were conducted on US stock only. 
5.3.2.2 Contrarian Returns with Quintiles Portfolio in Established Markets 
I implement the contrarian strategies in a more stable sample period (1969-2014), where all 
countries indices start and end in the same date to avoid any slip-up, which may occur from 
variation among the starting dates of countries indices, and to gauge the effect of the variation 
in the sample size. 
To implement the basic contrarian strategies with quintile portfolios on the subsample1969-
2014 (18 countries), at `t' I buy the loser countries and sell the winner countries. The winners 
and the losers’ portfolios are constructed based on their past performances. I used 3 different 
formation periods 'F' and 3 different holding periods 'H', where F equals 36, 48, and 60 
months and H equals 36, 48, and 60 months as indicated in Table 4.2.12. Thus, I have 9 
strategies in total. The contrarian portfolios in Table 4.2.12 panel A are formed immediately 
after the formation period, but I also examine a second set of 9 contrarian strategies that skip 
a month between the formation and the holding period as indicated in Table 4.2.12 Panel B. 
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The average monthly returns of the winners and the losers’ portfolio are indicated in the 
table. The t-statistics are reported in the parentheses and the p-values are reported next. The 
sample period is from December 1969 to January 2014. 
[Insert Table 4.2.12 Here] 
Very interesting aspects of the reversal effect appear when analysing the contrarian strategies 
on established market. In Table 4.2.12., the results of the contrarian strategies with quintile 
portfolios on established market for the whole sample period reveal that, most of the 
contrarian strategies’ returns are positive; 6 strategies are significant. The most successful 
contrarian strategy selects stocks based on their previous performances over 60 months and 
then holds the portfolio for the next 48 months. This strategy yields 0.44% per month (5.40% 
per year) with a t-statistic of 3.15 and a p-value of 0.02 when there is not time lag between 
the formation period and the holding period (Table 4.2.12 Panel A). 
More importantly, I find that skipping a month between the formation and the holding period 
did not improve the 60-month/48-month strategy performance as the equivalent holding 
period returns are slightly lower, it yields 0.42 per month (5.10% per year) with a t-statistic of 
3.37 and a p-value of 0.00 (Table 4.2.12 Panel B). This contradicts the initial findings by 
Fama and French (1996) that suggested that when the preceding months is included in the 
test, short-term continuation tends to offset long-term reversal, and past losers have lower 
future returns than past winners for portfolios formed with up to four years past returns. It 
also points to greater returns given that Fama and French (1996) suggested 1.16% average 
return per month for the loser portfolio, 0.42 % per month for the winner portfolio and 0.74% 
per month (9.25% per year) for the loser minus winner portfolio). 
Overall, these results show that the contrarian strategies’ returns are positive.  The loser 
portfolio outperforms the winner portfolio to generate positive average contrarian profits. I 
can establish that the most profitable strategy is the 60-month/48-month that does not skip a 
month (Table 4.2.12 Panel A); it yields and effective compounded return of 5.40% per year 
and when the strategy does skip a month the 60-month/48-month remains profitable and 
significant (Table 4.2.12 Panel B).  
My findings are consistent between unbalanced sample and the established market sub-set as 
they suggest that the global contrarian strategy remains profitable after changing the sample 
size and constituents, and support De Bondt and Thaler’s (1985) findings in US stock market. 
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They suggested that 3 to 5 years after a past performance based portfolio formation, losers' 
portfolios outperformed winners' portfolios by approximately 25% over 3 years and 8% 
annually for 5 years post- ranking period. These findings also support the initial tests and 
hypothesis that long-term contrarian strategies are profitable and indicate a better contrarian 
return than Jordan's (2012) study that suggested that contrarian strategies are internationally 
profitable (5.60% per year) with earning above the risk-free rate; and that the long-term 
contrarian profits is not a robust phenomenon. 
In addition, these findings are essential and deviate from other studies in the sense that I use 
quintiles portfolio to demonstrate how the portfolio size affect the contrarian return. The 
effective yearly return is calculated using the monthly-compounded return over 12 months 
rather than the arithmetic average of percentage return. They are also complementary given 
that Jordan's (2012), and De Bondt and Thaler's (1985) study did not look at the contrarian 
phenomenon as a generalized phenomenon. Jordan's study was initially done on individual 
market index where stocks are sorted by their past 3-year buy-and-hold return and the losers 
and winners represented respectively the 25% bottom and 25% top, while De Bondt and 
Thaler’s (1985) and Fama and French’s (1996) studies were conducted on US stocks only. 
5.3.2.3 Contrarian Returns with Quintiles Portfolio since Globalisations 1994-2014 
I consider alternative set of contrarian portfolios, which are formed on the 1994-2014 
subsamples (47 countries), given that, since MSCI launched the Emerging Market Index in 
1988 it consisted of just 10 countries representing less than 1% of world market 
capitalization. From 1994 to 2014 the MSCI Emerging Market Index consist of 23 countries 
representing 10% of world market capitalization. The Index is now available for a number of 
regions, market segments or sizes and covers approximately 85% of the free float-adjusted 
market capitalization each of the 23 countries. 
. At 't' I buy the winner countries and sell the loser countries.  The winners and the losers’ 
portfolios are constructed based on their past performances. I use 3 different formation 
periods 'J' and 3 different holding periods 'K', where J equals 36, 48, and 60 months and K 
equals 36, 48, and 60 months as indicated in Table 4.2.13. Thus, I have 9 strategies in total. 
The contrarian portfolios in Table 4.2.13 panel A are formed immediately after the formation 
period, but I also examine a second set of 9 contrarian strategies that skip a month between 
the formation and the holding period as indicated in Table 4.2.13 Panel B. The average 
monthly returns of the winners and the losers’ portfolio are indicated in the table the t-
180 
 
statistics are reported in the parentheses and the p-values are reported next. The sample 
period is from December 1994 to January 2014.  
[Insert Table 2.13 Here] 
In table 4.2.13., my attempt to examine the contrarian strategies on the stock market indices 
of 47 counties for 1994 to 2014, which include the global finance crisis 2007-2008 shows that 
the contrarian strategies remain profitable on average but none of the strategies' return is 
significant. The most successful contrarian strategy selects stocks based on their previous 
performances over 60 months and then holds the portfolio for the next 48 months. This 
strategy yields 0.59% per month (7.20% per year) with a t-statistic of 1.61 and a p-value of 
0.25 (Table 4.2.13 Panel A). 
Examining whether skipping a time lag is beneficial, I find that skipping a month between the 
formation and the holding period, it yields 0.63% per month (7.85% per year) with a t-
statistic of 2.06 and a p-value of 0.01 (Table 4.2.13 Panel B) which appears to be not 
significant and inconsistent with the overall findings. This is in line with the initial findings 
by Fama and French (1996) that suggested that when the preceding months are included in 
the test, short-term continuation tends to offset long-term reversal, and past losers have lower 
future returns than past winners for portfolios formed with up to four years past returns. It 
also points to greater returns given that Fama and French suggested 1.16% average return per 
month for the loser portfolio and 0.42 % per month for the winner portfolio (0.74% per 
month or 9.2504 per year for the loser minus winner portfolio). 
This also indicates that, even though different market conditions and different periods exhibit 
contrarian profit, this return vary with the study time horizon, which may arise in the period 
post-globalisation as the evidences suggest here. However, I argue that the fact that these 
results are less significant can be due to the small number of observations generated with 
non-overlapping approach, as I do not have much power to detect the departure from zero. 
Therefore, I will not be quick to throw out the strategies, which are not significant or get too 
enamoured with the ones that appear significant.  
Overall, the results in Table 4.2.13 validate the initial tests hypothesis that long-term 
contrarian strategies are profitable internationally. They are consistent with other such as De 
Bondt and Thaler (1985) in US stock market that suggested that 3 to 5 years after a past 
performance based portfolio formation, losers' portfolios outperformed winners' portfolios by 
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approximately 25% over 3 years and 8% annually for 5 years post-ranking period. They also 
indicate a better contrarian return than Jordan’s (2012) study that suggested that contrarian 
strategies are internationally profitable (5.60 per year) with earning above the risk free rate; 
and that the long-term contrarian profits is not a robust phenomenon internationally. My 
findings also present better return than Malin and Bornholt's (2013) study that suggested 
0.46% contrarian return per month (5.66% per year) in developed market and 0.68% per 
month (8.47 per year) in emerging market, and Richards's (1996) study that found 6.60% per 
year for 3 years holding period and 5.80% per year over 4 years.  
However, this thesis deviates from other studies in the sense that I use quintiles portfolio to 
demonstrate how the portfolio size affect the contrarian return. The effective yearly returns 
are calculated using the monthly-compounded return over 12 months rather than the 
arithmetic average of percentage return. The findings are complementary given that Jordan 
(2012), and De Bondt and Thaler (1985) study did not look at the contrarian phenomenon as 
a generalized phenomenon. Jordan's study was initially done on individual market index 
where stocks are sorted by their past 3-year buy-and-hold return and the losers and winners 
represented respectively the 25% bottom and 25% top, while De Bondt and Thaler (1985) 
and Fama and French (1996) studies were conducted on US stocks only. 
5.3.2.4 Contrarian Returns with Quintiles Portfolios in Developed Market 
I assess the contribution of the developed countries on global contrarian strategies, since the 
contrarian profit may differ from developed to emerging countries. I implement the 
contrarian strategy with quintile portfolios on the developed countries subsample (23 
countries) over 1969-2014.  At `t’ I buy the winner countries and sell the loser countries. The 
winners and the losers’ portfolios are constructed based on their past performances. I use 3 
different formation periods 'F' and 3 different holding periods 'H', where 'F' equals 36, 48, and 
60 months and 'H' equals 36, 48, and 60 as indicated in Table 4.2.14 below; this give a total 
of 9 strategies. The contrarian portfolios in Table 4.2.14 panel A are formed immediately 
after the formation period, but I also examine a second set of 16 momentum strategies that 
skip a month between the formation and the holding period as indicated in Table 4.2.14 Panel 
B. The average monthly returns of the winners and the losers’ portfolio are indicated in, the t-
statistics are reported in the parentheses and the p-values are reported next. The sample 
period is from December 1969 to January 2014. 
[Insert Table 4.2.14 Here] 
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 The results in Table 4.2.14 show that the contrarian strategies’ returns are profitable in 
developed countries, given that 8 strategies are significant. The most successful contrarian 
strategy selects indices based on their previous performances over 60 months and then holds 
them for the next 48 months. This strategy yields 0.58% per month (7.12% per year) with a t-
statistic of 5.65 and a p-value of 0.00 when there is not time lag between the formation period 
and the holding period (Table 4.2.14 Panel A). 
Testing out whether skipping a time lag is beneficial, I find that, skipping a month between 
the formation and the holding period improve the 60-month/48-month strategy performance 
as the equivalent holding period returns are slightly lower. It yields 0.56% per month (6.94% 
per year) with a t-statistic of 6.85 and a p-value of 0.00 (Table 4.2.14 Panel B). This 
contradicts the initial findings by Fama and French (1996) that suggested that, when the 
preceding months are included in the test, short-term continuation tends to offset long-term 
reversal, and past losers have lower future returns than past winners for portfolios formed 
with up to four years past returns. It also points greater returns given that Fama and French 
suggested 1.16% average return per month for the loser portfolio, 0.42 % per month for the 
winner portfolio and 0.74% per month (9.25% per year) for the loser minus winner portfolio). 
I suggest that the contrarian strategies are profitable internationally with respect to the time 
horizon and the length of the formation and the holding period. I establish that the most 
profitable strategy is the 60-month/48-month that does not skip a month; it generates an 
effective compounded return of 7.12% per year (Table 4.2.14 Panel A). My findings endow 
with a greater return than Malin and Bornholt's (2013) study that suggested 0.46% contrarian 
return per month (5.66% per year) in developed market and 0.68% per month (8.47 per year) 
in emerging market, and Richards's (1996) study that found 6.60% per year for 3 years 
holding period and 5.80% per year over 4 years.  
Additionally, these findings are essential and deviate from other studies in the sense that I use 
quintiles portfolio to demonstrate how the portfolio size affect the contrarian return. The 
effective yearly return is calculated using the monthly-compounded return over 12 months 
rather than the arithmetic average of percentage return. They are also complementary given 
that Jordan’s (2012) and De Bondt and Thaler’s (1985) study did not look at the contrarian 
phenomenon as a generalized phenomenon. Jordan's study was initially done on individual 
market index where stocks are sorted by their past 3-year buy-and-hold return and the losers 
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and winners represented respectively the 25% bottom and 25% top, while De Bondt and 
Thaler (1985) and Fama and French (1996) studies were conducted on US stocks only. 
5.3.2.5 Contrarian Return with Quintiles Portfolios in Emerging Market 
Given that contrarian strategies are significantly profitable in the full sample and, on average, 
positive in different period, I will expect the contrarian strategies to be profitable in emerging 
market. It is understandable that there may be serious concern over the fact that emerging 
market might be on average illiquid and unstable and seriously segmented (Chan, et al., 
2000) but this analysis is more interested in the practicality of the contrarian strategies than 
the market condition. To test the sensitivity of the contrarian strategies with quintile 
portfolios on the emerging market, I implement the contrarian strategies on the emerging 
market subsample (December 1987 to January 2014) given that the first emerging market 
enters the sample in December 1987. 
At 't' I buy the loser countries and sell the winner countries. The winners and the losers’ 
portfolios are constructed based on their past performances. I use 3 different formation 
periods 'J' and 3 different holding periods 'K', where 'J' equals 36, 48, and 60 months and 'K' 
equals 36, 48, and 60 months as indicated in Table 4.2.15 below. This gives a total of 9 
strategies. The contrarian portfolios in Table 4.2.15 panel A are formed immediately after the 
formation period, but I also examine a second set of 9 contrarian strategies that skip a month 
between the formation and the holding period as indicated in Table 4.2.15 Panel B. The 
average monthly returns of the winners and the losers’ portfolio are indicated in the table, the 
t-statistics are reported in the parentheses and the p-values are reported next. The sample 
period is from December 1987 to January 2014. 
[Insert Table 4.2.15 Here] 
The contrarian strategies result on emerging countries are reported in Table 4.2.15. By 
comparison, to those of the full sample and the developed countries, the contrarian strategies 
in emerging countries appear to generate positive returns, on average. 8 out of 9 strategies 
generate positive return for the contrarian strategies without a month lag and 8 out of 9 
strategies generate positive return for the contrarian strategies with a month lag but none is 
significant. The 60-month/60-month is the most profitable strategy it yields 0.65% per month 
(8.13% per year) with a t-statistic of 3.84, and a p-value of 0.03 (Table 4.2.15 Panel A). 
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Testing out whether skipping a time lag is beneficial, I find that skipping a month between 
the formation and the holding period did not improve the 60-month/60-month strategy 
performance as the equivalent holding period returns are slightly lower. When there is not 
time lag between the portfolio formation period and the holding period, it yields a 
considerably but less return of 0.55% per month (6.80% per year) with a t-statistic of 3.60 
and a p-value of 0.04 (Table 4.2.15 panel B) which is significant at 5% level. This indicates 
that, even though different market conditions and different time periods exhibit contrarian 
profit, the highest return observed in emerging market as the evidences suggest is 8.14% per 
year with the 60-month/ 60-month with a time lag. This contradicts the initial findings by 
Fama and French (1996) that suggested that when the preceding months/year is included in 
the test, short-term continuation tends to offset long-term reversal, and past losers have lower 
future returns than past winners for portfolios formed with up to four years past returns. It 
also points to greater returns given that Fama and French suggested 1.16% average return per 
month for the loser portfolio and 0.42 % per month for the winner portfolio (0.74% per 
month or 9.25 per year for the loser minus winner portfolio). 
Overall, the results in Table 4.2.15 validate the initial tests hypothesis that long-term 
contrarian strategies are profitable internationally. They are consistent with other studies such 
as De Bondt and Thaler (1985) in US stock market that suggested that 3 to 5 years after a past 
performance based portfolio formation, losers' portfolios outperformed winners' portfolios by 
approximately 25% over 3 years and 8% annually for 5 years post-ranking period. They 
indicate a better contrarian return than Jordan’s (2012) study that suggested that contrarian 
strategies are internationally profitable (5.60% per year) with earning above the risk-free rate; 
and that the long-term contrarian profits is not a robust phenomenon internationally. 
My findings also endow with a greater return than Malin and Bornholt's (2013) study that 
suggested 0.46% contrarian return per month (5.66% per year) in developed market and 
0.68% per month (8.47% per year) in emerging market, and Richards's (1996) study that 
found 6.60% per year for 3 years holding period and 5.80% per year over 4 years.  
However, these findings deviate from other studies in the sense that I use quintiles portfolio 
to demonstrate how the portfolio size affect the contrarian return. The effective yearly return 
is calculated using the monthly-compounded return over 12 months rather than the arithmetic 
average of percentage return. They are also complementary given that Jordan’s (2012) and 
De Bondt and Thaler’s (1985) study did not look at the contrarian phenomenon as a 
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generalized phenomenon. Jordan's study was initially done on individual market index where 
stocks are sorted by their past 3-year buy-and-hold return and the losers and winners 
represented respectively the 25% bottom and 25% top, while De Bondt and Thaler (1985) 
and Fama and French (1996) studies were conducted on US stocks only. 
5.3.2.6 Summary 
I examined the profitability of the contrarian strategies with quintile portfolios based on past 
returns of countries indices in international equity markets. My findings indicate evidences of 
contrarian profitability. The contrarian strategies have shown to be profitable on average over 
the full sample period, and the 60-month/48-month strategy generates the highest return with 
the whole sample period this strategy yield 0.71% per month (8.89% per year) with a t-
statistic of 4.78 and a p-value of 0.00 (Table 4.2.11 Panel A). Evidences also indicate that the 
contrarian strategies are highly profitable in emerging countries and that developed countries' 
contribution are significant. 
Even more interesting this study did not find evidence of return continuation among countries 
indices but I must point out that the evidences are in line with Jordan’s (2012) study that 
suggested that contrarian strategies are internationally profitable and that the long-term 
contrarian profits is not a robust phenomenon. I also emphasise the point that investors may 
earn extra returns over time by investing internationally as the global contrarian strategy 
generates a return slightly higher than the 8% per annum as reported by De Bondt and Thaler 
(1985). A direct implication of these results is that international investors will be able to beat 
the market using common investment strategy such as the global momentum with 
overlapping portfolios. 
To increase the power of the test, I also perform similar analysis on contrarian strategies with 
overlapping portfolios where, contrarian deciles portfolio in any month holds indices ranked 
in the deciles in any of the previous J months. 
5.3.3 Contrarian Strategies with Overlapping Portfolios Quintile Portfolios 
5.3.4 Introduction 
In this section, I examine whether contrarian strategies earn significant return after increasing 
the power of the test. I construct overlapping contrarian quintiles portfolios that in any 
particular month holds stocks ranked in those quintiles in any of the previous H ranking 
months. In sequence with the initial findings by Fama and French (1996) that suggested that 
when the preceding months are included in the test, short-term continuation tends to offset 
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long-term reversal, and past losers have lower future returns than past winners do. I also test 
the contrarian strategies that sky a month between the formation and the holding periods. I 
examine the contrarian strategies profitability in the full sample 1969-2014 and in different 
market states. 
5.3.4.1 Contrarian Strategies for International Investors: Full Sample 1969-2014 
I start the analysis by implementing the basic contrarian strategies with overlapping quintile 
portfolios first, on the entire times series data. In period `t' I buy the losers countries and sell 
the winners countries’ indices. The winners and the losers’ portfolios are constructed based 
on their past performances. I use three different formation periods 'F' and three different 
holding periods 'H', where 'F' equals 36, 48, and 60 months, and 'K' equals 36, 48, and 60 
months as indicated in Table 4.2.16 below, this give a total of 9 strategies. The contrarian 
portfolios in panel A are formed immediately after the formation period Table 4.2.16 Panel 
A, but I also examine a second set of 9 contrarian strategies that skip a month between the 
formation and the holding period as indicated in Table 4.2.16 Panel B. The average monthly 
returns of the winners and the losers' portfolio are indicated in the table the t-statistics are 
reported in the parentheses and the p-values are reported next. The sample period is from 
December 1969 to January 2014.  
[Insert Table 4.2.16 Here] 
Table 4.2.16 reports the results for the whole sample period, the winner, the loser, and the 
contrarian portfolio (loser-winner) returns are reported for the 18 strategies. All the contrarian 
strategies’ returns are positive; 13 strategies are significant. The most successful contrarian 
strategy selects stocks based on their previous performances over 60 months and then holds 
the portfolio for the next 48 months. This strategy yields 0.71% per month (8.89% per year) 
with a t-statistic of 4.77 and a p-value of 0.20 when there is not time lag between the portfolio 
formation period and the holding period (Table 4.2.16 Panel A). 
Investigating whether skipping a time lag is beneficial, I find that skipping a month between 
the formation and the holding period did not improve strategy return. The 60-month/48-
month strategy yields 0.51% per month (6.28% per year) with a t-statistic of 15.91 and a p-
value of 0.00 (Table 4.2.16 panel B) when there is a time lag between the portfolio formation 
period and the holding period. 
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Given that the contrarian strategies' returns are positive in most of the case and that the 
returns are highly significant in most cases, I suggest that the contrarian strategies are on 
average profitable internationally when using overlapping quintile portfolios of stock indices 
and that the loser portfolio outperforms the winner portfolio to generate positive average 
contrarian profits. I establish that, the most profitable strategy is the 60-month/48-month, 
when the strategy does not skip a month (Table 4.2.16 Panel A). It yields and effective 
compounded return of 8.89% per year but investor can also earn a return in the magnitude of 
10.28% per year with the 48-month/60-month strategy that skip a month lag, which is 
different and more profitable than the 48-month/60-month documented with the non-
overlapping strategies Table 4.2.16 Panel A (8.89% per year). 
These findings are central since they indicate that skipping a month lag between the 
formation and holding period do not always increase the quintile portfolios returns and using 
overlapping portfolio do improve the test on return reversal, but lessen the portfolio return. 
These findings have another outstanding aspect as they point out the fact that overlapping 
quintile portfolio might be more profitable than deciles portfolio. The returns remain 
comparatively greater than De Bondt and Thaler’s (1985) proposed return of 8% per year and 
Jordan’s (2012) study that suggested that contrarian strategies are internationally profitable 
and yields 5.60% per year over three years; conversely the result with overlapping portfolio 
indicate signs of strength of the long-term contrarian phenomenon internationally. 
Nonetheless, these findings are essential as I use quintiles portfolio to demonstrate how the 
portfolio size affect the contrarian return. The effective yearly return is calculated using the 
monthly-compounded return over 12 months rather than the arithmetic average of percentage 
return. They are also complementary given that Jordan’s (2012), and De Bondt and Thaler's 
(1985) study did not look at the contrarian phenomenon as a generalized phenomenon. 
Jordan's study was initially done on individual market index where stocks are sorted by their 
past 3-year buy-and-hold return and the losers and winners represented respectively the 25% 
bottom and 25% top, while De Bondt and Thaler’s (1985) and Fama and French’s (1996) 
studies were conducted on US stocks only. 
5.3.4.2 Contrarian Returns with Quintiles Portfolio in Established Markets 
I turn to a more stable sample period, I implement the contrarian strategies with overlapping 
quintile portfolios in the 1969-2014 subsamples, where all countries' indices start and end in 
the same date to avoid any blunder, which may occur from non-synchronized starting dates 
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among countries' indices. To implement the basic contrarian strategies on the established 
market subset 1969-2014 period (18 countries) at `t', I buy the loser countries and sell the 
winner countries. The winners and the losers’ portfolios are constructed based on their past 
performances. I use 3 different formation periods 'F' and 3 for different holding periods 'H', 
where 'F' equals 36, 48, and 60 months and 'H' equals 36, 48, and 60 months as indicated in 
Table 4.2.17 below, this gives a total of 9 strategies. The contrarian portfolios in Table 4.2.17 
panel A are formed immediately after the formation period, but I also examine a second set of 
9 contrarian strategies that skip a month between the formation and the holding period as 
indicated in Table 4.2.17 Panel B.  The average monthly returns of the winners and the 
losers’ portfolio are indicated in the table below. The t-statistics are reported in the 
parentheses and the p-values are reported next. The sample period is from December 1969 to 
January 2014.  
[Insert Table 4.2.17 Here] 
Table 4.2.17 reports the results for the whole sample period on established markets, the 
winner, the loser, and the contrarian portfolio (loser-winner) returns are reported for the 18 
strategies. All the contrarian strategies’ returns are positive. The most successful contrarian 
strategy selects stocks based on their previous performances over 60 months and then holds 
the portfolio for the next 36 months. This strategy yields 0.34% per month (4.13% per year) 
with a t-statistic of 9.93 and a p-value of 0.00 (Table 4.2.17 Panel A) when there is not time 
lag between the portfolio formation period and the holding period. 
Examining whether skipping a time lag is beneficial, I find that skipping a month between the 
formation and the holding period improve the 60-month/36-month strategy performance as 
the equivalent holding period returns are slightly greater, it yields 0.35% per month (4.21% 
per year) with a t-statistic of 10.30 and a p-value of 0.00 (Table 4.2.17 panel B). When there 
is a month lag between the formation period and the holding period, the 48-month formation 
period. It remains profitable regardless of the holding period for both set of strategies. This is 
in line with the initial findings by Fama and French (1996) that suggested that when the 
preceding months is included in the test, short-term continuation tends to offset long-term 
reversal, and past losers have lower future returns than past winners for portfolios formed 
with up to four years past returns. It also points to greater returns given that Fama and French 
(1996) suggested 1.16% average return per month for the loser portfolio, 0.42 % per month 
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for the winner portfolio and 0.74% per month (9.25% per year) for the loser minus winner 
portfolio.  
Given that the contrarian strategies returns are positive in most of the strategies and that the 
returns are highly significant in all cases, I may suggest that the contrarian strategies are on 
average profitable for established market, and that the loser portfolio outperforms the winner 
portfolio to generate positive average contrarian profits. I then establish that the most 
profitable strategy is the 60-month/36-month that does not skip a month (Table 4.2.17 Panel).  
The returns here are significantly lower than the 8% return per year suggested by De Bondt 
and Thaler (1985). The results here emphasise the fact that contrarian returns are lower if 
investor apply the standard contrarian strategy with overlapping portfolios. 
Although, these findings are critical in the sense that I use quintiles portfolio to demonstrate 
how the portfolio size affect the contrarian return. The effective yearly return is calculated 
using the monthly-compounded return over 12 months rather than the arithmetic average of 
percentage return. They are also complementary given that Jordan’s (2012) and De Bondt and 
Thaler’s (1985) study did not look at the contrarian phenomenon as a generalized 
phenomenon. Jordan's study was initially done on individual market index where stocks are 
sorted by their past 3-year buy-and-hold return and the losers and winners represented 
respectively the 25% bottom and 25% top, while De Bondt and Thaler (1985) and Fama and 
French (1996) studies were conducted on US stocks only. 
5.3.4.3 Contrarian Returns with overlapping quintiles portfolios since Globalisation 
To ascertain whether the contrarian strategies with overlapping quintile portfolios remain 
profitable after 1994, I examine alternative sets of contrarian portfolio, which are formed on 
the 1994-2014 subsamples (47 countries). At `t' I buy the losers’ countries indices and sell the 
winners’ countries indices. The winners and the losers' portfolios are constructed based on 
their past performances. I use three different formation periods 'F' and three different holding 
periods 'H', where 'F' equals 36, 48, and 60 months and 'H' equals 36, 48, and 60 months as 
indicated in Table 4.2.18 below, and this gives a total of 9 strategies. The contrarian 
portfolios in Table 4.2.18 panel A are formed immediately after the formation period, but I 
also examine a second set of 9 contrarian strategies that skip a month between the formation 
and the holding period Table 4.2.18 Panel B. The average monthly returns of the winners and 
the losers’ portfolio are indicated in the table the t-statistics are reported in the parentheses 
and the p-values are reported next. The sample period is from January 1994 to January 2014.   
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[Insert Table 4.2.18 Here] 
Table 4.2.18 shows the results of the contrarian strategies implemented on the stock market 
indices of 47 countries for 1994 to 2014, which include the global finance crisis 2007-2008. 
These results show that the contrarian strategies’ returns are positive in most of the cases, 6 
strategies are significant. The most successful contrarian strategy selects stocks based on their 
previous performances over 60 months and then holds the portfolio for the next 36 months. 
This strategy yields 0.36% per month (4.40 per year) with a t-statistic of 4.44 and a p-value of 
0.00 (Table 4.2.18 Panel A). 
Testing out whether skipping a time lag is beneficial, I find that skipping a month between 
the formation and the holding period improve the 60-month/36-month strategy performance. 
The equivalent holding period returns are slightly greater 0.37% per month (4.45% per year) 
with a t-statistic of 4.66 and a p-value of 0.00 (Table 4.2.18 Panel B) when there is a time lag 
between the formation and the holding period. This indicates that even with the impact of the 
financial crisis and the globalization, the contrarian strategies can still be profitable. 
In addition, these findings are essential and deviate from other studies in the sense that I use 
quintiles portfolio to demonstrate how the portfolio size affect the contrarian return. The 
effective yearly return is calculated using the monthly-compounded return over 12 months 
rather than the arithmetic average of percentage return. They are also complementary given 
that Jordan’s (2012) and De Bondt and Thaler’s (1985) study did not look at the contrarian 
phenomenon as a generalized phenomenon. Jordan's study was initially done on individual 
market index where stocks are sorted by their past 3-year buy-and-hold return and the losers 
and winners represented respectively the 25% bottom and 25% top, while De Bondt and 
Thaler (1985) and Fama and French (1996) studies were conducted on US stocks only. 
5.3.4.4 Contrarian Return with Overlapping Quintiles Portfolios in Developed Countries 
To better understand which of the developed and the emerging market may be driving the 
return on the global contrarian strategies, I implement the contrarian strategy with 
overlapping portfolio on the developed countries subsample (23 countries) over 1969-2014.  
At `t' I buy the loser countries and sell the winner countries. The winners and the loser’s 
portfolios are constructed based on their past performances. I use 3 different formation 
periods 'F' and 3 different holding periods 'H', where 'F' equals 36, 48, and 60 months and 'H' 
equals 36, 48, and 60 months as indicated in Table 4.2.19 below, this give a total of 9 
strategies.  The contrarian portfolios in Table 4.2.19 panel A are formed immediately after 
191 
 
the formation period, but I also examine a second set of 9 contrarian strategies that skip a 
month between the formation and the holding period as indicated in Table 4.2.19 Panel B. 
The average monthly returns of the winners and the losers’ portfolio are indicated in the table 
below the t-statistics are reported in the parentheses and the p-values are reported next.  
[Insert Table 4.2.19 Here] 
Table 4.2.19 reports the contrarian results of the developed countries for the whole sample 
period, the winner, the loser, and the contrarian portfolio (loser-winner) returns are reported 
for the 18 strategies. The results in developed countries indicate that all the contrarian 
strategies return are positive and significant (9 out of 9 strategies) for the strategies without 
time lag and (9 out of 9 strategies) for the strategies with a month lag. The most successful 
contrarian strategy selects stocks based on their previous performances over 60 months and 
then holds the portfolio for the next 36 months. This strategy yields 0.45% per month (5.54% 
per year) with a t-statistic of 12.11 and a p-value of 0.00 (Table 4.2.19 Panel A), when there 
is not time lag between the portfolio formation period and the holding period. 
I also find that skipping a month between the formation and the holding period improve the 
60-month/36-month strategy performance as the equivalent holding period returns are slightly 
greater. It yields 0.46% per month (5.70% per year) with a t-statistic of 12.56 and a p-value 
of 0.00 (Table 4.2.19 Panel B), when there is a month lag between the formation period and 
the holding period. This is in line with the initial findings by Fama and French (1996) that 
suggested that, when the preceding month is included in the test, short-term continuation 
tends to offset long-term reversal and past losers have lower future returns than past winners 
for portfolios formed with up to four years past returns. It also points to a greater return given 
that Fama and French suggested 1.16% average return per month for the loser portfolio and 
0.42 % per month for the winner portfolio (0.74% per month (9.25% per year) for the loser 
minus winner portfolio. 
Since the contrarian strategies returns are positive in most of the strategies and that the 
returns are highly significant. I may suggest that the contrarian strategies are on average 
profitable internationally for developed countries, that the loser portfolio outperforms the 
winner portfolio to generate positive average contrarian effective return of 5.69% per year. 
This results support my initial findings that, the contrarian strategies are consistently 
profitable internationally with overlapping quintile portfolio. In line with De Bondt and 
Thaler’s (1985) findings that suggested 8% per year contrarian return in the US market and 
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Jordan’s study which was initially done on individual market index where stocks are sorted 
by their past 3-year buy-and-hold return and the losers and winners represented respectively 
the 25% bottom and 25% top. However, both study did not look at the contrarian 
phenomenon as a generalized phenomenon.  
5.3.4.5 Contrarian Return with Overlapping Quintiles Portfolios in Emerging Market 
I re-examined the contrarian strategies with quintile portfolio in the same manner as I did in 
developed countries, I implement the strategies on the emerging market subsample 
(December 1987 to January 2014) given that the first emerging market enters the sample in 
December 1987.At `t' I buy the loser countries and sell the winner countries. The winners and 
the losers’ portfolios are constructed based on their past performances. I use three different 
formation periods 'F' and three different holding periods 'H', where 'F' equals 36, 48, and 60 
months and 'H' equals 36, 48, and 60 months as indicated in Table 4.2.20 below and this 
gives a total of 9 strategies. The contrarian portfolios in Table 4.2.20 panel A are formed 
immediately after the formation period, but I also examine a second set of 9 contrarian 
strategies that skip a month between the formation and the holding period as indicated in 
Table 4.2.20 Panel B. The average monthly returns of the winners and the losers’ portfolio 
are indicated in Table 4.2.20 below. The t-statistics are reported in the parentheses and the p-
values are reported next. The sample period is from December 1987 to January 2014. 
[Insert Table 4.2.20 Here] 
Table 4.2.20 reports the contrarian strategies results on emerging countries. By comparison to 
those of the full sample and the developed countries, the contrarian strategies in emerging 
countries are positives and significant on average. 9 out of 9 strategies generate positive 
return without a time lag and 9 out of 9 strategies generate positive return for the contrarian 
strategies with a month lag. The 48-month/36-month is the most profitable strategy, it yields 
about 0.73% per month with a t-statistic of 10.59, and a p-value of 0.00 (Table 4.2.20 Panel 
A), when there is not time lag between the portfolio formation period and the holding period. 
I also find that skipping a month between the formation and the holding period improve the 
48-month/36-month strategy performance. The equivalent holding period returns are slightly 
lower 0.71% per month with a t-statistic of 10.19 and a p-value of 0.00 (Table 4.20 panel B) 
when there is a month lag between the formation period and the holding period. This 
contradicts the initial findings by Fama and French (1996) that suggested that when the 
preceding month is included in the test, short-term continuation tends to offset long-term 
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reversal, and past losers have lower future returns than past winners for portfolios formed 
with up to four years past returns. It also points to a greater return than Fama and French 
(1996) propose returns of 1.16% per month for the loser portfolio and 0.42 % per month for 
the winner portfolio (0.74% per month or (9.25% per year) for the loser minus winner 
portfolio. 
Given that, the contrarian strategies’ returns are positive in all the strategies I may suggest 
that the contrarian strategies are on average more and consistently profitable for emerging 
countries with overlapping portfolio. The loser portfolios outperform the winner portfolio to 
generate an effective compounded contrarian return of 9.13% per year, but contrary to the 
developed and the whole sample analysis the 48-month/36-month generate the highest return. 
Overall, the results in Table 4.2.20 validate the initial tests hypothesis that long-term 
contrarian strategies are profitable internationally. They are consistent with studies such as 
De Bondt and Thaler (1985) in US stock market that suggested that 3 to 5 years after a past 
performance based portfolio formation, losers' portfolios outperformed winners' portfolios by 
approximately 25% over 3 years and 8% annually for 5 years post-ranking period. They also 
indicate a better contrarian return than Jordan’s (2012) study that suggested that contrarian 
strategies are internationally profitable (5.60% per year) with earning above the risk-free rate. 
I using quintiles portfolio I demonstrate how the portfolio size affect the contrarian return 
which deviate from Jordan’s (2012) and De Bondt and Thaler’s (1985) given that they study 
did not look at the contrarian phenomenon as a generalized phenomenon. More importantly 
do not enphasis on the portfolios size. It is also essential to reiterate that Jordan's study was 
initially done on individual market index where stocks are sorted by their past 3-year buy-
and-hold return and the losers and winners represented respectively the 25% bottom and 25% 
top, while De Bondt and Thaler’s (1985) and Fama and French’s (1996) studies were 
conducted on US stocks only. 
5.3.4.6 Summary 
I examined the profitability of the contrarian strategies using deciles and quintiles portfolios 
based on past returns of countries’ indices in international equity markets. Taken individually 
the results with the non-overlapping decile portfolios validate the initial tests hypothesis that 
long-term contrarian strategies are profitable internationally. They indicate evidences of 
consistence contrarian profitability where the 48-month/60-month strategy generates a return 
as high 0.83% per month (10.40% per year) with the whole sample period. However, the 
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contrarian returns tend to rise considerably when the strategy skips a time lag between the 
portfolio formation period and the holding period, the overall result is not exceptionally 
significant. 
Evidences also indicate that; the contrarian strategies are highly profitable in emerging with a 
return as high as 1.37% per month (17.70% per year) with the 60-month/ 48-month strategy. 
The developed countries' contributions are less significant, still a consistent contrarian return 
of 0.93% per month (11.72% per year) could be observed in developed countries with the 60-
month/48-month strategy when the strategy skips a time lag between the portfolio formation 
period and the holding period. 
My findings also indicate that, contrarian strategies with non-overlapping quintile portfolios 
are profitable over the full sample period. The 48-month/60-month strategy generates a return 
as high as 0.71% per month (8.89% per year). These returns are not statistically significant on 
the average and vary considerably from one market condition to another. More importantly, 
the contrarian strategies remain on the average profitable and significant in the period post-
1994. The contrarian strategies remain profitable in emerging countries, but it is important to 
reiterate that on average they are more statistically significant with overlapping portfolios 
than the non-overlapping portfolios. 
Taken as a whole these evidences indicate that the contrarian strategies’ yield on average 
higher return with the non-overlapping portfolio than the equivalent overlapping approaches 
for both deciles and quintiles portfolios and that the contrarian strategy are on the average 
considerably greater with deciles portfolios than quintiles portfolios.  
These results demonstrate that, the contrarian strategies are consistently profitable 
internationally with both quintile and decile portfolio. They point to significantly higher 
returns compared to De Bondt and Thaler's (1985) study suggested that 3 to 5 years after a 
past performance based portfolio formation, losers' portfolios outperformed winners' 
portfolios by approximately 25% over 3 years and 8% annually for 5 years post-ranking 
period. They indicate a better contrarian return than Jordan’s (2012) study that suggested that 
contrarian strategies are internationally profitable (5.60% per year) with earning above the 




My findings also endow with a greater return than Malin and Bornholt's (2013) study that 
suggested 0.46% contrarian return per month (5.66% per year) in developed market and 
0.68% per month (8.47 per year) in emerging market, and Richards's (1996) study that found 
6.60% per year for 3 years holding period and 5.80% per year over 4 years.  
So far, I have argued that contrarian strategy is on the average profitable in international 
market. However, from the theoretical point of view, there is reason to believe that contrarian 
trading is a risky process and therefore that it is only of limited effectiveness. In principle, 
any example of persistent mispricing is evidence of limited arbitrage (Barberis and Thaler, 
2002). The problem is that while the profitability of the contrarian strategy could be 
interpreted as price deviation from fundamental value it required consistent analysis in 
different market states and time periods to provide evidence of inefficiency. Because the 
world has just experienced one of its worst bear markets since the great Depression, there is 
an even greater need to start studying contrarian performance in the past bull and bear 
markets to make long-term decisions about investing using the global contrarian strategy. By 
providing information on contrarian, performance over different market state and different 
period, investors can define a model of contrarian equilibrium with endogenous trading 
across different state of the economy based on their preference. 
5.3.5 Contrarian Returns Following Bear and Bull Phases 
To examine the extent to which contrarian performances are associated to the bull and bear 
phases I refer to the popular agreement that the bull markets are associated with persistently 
rising share prices, but it can be noted that there still does not exist a consensus as to the 
objective definition of a bull market (Gonzalez et al. 2005). This thesis utilizes a formal 
procedure to identify bear and bull phases in stock indices’ series that indicate the meaningful 
time intervals corresponding to a bear or a bull phase. It then examines the magnitude of the 
contrarian profitability achieved following bull and bear markets using data from the MSCI 
World index, as it appears to be a good representation of the world equity markets. 
Testing out whether the global contrarian strategy generates superior contrarian return 
following stock market state, this study examines how the performances of the optimum 
strategy 48-month/60-month are associated with different phases of the world equity market, 
because the bull and the bear markets are broad market movements and would best capture 
the impact of market state changes. 
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 The bull and bear phases are defined based on the global market return (MSCI World Index) 
over various time horizons, and it is expected that the global momentum should earn more 
pronounced return following down markets. The sample period is divided into bear and bull 
phase following Siganos and Chelley-Steeley (2006) approach. This paper defines bull phase 
as the period when the market return is positive for 3, 6, 9 and 12 months before the test 
period, and the bear state when the market return is negative for 3, 6, 9 and 12 months before 
the test and the results are shown in the Table 21 below. 
[Insert Table 4.2.21 Here] 
Table 4.2.21 presents the bear and bull market performances between December 1969 and 
January 2014, and the average contrarian profits accomplished after bull and bear markets, 
and the 12 months’ market performance of the defined phases. This study noted that the 
longer the duration employed to define the up and down states the smaller the number of bear 
and bull periods.  The lowest the duration used to describe the down market generates the 
strongest the negative market return that arises in bear phase. The optimum contrarian 
strategy 48-month/60-month is associated with the 12-month duration where the bull market 
performance (-1.43%) is relatively higher than the equivalent bear market (1.09%) in absolute 
value and the bear frequency (25%) is the lowest while the bull frequency (75%) is the 
highest compared to another horizon (3, 6 and 9). These observations suggest that the 
contrarian strategy generates superior return when the market rises slowly in bull and/or fall 
quickly in bear phase as the high market performance indicates a high and positive change in 
Indices prices and inversely. Therefore, a forecast of a slow recovery could bike seen as good 
news for contrarian investors while the inverse is not necessary a bad news for global 
contrarian investors comparatively. These results are in line with Klein’s (2001) study that 
suggested that higher price restores equilibrium because it induces more selling by investors 
who are locked into a given security, and causes less buying by investors who wish to acquire 
exposure to the risk characteristics of this security. The higher equilibrium price implies that 
expected returns in subsequent periods are lower. However, this study reiterates that the size 
of contrarian return will depend upon speed of the rising and the falling market phases. 
To restate, the primary goal of this study is to test whether the contrarian strategy is profitable 
internationally and whether prices reversal effect is predictive. In other words, as I focus on 
indices that go through more extreme return experiences during the formation period, 
subsequent price reversals should be pronounced over the test period. De Bondt and Thaler 
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(1985) suggested that, an easy way to generate extreme observations for any given formation 
period is to compare the test period performances over time. Following this view, I examine 
whether the cumulative average return for various formation period (36, 48 and 60-month) 
grows consistently larger over the test period. I then identified when the subsequent reversal 
occurs during the test period, to consider whether there is a pattern among contrarian returns 
with different formation period over different holding periods (1, 3, 6, 12, 24, 36, and 60-
month) as indicated in Table 4.2.22. 
[Insert Table 4.2.22 Here] 
Table 4.2.22 shows that none or little significant reversal pattern for formation period 36, 48 
and 60-month in the first 2 years. As the cumulative average returns of holding periods as 
short as 2 year-period do not always grow larger. The results also indicate sign of growing 
return reversal pattern in period after 3 years for the 36 and 48-month formation periods but 
the 60-month formation period shows opposite effect as the cumulative average returns of the 
holding period after 3 years plunge lower. These results are broadly consistent with the 
prediction of the return reversal in international equity market. However, several aspects of 
the contrarian return internationally remain without adequate explanation.  
[Insert Figure 2 Here] 
In addition, Figure 25 also indicates that as investors move toward periods with the lowest 
past market performance the contrarian become highly profitable with all holding periods. 
The 48-month formation period yields negative payoffs at the end of every good market state 
with the 1-month holding period while the return with the 60-month holding period are 
positive regardless of the sub-period. Still most of the returns are realized by selecting stock 
based on their performances over previous 48 months and hold for horizon up to 60 months 
are positive. Furthermore, if the reversal effect survives the globalisation impact we should 
be able to detect this following a longitudinal analysis of the sub-period average contrarian 
return. Figure 2 also indicates that significant return come from period after 1994; this shows 
that the integration of equity markets together with the international correlation among 
markets do not synchronized the prices reversal effect around the world.   
Overall these findings are in line with the thought that indicated that when past movement of 
the market has upward movement, most of the share prices have achieved gain, and investors 
become optimistic for the future. The stronger the achieved lagged market gains, the more 
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optimism appears among traders, generating increasing reversal effect (Siganos and Chelley-
Steley, 2006). Another possible explanation of the contrarian superior return is that; it is 
relatively less difficult to account for bad news than good news. This implies that investors 
react to bad news, by massive selling, thus overestimating bad news impact on prices, and 
subsequently revise their expectation and start buying back stock or invest after periods of 
bad news. This explanation means investors are not rational, that information is not always 
included in share prices and that it takes time to be fully included on the stock price, given 
that investors take time to reflect on bad news' impact.   
5.3.6 Conclusion 
I examine the profitability of the contrarian strategy internationally while considering the 
contrarian strategy as a global phenomenon over the period 1969 to 2014 and study the effect 
of the globalisation, and the change on the global financial market as I progress over time on 
the contrarian strategy profitability. I also take a step towards linking the global contrarian 
profitability to different phases (Bear and bull phases), and different period. Which in turn, 
helps enhance my understanding of the factors that drive contrarian return across different 
period and different market states. My analysis takes on particular significance given the 
association between lagged market movement (share prices) and investor's optimism that 
appears among traders, generating increasing reversal effect (Siganos and Chelley-Steley, 
2006), and also has direct implication for predicting and controlling trading costs associated 
with asset allocation strategies. 
Some of the findings are as follows: The contrarian strategies are highly profitable with the 
full sample 0.83 per month (10.40 per year). The contrarian strategies generate in emerging 
countries return as high as 1.37% per month (17.70% per year) with the 60-month/ 48-month 
strategy. The developed countries' contributions are less significant, still a consistent 
contrarian return of 0.93% per month (11.72% per year) could be observed in developed 
countries with the 60-month/48-month strategy when the strategy skips a time lag between 
the portfolio formation period and the holding period. 
My findings also indicate that, contrarian strategies with non-overlapping quintile portfolios 
are profitable over the full sample period. The 48-month/60-month strategy generates a return 
as high as 0.71 per month (8.89% per year). These returns are not statistically significant on 
the average and vary considerably from one market condition to another. More importantly, 
the contrarian strategies remain on the average profitable and significant in the period post-
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1994 but are not particularly distinctive, which imply that the reversal effect survive the 
globalisation impact and indicate that the integration of equity markets together with the 
international correlation among markets do not synchronized the prices reversal effect around 
the world given that.  
Moreover, the contrarian strategies remain profitable in emerging countries, but it is 
important to reiterate that on average they are more statistically significant with overlapping 
portfolios than the non-overlapping portfolios. 
Taken as a whole these evidences indicate that the contrarian strategies’ yield on average 
higher with the non-overlapping portfolio than the equivalent overlapping approaches for 
both deciles and quintiles portfolios and that the contrarian strategy are on the average 
considerably greater with deciles portfolios than quintiles portfolios. A direct implication of 
these results is that international investors might be able to beat the market using common 
investment strategy such as the global contrarian. 
Furthermore, there is not sign of consistent and predictable seasonal contrarian pattern over 
consecutive sub period with test horizons as long as 2 years. As the cumulative average 
returns of holding periods as short as 2 year-period do not always grow larger. The results 
also indicate sign of growing return reversal pattern in period after 3 years for the 36 and 48-
month formation periods but the 60-month formation period shows opposite effect as the 
cumulative average returns of the holding period after 3 years plunge lower. 
My work suggests a lush research agenda given that little theoretical work has been done on 
time-series movement of return reversal internationally, and there is no theory that link the 
contrarian strategy taken as global and generalized phenomenon, and the change in 
international equity market state. This implies that a model of contrarian equilibrium with 
endogenous trading across different market state would be desirable. I expect this work to 
serve and inspire research in these areas as it reiterates that the size of contrarian return will 







Chapter 6: Impact of the Risks Factors on Global Momentum and 
Contrarian Strategies 
6.1 Introduction 
In this Chapter I examine for the first time the role of global risk factors in explaining 
profitability of the global momentum and contrarian strategies, I start by examining whether 
the momentum strategies earn significant return after adjusting for global risks given that, the 
risk explanation of the momentum strategies could be seen as validation test for the Efficient 
Market Hypothesis. I then examine whether the contrarian strategies earn significant profit 
after adjusting for global risk in line with Chan’s (1988) suggestion that the contrarian profits 
are just normal compensation for investors bearing extra risk. 
The results indicate a strong relation between variations in macroeconomic factor notably 
world industrial production and the adjusted momentum return. The evidence is that 
industrial production tends to contribute significantly in explaining the momentum return 
with a coefficient of 1.05, a t-statistic of 3.46 and a P-value of 0.00 when I control for global 
risks factors. This reveals that change in economy growth or in industries’ output strongly 
affects the momentum profit, and indicates the ability of global factor to explain the 
momentum profit. In line with Cochrane’s (2011) suggestions that markets are integrated 
across both countries and assets. Moreover, I find no systematic relation between variation in 
macroeconomic factor and the contrarian profit. The evidence is that significant adjusted 
contrarian returns remains after controlling consecutively for Fama and French risks, market 
state factors, macroeconomic risk factor and the joint effect of global risk factors. 
6.2 Global Risks Impact on Momentum Strategy Payoff 
In this section, I examine more formally the effect of systematic variation in global risks 
factors on the strength of the global momentum performance following Jegadeesh and Titman 
(1993), I focus on momentum performance because the momentum phenomenon is an 
anomaly not explained by risk premium. If change in momentum reflects change in risk 
factors, I will expect a significant relation between momentum profits and change in risk 
factor, consequently, no significant abnormal return after controlling for global risk factors.   
6.2.1 Effect of Fama and French risk on Momentum Profits 
I start the analysis by implementing test on Fama and French risks. I consider the optimum 
strategy that generates the highest returns and remains profitable in every horizon (9-
month/3-month). This strategy selects stocks based on their previous performances over 9 
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months and then holds the portfolio for the next 3 months, based on overlapping portfolios. 
The choice of the overlapping approach is to avoid statistical error, which may occur due to 
limited number of observations. The returns are further adjusted by the Fama-French’s three-
factor model (see equation below). I also report the regression result for 6, 9 and 12 months 
holding period, in Table 4.3.1 below. The t-statistics are reported in the parentheses and the 
p-values are reported next. The sample period is from December 1969 to January 2014. 
 (28)                   𝑀𝑜𝑚𝑡 =⁡𝛼0 +⁡𝛽1(𝑅𝑀 − 𝑅𝐹)𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 ⁡+ 𝛽3𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 +⁡𝑒𝑡 
Where: 𝑀𝑜𝑚𝑡 are the returns of the momentum portfolio at time t, 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 (high minus low) is 
the return to portfolio that is long on high book-to-market stocks and short on low book-to-
market stocks in US, and 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡(small minus big) is returns to long-short portfolios 
constructed using size in US market.⁡𝑅𝑀 − 𝑅𝐹 is the market premium and 𝛽 the factors 
loading are the slopes in the times-series regression. 
 
[Insert Table 4.3.1 Here] 
As shown in Table 4.3.1 Panel A, the momentum strategies have positive and consistent 
adjusted returns (Alpha) with all holding periods. The optimum strategy 9-month/3-month 
retains abnormal return of about 0.90% per month with a t-statistic of 4.82 and a P-value of 
0.000 after adjusting for Fama and French risk. For the findings to be consistent in any 
period, I expect the abnormal return to be unswerving and significant over time. The evidence 
in Table 4.3.1 Panel A is strongly consistent with this explanation given that the adjusted 
momentum returns remain for 6-month holding period (0.70% per month), 9-month (0.60% 
per month) and 12-month (0.30% per month). Of particular interest, the size of the abnormal 
return decrease when I increase the holding period with the lowest return of 0.30% per month 
observed with the 9-month/12-month strategy suggesting that this abnormal return may 
disappear in the long-run. More importantly, I find that these adjusted returns are highly 
significant.  
The SMB tends to contribute gradually and significantly, in reducing the size of the abnormal 
return in the long-run but the SMB effect is slightly moderated as the time goes given that the 
coefficient rises but oscillates significantly between -0.106 and -0.092. The effect of the 
HML is also noticeable at 9-month horizon. This pattern of behaviour is robust in Table 4.3.1 
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Panel B with the Fama and French risks when I substitute the excess return based on the 
MSCI world index (MKTRF) with the excess return on the US market (ERM).  
The findings indicate that the global momentum adjusted return is consistent and different 
from zero in all horizon even with estimation method such as OLS (Appendix C13) and 
Newey and West procedure (Appendix C1 and C2) rejecting the null hypothesis that Alpha is 
equal to zero at 1% significance level. All this suggests that investors may earn extra return 
for accepting the strategies. These findings strongly support the argument that Fama-French’s 
three-factor model is well specified for momentum portfolio. Given that, the Fama and 
French’s three factor model do not explain the momentum profit, at least for the short to 
medium term. These findings are in line with Chordia and Shivahumar’s (2005) and Fama 
and French’s (1996) studies that suggested that the short-term returns continuation are 
primarily attributable to cross-sectional variation in the exposure of momentum portfolios to 
the earning based factor. 
6.2.2 Effect of Market State Factors on Momentum profits 
Since the predictability of the momentum strategies payoff might be affected by market state 
risk factors, I use a variety of measure as proxies of the market risk factors (liquidity factor 
(LIQ), Default spread ((DS), the Term spread (TS) and the market return (MKT)), to examine 
the role of such factors on the momentum strategies. I regress the momentum returns on the 
lagged market state. This approach indicates that the momentum returns are further adjusted 
to market state risk. The results are reported in Table 4.3.2 the regression is written as follow. 
(29)            𝑀𝑜𝑚𝑡 =⁡𝛼1 +⁡𝛽1𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐷𝑆𝑡−1 ⁡+ 𝛽3𝑇𝑆𝑡−1 ⁡+ 𝛽4𝑀𝑆𝐶𝐼𝑊𝑡−1 +⁡𝑒𝑡 
Where: 𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑡−1 is the liquidity factor, 𝐷𝑆𝑡−1 is the Default spread, TS is the Term spread, and 
𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡−1 is the return on the MSCI world indices price level and represent price levels at time 
t-1, the t-statistics are reported in the parentheses and the p-values are reported next. 
[Insert Table 4.3.2] 
Table 4.3.2 shows that the momentum strategy has a positive and consistent adjusted returns 
(Alpha) for holding periods up to 9-month. The optimum strategy 9-month/3-month retains 
abnormal return of about 1.2% per month with a t-statistic of (2.01) and a P-value of 0.045 
after adjusting for market state risk. For the findings to be consistent in any period, I expect 
the market state factors to be constant and significant over time. The evidence in Table 4.3.2 
is consistent with this explanation in the short term given that the adjusted momentum returns 
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remain for 6-month holding period (1.0% per month), and 9-month (0.40% per month). Of 
particular interest, the size of the abnormal return also decreases when I increase the holding 
period with the lowest return of -0.10% observed with the 9-month/12-month strategy. This 
later adjusted return is also non-significant suggesting that this abnormal return may 
disappear in the long-run. More importantly, the market return shows a significant coefficient 
of -0.033 with a t-statistic of -2.07 indicating that the market tendency may reduce the 
momentum profit by -0.033 for every unit change in market return. This pattern of behaviour 
is consistent with market risk factor as shown with estimation approach such as OLS 
(Appendix C14) and the Newey West procedure (please see appendix C2 and C4) rejecting 
the null hypothesis that Alpha is equal to zero at 1% significance level. This finding is central 
given that the momentum returns also follow similar outline given that they rely on 
performance of the determinants of the market to move in the short run and reverse in the 
long term in conformity with the expected market risk premium. This is also consistent with 
the modern asset pricing theories that indicate the countercyclical price of risk (Zang, 2005). 
6.2.3 Effect of macroeconomic factor on momentum profits 
The momentum strategies profit could reflect mispricing of macroeconomic variables 
(Chordia and Shivakumar, 2005) this implies that momentum profit would again be related to 
macroeconomic conditions. I test this assertion by regressing the momentum returns on the 
lagged macroeconomic variables. I also account for time variation through time dummy. I 
report the regression parameters result for each explanatory variable in Table 4.3.3. This table 
shows the result of the following monthly time-series regression.  
(30)                         𝑀𝑜𝑚𝑡 =⁡𝛼2 + 𝛽1∆𝑂𝑃𝑡−1 ⁡+ 𝛽3𝑊𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑡−1 ⁡+ 𝛽4∆𝐼𝑃𝑡−1 +⁡𝑒𝑡 
Where: ∆𝑂𝑃𝑡−1, is the Oil price at time t-1, 𝑊𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑡−1 is the market volatility at time t-1 
based on the MSCI world indices price level, and ∆𝐼𝑃𝑇−1 is the monthly value of the US 
Industrial production at time t-1. I estimate the regression using the GMM model. The test 
statistics are reported in the parentheses and the p-values are reported next. 
[Insert Table 4.3.3 Here] 
As for the intercepts (Alphas) that measure the abnormal profits of the global momentum 
strategy after adjusting for the exposure to market state factors, evidences show that none of 
the abnormal return is significant. The momentum strategy has inconsistent adjusted returns 
for all holding periods after adjusting for risk; this includes the optimum strategy 9-month/3-
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month. Of particular interest, I find that industrial production tends to contribute significantly 
in explaining the momentum return with a coefficient of 0.989, a t-statistic of 3.18 and a P-
value of 0.001 for the optimum strategy (9-month/3-month), this effect persists for horizon up 
to 6-month but diminishes considerably at 9-month and before disappearing at 12-month. The 
contribution of the market volatility is also noticeable for 6-month holding period. This result 
indicates that change in economy growth or in industry output strongly explains the 
momentum profit in the short to medium term, and indicates the ability of global factor to 
explain the momentum profit, for example all adjusted returns measured by Alpha become 
insignificant after adjusting the momentum return for macroeconomic risks, in line with 
Cochrane (2011) suggestions market are integrated across both countries and assets. This 
pattern of behaviour is consistent as shown with different estimation approach such as OLS 
(Appendix C15) and Newey and West procedure (please see appendix C5 and C6) rejecting 
the null hypothesis that Alpha is equal to zero at 1% significance level. One possible 
interpretation of this result is that there is a strong relation between change in economic state 
variable and the global momentum. These findings reject Liew and Vassala’s (2000); Griffin 
et al. (2003) study that found that internationally macroeconomic risk cannot explain 
momentum profits. They contradict Jegadeesh and Titman’s (1993) contention that irrational 
agents drive the momentum returns and raise the question to whether the momentum strategy 
taken as global coordinated and generalized strategy could have different feature. 
Objectively these factors may not solely influence momentum profit. I therefore account for 
the joint impact of Fama and French risk, market state and macroeconomic risk factors on the 
global momentum profit. 
6.2.4 Effect of Global Risk Factor on the Global Momentum Profit 
To examine whether jointly Fama and French risks factors, market state factor, and 
macroeconomic risks factors affect the momentum payoff. I follow Avramov et al. (2015) 
approach. My examination is based on the following time-series regression specification. I 
consider all possible combinations of predictive macroeconomic risk factors. The predictive 
variables include all Fama and French risk factors, all market state factors, and all 
macroeconomic variables included in the previous equation (1-3). Starting with model (1) 
which drops all predictive macroeconomic risk variables and ending with all-inclusive model 
3. I report the regression parameters result for each explanatory variable in Table 4.3.4.  
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(31) 𝑀𝑜𝑚𝑡 =⁡𝛼3 +⁡𝛽1(𝑅𝑀 − 𝑅𝐹)𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 ⁡+ 𝛽3𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑡−1 + 𝛽6𝐷𝑆𝑡−1 ⁡+
𝛽7𝑇𝑆𝑡−1 ⁡+ 𝛽8𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡−1 + 𝛽10∆𝑂𝑃𝑡−1 ⁡+ 𝛽11𝑊𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑡−1 ⁡+ 𝛽12∆𝐼𝑃𝑡−1⁡ +⁡𝑒𝑡 
Where: 𝑀𝑜𝑚𝑡 are the returns of the momentum portfolio at time t, 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 (high minus low) is 
the return to portfolios that is long on high book-to-market stocks and short on low book-to-
market stocks in US, 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡(small minus big) are returns to long-short portfolios constructed 
using size, 𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑡−1is the liquidity factor at time t-1, 𝐷𝑆𝑡−1 is the Default spread at time t-1, 
𝑇𝑆𝑡−1 is the Term spread at time t-1, 𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡−1is the MSCI world indices price level and 
represent price levels at time t-1, ∆𝑂𝑃𝑡−1 is the percent change of monthly Oil price at time t-
1, 𝑊𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑡−1 is the market volatility at time t-1, ∆𝐼𝑃𝑡−1⁡ is the percent change of monthly 
value of the US Industrial production at time t-1. The results are reported in Table 4.3.4. The 
test statistics are reported in the parentheses and the P-values are reported next. 
[Insert Table 4.3.4 Here] 
Table 4.3.4 reports the test results of the momentum portfolio returns regressed on the global 
risk factors. I begin the estimation with Fama and French risk factors, and then include 
market state and macroeconomic factors consecutively. Table 4.3.4 Models 1 and 2 show 
significant adjusted momentum returns of the momentum portfolio after adjusting the 
momentum return consecutively to the Fama and French risks and the market state factors. 
The coefficients associated with the macroeconomic risk factors are not particularly 
significant. More importantly, I find that industrial production contributes significantly in 
explaining the momentum return with a coefficient of 1.011, a t-statistic of 3.27 and a P-value 
of 0.001 for the optimum strategy (9-month/3-month) when I control for macroeconomic risk 
exclusively (Table 4.3.4 Model 3). This effect persists when the test includes all risk factors 
where the momentum strategy yields about 1.051% abnormal return per month with a t-
statistic of 3.46 and a P-value of 0.001. Implying that change in economy growth or in 
industry output strongly explains the momentum profit.  
One possible interpretation of this result is that there is as strong relation between change in 
macroeconomic and the global momentum profitability. They indicate the ability of global 
factor to explain the momentum profit; in line with Cochrane (2011), suggestions that market 
are integrated across both countries and assets. I can confirm at this stage that if the 
momentum profits are improved by taking extra risk these risks do not or least partially do 
not derive from the Fama and French, and market state factor but there is a strong tendency of 
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macroeconomic risk factors in explaining the momentum profit. These findings contribute in 
the debate by reinforcing Chordia and Shiva Kumar’s (2000) study that suggested that 
momentum strategies profits are explained by common macroeconomic variables, implying 
that the profitability of the global momentum strategy could be due to variations in common 
macroeconomic factors and presumably change in risk. Also in line with Griffin et al. (2003), 
study demonstrated that average momentum profit is positive during GDP growth and even 
larger and positive with negative market return than positive market returns. 
[Insert Table 4.3.5 Here] 
Considering the seasonality of the relation between global risk factor and the momentum 
profitability as shown in Table 4.3.5, the momentum strategy has insignificant adjusted 
returns (Alpha) with all holding periods. The optimum strategy 9-month/3-month retains 
abnormal return of about 0.50% per month with a t-statistic of (0.71) and a P-value of 0.481 
after adjusting for global risk. For the findings to be consistent in any period, I will expect the 
global risk factors to be unswerving over time. The evidence in Table 4.3.5 is strongly 
consistent with this explanation given that the adjusted momentum return remains 
insignificant abnormal return for the 6-month holding period (0.10% per month), 9-month 
(0.00% per month) and 12-month (-0.40% per month). Of particular interest the size of the 
abnormal return decreases when I increase the holding period with the lowest return of -
0.40% observed with the 9-month/12-month strategy suggesting that this abnormal return not 
only disappear in the long run after controlling for global risk, global risks may induce a 
negative momentum payoff. This particular aspect attracts my curiosity given that I have a 
zero profit for horizon up to 9-month and a negative abnormal return at 12-month.  
The effect of market volatility on momentum profit is also non-negligible at 9-month holding 
period. These findings indicate that the global momentum adjusted returns are not consistent 
due to the effect of macroeconomic risk. I may accept the hypothesis that Alpha is equal to 
zero at 9-month horizon. This pattern of behaviour is also confirmed with results using 
estimation method such as OLS (Appendix C16) and Newey and West procedure (please see 
appendix C7 and C8). The implication is that, as momentum investors hold on to their 
momentum portfolio the abnormal return diminishes gradually up to the point where the 
momentum profit alters from positive to negative payoff (between 9-month and 12-month 
holding period) due to the reduced contribution of macroeconomic factor such as the 
industrial production. These findings support Chordia and Shivakumar (2000) study that 
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suggested that momentum strategies profits are explained by common macroeconomic 
variables, implying that the profitability of the global momentum strategy could be due to 
variations in common macroeconomic factors and presumably change in risks. Also in line 
with Griffin et al. (2003), study demonstrates that, average momentum profit is positive 
during GDP growth and even larger and positive with negative market return than positive 
market returns in the United States. 
6.2.5  Crises Role on Momentum Profits 
To examine how global risks factors, affect the momentum performance in crisis period, I 
regress a time series of momentum return in crisis period on the equivalent global risk factors 
in the same period. I also conduct separate regression with a dummies variables as additional 
variables to my initial regression model to control for the impact of crisis period, where a 
dummy variable takes the value one when the economy is in crisis mode and zero otherwise. 
My examination is based on the following regression specification. I report the first 
regression parameters result in Table 4.3.6. This table shows the result of the following 
monthly time-series regression.  
(32) 𝑀𝑜𝑚𝑡 =⁡𝛼4 +⁡𝛽2(𝑅𝑀 − 𝑅𝐹)𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 ⁡+ 𝛽4𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑡−1 + 𝛽6𝐷𝑆𝑡−1 ⁡+
𝛽7𝑇𝑆𝑡−1 ⁡+ 𝛽8𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡−1 + 𝛽9∆𝑂𝑃𝑡−1 ⁡+ 𝛽10𝑊𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑡−1 ⁡+ 𝛽11∆𝐼𝑃𝑡−1⁡ +⁡𝑒𝑡 
Where: 𝑀𝑜𝑚𝑡 is the momentum returns, 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 (High minus low) is the return to portfolios 
that is long on high book-to-market stocks and short on low book-to-market stocks in US, 
𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡(Small minus big) are returns to long-short portfolios constructed using size in US 
market, 𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑡−1is the liquidity factor at time t-1, 𝐷𝑆𝑡−1 is the Default spread at time t-1, 𝑇𝑆𝑡−1 
is the Term spread at time t-1,⁡𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡−1is the MSCI world indices price level and represent 
price levels at time t-1, ∆𝑂𝑃𝑡−1 is the monthly Oil price at time t-1, 𝑊𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑡−1 is the market 
volatility at time t-1, and 𝐼𝑃𝑇−1⁡ is the monthly value of the US Industrial production at time 
t-1.The t-statistics are also reported in the parentheses and the p-values are reported next. I 
report the parameter results for each type of crisis (Currency crisis, Stock market crash and 
banking crisis). 
I consider all possible combinations of predictive risk factors. The predictive variables 
include all Fama and French risk factors, all market state factors, and all macroeconomic 
variables included in the previous equation (1-3). Starting with model (1) which drops all 
predictive macroeconomic risk variables and ending with all-inclusive model (4). I report the 
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regression parameters result for crisis period and non-crisis period in Table 4.3.6, 4.3.7 and 
4.3.8.  
[Insert Table 4.3.6, 4.3.7and 4.3.8 Here] 
Table 4.3.6 reports the test result of the momentum portfolio returns regressed on Fama and 
French, market state and macroeconomic risk factors. I begin with the estimates of the 
regression for the currency crisis. I then examine the impact during stock market crash, and 
banking crisis and find that the adjusted momentum remains significant only during banking 
crisis with 4.30% per month, a t-statistic of 3.54 and a P-value of 0.000, this imply that global 
risk factor does not or at least partially explain the momentum profit during banking crisis. 
Industrial production remain the main driver of the momentum return in all other crisis. 
However, including all crisis (currency crisis banking crisis and stock market crash) in the 
sample as indicate in Table 4.3.7 shows that macroeconomic factors do explain the 
momentum profit. More importantly industrial production indicates significant impact on 
momentum profit Table 4.3.7 Model 3 and 4 with a coefficient of 0.975% per month, t-
statistic (2.60) and a P-value (0.009) when all global risk factors are included in the analysis. 
Further analysis with the subset of non-crisis Table 4.3.8 period indicate that the momentum 
returns remain after adjusting for Fama and French risks (Table 4.3.8 Model 1), with adjusted 
momentum return of 1.20% per month with a t-statistic of (4.28) and a P-value 0.000. More 
importantly industrial production remains the main driver of the abnormal return with a 
coefficient of 1.94, a t-statistic of 2.04 and a P-value of 0.042 when all risk factors are 
included (Table 4.3.8 Model 4) in non-crisis period. This result indicates that change in 
economy growth or in industry’s output strongly affects the momentum profit. One possible 
interpretation of this result is that, there is a strong relation between change in 
macroeconomic variables and the global momentum. This reinforcing Chordia and 
Shivakumar’s (2000) argument that momentum strategies profits are explained by common 
macroeconomic variables, and indicates the ability of global factor to explain the momentum 
profit, in line with Cochrane (2011) suggestions that market are integrated across both 
countries and assets classes.  
I can confirm at this stage that the momentum profits can be improved by taking extra 
macroeconomic risk in non-crisis period, during currency crisis and stock market crash as 
indicated in Table 4.3.6. These results are compatible with a separate analysis that add crisis 
dummy as additional variable to the set of independent variables to capture the impact of 
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individual crisis on momentum return, estimate with method such as the Newey and West 
procedure (please see appendix C9) following Avramov, et al. (2015). The results also show 
a strong influence of industrial production on the momentum profit in crisis periods. None of 
crisis shows significant abnormal return. 
6.2.6 Business Cycle Role on Momentum Profits 
To examine the joint effect of Fama and French risk factors, market state factor, and 
macroeconomic risk factors on momentum payoff follow business cycle. I follow Avramov et 
al.’s (2015) approach. My examination is based on the following time-series regression 
specifications. I consider all possible combinations of predictive macroeconomic risk factors. 
The predictive variables include all Fama and French risk factors, all market state factors, and 
all macroeconomic variables included in the previous equation (1-3). Starting with model (1) 
which drops all predictive macroeconomic risk variables and ending with all-inclusive model 
(4). I report the regression parameters result in Table 4.3.9. This table shows the result of the 
following regression.  
(33) 𝑀𝑜𝑚𝑡 =⁡𝛼5 +⁡𝛽1(𝑅𝑀 − 𝑅𝐹)𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 ⁡+ 𝛽3𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑡−1 + 𝛽6𝐷𝑆𝑡−1 ⁡+
𝛽7𝑇𝑆𝑡−1 ⁡+ 𝛽8𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡−1 + 𝛽10∆𝑂𝑃𝑡−1 ⁡+ 𝛽11𝑊𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑡−1 ⁡+ 𝛽12∆𝐼𝑃𝑡−1⁡ +⁡𝑒𝑡 
Where: 𝑀𝑜𝑚𝑡 are the returns of the momentum portfolio at time t, 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 (high minus low) is 
the return to portfolios that, is long on high book-to-market stocks and short on low book-to-
market stocks in US, 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡(Small minus big) are returns to long-short portfolios constructed 
using size, 𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑡−1is the liquidity factor at time t-1, 𝐷𝑆𝑡−1 is the Default spread at time t-1, 
𝑇𝑆𝑡−1 is the Term spread at time t-1, 𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡−1 is the MSCI world indices prices level, It 
represents price levels at time t-1, ∆𝑂𝑃𝑡−1 is the monthly Oil price at time t-1, 𝑊𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑡−1 is 
the market volatility at time t-1, and ∆𝐼𝑃𝑡−1⁡ is the monthly value of the US Industrial 
production at time t-1. The t-statistics are reported in the parentheses and the p-values are 
reported next. 
[Insert Table 4.3.9 and 4.3.9 Here] 
Table 4.3.9 model 1 indicates that the momentum strategy yields significant abnormal return 
of 1.10% per month with, a t-statistic of 5.61 and a P-value of 0.00 after adjusting for Fama 
and French risk. The subsequent analysis that includes market and economics state factors 
consecutively in Table 4.3.9 Models 2 to 4 indicates insignificant adjusted momentum 
returns. As of interest, the coefficient associated with the macroeconomic risk factor such as 
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industrial production remains significant. This indicates that industrial production tends to 
contribute significantly in explaining the momentum return with a coefficient of 1.31, a t-
statistic of 3.42 and a P-value of 0.00 for the optimum strategy (9-month/3-month) when I 
control for macroeconomic risk (Table 4.3.9 Model 3). This effect persists with all risk 
factors included with a coefficient of 1.26, a t-statistic 3.21 and a P-value of 0.00. The default 
spread also show significant but lower effect on the momentum profit. This result indicates 
that change in economy growth or in industry’s output strongly explains the momentum 
profit. One possible interpretation of this result is that there is a strong relation between 
change in economic state variable and the global momentum. That the default spread also 
contribute in explaining the momentum profit during economic expansion. I therefore 
confirm at this stage that if the momentum profits are improved by taking extra risk these 
risks do at least or partially derive from market state and macroeconomic factors. 
Further analyses with the subset of contraction period (Table 4.3.10) indicate that momentum 
returns become negative after adjusting for macroeconomic risks (Table 4.3.10 Model 3), 
with adjusted momentum return (-1.30% per month), with a t-statistic of -2.12 and a P-value 
of 0.03. More importantly, one of the market risks factor do contribute to the momentum 
profit (TS). I also notice a high and significant level of the market volatility. I may suggest 
that the effect of economy growth or change in industrial production disappears during the 
contraction period. However, it is also important to suggest that the impact of market state 
factor become more noticeable.  
6.2.7 Momentum Profits and Macro Risk Factor in Emerging Market 
In addition to the global risk on momentum crisis following crisis and change in business 
cycle, I examine the influence of these factors on the global momentum in different markets’ 
state. I examine whether jointly Fama and French risk factors, market state factor, and 
economic risk factors explain the momentum payoff in emerging market. I follow Avramov 
et al. (2015) approach. I consider all possible combinations of predictive macroeconomic risk 
factors. The predictive variables include all Fama and French risk factors, all market state 
factors, and all macroeconomic variables included in the previous equation (1-3). Starting 
with model (1) which drops all predictive macroeconomic risk variables and ending with all-
inclusive model (4). My examination is based on the following time-series regression 
specification. I report the regression parameters results in Table 4.3.11.  
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(34) 𝑀𝑜𝑚𝑡 =⁡𝛼6 +⁡𝛽1(𝑅𝑀 − 𝑅𝐹)𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 ⁡+ 𝛽3𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑡−1 + 𝛽6𝐷𝑆𝑡−1 ⁡+
𝛽7𝑇𝑆𝑡−1 ⁡+ 𝛽8𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡−1 + 𝛽10∆𝑂𝑃𝑡−1 ⁡+ 𝛽11𝑊𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑡−1 ⁡+ 𝛽12∆𝐼𝑃𝑡−1⁡ +⁡𝑒𝑡 
Where: 𝑀𝑜𝑚𝑡 are the returns of the momentum portfolio at time t, 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 (high minus low) is 
the return to portfolio that is long on high book-to-market stocks and short on low book-to-
market stocks in US, 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡(Small minus big) are returns to long-short portfolios constructed 
using size, 𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑡−1is the liquidity factor at time t-1, 𝐷𝑆𝑡−1 is the Default spread at time t-1, 
𝑇𝑆𝑡−1 is the Term spread at time t-1, 𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡−1is MSCI world indices price level and 
represents price levels at time t-1, ∆𝑂𝑃𝑡−1 is the monthly Oil price at time t-1, 𝑊𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑡−1 is 
the market volatility at time t-1, and ∆𝐼𝑃𝑡−1⁡ is the monthly value of the US Industrial 
production at time t-1. The t-statistics are reported in the parentheses and the p-values are 
reported next. 
[Insert Table 4.3.11 Here] 
As shown in Table 4.3.11 Models 1 and 2, significant adjusted momentum returns remain 
after adjusting the momentum profit consecutively for Fama and French risks and market 
state factors. While the abnormal return associated with the macroeconomic risk factor and 
the regression after controlling for global risk factor are not significant. More importantly, I 
find that industrial production tends to contribute significantly in explaining the momentum 
return with a coefficient of 1.36, a t-statistic of 3.27 and a P-value of 0.00 for the optimum 
strategy (9-month/3-month) when I control for macroeconomic risk exclusively (Table 4.3.11 
Model 3). This effect persists with all risk factors included with a coefficient of 1.04, a t-
statistic 2.39 and a P-value of 0.02. This result also indicates that one unit change in 
industrial production will increase the momentum profit by 1.04. implying that change in 
economy growth or in industry’s output strongly explains the global momentum profit, and 
shows the ability of global factor to explain the momentum profit, in line with Cochrane 
(2011) suggestions that markets are integrated across both countries and assets classes. 
One possible interpretation of this result is that there is a strong and positive relation between 
change in macroeconomic variable and the global momentum. I therefore confirm at this 
stage that if the momentum profits are improved by taking extra risk these risks do derive in 
most case from macroeconomic risk factors. These findings contribute in the debate by 
reinforcing Chordia and Shivakumar (2000) study that suggested that momentum strategies 
profits are explained by common macroeconomic variables, implying that the profitability of 
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the global momentum strategy could be due to variations in common macroeconomic factors 
and presumably change in risk. It is also in line with Griffin et al. (2003) that demonstrated 
that average momentum profit is positive during GDP growth and even larger and positive 
with negative market return than positive market returns. These results are also consistent 
with estimation approach such as the Newey West procedure (Please see Appendix C12). 
6.2.8 Momentum Profits and Macro Risk Factor in Develop Market 
To examine whether jointly Fama and French risk factors, market state factor, and 
macroeconomic risk factors explain the momentum payoff in develop market. I also follow 
Avramov et al. (2015) approach. I consider all possible combinations of predictive 
macroeconomic risk factors. The predictive variables include all Fama and French risk 
factors, all market state factors, and all macroeconomic variables included in the previous 
equation (1-3); starting with model (1) which drops all predictive macroeconomic risk 
variables and ending with all-inclusive model (4). My examination is based on the following 
time-series regression specification. I report the regression parameters results Table 4.3.12. 
This table shows the result of the following monthly time-series regression.  
(35) 𝑀𝑜𝑚𝑡 =⁡𝛼6 +⁡𝛽1(𝑅𝑀 − 𝑅𝐹)𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 ⁡+ 𝛽3𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑡−1 + 𝛽6𝐷𝑆𝑡−1 ⁡+
𝛽7𝑇𝑆𝑡−1 ⁡+ 𝛽8𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡−1 + 𝛽10∆𝑂𝑃𝑡−1 ⁡+ 𝛽11𝑊𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑡−1 ⁡+ 𝛽12∆𝐼𝑃𝑡−1⁡ +⁡𝑒𝑡 
Where: 𝑀𝑜𝑚𝑡 are the returns of the momentum portfolio at time t, 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 (high minus low) is 
the return to portfolios that is long on high book-to-market stocks and short on low book-to-
market stocks in US, 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡(Small minus big) are returns to long-short portfolios constructed 
using size, 𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑡−1Is the liquidity factor at time t-1, 𝐷𝑆𝑡−1 is the Default spread at time t-1, 
𝑇𝑆𝑡−1 is the Term spread at time t-1, 𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡−1 is the MSCI world indices price level, It 
represents price levels at time t-1, ∆𝑂𝑃𝑡−1 is the monthly Oil price at time t-1, 𝑊𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑡−1 is 
the market volatility at time t-1, and ∆𝐼𝑃𝑡−1⁡ is the monthly value of the US Industrial 
production at time t-1. The t-statistics are reported in the parentheses and the p-values are 
reported next. 
[Insert Table 4.3.12 Here] 
As shown in Table 18 Models 1, 2 and 3 I record significant adjusted momentum returns after 
adjusting for Fama and French risks. While the coefficients associate with market state and 
macroeconomic risk factor and the regression after controlling for all global risk factor are 
not significant. More importantly, I find that industrial production contributes significantly in 
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explaining the momentum return with a coefficient of 0.57, a t-statistic of 2.08 and a P-value 
of 0.038 for the optimum strategy (9-month/3-month) when I control for macroeconomic risk 
exclusively (Table 4.3.12 Model 3). This effect persists with all risk factors included in the 
regression, with a coefficient of 0.71, a t-statistic 2.48 and a P-value of 0.01. This result also 
indicates that one unit change in industrial production will increase the momentum profit by 
0.71, which is lower by comparison to 1.04 in emerging market. It also implies that change in 
economy growth or in industry’s output strongly explains the global momentum profit, and 
indicates the ability of global factor to explain the momentum profit, in line with Cochrane 
(2011) suggestions that markets are integrated across both countries and assets classes. 
One possible interpretation of this result is that there is a strong and positive relation between 
change in macroeconomic variable and the global momentum. I therefore confirm at this 
stage that if the momentum profits are improved by taking extra risk these risks do derive in 
most case from macroeconomic risk. However, the Term Spread contribution is not 
negligible given that it positively and significantly explains the momentum return at 1% level 
in develop market. These results are in line with Chordia and Shivakumar’s (2000) study that 
suggested that momentum strategies profits are explained by common macroeconomic 
variables, implying that the profitability of the global momentum strategy could be due to 
variations in common macroeconomic factors and presumably change in risk. It is also in line 
with Griffin et al. (2003) that demonstrated that average momentum profit is positive during 
GDP growth and even larger and positive with negative market return than positive market 
returns. These results are also consistent with estimation approach such as the Newey West 
procedure (Please see Appendix C11). 
6.2.9 Momentum Profits and Macro Risk Factor in Established Market 
I examine the influence of these factors on the global momentum in established market. I 
follow Avramov et al.’s (2015) approach. I consider all possible combinations of predictive 
macroeconomic risk factors. The predictive variables include all Fama and French risk 
factors, all market state factors, and all macroeconomic variables included in the previous 
equation (1-3); Starting with model (1) which drops all predictive macroeconomic risk 
variables and ending with all-inclusive model (4). My examination is based on the following 
time-series regression specification. I report the regression parameters results in Table 4.3.13.  
(36) 𝑀𝑜𝑚𝑡 =⁡𝛼6 +⁡𝛽1(𝑅𝑀 − 𝑅𝐹)𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 ⁡+ 𝛽3𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑡−1 + 𝛽6𝐷𝑆𝑡−1 ⁡+
𝛽7𝑇𝑆𝑡−1 ⁡+ 𝛽8𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡−1 + 𝛽10∆𝑂𝑃𝑡−1 ⁡+ 𝛽11𝑊𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑡−1 ⁡+ 𝛽12∆𝐼𝑃𝑡−1⁡ +⁡𝑒𝑡 
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Where: 𝑀𝑜𝑚𝑡 are the returns of the momentum portfolio at time t, 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 (high minus low) is 
the return to portfolios that is long on high book-to-market stocks and short on low book-to-
market stocks in US, 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡(Small minus big) are returns to long-short portfolios constructed 
using size,  𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑡−1is the liquidity factor at time t-1, 𝐷𝑆𝑡−1 is the Default spread at time t-1, 
𝑇𝑆𝑡−1 is the Term spread at time t-1, 𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡−1is MSCI world indices price level and 
represents price levels at time t-1, ∆𝑂𝑃𝑡−1 is the monthly Oil price at time t-1, 𝑊𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑡−1 is 
the market volatility at time t-1, and ∆𝐼𝑃𝑡−1⁡ is the monthly value of the US Industrial 
production at time t-1. The t-statistics are reported in the parentheses and the p-values are 
reported next. 
[Insert Table 4.3.13 Here] 
As shown in Table 4.3.13 Models 1, 2, and 3 significant adjusted momentum returns remain 
after adjusting of the momentum portfolio consecutively to the Fama and French risks and the 
market state factors. While the coefficients associated with the macroeconomic risk factor 
and the regression after controlling for global risk factor are not significant. More 
importantly, I find that industrial production to contribute significantly in explaining the 
momentum return with a coefficient of 0.59, a t-statistic of 2.17 and a P-value of 0.03 for the 
optimum strategy (9-month/3-month) when I control for macroeconomic risk exclusively 
(Table 4.3.13 Model 3). This effect persists with all risk factors included with a coefficient of 
0.68, a t-statistic of 2.50 and a P-value of 0.01. This result also indicates one unit change in 
industrial production will increase the momentum profit by 0.68, that change in economy 
growth or in industry’s output strongly explains the global momentum profit, and indicates 
the ability of global factor to explain the momentum profit, in line with Cochrane’s (2011) 
suggestions that markets are integrated across both countries and assets classes.  
One possible interpretation of this result is that there is a strong and positive relation between 
change in economic state variable and the global momentum. I therefore confirm at this stage 
that if the momentum profits are improved by taking extra risk these risks do derive in most 
case from macroeconomic risk. These findings contribute in the debate by reinforcing 
Chordia and Shivakumar’s (2000) study that suggested that momentum strategies profits are 
explained by common macroeconomic variables, implying that the profitability of the global 
momentum strategy could be due to variations in common macroeconomic factors and 
presumably change in risk. It is also in line with Griffin et al. (2003) that demonstrated that 
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average momentum profit is positive during GDP growth and even larger and positive with 
negative market return than positive market returns.  
6.2.10 Macro Risk Factor Impact on Momentum Profit During the Globalization Period 
1994-2014 
I examine whether jointly Fama and French risk factors, market state factor, and economic 
risk factors explain the momentum payoff during the globalization period. I follow Avramov 
et al (2015) approach. I consider all possible combinations of predictive macroeconomic risk 
factors. The predictive variables include all Fama and French risk factors, all market state 
factors, and all macroeconomic variables included in the previous equation (1-3)’ starting 
with model (1) which drops all predictive macroeconomic risk variables and ending with all-
inclusive model (4). My examination is based on the following time-series regression 
specification. I report the regression parameters results on Table 4.3.14 this table shows the 
result of the following monthly time-series regression.  
(37) 𝑀𝑜𝑚𝑡 =⁡𝛼6 +⁡𝛽1(𝑅𝑀 − 𝑅𝐹)𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 ⁡+ 𝛽3𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑡−1 + 𝛽6𝐷𝑆𝑡−1 ⁡+
𝛽7𝑇𝑆𝑡−1 ⁡+ 𝛽8𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡−1 + 𝛽10∆𝑂𝑃𝑡−1 ⁡+ 𝛽11𝑊𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑡−1 ⁡+ 𝛽12∆𝐼𝑃𝑡−1⁡ +⁡𝑒𝑡 
Where: 𝑀𝑜𝑚𝑡 are the returns of the momentum portfolio at time t, 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 (High Minus Low) 
is the return to portfolios that is long on high book-to-market stocks and short on low book-
to-market stocks in US, 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡(Small minus big) are returns to long-short portfolios 
constructed using size, 𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑡−1is the liquidity factor at time t-1, 𝐷𝑆𝑡−1 is the Default spread at 
time t-1, 𝑇𝑆𝑡−1 is the Term spread at time t-1, 𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡−1is MSCI the world indices price level 
and represents price levels at time t-1, ∆𝑂𝑃𝑡−1 is the monthly Oil price at time t-1, 𝑊𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑡−1 
is the market volatility at time t-1, and ∆𝐼𝑃𝑡−1⁡ is the monthly value of the US Industrial 
production at time t-1. The t-statistics are reported in the parentheses and the p-values are 
reported next. 
[Insert Table 4.3.14 Here] 
As shown in Table 4.3.14 Models 1 and 2, significant adjusted momentum returns remain 
after adjusting the momentum portfolio return consecutively to Fama and French risks and 
market state factors. While the coefficients associate with the macroeconomic risk factor and 
the regression after controlling for global risk factor are not significant. The results indicate 
that industrial production contribute positively significantly in explaining the momentum 
return with a coefficient of 1.19, a t-statistic of 2.77 and a P-value of 1.01 for the optimum 
strategy (9-month/3-month) when I control for macroeconomic risk exclusively (Table 4.3.14 
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Model 3). This effect persists when all risk factors included in the regression with a 
coefficient of 0.807, a t-statistic of 2.01 and a P-value of 0.04 (Table 4.3.14 Model 4). The 
results also indicate that one unit change in industrial production will increase the momentum 
profit by 0.81. implying that change in economy growth or in industry’s output strongly 
explains the global momentum profit, and indicates the ability of global factors to explain the 
momentum profit, in line with Cochrane’s (2011) suggestions that market are integrated 
across both countries and assets classes. The Term Spread also show significant but lower 
contribution to the momentum profit during the globalization period. 
One possible interpretation of this result is that there is a strong and positive relation between 
change in macroeconomic factor such as industrial production, state variable such as change 
on term spread and the momentum profit. This in line with Chordia and Shivakumar’s (2000) 
study that suggested that, momentum strategies profits are explained by common 
macroeconomic variables, implying that the profitability of the global momentum strategy 
could be due to variations in macroeconomic factors and presumably change in risk. It is also 
in line with Griffin et al. (2003) that demonstrates that average momentum profit is positive 
during GDP growth and even larger and positive with negative market return than positive 
market returns.  
6.2.11 Effect of Global Risks Factors on Excess Momentum Profits 
I finally examine the influence of these factors on the excess global momentum in other to 
access the comparative advantage of opting for the strategies. To examine whether jointly 
Fama and French risk factors, market state factor, and economic risk factors explain the 
momentum payoff. I follow Avramov et al. (2015) approach. I consider all possible 
combinations of predictive macroeconomic risk factors. The predictive variables include all 
Fama and French risk factors, all market state factors, and all macroeconomic variables 
included in the previous equation (1-3). Starting with model (1) which drops all predictive 
macroeconomic risk variables and ending with all-inclusive model (4). My examination is 
based on the following time-series regression specification. I report the regression parameters 
results Table 4.3.15.  
(38) 𝑀𝑜𝑚𝑡 − 𝑅𝐹𝑡 =⁡𝛼7 +⁡𝛽1(𝑅𝑀 − 𝑅𝐹)𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 ⁡+ 𝛽3𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑡−1 + 𝛽6𝐷𝑆𝑡−1 ⁡+
𝛽7𝑇𝑆𝑡−1 ⁡+ 𝛽8𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡−1 + 𝛽10∆𝑂𝑃𝑡−1 ⁡+ 𝛽11𝑊𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑡−1 ⁡+ 𝛽12∆𝐼𝑃𝑡−1⁡ +⁡𝑒𝑡 
Where: 𝑀𝑜𝑚𝑡 are the returns of the momentum portfolio at time t, 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 (high minus low) is 
the return to portfolios that is long on high book-to-market stocks and short on low book-to-
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market stocks in US, 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡(Small minus big) are returns to long-short portfolios constructed 
using size, 𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑡−1is the liquidity factor at time t-1, 𝐷𝑆𝑡−1 Is the Default spread at time t-1, 
𝑇𝑆𝑡−1 is the Term spread at time t-1, 𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡−1 is the MSCI world indices prices levels, It 
represents prices levels at time t-1, ∆𝑂𝑃𝑡−1 is the monthly Oil price at time t-1, 𝑊𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑡−1 is 
the market volatility at time t-1, and ∆𝐼𝑃𝑡−1⁡ and is the yearly value of the US Industrial 
production at time t-1. The t-statistics are reported in the parentheses and the p-values are 
reported next. 
[Insert Table 4.3.15 Here] 
As shown in Table 4.3.15 Models 1 and 2 significant adjusted momentum returns remain 
after adjusting consecutively for Fama and French risks and market state factors. The 
coefficients associated with the macroeconomic risk factor and the regression that include all 
global risk factor are not significant. More importantly, I find that industrial production 
contributes significantly in explaining the momentum return with a coefficient of 0.10, a t-
statistic of 3.28 and a P-value of 0.00 for the optimum strategy (9-month/3-month) when I 
control for macroeconomic risk exclusively (Table 4.3.15 Model 3). This effect persists with 
all risk factors included in the regression with a coefficient of 1.04, a t-statistic 3.44 and a P-
value of 0.00 (Table 4.3.15 Model 4). This result also indicates that one unit change in 
industrial production will increase the momentum profit by 1.035. implying that change in 
economy growth or in industry’s output strongly explain the global momentum profit, and 
indicates the ability of global factor to explain the momentum profit, in line with Cochrane’s 
(2011) suggestions that markets are integrated across both countries and assets classes.  
One possible interpretation of this result is that there is a strong and positive relation between 
change in macroeconomic variable and the global momentum. I therefore confirm at this 
stage that if the momentum profits are improved by taking extra risk these risks do derive in 
most case from macroeconomic risk. 
These findings contribute in the debate by reinforcing Chordia and Shivakumar’s (2000) 
study that suggested that momentum strategies profits are explained by common 
macroeconomic variables, implying that the profitability of the global momentum strategy 
could be due to variations in common macroeconomic factors and presumably change in risk. 
It is also in line with Griffin et al. (2003) that demonstrates that average momentum profit is 
positive during economy growth and even larger and positive with negative market return 
than positive market returns.  
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6.2.12 Summary  
I examined the role of global risks factors in explaining the global momentum profit, and 
found a strong systematic relation between variations in macroeconomic factor, notably 
industrial production, and the adjusted momentum return. The evidence is that industrial 
production tends to contribute significantly in explaining the momentum return with a 
coefficient of 1.05, a t-statistic of 3.46 and a P-value of 0.00 when I control for all risk factor. 
This reveals that change in economy growth or in industry’s output strongly affect the 
momentum profit, and indicates the ability of global risks factors to explain the momentum 
profit, in line with Cochrane (2011) suggestions market are integrated across both countries 
and assets classes. This positive relationship is quiet strong. For example, the findings survive 
with 6-month and 9-month holding period. Of particular interest, the abnormal return decease 
when I increase the holding period (0.10%), 9-month (0.00%) and 12-month (-0.40%) with 
the lowest return of -0.40% observed with the 9-month/12-month strategy. Suggesting that 
this abnormal return not only disappears in the long run after controlling for global risks, the 
global risks may induce a negative momentum payoff. This aspect attracts my curiosity given 
that I have a zero profit for 9 months’ horizon and a negative abnormal return at 12-month. 
The positive impact of macroeconomic risk factor on the global momentum profit is also 
significant when I examine the role of the risk factors in explaining the momentum profit in 
emerging countries, developed countries, established markets and globalization indicating 
that the findings are not limited. These findings on the association between macroeconomic 
risk and momentum abnormal indicate the need of studying the dynamic of the global 
momentum worldwide. 
Examining the impact of crisis on the momentum, I refer to the possibility that stock market 
is an indicator of the state of the economy as suggested by Naes et al. (2011) given that the 
global momentum are based on stock market indices prices. I also find no substantial 
remaining momentum after account for the crisis and non-crisis period with the exception 
made on Banking crisis (4.30% per month) when taken solely. My findings also strongly 
support that industrial production contributes significantly in explaining the momentum 
return following business cycle expansion, and disappears with contraction in line with 
Chordia and Shivakumar (2002) who suggested that variation in momentum payoffs reflect 
time varying over the business cycle. A direct implication of these results is that the global 
momentum profit could be a compensation for global. international investors might be able to 
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earn extra return by increasing their exposure to world risks factors in line with arguments 
that support Efficient Market Hypothesis. 
6.3 Global-risk Factors Role in Explaining the Contrarian Strategy Payoff  
Given the results obtained for the momentum, I now turn into the contrarian risks based 
explanation. Chan (1988) suggested that the abnormal returns earned with the contrarian 
strategy are just a normal compensation for risk related to the strategy. The risk-based 
explanation defends the efficient market hypothesis, suggesting that abnormal profits of 
trading strategies can be captured by asset pricing model or model misspecification. I 
examine whether the global contrarian strategy earn significant profit after adjusting for risk 
with the intuition that, examining more formally the effect of systematic variation in global 
risks factors on the strength of the global contrarian performance will provide more 
information. If changes in contrarian profit reflect changes in risk factors, I will expect a 
significant relation between contrarian profits and change in risk factor, consequently, no 
significant abnormal return after controlling for global risk factors.   
6.3.1 Effect of Fama and French Risk on Contrarian Profits 
I start the analysis by implementing test on Fama and French risks. I consider the optimum 
strategy that generates the highest returns and remains profitable in every horizon (48-
month/48-month). This strategy selects stocks based on their previous performances over 48 
months and then holds the portfolio for the next 48 months, based on overlapping portfolios. 
The choice of the overlapping approach is to avoid statistical error, which may occur due to 
limited number of observations. The returns are further adjusted by the Fama-French’s three-
factor model (see equation 39 below). I also report the regression result for 36, and 60 months 
holding period, in Table 4.4.1 below. The test-statistics are reported in the parentheses and 
the p-values are reported next. The sample period is from December 1969 to January 2014. 
(39)                   𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡 =⁡𝛼0 +⁡𝛽1(𝑅𝑀 − 𝑅𝐹)𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 ⁡+ 𝛽3𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 +⁡𝑒𝑡 
Where: 𝑀𝑜𝑚𝑡 are the returns of the momentum portfolio at time t, 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 (high minus low) is 
the return to portfolio that is long on high book-to-market stocks and short on low book-to-
market stocks in US, and 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡(small minus big) is returns to long-short portfolios 
constructed using size in US market.⁡𝑅𝑀 − 𝑅𝐹 is the market premium and 𝛽 the factors 




[Insert Table 4.4.1 Here] 
As shown in Table 4.4.1 Panel A, the contrarian strategy has positive and consistent adjusted 
returns (Alpha) with all holding periods. The optimum strategy 48-month/48-month retains 
abnormal return of about 0.50% per month with a t-statistic of 13.11 and a P-value of 0.000 
after adjusting for Fama and French risk. For the findings to be consistent in any period, I 
expect the Fama and French factors to be unswerving and significant over time. The evidence 
in Table 4.4.1 is strongly consistent with this explanation given that the adjusted contrarian 
return remains for 36-month holding period (0.60% per month), and 60-month (0.50% per 
month). Of particular interest, the sizes of the abnormal returns are relatively close when I 
increase the holding period suggesting that the contrarian strategies may generate consistent 
abnormal regardless of the holding period. More importantly, I find that these adjusted 
returns are highly significant. The SMB tends to contribute significantly to reduce the size of 
the abnormal return. The SMB effect is slightly moderated as the time goes given that the 
coefficient decreases and becomes less significant from -0.084 to -0.031. The effect of the 
MKTRF is also noticeable at 36-month horizon. This pattern of behaviour is strong in Table 
4.4.1 Panel B with the Fama and French risks when I substitute the excess return based on the 
MSCI world index (MKTRF) with the excess return on the US market (ERM). The findings 
indicate that the global contrarian adjusted return is consistent and different from zero in all 
horizon. Rejecting the null hypothesis that Alpha is equal to zero at 1% significance level. All 
these findings imply that investor may earn extra return for accepting the strategies. They 
strongly support the argument that, the contrarian strategy can produce both market and 
CAPM-adjusted abnormal return with holding and testing periods, rankings from three to five 
years (Larkomaa, 1999). These findings are in line with Jegadeesh (1990), and De Bondt and 
Thaler (1985) who suggested that adjustment of the contrarian strategy return to risk could 
not explain the abnormal results. In addition, De Bondt and Thaler (1985) showed that 
portfolios based on market-adjusted excess returns do not differ with respect to market value. 
Therefore, these results challenge the hypothesis of weak-form market efficiency. 
6.3.2 Effect of Market State Factor on Contrarian Profits 
Since the predictability of the contrarian strategies payoff might be affected by market state 
risk factors, I use a variety of measure as proxies of the market risk factors (liquidity factor 
(LIQ), Default spread ((DS), the Term spread (TS) and the market return (MKT), to examine 
the role of such factors on the contrarian strategies. I regress the contrarian returns on the on 
the lagged market state factors. This approach indicates that the contrarian returns are further 
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adjusted by the risk exposure to market state factors. I report the regression parameters result 
for each explanatory variable in Table 4.4.2 showing the results of the following monthly 
time-series regression.  
(40)             𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡 =⁡𝛼1 +⁡𝛽1𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐷𝑆𝑡−1 ⁡+ 𝛽3𝑇𝑆𝑡−1 ⁡+ 𝛽4𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡−1 +⁡𝑒𝑡 
Where: 𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑡−1 is the liquidity factor at time t-1, 𝐷𝑆𝑡−1 is the Default spread at time t-1, TS is 
the Term spread at time t-1, and 𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡−1 is the return on MSCI world indices. The test-
statistics are reported in the parentheses and the p-values are reported next. 
[Insert Table 4.4.2] 
Table 4.4.2 reports the test result of the contrarian strategies return regress on market state 
factors. The contrarian strategy has a positive and consistent adjusted returns (Alpha) for all 
holding periods up to 60-month. The optimum strategy 48-month/48-month retains abnormal 
return of about 0.70% per month with a t-statistic of 7.04 and a P-value of 0.000 after 
adjusting for market state risks. For the findings to be consistent in any period, I expect the 
market state factors to be constant and significant over time. The evidence in Table 4.4.2 is 
consistent with this explanation given that the adjusted momentum returns remain for all 
holding periods. Of particular interest, the size of the abnormal return also decreases when I 
increase the holding period from 36 months to 48 months but remains constant thereafter. 
These adjusted returns are all significant suggesting that the contrarian abnormal return 
remains in the long run. More importantly, the default spread shows a significant and 
negative coefficient of -0.002 with a t-statistic of -3.16 and a P-value of 0.002 with the 60-
month indicating that change in default risk may reduce the contrarian profit by -0.002 for 
every unit change in default spread. This pattern of behaviour is consistent in market risk 
factor rejecting the null hypothesis that Alpha is equal to zero at 1% significance level. This 
finding is central given that the contrarian return relies the on performance of the 
determinants of the market to reverse in the long term in conformity with the expected market 
risk premium. They are also consistent with the modern asset pricing theories that indicate 
the countercyclical price of risk (Zang, 2005). They are in line with Lakonishok et al.’s 
(1994) study that suggested that, there is little evidence to support that, value stocks are 
fundamentally riskier than glamour stocks. My findings are also consistent with Gregory et 
al.’s (2001) study that found that, the contrarian excess returns persist even after controlling 
for size effects in stock returns and confirm that the contrarian returns are not compensation 
for market risk. 
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6.3.3 Effect of Macroeconomic Factor on Contrarian Profits 
The contrarian strategies profit could reflect mispricing of macroeconomic variables this 
implies that contrarian profit would again be related to future macroeconomic conditions. In 
this section I examine whether the global contrarian strategy earn significant profit after 
adjusting for risk. I regress the contrarian’ returns on the lagged macroeconomic variables I 
also account for time variation through time dummy. I report the regression parameters’ 
results for each explanatory variable in Table 4.4.3. This table shows the result of the 
following monthly time-series regression.  
(41)                     𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡 =⁡𝛼2 + 𝛽1∆𝑂𝑃𝑡−1 ⁡+ 𝛽3𝑊𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑡−1 ⁡+ 𝛽4∆𝐼𝑃𝑡−1 +⁡𝑒𝑡 
Where: ∆𝑂𝑃𝑡−1, is the Oil price at time t-1, 𝑊𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑡−1is the market volatility at time t-1 based 
on the MSCI world indices price level, and ∆𝐼𝑃𝑡−1 is the monthly value of the US Industrial 
production at time t-1. I estimate the regression using the GMM model. The test statistics are 
reported in the parentheses and the p-values are reported next. 
[Insert Table 4.4.3 Here] 
As for the intercepts (Alphas) that measure the abnormal profits of the global contrarian 
strategy after adjusting to macroeconomic factors, evidences show that all the abnormal 
returns are significant. The contrarian strategy has consistent adjusted returns for all holding 
periods after adjusting for risk. This includes the optimum strategy 48-month/48-month. Of 
particular interest, I find that industrial production tends to contribute significantly in 
reducing the contrarian return with a coefficient of -0.673, a t-statistic of -5.28 and a P-value 
of 0.000 for the optimum strategy (48-month/48-month), this effect persists for horizon up to 
60-month. The contribution of the oil price is also noticeable for 60-month holding period. 
This result indicates a negative relation between economy growth and industry’s output and 
the contrarian profit, and rejects the null hypothesis that Alpha is equal to zero at 1% 
significance level. One possible interpretation of this result is that there is none or little 
relation between change in economic state variable and the global contrarian. They are in line 
with Lakonishok et al.’s (1994) study that suggested that, there is little evidence to support 
that, value stocks are fundamentally riskier than glamour stocks. My findings are also 
consistent with Gregory et al.’s (2001) study that found that, the contrarian excess returns 
persist even after controlling for size effects in stock returns and confirm that the contrarian 
returns are not compensation for market risk. 
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Objectively these factors may not solely influence the contrarian profit as the study suggests. 
I therefore account for the joint impact of Fama and French risk, market state and 
macroeconomic risk factors on the global momentum profit. 
6.3.4 Effect of Global Risk Factor on the Global Contrarian Profit 
To examine whether jointly Fama and French risk factors, market state factor, and economic 
risk factors affect the contrarian payoff. I follow Avramov et al. (2015) risk analysis 
approach. My examination is based on the following time-series regression specification. I 
consider all possible combinations of predictive macroeconomic risk factors. The predictive 
variables include all Fama and French risk factors, all market state factors, and all 
macroeconomic variables included in the previous equation (1-3). Starting with model (1) 
which drops all predictive macroeconomic risk variables and ending with all-inclusive model 
(4). I report the regression parameters’ result for each explanatory variable in Table 4.4.4. 
This table shows the result of the following monthly time-series regression.  
(42) 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡 = ⁡𝛼3 +⁡𝛽1(𝑅𝑀 − 𝑅𝐹)𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 ⁡+ 𝛽3𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑡−1 + 𝛽6𝐷𝑆𝑡−1 ⁡+
𝛽7𝑇𝑆𝑡−1 ⁡+ 𝛽8𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡−1 + 𝛽9∆𝑂𝑃𝑡−1 ⁡+ 𝛽10𝑊𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑡−1 ⁡+ 𝛽11∆𝐼𝑃𝑡−1⁡ +⁡𝑒𝑡 
Where: 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡 are the returns of the contrarian portfolio at time t, 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 (high minus low) is 
the return to portfolios that is long on high book-to-market stocks and short on low book-to-
market stocks in US, 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡(Small minus big) are returns to long-short portfolios constructed 
using size, 𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑡−1 is the liquidity factor at time t-1, 𝐷𝑆𝑡−1 is the Default spread at time t-1, 
𝑇𝑆𝑡−1 is the Term spread at time t-1, 𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡−1 is the MSCI world indices price level and 
represents price levels at time t-1, ∆𝑂𝑃𝑡−1 is the monthly Oil price at time t-1, 𝑊𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑡−1 is 
the market volatility at time t-1, and ∆𝐼𝑃𝑡−1⁡ is the monthly value of the US Industrial 
production at time t-1. The results are reported in Table 4.4. The test-statistics are reported in 
the parentheses and the p-values are reported next. 
[Insert Table 4.4.4 Here] 
As shown in Table 4.4.4 Models 1, 2 and 3 significant adjusted contrarian returns remain 
after controlling consecutively for Fama and French risks, market state risks, and 
macroeconomic risks. More importantly, when I control for the joint effect of the global risk 
factors, the contrarian strategy generates a statistically and significant abnormal return of 
1.00% with a t-statistic of 6.58 and a P-value of 0.000 with the optimum strategy (48-
month/48-month) Table 4.4.4 Model 4. The results also show that market volatility tends to 
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contribute significantly in reducing the contrarian return with a coefficient of -0.686, a t-
statistic of -5.16 and a P-value of 0.000 with the optimum strategy, when I control for 
macroeconomic risk exclusively (Table 4.4.4 Model 3). The market volatility effect persists 
even when I account for all risk factors with a coefficient of -0.639, a t-statistic of -4.75 and a 
P-value of 0.000. However, the market volatility impact solely cannot expunge the abnormal 
return. One possible interpretation is that global risk factors do not explain the contrarian 
profit. I can confirm at this stage that contrarian investors will not increase their profits by 
taking extra risk. However, there is a tendency of macroeconomic risk factors to be on 
average negatively related to the contrarian profit. These findings are in line with Lakonishok 
et al. (1994) study that suggested that, value stocks are not fundamentally riskier than 
glamour stocks, consistent with Gregory et al. (2001) study that found that, the contrarian 
excess returns persist even after controlling for size effects in stock returns and confirm that 
the contrarian returns are not compensation for market risk. These results also contribute to 
the debate by reinforcing De Bondt and Thaler (1985) findings that claim that overreaction is 
predictive, and that adjustment of profits to the CAPM-model could not explain the abnormal 
returns. In addition, they show that portfolios based on market-adjusted excess returns do not 
systematically differ with respect to market value of equity, challenging the weak form of the 
efficient market hypothesis. 
[Insert Table 4.4.5 Here] 
Considering the seasonality of the relation between global risk factor and the momentum 
profitability. As shown in Table 4.4.5, the contrarian strategies have significant adjusted 
returns (Alpha) with all holding periods. The optimum strategy 48-month/48-month retains 
abnormal return of about 1.00% per month with a t-statistic of 6.58 and a P-value of 0.000 
after adjusting for global risk. For the findings to be consistent in any period, I will expect the 
global risk factors to be unswerving over time. The evidence in Table 4.4.5 is strongly 
consistent with this explanation given that the adjusted momentum return remains 
insignificant for 36-month holding period (1.20% per month), and 60-month (0.90% per 
month). Of particular interest, the size of the abnormal return decrease when I increase the 
holding period with the lowest return of 0.90% per month observed with the 48-month/60-
month strategy suggesting that this abnormal return may disappear in the long-run after 
controlling for global risk. This particular aspect attracts my curiosity given that investors 
will exploit such awareness to avoid sudden negative payoff and increase their profit. The 
negative effect of the default spread, market volatility and the change in SMB factors on 
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contrarian profit are also non-negligible. These findings indicate that the global contrarian 
adjusted returns remain consistent after controlling the impact of macroeconomic risk 
rejecting the hypothesis that Alpha equal to zero in all horizon. This pattern of behaviour is 
also confirmed when I substitute the contrarian return with the contrarian excess return later 
in my analysis. The implication is that, as contrarian investors hold on to their contrarian 
portfolio the abnormal return diminishes gradually over time due to the negative contribution 
of global risk factor such as the default spread, market volatility and the change in SMB 
factors. 
6.3.5  Crises Role in Explaining the Contrarian Profits 
To examine how global risk factors, affect the contrarian performance in crisis periods, a time 
series of contrarian returns in crisis periods is regressed on the equivalent global risk factor in 
the same periods, I conduct this analysis with time dummies as endogenous variable to 
control the impact of time variation on the contrarian profit. My examination is based on the 
following regression specification. I report the regression parameters’ result for Table 4.4.6. 
This table shows the result of the following monthly time-series regression.  
(43) 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡 = ⁡𝛼4 +⁡𝛽2(𝑅𝑀 − 𝑅𝐹)𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 ⁡+ 𝛽4𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑡−1 + 𝛽6𝐷𝑆𝑡−1 ⁡+
𝛽7𝑇𝑆𝑡−1 ⁡+ 𝛽8𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡−1 + 𝛽9∆𝑂𝑃𝑡−1 ⁡+ 𝛽10𝑊𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑡−1 ⁡+ 𝛽11∆𝐼𝑃𝑡−1⁡ +⁡𝑒𝑡 
Where: 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡 is the contrarian returns, 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 (High minus low) is the return to portfolios that 
is long on high book-to-market stocks and short on low book-to-market stocks in US, 
𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡(Small minus big) are returns to long-short portfolios constructed using size in US 
market, 𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑡−1is the liquidity factor at time t-1, 𝐷𝑆𝑡−1 is the Default spread at time t-1, 𝑇𝑆𝑡−1 
is the Term spread at time t-1,⁡𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡−1is the MSCI world indices price level and represent 
price levels at time t-1, ∆𝑂𝑃𝑡−1 is the monthly Oil price at time t-1, 𝑊𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑡−1 is the market 
volatility at time t-1, and 𝐼𝑃𝑇−1⁡ is the monthly value of the US Industrial production at time 
t-1. The t-statistics are also reported in the parentheses and the p-values are reported next. I 
report the parameter results for each type of crisis (Currency crisis, Stock market crash and 
banking crisis). 
I examine individual crisis solely, then all crises together. I also consider all possible 
combinations of predictive risk factors. The predictive variables include all Fama and French 
risk factors, all market state factors, and all macroeconomic variables included in the 
previous equation (1-3). Starting with model (1) which drops all predictive macroeconomic 
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risk variables and ending with all-inclusive model (4). I report the regression parameters 
result for crisis period and non-crisis period subset variable in Table 4.4.6 to 4.4.8.  
[Insert Table 4.6, 4.7and 4.8 Here] 
Table 4.4.6 reports the test result of the contrarian portfolio returns regressed on Fama and 
French, market state and macroeconomic risk factors. I begin with the estimates of the 
regression for the currency crisis. I then examine the impact during stock market crash, and 
banking crisis, and find that the adjusted contrarian remains significant and positive during 
banking crisis with a coefficient of 1.40%, a t-statistic of 5.37 and a P-value of 0.000, and 
currency crisis with 4.20% per month, a t-statistic of 3.05 and a P-value of 0.002. However, 
the analysis in stock market crash shows a negative but significant abnormal return with -
0.80% per month, a t-statistic of -2.82 and a P-value of 0.005. This implies that global risk 
factors at least partially do not explain the contrarian profit during currency and banking 
crises but the contrarian abnormal return could be wipe out during stock market crash due to 
the dominant negative effect of global risk factors. However, including all crisis (currency 
crisis, banking crisis and stock market crash) in the sample, Table 4.4.7 shows that 
macroeconomic factors do explain the momentum profit. More importantly, the default 
spread and the market return indicate significant and positive contribution to the contrarian 
profit Table 4.4.7 Model 2 and 4 with a coefficient of 0.005, t-statistic (3.14) and a P-value 
(0.002) for the default spread and 0.040%, a t-statistic of 2.75 and a P-value of 0.005 for the 
market return. 
Further analysis with the subset of non-crisis period on Table 4.4.8 indicate that contrarian 
returns remain after adjusting for global risk (Table 4.8 Model 1 to 4), with adjusted 
momentum return. More importantly the HML remains the only positive and significant 
contributor to the contrarian return with a coefficient of 0.065, a t-statistic of 2.92 and a P-
value of 0.004 when all risk factors are included (Table 4.4.8 Model 4) in non-crisis period. 
This result indicates that changes in market state factors and macroeconomic factors do not 
explain the global contrarian profit. 
One possible interpretation of this result is that there is none or little relation between change 
in macroeconomic risk and the rise global contrarian, reinforcing De Bondt and Thaler’s 
(1985) claim that overreaction is predictive, and that adjustment of profits to the risk could 
not explain the abnormal returns. I therefore confirm at this stage that the contrarian profits 
cannot be improved by taking extra macroeconomic risk in non-crisis period, during currency 
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crisis and banking crisis. However, stock market crash may have significant impact on the 
profitability of the contrarian strategy. 
6.3.6 Business Cycle Role on Contrarian Profits 
To examine the joint effect of Fama and French risk factors, market states factors and 
macroeconomic risk factors on contrarian payoff following business cycle. I follow 
Avramov, Cheng, and Hameed’s (2015) approach. My examination is based on the following 
time-series regression specifications. I consider all possible combinations of predictive 
macroeconomic risk factors. The predictive variables include all Fama and French risk 
factors, all market state factors, and all macroeconomic variables included in the previous 
equation (1-3). Starting with model (1) which drops all predictive macroeconomic risk 
variables and ending with all-inclusive model (4). I report the regression parameters results in 
Table 4.4.9. This table shows the results of the following regression.  
(44) 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡 = ⁡𝛼5 +⁡𝛽1(𝑅𝑀 − 𝑅𝐹)𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 ⁡+ 𝛽3𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑡−1 + 𝛽6𝐷𝑆𝑡−1 ⁡+
𝛽7𝑇𝑆𝑡−1 ⁡+ 𝛽8𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡−1 + 𝛽9∆𝑂𝑃𝑡−1 ⁡+ 𝛽10𝑊𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑡−1 ⁡+ 𝛽11∆𝐼𝑃𝑡−1⁡ +⁡𝑒𝑡 
Where: 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡 are the returns of the contrarian portfolio at time t,  𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 (High minus low) is 
the return to portfolios that is long on high book-to-market stocks and short on low book-to-
market stocks in US, 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡(Small minus big) are returns to long-short portfolios constructed 
using size, 𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑡−1is the liquidity factor at time t-1, 𝐷𝑆𝑡−1 is the Default spread at time t-1, 
𝑇𝑆𝑡−1 is the Term spread at time t-1, 𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡−1is MSCI world indices price level and represent 
price levels at time t-1, ∆𝑂𝑃𝑡−1 is the monthly Oil price at time t-1, 𝑊𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑡−1 is the market 
volatility at time t-1, and ∆𝐼𝑃𝑡−1⁡ is the monthly value of the US Industrial production at time 
t-1. The t-statistics are reported in the parentheses and the p-values are reported next. 
[Insert Table 4.4.9 and 4.4.10 Here] 
Table 4.4.9 reports the test result of the contrarian portfolio returns regressed on Fama and 
French, market state and macroeconomic risk factors. The results indicate that the adjusted 
contrarian returns are all significant for every combination of factors (Model 1-4). As of 
interest, the coefficients associate with the risk factor such as market volatility negative -
0.665, a t-statistic of -3.59 and a P-value of 0.000. The HML factor coefficient is also 
negative -0.040, a t-statistic of -1.92 and a P-value of 0.055 (Table 4.4.9 Model 4). This 
effect persists when I control for macroeconomic factors solely with a coefficient of -0676, a 
t-statistic -3.67 and a P-value of 0.000 for market volatility and -0.034 with a test statistic of -
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1.66 and a P-value of 0.096 for the HML factor. Indicating a negative relationship between 
contrarian return, market volatility and HML factor. However, the weight of the findings 
indicates that the contrarian abnormal return remains after adjusting for global risks. One 
possible interpretation of this result is that global risk factors do not explain the contrarian 
profit and consequently investors will not increase their profit by taking risk associate with 
the strategy if any exist during economic expansion.  
Further analysis with the subset of contrarian returns during contraction periods Table 4.4.10 
indicates that the contrarian abnormal returns become negative after adjusting for market 
state factors and macroeconomic risks (Table 4.4.10 Model 2 and 3), while the contrarian 
adjusted return is insignificant when all risk factors are included. More importantly the 
market volatility shows a negative relation with the adjusted return with a coefficient of -
0.341, a t-statistic of (-3.27) and a P-value 0.001, the SMB factor also shows a negative and 
significant relation to the contrarian profit with a coefficient of -0.093, a t-statistic of (-2.08) 
and a P-value 0.037. 
These results indicate that the contrarian profit may not remain after controlling for global 
and consequently global risk factor do explain the contrarian profit during economy 
contraction. The same Fama and French risks taken solely do explain the contrarian profit. I 
may suggest that while global risk factor have none or little impact on contrarian profit 
during expansion, the impact become noticeable during contraction allowing contrarian 
investor to take advantage of any change in global risk factors and even more precisely, 
change in Fama and French risks. These findings also reject Gregory et al. (2001) findings 
that, the contrarian excess returns persist even after controlling for size effects in stock 
returns and confirm that the contrarian returns could be a result of a compensation for market 
risk during contraction period. 
6.3.7 Contrarian Profits and Global Risk Factor in Emerging Market 
In addition to the effect of global risk on contrarian payoff following crisis and change in 
business cycle, I examine the influence of these factors on the global contrarian in different 
market states. To examine whether jointly Fama and French risk factors, market state factor, 
and economic risk factors explain the contrarian payoff in emerging market. I follow 
Avramov et al.’s (2015) approach. I consider all possible combinations of predictive 
macroeconomic risk factors. The predictive variables include all Fama and French risk 
factors, all market state factors, and all macroeconomic variables included in the previous 
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equation (1-3). Starting with model (1) which drops all predictive macroeconomic risk 
variables and ending with all-inclusive model (4). My examination is based on the following 
time-series regression specification. I report the regression parameters results Table 4.4.11. 
This table shows the results of the following monthly time-series regression.  
(45) 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡 = ⁡𝛼6 +⁡𝛽1(𝑅𝑀 − 𝑅𝐹)𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 ⁡+ 𝛽3𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑡−1 + 𝛽6𝐷𝑆𝑡−1 ⁡+
𝛽7𝑇𝑆𝑡−1 ⁡+ 𝛽8𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡−1 + 𝛽9∆𝑂𝑃𝑡−1 ⁡+ 𝛽10𝑊𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑡−1 ⁡+ 𝛽11∆𝐼𝑃𝑡−1⁡ +⁡𝑒𝑡 
Where: 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡 are the returns of the contrarian portfolio at time t, 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 (High minus low) is 
the return to portfolios that is long on high book-to-market stocks and short on low book-to-
market stocks in US, 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡(Small minus big) are returns to long-short portfolios constructed 
using size, 𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑡−1is the liquidity factor at time t-1’ 𝐷𝑆𝑡−1 is the Default spread at time t-1, 
𝑇𝑆𝑡−1 is the Term spread at time t-1, 𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡−1is the MSCI world indices prices level. It 
represents price levels at time t-1, ∆𝑂𝑃𝑡−1 is the monthly Oil price at time t-1, 𝑊𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑡−1 is 
the market volatility at time t-1, and ∆𝐼𝑃𝑡−1⁡ is the monthly value of the US Industrial 
production at time t-1. The t-statistics are reported in the parentheses and the p-values are 
reported next. 
[Insert Table 4.4.11 Here] 
The results in Table 4.4.11 Models 1 to 4 show that significant adjusted contrarian returns 
remain after adjusting the momentum profit consecutively for Fama and French risks, market 
state factors and macroeconomic factor. More importantly, I find that market return tends to 
contribute positively significantly in explaining the momentum return with a coefficient of 
0.038, a t-statistic of 2.69 and a P-value of 0.00 for the optimum strategy (48-month/48-
month) when I control for market state risk factors exclusively (Table 4.4.11 Model 2). This 
effect persists with all risk factors included with a coefficient of 0.039, a t-statistic 2.75 and a 
P-value of 0.006. This result also indicates that one unit change in market return will increase 
the contrarian profit by 0.039. The same the coefficient associate with the industrial 
production is also positive and significant indicating that change in economy growth or in 
industry output may have also have a positive contribution on the contrarian profit, while all 
other significant factors show a negative coefficient.  
One possible interpretation of this result is that global risk factors show opposite and 
conflicting relation to the contrarian profit and their combining effect do not explain the 
contrarian abnormal return. I can confirm at this stage that if the contrarian profits will not 
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improve by taking extra risks in emerging market. These findings are in line with Lakonishok 
et al. (1994) study that suggested that, value stocks are not fundamentally riskier than 
glamour stocks, consistent with Gregory et al. (2001) study that found that, the contrarian 
excess returns persist even after controlling for size effects in stock returns and confirm that 
the contrarian returns are not compensation for market risk. These results also contribute to 
the debate by reinforcing De Bondt and Thaler’s (1985) findings that claim that overreaction 
is predictive, and that adjustment of profits to the CAPM-model could not explain the 
abnormal returns. 
6.3.8 Contrarian Profits and Macro Risk Factor in Developed Markets 
To examine whether jointly Fama and French risk factors, market state factor, and 
macroeconomic risk factors explain the contrarian payoff in developed countries. I also 
follow Avramov et al. (2015) approach. I consider all possible combinations of predictive 
macroeconomic risk factors. The predictive variables include all Fama and French risk 
factors, all market state factors, and all macroeconomic variables included in the previous 
equation (1-3). Starting with model (1) which drops all predictive macroeconomic risk 
variables and ending with all-inclusive model (4). My examination is based on the following 
time-series regression specification. I report the regression parameters results on Table 
4.4.12. This table shows the results of the following monthly time-series regression.  
(46) 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡 = ⁡𝛼6 +⁡𝛽1(𝑅𝑀 − 𝑅𝐹)𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 ⁡+ 𝛽3𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑡−1 + 𝛽6𝐷𝑆𝑡−1 ⁡+
𝛽7𝑇𝑆𝑡−1 ⁡+ 𝛽8𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡−1 + 𝛽9∆𝑂𝑃𝑇−1 ⁡+ 𝛽10𝑊𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑇−1 ⁡+ 𝛽11∆𝐼𝑃𝑇−1⁡ +⁡𝑒𝑡 
Where: 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡 are the returns of the contrarian portfolio at time t, 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 (high minus low) is 
the return to portfolios that is long on high book-to-market stocks and short on low book-to-
market stocks in US, 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡(Small minus big) are returns to long-short portfolios constructed 
using size, 𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑡−1is the liquidity factor at time t-1, 𝐷𝑆𝑡−1 is the Default spread at time t-1, 
𝑇𝑆𝑡−1 is the Term spread at time t-1, 𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡−1is MSCI world indices price level and 
represents price levels at time t-1, ∆𝑂𝑃𝑡−1 is the monthly Oil price at time t-1, 𝑊𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑡−1 is 
the market volatility at time t-1, and ∆𝐼𝑃𝑡−1⁡ is the monthly value of the US Industrial 
production at time t-1. The t-statistics are reported in the parentheses and the p-values are 
reported next. 
[Insert Table 4.4.12 Here] 
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Table 4.12 Models 1 to 4 shows significant adjusted contrarian returns after adjusting the 
contrarian portfolio consecutively for Fama and French risks, market state and 
macroeconomic risk factor. More importantly, I find that the liquidity factor, the default 
spread, and the term spread are positively related to contrarian, while the SMB and the HML 
factors are negatively related. The strategy generates a contrarian adjusted return of 0.40% 
per month with a t-statistic of 3.69 and a P-value of 0.000 for the optimum strategy (48-
month/48-month) when I control for all global risk (Table 4.4.12 Model 4). This result also 
implies that the combine change in global risk factor do not explain the contrarian profit.  
One possible interpretation of this result is that there is a limited relation between change in 
global risk factors and the global contrarian. I therefore confirm at this stage that the 
contrarian profits are not improved by taking extra risk in developed markets. These findings 
follow Lakonishok et al. (1994) study that suggested that, value stocks are not fundamentally 
riskier than glamour stocks, consistent with Gregory et al. (2001) study that found that, the 
contrarian excess returns persist even after controlling for size effects in stock returns and 
confirm that the contrarian returns are not compensation for market risk. These results also 
contribute to the debate by reinforcing De Bondt and Thaler’s (1985) findings that claim that 
overreaction is predictive, and that adjustment of profits to the CAPM-model could not 
explain the abnormal returns. 
6.3.9 Impact of Global Risks Factors on Contrarian Profit in established market 
I examine the role of the global risk factors in explaining the global contrarian in established 
market. I follow Avramov et al. (2015) approach. I consider all possible combinations of 
predictive macroeconomic risk factors. The predictive variables include all Fama and French 
risk factors, all market state factors, and all macroeconomic variables included in the 
previous equation (1-3). Starting with model (1) which drops all predictive macroeconomic 
risk variables and ending with all-inclusive model (4). My examination is based on the 
following time-series regression specification. I report the regression parameters results Table 
4.4.13. This table shows the results of the following monthly time-series regression.  
(47) 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡 = ⁡𝛼6 +⁡𝛽1(𝑅𝑀 − 𝑅𝐹)𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 ⁡+ 𝛽3𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑡−1 + 𝛽6𝐷𝑆𝑡−1 ⁡+
𝛽7𝑇𝑆𝑡−1 ⁡+ 𝛽8𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡−1 + 𝛽9∆𝑂𝑃𝑡−1 ⁡+ 𝛽10𝑊𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑡−1 ⁡+ 𝛽11∆𝐼𝑃𝑡−1⁡ +⁡𝑒𝑡 
Where: 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡 are the returns of the contrarian portfolio at time t, 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 (high minus low) is 
the return to portfolios that is long on high book-to-market stocks and short on low book-to-
market stocks in US, 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡(small minus big) are returns to long-short portfolios constructed 
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using size, 𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑡−1is the liquidity factor at time t-1, 𝐷𝑆𝑡−1 is the Default spread at time t-1, 
𝑇𝑆𝑡−1 is the Term spread at time t-1, 𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡−1is the MSCI world indices price level, It 
represents price levels at time t-1, ∆𝑂𝑃𝑡−1 is the monthly Oil price at time t-1, 𝑊𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑡−1 is 
the market volatility at time t-1, and  ∆𝐼𝑃𝑡−1⁡ is the monthly value of the US Industrial 
production at time t-1. The t-statistics are reported in the parentheses and the p-values are 
reported next. 
[Insert Table 4.4.13 Here] 
As shown in Table 4.4.13 Models 1, 2 and 3 significant adjusted contrarian returns remain 
after adjusting of the contrarian portfolio consecutively to the Fama and French risks, the 
market state factors, and the macroeconomic factor. More importantly, I find that when all 
factors are included, the contrarian strategy yields a statistically significant abnormal profit at 
10% per month of 0.20% with a t-statistic of 1.74 and a P-value of 0.082 for the optimum 
strategy (48-month/48-month) Table 4.4.13 Model 4. This result also indicates a positive 
relation between the default spread, industrial production and the contrarian return while all 
Fama and French risk factors have a negative effect on the momentum profit (Table 4.4.13 
Model 4) and implies that the combined change in global risk factors do not explain the 
contrarian profit in established market. One possible interpretation of this result is that there 
is a limited relation between change in global risk factors and the global contrarian.  
I therefore confirm at this stage that the contrarian profits are not improved by taking extra 
risk in developed market. These findings follow Lakonishok et al.’s (1994) study that 
suggested that, value stocks are not fundamentally riskier than glamour stocks, consistent 
with Gregory et al. (2001) study that found that, the contrarian excess returns persist even 
after controlling for size effects in stock returns and confirm that the contrarian returns are 
not compensation for market risk. These results also contribute to the debate by reinforcing 
De Bondt and Thaler (1985) findings that claim that overreaction is predictive, and that 
adjustment of profits to the CAPM-model could not explain the abnormal returns. 
6.3.10 Effect of Global Risk Contrarian Profit Factor during the Globalization Period 
1994-2014 
I also examine whether jointly Fama and French risk factors, market state factor, and 
economic risk factors explain the contrarian payoff during the globalization period. I follow 
Avramov et al.’s (2015) approach. I consider all possible combinations of predictive 
macroeconomic risk factors. The predictive variables include all Fama and French risk 
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factors, all market state factors, and all macroeconomic variables included in the previous 
equation (1-3). Starting with model (1) which drops all predictive macroeconomic risk 
variables and ending with all-inclusive model (4). My examination is based on the following 
time-series regression specification. I report the regression parameters results in Table 4.4.14. 
This table shows the results of the following monthly time-series regression.  
(48) 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡 = ⁡𝛼6 +⁡𝛽1(𝑅𝑀 − 𝑅𝐹)𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 ⁡+ 𝛽3𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑡−1 + 𝛽6𝐷𝑆𝑡−1 ⁡+
𝛽7𝑇𝑆𝑡−1 ⁡+ 𝛽8𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡−1 + 𝛽9∆𝑂𝑃𝑡−1 ⁡+ 𝛽10𝑊𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑡−1 ⁡+ 𝛽11∆𝐼𝑃𝑡−1⁡ +⁡𝑒𝑡 
Where: 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡 are the returns of the contrarian portfolio at time t, 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 (High Minus Low) is 
the return to portfolios that is long on high book-to-market stocks and short on low book-to-
market stocks in US, 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡(Small minus big) are returns to long-short portfolios constructed 
using size, 𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑡−1is the liquidity factor at time t-1, 𝐷𝑆𝑡−1 is the Default spread at time t-1, 
𝑇𝑆𝑡−1 is the Term spread at time t-1, 𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡−1is MSCI world indices price level, It represents 
price levels at time t-1, ∆𝑂𝑃𝑡−1 is the monthly Oil price at time t-1, 𝑊𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑡−1 is the market 
volatility at time t-1, and  ∆𝐼𝑃𝑡−1⁡ is the monthly value of the US Industrial production at time 
t-1. The t-statistics are reported in the parentheses and the p-values are reported next. 
[Insert Table 4.4.14 Here] 
As shown in Table 4.14 Models 1, 2 and 3 significant adjusted momentum returns remain 
after adjusting of the momentum portfolio consecutively to the Fama and French risks, the 
market state factors, and the macroeconomic factor. More importantly, I find that when all 
factors are included, the contrarian strategy yields a statistically significant abnormal profit at 
1% of 1.70% per month with a t-statistic of 8.42 and a P-value of 0.00 for the optimum 
strategy (48-month/48-month) Table 4.4.14 Model 4. This result also indicates a negative 
relation between the market volatility and default spread, and the contrarian return. However, 
the combined change in global risk factors do not explain the contrarian profit in de 
globalization period. One possible interpretation of this result is that there is a limited relation 
between change in global risk factors and the global contrarian profit. Implying that the 
contrarian profits are not improved by taking extra risk during globalization period.  
These findings follow Lakonishok et al. (1994) study that suggested that, value stocks are not 
fundamentally riskier than glamour stocks, consistent with Gregory et al. (2001) study that 
found that, the contrarian excess returns persist even after controlling for size effects in stock 
returns and confirm that the contrarian returns are not compensation for market risk. These 
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results also contribute to the debate by reinforcing De Bondt and Thaler’s (1985) findings 
that claim that overreaction is predictive, and that adjustment of profits to the CAPM-model 
could not explain the abnormal returns. 
6.3.11 Global Risks Impact on excess contrarian profits 
In addition to the global risk effect following crisis and change in business cycle, I finally 
examine the influence of global risks factors on the excess global contrarian return in other to 
access the comparative advantage of opting for the strategies. To examine whether jointly 
Fama and French risk factors, market state factor, and macroeconomic risk factors explain the 
contrarian payoff. I follow Avramov et al.’s (2015) approach. I consider all possible 
combinations of predictive macroeconomic risk factors. The predictive variables include all 
Fama and French risk factors, all market state factors, and all macroeconomic variables 
included in the previous equation (1-3). Starting with model (1) which drops all predictive 
macroeconomic risk variables and ending with all-inclusive model (4). My examination is 
based on the following time-series regression specification. I report the regression parameters 
results in Table 4.4.15. This table shows the result of the following monthly time-series 
regression.  
(49) 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡 − 𝑅𝐹𝑡 =⁡𝛼7 +⁡𝛽1(𝑅𝑀 − 𝑅𝐹)𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 ⁡+ 𝛽3𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑡−1 + 𝛽6𝐷𝑆𝑡−1 ⁡+
𝛽7𝑇𝑆𝑡−1 ⁡+ 𝛽8𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡−1 + 𝛽9∆𝑂𝑃𝑡−1 ⁡+ 𝛽10𝑊𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑡−1 ⁡+ 𝛽11∆𝐼𝑃𝑡−1⁡ +⁡𝑒𝑡 
Where: 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡 − 𝑅𝐹𝑡 is the excess return of contrarian strategy at time t, 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 (high minus 
low) is the return to portfolios that is long on high book-to-market stocks and short on low 
book-to-market stocks in US, 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡(Small minus big) are returns to long-short portfolios 
constructed using size, 𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑡−1is the liquidity factor at time t-1, 𝐷𝑆𝑡−1 is the Default spread at 
time t-1, 𝑇𝑆𝑡−1 is the Term spread at time t-1, 𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡−1is MSCI world indices price level, It 
represents price levels at time t-1, ∆𝑂𝑃𝑡−1 is the monthly Oil price at time t-1, 𝑊𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑡−1 is 
the market volatility at time t-1, and ∆𝐼𝑃𝑡−1⁡ is the yearly value of the US Industrial 
production at time t-1. The t-statistics are reported in the parentheses and the p-values are 
reported next. 
[Insert Table 4.4.15 Here] 
Table 4.4.15 Models 1, 2 and 3 show significant adjusted contrarian excess returns after 
adjusting of the contrarian portfolio consecutively to the Fama and French risks, the market 
state factors, and the macroeconomic factor. More importantly, I find that when all factors are 
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included in the regression, the contrarian strategy yields a statistically significant abnormal 
profit at 1% of 0.60% per month with a t-statistic of 4.98 and a P-value of 0.000 with the 
optimum strategy (48-month/48-month) Table 4.4.15 Model 4. This result also indicates a 
positive relation between the default spread, market volatility, the HML factor and the 
contrarian return and implies that the combined change in global risk factor do not explain 
the adjusted excess contrarian profit. One possible interpretation of this result is that there is a 
limited relation between change in global risk factors and the global contrarian profit. I 
therefore confirm that the contrarian profits are not improved by taking extra risk and that the 
results do not systematically differ with respect to either the return or the excess return on the 
global contrarian strategy. These findings follow Lakonishok et al. (1994) study that 
suggested that, value stocks are not fundamentally riskier than glamour stocks, consistent 
with Gregory et al’s (2001) study that found that, the contrarian excess returns persist even 
after controlling for size effects in stock returns and confirm that the contrarian returns are 
not compensation for market risk. These results also contribute to the debate by reinforcing 
De Bondt and Thaler’s (1985) findings that claim that overreaction is predictive, and that 
adjustment of profits to the CAPM-model could not explain the abnormal returns. 
6.3.12 Summary 
I examined the role of global risk factor in explaining the global profit. I find no relation 
between variations in macroeconomic risk factors. Notably the evidence is that the contrarian 
strategy generates risk-adjusted profit of 1.00% with a t-statistic of 6.58 and a P-value of 
0.000 with the optimum strategy. The results also show that market volatility tends to 
contribute significantly in reducing the contrarian return. This finding is quiet robust. For 
example, the finding survives during the banking crisis with 1.40% abnormal return per 
month, 4.20% per month during currency crisis. However, the exception is during stock 
market crash where the thesis records a negative abnormal profit. Further analysis indicates 
that contrarian returns remain after adjusting for global risks. 2.50% per month with subset of 
non-crisis period, 1.00% per month during the expansion period, 1.40% per month in 
emerging market, 0.40% per month in developed countries, 0.2% per month in established 
market, and 1.70% per month during the globalization period, 0.60% per month when I 
control the impact of global risks on excess contrarian return. However, the contraction 
subset shows insignificant abnormal return. A direct implication of these results is that 
international investors might be able to beat the market using common investment strategy 
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such as the global contrarian, and the contrarian strategies profits are not compensation for 
risks. 
6.4 Other Robustness Checks 
It is important to determine whether global momentum and contrarian profits and specific risks are 
related across regions. If the global momentum profits are explained by global risks, and markets are 
internationally and regionally integrated, then one ought to expect a strong relation between regional 
(Emerging and Developed markets) risks factors and global momentum. From a purely empirical 
perspective, examining the relation between the global momentum profits and the global risk factors 
internationally and across regions enable one to examine whether global momentum profits is 
explained by a single global risk factor or instead are due to nearly independent regional risk factors. 
6.4.1 Effect of Global Fama and French Three-Factor on the Global Momentum Profit 
To examine whether jointly Fama and French risks factors, market state factor, and 
macroeconomic risks factors affect the momentum payoff. I based my examination on the 
following time-series regression specification. I consider all possible combinations of 
predictive macroeconomic risk factors. The predictive variables include Global Fama and 
French risk factors, all market state factors, and all macroeconomic variables included in the 
previous equation (1-3). Starting with model (1) which drops all predictive macroeconomic 
risk variables and ending with all-inclusive model 3. I report the regression parameters result 
for each explanatory variable in Table 4.5.1.  
(50) 𝑀𝑜𝑚𝑡 =⁡𝛼3 +⁡𝛽1(𝑅𝑀 − 𝑅𝐹)𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 ⁡+ 𝛽3𝑔𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝐷𝑆𝑡−1 ⁡+
𝛽6𝑇𝑆𝑡−1 ⁡+ 𝛽7𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡−1 + 𝛽8∆𝑂𝑃𝑡−1 ⁡+ 𝛽9𝑊𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑡−1 ⁡+ 𝛽10∆𝐼𝑃𝑡−1⁡ +⁡𝑒𝑡 
Where: 𝑀𝑜𝑚𝑡 are the returns of the global momentum portfolio at time t, 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 (high minus 
low) is the equal-weight average of the return for the two high book-to-market portfolios for 
region minus the average of the returns for the two low book-to-market stocks, 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡(small 
minus big) is the equal-weight average of the returns on the three small stock portfolios for 
the region minus the average of the returns on the three big stock portfolios, 𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑡−1is the 
liquidity factor at time t-1, 𝐷𝑆𝑡−1 is the Default spread at time t-1, 𝑇𝑆𝑡−1 is the Term spread 
at time t-1, 𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡−1is the MSCI world indices price level and represent price levels at time t-
1, ∆𝑂𝑃𝑡−1 is the percent change of monthly Oil price at time t-1, 𝑊𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑡−1 is the market 
volatility at time t-1, ∆𝐼𝑃𝑡−1⁡ is the percent change of monthly value of the US Industrial 
production at time t-1. The results are reported in Table 4.4.1. The test statistics are reported 
in the parentheses and the P-values are reported next. 
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[Insert Table 4.5.1 Here] 
Table 4.5.1 reports the test results of the momentum portfolio returns regressed on the global 
risk factors. I begin the estimation with the Global Fama and French risk factors, I 
subsequently include market state and macroeconomic factors consecutively. Table 4.5.1 
Models 1 and 2 show significant adjusted momentum returns of the momentum portfolio 
after adjusting the momentum return consecutively to the Global Fama and French risks and 
the market state factors. The coefficients associated with the macroeconomic risk factors are 
not particularly significant in Table 4.5.1. More importantly, I find that industrial production 
contributes significantly in explaining the momentum return with a coefficient of 1.291, a t-
statistic of 3.24 and a P-value of 0.001 for the optimum strategy (9-month/3-month) when I 
control for macroeconomic risk exclusively (Table 4.5.1 Model 3). This effect persists when 
the test includes all risk factors where the coefficient associated with industrial production 
remains significant at 5% (0.983) with a t-statistic of 2.00 and a P-value of 0.045 and 
abnormal return is insignificant. This implyies that change in economy growth or in industry 
output strongly explains the momentum profit.  
One possible interpretation of this result is that there is as strong relation between change in 
global macroeconomic risk and the global momentum profitability. They indicate the ability 
of global factor to explain the momentum profit; in line with Cochrane (2011), suggestions 
that market are integrated across both countries and assets. I can confirm at this stage that if 
momentum investors follow the 9-month/3-month they will outperform the market. Their 
profits could be improved by taking extra risk following change in industrial production. 
However, the Global Fama and French Three-Factor do not or least partially do not explain 
the momentum profit. This result also support Griffin et al.’s (2003) finding that average 
momentum profit is positive during GDP growth and even larger and positive with negative 
market return than positive market returns. 
6.4.2 Effect of Global Fama and French Five-Factor on the Global Momentum Profit 
Fama and French (2015) suggested that a five-factor model that adds profitability and 
investment factors to the three-factor model of Fama and French (1993) largely absorbs the 
patterns in average returns in the stock market. Given that the momentum strategies rely on 
the ability of the stock market to rise in the short term, I examine whether jointly Global 
Fama and French five-factor, market state factor, and macroeconomic risks factors affect the 
momentum payoff. I extend equation (50) by adding two additional factors (profitability and 
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investment). My examination is based on the following time-series regression specification. I 
consider all possible combinations of predictive macroeconomic risk factors. The predictive 
variables include the Global Fama and French Five-Factor, all market state factors, and all 
macroeconomic variables included in the previous equation (1-3). Starting with model (1) 
which drops all predictive macroeconomic risk variables and ending with all-inclusive model 
3. I report the regression parameters result for each explanatory variable in Table 4.5.2.  
(51) 𝑀𝑜𝑚𝑡 =⁡𝛼3 +⁡𝛽1(𝑅𝑀 − 𝑅𝐹)𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 ⁡+ 𝛽3𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑅𝑀𝑊𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑡 +
𝛽6𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑡−1 + 𝛽7𝐷𝑆𝑡−1 ⁡+ 𝛽8𝑇𝑆𝑡−1 ⁡+ 𝛽9𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡−1 + 𝛽10∆𝑂𝑃𝑡−1 ⁡+ 𝛽11𝑊𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑡−1 ⁡+
𝛽12∆𝐼𝑃𝑡−1⁡ +⁡𝑒𝑡 
Where: 𝑀𝑜𝑚𝑡 are the returns of the global momentum portfolio at time t,  𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 (high minus 
low) is the equal-weight average of the return for the two high book-to-market portfolios for 
region minus the average of the returns for the two low book-to-market stocks, 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡(small 
minus big) is the equal-weight average of the returns on the three small stock portfolios for 
the region minus the average of the returns on the three big stock portfolios, 𝑅𝑀𝑊𝑡 (Robust 
Minus Weak) is the average return on the two robust operating profitability portfolios minus 
the average return on the two weak operating profitability portfolios, 𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑡 (Conservative 
Minus Aggressive) is the average return on the two conservative investment portfolios minus 
the average return on the two aggressive investment portfolios, 𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑡−1is the liquidity factor 
at time t-1, 𝐷𝑆𝑡−1 is the Default spread at time t-1, 𝑇𝑆𝑡−1 is the Term spread at time t-1, 
𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡−1is the MSCI world indices price level and represent price levels at time t-1, ∆𝑂𝑃𝑡−1 is 
the percent change of monthly Oil price at time t-1, 𝑊𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑡−1 is the market volatility at time 
t-1, ∆𝐼𝑃𝑡−1⁡ is the percent change of monthly value of the US Industrial production at time t-
1. The results are reported in Table 4.5.2. The test statistics are reported in the parentheses 
and the P-values are reported next. 
[Insert Table 4.5.2 Here] 
Table 4.5.2 reports the test results of the global momentum portfolio returns regressed on the 
global risk factors. I begin the estimation with global Fama and French Five-Factor, 
subsequently include market state and macroeconomic factors. Table 4.5.2 Models 1 and 2 
show significant adjusted momentum returns (Alpha) of 0.007 with a t-statistic of 3.04 and a 
p-value of 0.002 after adjusting the momentum return the Global Fama and French Five-
Factor, 0.002 with a t-statistic of 3.90 and a p-value of 0.000 after adjusting for market state 
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factors (0.022). The coefficients associated with the macroeconomic risk factors are not 
particularly significant. More importantly, I find that industrial production contributes 
significantly in explaining the momentum return with a coefficient of 1.266, a t-statistic of 
3.24 and a P-value of 0.001 for the optimum strategy (9-month/3-month) when I control for 
macroeconomic risk exclusively (Table 4.5.2 Model 3). This effect persists when the test 
includes all risk factors. The adjusted return (Alpha) is not significant but industrial 
production show significant impact in explaining the momentum return with a coefficient of 
0.936 a t-statistic of 2.29 and a P-value of -0.001. Implying that change in economy growth 
or in industry output strongly explains the momentum profit. One possible interpretation of 
this result is that there is as strong relation between change in macroeconomic and the global 
momentum profitability. These findings contribute in the debate by reinforcing Chordia and 
Shiva Kumar’s (2000) study that suggested that momentum strategies profits are explained by 
common macroeconomic variables, implying that the profitability of the global momentum 
strategy could be due to variations in common macroeconomic factors and presumably 
change in risk. However, the Fama and French’s profitability and the investment factors do 
not significantly affect the profitability of the momentum strategy momentum return.  
6.4.3 Effect of Asia Pacific Market Fama and French Three-factor on Momentum Profits 
in Emerging Market 
There is also a tendency for the average stock returns to rise relatively with book-to- ratio. 
Fama and French (2015) document evidence of such rise in Asia Pacific countries. Since the 
momentum return relies the on performance of the determinants of the market to rise in the 
short term. I examine whether jointly the global Fama and French Three-Factors (Fama and 
French Asia Pacific excluding Japan) market state factors, and the macroeconomic factors 
explain the momentum profit in emerging market. I consider all possible combinations of 
predictive risks factors. The predictive variables include all the Global Fama and French 
three-factors (Fama and French Asia Pacific excluding Japan), all market state factors, and all 
macroeconomic variables included in the previous equation (1-3) are considered. Starting 
with model (1) which drops all predictive macroeconomic risk variables and ending with all-
inclusive model (4). My examination is based on the following time-series regression 
specification. I report the regression parameters results in Table 4.5.3.  
(52) 𝑀𝑜𝑚𝑡 =⁡𝛼6 +⁡𝛽1(𝑅𝑀 − 𝑅𝐹)𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 ⁡+ 𝛽3𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝐷𝑆𝑡−1 ⁡+
𝛽6𝑇𝑆𝑡−1 ⁡+ 𝛽7𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡−1 + 𝛽8∆𝑂𝑃𝑡−1 ⁡+ 𝛽9𝑊𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑡−1 ⁡+ 𝛽10∆𝐼𝑃𝑡−1⁡ +⁡𝑒𝑡 
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Where: 𝑀𝑜𝑚𝑡 are the returns of the momentum portfolio in emerging market at time t, 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 
(high minus low) is the equal-weight average of the returns for the two high book-to-market 
portfolios for a region minus the average of the returns for the two low book-to-market 
portfolios, 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡(Small minus big) is the equal-weight average of the returns on the three 
small stock portfolios for the region minus the average of the returns on the big stock 
portfolio, 𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑡−1is the liquidity factor at time t-1, 𝐷𝑆𝑡−1 is the Default spread at time t-1, 
𝑇𝑆𝑡−1 is the Term spread at time t-1, 𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡−1is MSCI world indices price level and 
represents price levels at time t-1, ∆𝑂𝑃𝑡−1 is the monthly Oil price at time t-1, 𝑊𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑡−1 is 
the market volatility at time t-1, and ∆𝐼𝑃𝑡−1⁡ is the monthly value of the US Industrial 
production at time t-1. The t-statistics are reported in the parentheses and the p-values are 
reported next. 
[Insert Table 4.5.3 Here] 
As shown (Table 4.5. 3. Model 1) when I control for the Fama and French risks exclusively 
the adjusted return become insignificant indicating the ability of the Fama and French risks 
factor to subsume the momentum profit in emerging market. In Table 4.5.3. Models 2, 
significant adjusted momentum returns (Alpha) of 0.034 with a t-statistic of 3.18 and a p-
value of 0.001 remain after adjusting the momentum profit consecutively for Fama and 
French risks and market state factors. While the abnormal return associated with the 
macroeconomic risk factor and the regression after controlling for global risk factor are not 
particularly significant. More importantly, I find that industrial production tends to contribute 
significantly in explaining the momentum return with a coefficient of 1.832, a t-statistic of 
2.31 and a P-value of 0.021 for the optimum strategy (9-month/3-month) when I control for 
macroeconomic risk exclusively (Table 4.5. 3. Model 3). However, when all risk factors 
included with the adjusted return become significant (0.026) with a t-statistic of 2.11 and a P-
value 0.035 which could be interpreted as the dominant contribution of the market state 
factor. My intuition is that the impact of industrial production is still considerable but not 
enough to explain the momentum profit.  
6.4.4 Effect of European Fama and French Five-Factor, TED and Euribor: OIS Spread on 
Momentum Profits in Develop Market 
In this section, I follow the thought that different state of the economy might induce 
unprecedented liquidity shock and increase in credit risk in the European market (Aussenegg 
et al. 2016). More precisely the EURBOR_OIS is often considered as a market barometer of 
liquidity and widely use as measure of the level of liquidity in the European region 
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(Aussenegg et al., 2015). In addition, the average stock returns in Europe also tend to 
increase with the book-to-market ratio and the profitability are inversely related to investment 
(Fama and French, 2015). I extend my analysis by adding the Fama and French’s profitability 
and the investment factors. I also consider an alternative measure of liquidity such as the 
EURIBOR: OIS Spread (difference between the rate at which European banks lend to each 
other (ERIBOR) and the overnight’ risk free’ swap rate (EONIA) among the same banks for 
3-month period. Please see Appendix E4 for detailed definition.), given that this informs 
investor on whether risk is rising or falling in credit market and it is a good indicator of stress 
in the banking system.  
I refer to the TED Spread or the difference between the London Interbank Offered Rate 
(Libor) and the 3-month Treasury Bill, given that rising TED Spread is commonly known as 
a bearish indicator and it is evidence that liquidity is being withdrawn from the financial 
market (Please see Appendix E4 for detailed definition). I consider all possible combinations 
of predictive risk factors. The predictive variables include all Fama and French Five-Factors, 
all market state excluding the U.S. liquidity factors. I include the EURIBOR: OIS and the 
TED Spread, and all macroeconomic variables included in the previous equations; starting 
with model (1) which drops all predictive macroeconomic risk variables and ending with all-
inclusive model (7). My examination is based on the following time-series regression 
specification. I report the regression parameters results Table 4.5.4. This table shows the 
result of the following monthly time-series regression.  
(53) 𝑀𝑜𝑚𝑡 =⁡𝛼6 +⁡𝛽1(𝑅𝑀 − 𝑅𝐹)𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 ⁡+ 𝛽3𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑅𝑀𝑊𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑡 +
+𝛽6𝐸𝑂𝐼𝑆𝑡−1 + 𝛽7𝑇𝐸𝐷𝑡−1 + 𝛽8𝐷𝑆𝑡−1 ⁡+ 𝛽9𝑇𝑆𝑡−1 ⁡+ 𝛽10𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡−1 + 𝛽11∆𝑂𝑃𝑡−1 ⁡+
𝛽12𝑊𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑡−1 ⁡+ 𝛽13∆𝐼𝑃𝑡−1⁡ +⁡𝑒𝑡 
Where: 𝑀𝑜𝑚𝑡 are the returns of the momentum portfolio at time t,  𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 (high minus low) 
is the equal-weight average of the return for the two high book-to-market portfolios for the 
region minus the average of the returns for the two low book-to-market stocks, 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡(small 
minus big) is the equal-weight average of the returns on the three small stock portfolios for 
the region minus the average of the returns on the three big stock portfolios, 𝑅𝑀𝑊𝑡 (Robust 
Minus Weak) is the average return on the two robust operating profitability portfolios minus 
the average return on the two weak operating profitability portfolios, 𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑡 (Conservative 
Minus Aggressive) is the average return on the two conservative investment portfolios minus 
the average return on the two aggressive investment portfolios, 𝐸𝑂𝐼𝑆𝑡−1  (EURIBOR:OIS 
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Spread ) is the difference between the rate at which European banks lend to each other 
(ERIBOR) and the overnight’ risk free’ swap rate (EONIA) among the same banks a 3 month 
period, 𝑇𝐸𝐷𝑡−1 Spread or the difference between the London Interbank Offered Rate (Libor) 
and the 3-month Treasury Bill at time t-1, 𝐷𝑆𝑡−1 is the Default spread at time t-1, 𝑇𝑆𝑡−1 is the 
Term spread at time t-1, 𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡−1 is the MSCI world indices price level, It represents price 
levels at time t-1, ∆𝑂𝑃𝑡−1 is the monthly Oil price at time t-1, 𝑊𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑡−1 is the market 
volatility at time t-1, and ∆𝐼𝑃𝑡−1⁡ is the monthly value of the US Industrial production at time 
t-1. The t-statistics are reported in the parentheses and the p-values are reported next. 
[Insert Table 4.5.4 Here] 
In Table 4.5.4. Models 1, and 2 I record consecutively significant adjusted momentum returns 
of 0.005 with a t-statistic of 2.46 and a p-value 0.014 after adjusting for European Fama and 
French risks, 0.006 with a t-statistic of 2.37 after adjusting for the TED Spread. Indicating 
that the European Fama and French risk factor do not explain the momentum profit. Also, the 
TED Spread is and indicator of change in liquidity in the given the perceive risk in lending as 
interbank rates rise against risk-free treasury rate. Which imply that a change in liquidity risk 
will not explain the momentum profit in developed control while I refer to the TED Spread. 
Conversely Table 4.5.4. Model 3 insignificant adjusted return. The coefficients associate with 
The Euribor: OIS Spread is significant (1.334) with a t-statistic of 4.04 a p-value of 0.000 
indicating that this factor may have significant impact on the momentum profit in developed 
market. The Euribor: OIS Spread inform us about how much trusts banks place in each other. 
One possible interpretation of this result is that rising or falling credit risks could explain the 
momentum profit in developed countries.  
Moreover, controlling for the joint effect of market state factors including The TED Spread 
Table 4.5.4 Model 4 indicates insignificant adjusted return implying that the Term Spread 
could have significant impact on momentum profit in developed countries, while the joint 
effect of market state factors including the Euribor: OIS not explains the momentum profit 
indicating that additional market variable might reduce the power of the change in credit risk 
in explaining the momentum profit. In Table 4.5.4. Model 6 there are consistent evidence to 
suggest that macroeconomic risk factor explain the momentum profit given that the adjusted 
return (Alpha) become insignificant.  More importantly I find that Euribor: OIS contribute in 
explaining the momentum profit in developed countries, when I control for all risk factors 
(Table 4.5.4 Model 7) the Euribor: OIS is associate with a coefficient of 1.242 with a t-
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statistic of 3.67 and a p-value of 0.000, while the Term Spread is associate with a coefficient 
of 0.192 with a t-statistic of 3.73 and a p-value of 0.000. The implication is that momentum 
investors could increase their profit following the credit risk when trading on developed 
country only. However, the Term Spread contribution is not negligible given that it positively 
and significantly explains the momentum return at 1% level in develop market, in line with 
Chordia and Shivakumar’s (2000) study that suggested that momentum strategies profits are 
explained by common macroeconomic variables. 
6.4.5  Summary  
I examined whether global momentum profits and specific risks are related across regions (Emerging 
and developed). I also examine whether global momentum profits is explained by a single global risk 
factor or instead are due to nearly independent regional risk factors, and found no consistent 
relation between variations in Global Fama and French Risks factor and the momentum 
profit. To reiterate the U.S. Fama and French has similar effect on the global momentum 
profit. As the global Fama and French risk factors. Examining the joint effect of Global Fama 
and French Factor on momentum profit I find that industrial production remains significant in 
explaining the momentum profit. This factor is associate with a coefficient of 0.936, a t-
statistic of 2.29 and a P-value of 0.022 when the Five Factors are included. This reveals that 
change in economy growth or in industry’s output strongly affect the momentum profit as 
initially found. This do results are not specific to individual region. This is in line with 
Cochrane (2011) suggestions market are integrated across both countries and assets classes. 
However, studying the relation between specific risk factors and momentum profit in 
emerging and developed market show that Fama and French factors in Asia pacific excluding 
Japan could explain the momentum profit based on emerging countries only given that the 
adjusted return become insignificant. But, impact of the industrial production remains 
strongly noticeable when I control for both Fama and French factors and macroeconomic 
factor. 
However, when I include market state factors in the equation this effect disappears indicating 
that the effect of market state factor reduces the power of the Fama and French Asia pacific 
Factor and the macroeconomic factor in explaining the momentum profit in emerging market. 
More importantly I find that both Euribor: OIS and the Term Spread contribute in explaining 
the momentum profit based on developed countries only, when I control for all risk factors. 
This positive relationship is quiet strong. For example, the Term Spread previously show the 
same effect when using U.S. instead of the European Fama and French Factor in the thesis. 
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The effect of macroeconomic cannot be ignore given that, when I control for both European 
Fama and French Factor and macroeconomic factor jointly the adjusted return (Alpha) 
become insignificant.   
6.5 Global-risk factors Role in Explaining the Contrarian Strategy Payoff  
The contrarian strategy has been shown to be profitable in U.S. and most developed countries. 
Jeegadesh and Titman (2001) show that the best performers appear to be no riskier than the worst 
performers. Therefore, standard risk adjustment will increase rather than decrease the return spread 
between past winners and past losers. I have shown that the global contrarian profits are not explained 
by global risks. However, if markets are internationally and regionally integrated, then one ought to 
expect a strong relation between risks factors and contrarian profit in various regions (Emerging and 
Developed markets). From a purely empirical perspective, examining the relation between the global 
contrarian profits and the global risk factors internationally and across regions enabling one to 
examine whether global contrarian profits are explained by a single global risk factor or instead are 
due to nearly independent country or regional risk factors. 
6.5.1 Effect of Global Fama and French Three-Factor on the Global Contrarian 
Profit 
To examine whether jointly the Global Fama and French Three-Factor, market state factor, 
and macroeconomic risks factors affect the global contrarian payoff, I based my examination 
on the following time-series regression specifications. I consider all possible combinations of 
predictive macroeconomic risk factors. The predictive variables include the Global Fama and 
French risk factors, all market state factors, and all macroeconomic variables included in the 
previous equation (1-3). Starting with model (1) which drops all predictive macroeconomic 
risk variables and ending with all-inclusive model 3. I report the regression parameters result 
for each explanatory variable in Table 4.3.4.  
(54) 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡 =⁡𝛼3 +⁡𝛽1(𝑅𝑀 − 𝑅𝐹)𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 ⁡+ 𝛽3𝑔𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝐷𝑆𝑡−1 ⁡+
𝛽6𝑇𝑆𝑡−1 ⁡+ 𝛽7𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡−1 + 𝛽8∆𝑂𝑃𝑡−1 ⁡+ 𝛽9𝑊𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑡−1 ⁡+ 𝛽10∆𝐼𝑃𝑡−1⁡ +⁡𝑒𝑡 
Where: 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡 are the returns of the global contrarian portfolio at time t regress on the Global 
Fama and French Three-Factor, 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 (high minus low) is the equal-weight average of the 
return for the two high book-to-market portfolios for region minus the average of the returns 
for the two low book-to-market stocks, 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡(small minus big) is the equal-weight average of 
the returns on the three small stock portfolios for the region minus the average of the returns 
on the three big stock portfolios, 𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑡−1is the liquidity factor at time t-1, 𝐷𝑆𝑡−1 is the Default 
spread at time t-1, 𝑇𝑆𝑡−1 is the Term spread at time t-1, 𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡−1is the MSCI world indices 
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price level and represent price levels at time t-1, ∆𝑂𝑃𝑡−1 is the percent change of monthly Oil 
price at time t-1, 𝑊𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑡−1 is the market volatility at time t-1, ∆𝐼𝑃𝑡−1⁡ is the percent change 
of monthly value of the US Industrial production at time t-1. The results are reported in Table 
4.6.1. The test statistics are reported in the parentheses and the P-values are reported next. 
 [Insert Table 4.6.1 Here] 
As shown in Table 4.6.1 Models 1, 2 and 3 significant adjusted contrarian returns remain 
after controlling consecutively for Global Fama and French risks, market state risks, and 
macroeconomic risks. More importantly, when I control for the joint effect of the global risk 
factors, the contrarian strategy generates a statistically and significant abnormal return of 
0.010 with a t-statistic of 3.54 and a P-value of 0.000 with the optimum strategy (48-
month/48-month) Table 4.6.1 Model 4. The results also show that market volatility tends to 
contribute significantly in reducing the contrarian return with a coefficient of -0.512, a t-
statistic of -3.25 and a P-value of 0.001 with the optimum strategy 48-month/48-month. The 
effect of the term spread is also noticeable -0.195 with a t-statistic of 2.57 and a p-value of 
0.010.  When I control for macroeconomic risks exclusively (Table 4.6.1 Model 3), the 
market volatility effect persists with a coefficient of -0.750, a t-statistic of -5.86 and a P-value 
of 0.000. However, neither the market volatility, the term spread, nor oil price solely cannot 
expunge the contrarian abnormal return. One possible interpretation is that global risk factors 
including the Global Fama and French Three-Factor do not explain the contrarian profit. I can 
confirm at this stage that contrarian investors will not increase their profits by taking extra 
risk. However, there is a tendency of all risks factors to be on average negatively related to 
the contrarian profit. These findings are in line with Lakonishok et al. (1994) study that 
suggested that, value stocks are not fundamentally riskier than glamour stocks, consistent 
with Gregory et al. (2001) study that found that, the contrarian excess returns persist even 
after controlling for size effects in stock returns and confirm that the contrarian returns are 
not compensation for market risk. These results also contribute to the debate by reinforcing 
De Bondt and Thaler (1985) findings that claim that overreaction is predictive, and that 
adjustment of profits to the CAPM-model could not explain the abnormal returns. 
6.5.2 Effect of Global Fama and French Five-Factor on the Global Contrarian Profit 
Referring to the Fama and French (2015) suggestion that a five-factor model that adds 
profitability and investment factors to the three-factor model of Fama and French (1993) 
largely absorbs the patterns in average returns. I extend my analysis by adding two additional 
246 
 
factors (profitability and investment). My examination is based on the following time-series 
regression specifications. I consider all possible combinations of predictive macroeconomic 
risk factors. The predictive variables include all Fama and French Five-Factors, all market 
state factors, and all macroeconomic variables included in the previous equation (1-3). 
Starting with model (1) which drops all predictive macroeconomic risk variables and ending 
with all-inclusive model 3. I report the regression parameters result for each explanatory 
variable in Table 4.6.2.  
(55) 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡 = ⁡𝛼3 +⁡𝛽1(𝑅𝑀 − 𝑅𝐹)𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 ⁡+ 𝛽3𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑅𝑀𝑊𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑡 +
𝛽6𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑡−1 + 𝛽7𝐷𝑆𝑡−1 ⁡+ 𝛽8𝑇𝑆𝑡−1 ⁡+ 𝛽9𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡−1 + 𝛽10∆𝑂𝑃𝑡−1 ⁡+ 𝛽11𝑊𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑡−1 ⁡+
𝛽12∆𝐼𝑃𝑡−1⁡ +⁡𝑒𝑡 
Where: 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡 are the returns of the momentum portfolio at time t,  𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 (high minus low) is 
the equal-weight average of the return for the two high book-to-market portfolios for region 
minus the average of the returns for the two low book-to-market stocks, 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡(small minus 
big) is the equal-weight average of the returns on the three small stock portfolios for the 
region minus the average of the returns on the three big stock portfolios, 𝑅𝑀𝑊𝑡 (Robust 
Minus Weak) is the average return on the two robust operating profitability portfolios minus 
the average return on the two weak operating profitability portfolios, 𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑡 (Conservative 
Minus Aggressive) is the average return on the two conservative investment portfolios minus 
the average return on the two aggressive investment portfolios, 𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑡−1is the liquidity factor 
at time t-1, 𝐷𝑆𝑡−1 is the Default spread at time t-1, 𝑇𝑆𝑡−1 is the Term spread at time t-1, 
𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡−1is the MSCI world indices price level and represent price levels at time t-1, ∆𝑂𝑃𝑡−1 is 
the percent change of monthly Oil price at time t-1, 𝑊𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑡−1 is the market volatility at time 
t-1, ∆𝐼𝑃𝑡−1⁡ is the percent change of monthly value of the US Industrial production at time t-
1. The results are reported in Table 4.6.2. The test statistics are reported in the parentheses 
and the P-values are reported next. 
 [Insert Table 4.6.2 Here] 
As shown in Table 4.6.2 Models 1 and 2, I record significant adjusted contrarian returns after 
controlling consecutively for Fama and French risks and the market state risks. Table 4.6.3 
Model 3 also show significant adjusted momentum return (Alpha) indicating global risk 
factors including the Global Fama and French Five-Factor do not explain the contrarian 
profit. However, when I control for the Global Fama and French Five-Factor exclusively the 
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investment factor (CMA) become significant with a coefficient -0.002 with a t-statistic of -
4.11 and a p-value of 0.000 so is the Profitability factor (RMW) with a negative coefficient -
0.001 with a t-statistic of -1.68 and a p-value 0.000. Furthermore, when I control for the joint 
effect of the global risk factors, the contrarian strategy adjusted returns remains significant at 
0.014 with a t-statistic of 9.71 and a P-value of 0.000 with the optimum strategy (48-
month/48-month) Table 4.6.2 Model 4. The results also show that market volatility tends to 
contribute significantly in reducing the contrarian return with a coefficient of -0.616, a t-
statistic of -5.11 and a P-value of 0.000 with the optimum strategy. The default spread also 
remains significant with a coefficient of -0.004, a t-statistic of -2.82 and a P-value of 0.005. 
Overall these results indicate that the contributions of the added risk factors (RMW and 
CMA) are not sufficient to expunge the abnormal return. One possible interpretation of this 
finding is that global risk factors do not explain the contrarian profit. I can confirm at this 
stage that contrarian investors will not increase their profits by taking extra risk. However, 
there is a tendency of macroeconomic risk factors to be on average negatively related to the 
contrarian profit. These findings are in line with Lakonishok et al. (1994) study that 
suggested that, value stocks are not fundamentally riskier than glamour stocks, consistent 
with Gregory et al. (2001) study that found that, the contrarian excess returns persist even 
after controlling for size effects in stock returns and confirm that the contrarian returns are 
not compensation for market risk. 
6.5.3 Effect of Asia Pacific Fama and French Three-factor on Contrarian Profit in 
Emerging Market 
In addition to the effect of global Fama and French risks on contrarian profits, I examine the 
influence of these factors on the global contrarian in emerging market following Fama and 
French (2015) findings that average stock returns of Asia Pacific increase with the book-to-
market ratio. Given that the contrarian return relies on the performance of the determinants of 
the market to rise in the long term. I examine whether jointly the global Fama and French 
Three-Factors (Fama and French Asia Pacific excluding Japan), market state factor, and 
economic risk factors explain the contrarian payoff in emerging market. I consider all 
possible combinations of predictive risks factors. The predictive variables include all the 
Fama and French Three-Factor in Asia Pacific excluding Japan, all market state factors, and 
all macroeconomic variables included in the previous equation (1-3). Starting with model (1) 
which drops all predictive macroeconomic risk variables and ending with all-inclusive model 
(4). My examination is based on the following time-series regression specification. I report 
the regression parameters results in Table 4.6.3.  
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(56) 𝑀𝑜𝑚𝑡 =⁡𝛼6 +⁡𝛽1(𝑅𝑀 − 𝑅𝐹)𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 ⁡+ 𝛽3𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝐷𝑆𝑡−1 ⁡+
𝛽6𝑇𝑆𝑡−1 ⁡+ 𝛽7𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡−1 + 𝛽8∆𝑂𝑃𝑡−1 ⁡+ 𝛽9𝑊𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑡−1 ⁡+ 𝛽10∆𝐼𝑃𝑡−1⁡ +⁡𝑒𝑡 
Where: 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡 are the returns of the contrarian portfolio in emerging market at time t, 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 
(high minus low) is the equal-weight average of the returns for the two high book-to-market 
portfolios for a region minus the average of the returns for the two low book-to-market 
portfolios, 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡(Small minus big) is the equal-weight average of the returns on the three 
small stock portfolios for the region minus the average of the returns on the big stock 
portfolio, 𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑡−1is the liquidity factor at time t-1, 𝐷𝑆𝑡−1 is the Default spread at time t-1, 
𝑇𝑆𝑡−1 is the Term spread at time t-1, 𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡−1is MSCI world indices price level and 
represents price levels at time t-1, ∆𝑂𝑃𝑡−1 is the monthly Oil price at time t-1, 𝑊𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑡−1 is 
the market volatility at time t-1, and ∆𝐼𝑃𝑡−1⁡ is the monthly value of the US Industrial 
production at time t-1. The t-statistics are reported in the parentheses and the p-values are 
reported next. 
 [Insert Table 4.6.3 Here] 
The results in Table 4.6.3 Models 1 to 4 show that significant adjusted contrarian returns 
remain after adjusting the contrarian profit consecutively for Fama and French Three-Factor, 
market state factors and macroeconomic factor. More importantly, I find that market return 
tends to contribute positively significantly in explaining the contrarian return with a 
coefficient of -0.025 a t-statistic of -2.18 and a P-value of 0.029 for the optimum strategy (48-
month/48-month) when I control for market state risk factors exclusively (Table 4.6.3 Model 
2). This effect persists with all risk factors included with a coefficient of -2.24, a t-statistic 
0.025 and a P-value of 0.003. This result also indicates that the default Spread significantly 
affects the contrarian return with coefficient of -0.006 a t-statistic of -4.93 and a P-value of 
0.000 for the optimum strategy (48-month/60-month) Table 4.6.3 Model 3. This effect 
persists with all risk factors included with a coefficient of -0.009, a t-statistic -5.61 and a P-
value of 0.000. The same the coefficient associated with the industrial production is also 
positive and significant, indicating that change in economy growth or in industry output may 
have also have a positive contribution on the contrarian profit.  
This result indicates that global combining effect do not explain the contrarian return. The 
effect of industrial production in explaining the contrarian profit persist even after controlling 
the Global Fama and French Three-Factor in Asia pacific excluding Japan. I can confirm at 
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this stage that if the contrarian investors will not improve their profit by taking extra risks in 
emerging market. These findings are in line with Lakonishok et al. (1994) study that 
suggested that, value stocks are not fundamentally riskier than glamour stocks. 
6.5.4 Effect of Fama and French Five-Factor, TED and EURIBOR: OIS Spread on 
Contrarian Profits in Developed Market 
Different states of the economy might induce unprecedented liquidity shock and increase in 
credit risk in the European market (Aussenegg et al. 2016) more precisely the EURBOR_OIS 
is considered as a market barometer of liquidity and widely used measure of the level of 
liquidity in the European region (Aussenegg et al., 2015). Furthermore, the average stock 
returns in Europe tend to increase with the book-to-market ratio and the profitability are 
inversely related to investment (Fama and French, 2015). Given that the contrarian relies on 
stock price to rise in the short term, I extend my analysis by adding the profitability and the 
investment factors. I also consider an alternative measure of liquidity such as the EURIBOR: 
OIS Spread (difference between the rate at which European banks lend to each other 
(ERIBOR) and the overnight’ risk free’ swap rate (EONIA) among the same banks a 3-month 
period. Please see Appendix E4 for detailed definition.), given that it informs investor on 
whether risk is rising or falling in credit market and it is a good indicator of stress in the 
banking system. I finally refer to the TED Spread or the difference between the London 
Interbank Offered Rate (Libor) and the 3-month Treasury Bill (Please see Appendix E4 for 
detailed definition.). Given that a rising TED Spread is a Bearish indicator and it is evidence 
that liquidity is being withdrawn from the financial market.  
To examine whether jointly Fama and French Five-Factors, market state factor, and 
macroeconomic risk factors explain the contrarian payoff in develop market. I consider all 
possible combinations of predictive macroeconomic risk factors. The predictive variables 
include all Fama and French Five-Factors, all market state excluding the U.S. liquidity 
factors. Additionally, I add consecutively the EURIBOR: OIS and the TED Spread, and all 
macroeconomic variables included in the previous equation (1-3); starting with model (1) 
which drops all predictive macroeconomic risk variables and ending with all-inclusive model 
(7). My examination is based on the following time-series regression specification. I report 
the regression parameters results Table 4.6.4. This table shows the result of the following 
monthly time-series regression.  
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(57) 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡 = ⁡𝛼6 +⁡𝛽1(𝑅𝑀 − 𝑅𝐹)𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 ⁡+ 𝛽3𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑅𝑀𝑊𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑡 +
+𝛽6𝐸𝑂𝐼𝑆𝑡−1 + 𝛽7𝑇𝐸𝐷𝑡−1 + 𝛽8𝐷𝑆𝑡−1 ⁡+ 𝛽9𝑇𝑆𝑡−1 ⁡+ 𝛽10𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡−1 + 𝛽11∆𝑂𝑃𝑡−1 ⁡+
𝛽12𝑊𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑡−1 ⁡+ 𝛽13∆𝐼𝑃𝑡−1⁡ +⁡𝑒𝑡 
Where: 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡 are the returns of the contrarian portfolio at time t,  𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 (high minus low) is 
the equal-weight average of the return for the two high book-to-market portfolios for region 
minus the average of the returns for the two low book-to-market stocks, 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡(small minus 
big) is the equal-weight average of the returns on the three small stock portfolios for the 
region minus the average of the returns on the three big stock portfolios, 𝑅𝑀𝑊𝑡 (Robust 
Minus Weak) is the average return on the two robust operating profitability portfolios minus 
the average return on the two weak operating profitability portfolios, 𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑡 (Conservative 
Minus Aggressive) is the average return on the two conservative investment portfolios minus 
the average return on the two aggressive investment portfolios, 𝐷𝑆𝑡−1 is the Default spread at 
time t-1, 𝑇𝑆𝑡−1 is the Term spread at time t-1, 𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡−1 is the MSCI world indices price level, 
It represents price levels at time t-1, 𝐸𝑂𝐼𝑆𝑡−1  (EURIBOR:OIS Spread ) is the difference 
between the rate at which European banks lend to each other (ERIBOR) and the overnight’ 
risk free’ swap rate (EONIA) among the same banks a 3 month period, 𝑇𝐸𝐷𝑡−1 Spread or the 
difference between the London Interbank Offered Rate (Libor) and the 3-month Treasury Bill 
at time t-1, ∆𝑂𝑃𝑡−1 is the monthly Oil price at time t-1, 𝑊𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑡−1 is the market volatility at 
time t-1, and ∆𝐼𝑃𝑡−1⁡ is the monthly value of the US Industrial production at time t-1. The t-
statistics are reported in the parentheses and the p-values are reported next. 
 [Insert Table 4.6.4. Here] 
Table 4.12 Models 1 to 3 shows significant adjusted contrarian returns after adjusting the 
contrarian portfolio consecutively for Fama and French risks, market state and 
macroeconomic risk factor. More importantly, I find that the Fama and French Five-Factor, 
the TED Spread, and the Euribor: IOS factor do not explain the contrarian profit given that all 
adjusted contrarian profit remains significant. The default spread, and the term spread have 
no impact on the contrarian given that none of the coefficient are profitable (Table 4.6.4 
Model 4 and 5). Market return also have significant effect in explaining the contrarian profit 
but these effects are not sufficient to expunge the abnormal profit. Controlling for 
macroeconomic factors (Table 4.6.4 Model 6 do not show sign of explaining the momentum 
profit. However, oil price show at least partially significant in explaining the contrarian profit 
with a coefficient of -0.010 a t-statistic of -2.41 and a p-value of 0.016. Market volatility also 
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contributes in explaining the contrarian return with a coefficient of -0.434 with a t-statistic of 
-5.24 and a p-value 0.000.  More importantly when the strategy generates a contrarian 
adjusted return of 0.005 per month with a t-statistic of 2.61 and a P-value of 0.009 for the 
optimum strategy (48-month/48-month) when I control for all global risks (Table 4.6.4 Model 
7). This result also implies that the combined change in global risk factor do not explain the 
contrarian profit and indicates that momentum investors could not increase their profit 
following the credit or liquidity risk when trading on developed countries only. 
6.5.5 Summary 
In supplementary tests, I examined the role of global risk factor in explaining the global 
contrarian profit. I find no relation between variations in global risk factors and the contrarian 
profit. Notably the results show that the contrarian strategy generates risk-adjusted profit of 
0.016 with a t-statistic of 9.01 and a P-value of 0.000 with the optimum strategy. When I 
control jointly for the Fama and French Five-Factor, the contrarian profit remains highly 
profitable (0.013) with a t-statistic of 9.71 and a p-value of 0.000. Referring to regional risk, I 
found that adjusting the contrarian strategy with global risk including the Fama and French 
Asia Pacific excluding Japan do not explain the contrarian profit in emerging market the 
adjusted contrarian profit is 0.012 with a t-statistic of 6.44 and the p-value of 0.000. 
More importantly to examine of the impact European risk factor on contrarian profit, I 
consider the European Fama and French Five-Factor, the Euribor: IOS and the TED Spread 
given that different state of the economy might induce unprecedented liquidity shock and 
increase in credit risk in the European market (Aussenegg et al. 2016). More precisely the 
EURBOR_OIS is often considered as a market barometer of liquidity and widely used as 
measure of the level of liquidity in the European region (Aussenegg et al., 2015). I also 
consider the joint effect of all states and macroeconomic factors. The results indicate that the 
strategy generates a contrarian adjusted return of 0.005 per month with a t-statistic of 2.61 
and a P-value of 0.009, consistent with this thesis initial findings that global risk factors do 
not explain the contrarian profit and indicate that contrarian investors could not increase their 






Chapter 7: Conclusion  
7.1 Introduction 
In this thesis, I indorse a better understanding of the dynamics of contrarian profitability by 
analysing the momentum and contrarian strategies internationally and across different market 
states (established Markets emerging market, developed countries, and during the 
globalization period). I also take a step towards linking the global momentum and contrarian 
profitability to different phases (Bear and bull phases), and different periods. This includes 
the effect of global chocks such as global financial crisis (banking crisis, currency crisis, and 
stock market crashes) on the momentum and the contrarian strategies profitability, which in 
turn, helps enhance my understanding of the factors that drive the momentum and the 
contrarian profit across different periods and different market states. 
The Efficient Market Hypothesis suggests that price “fully reflect” available information 
(Fama, 1970). A direct implication of the Efficient Market hypothesis is that no investors 
should be able to beat consistently the market using common investment strategies. The 
profitability of the global momentum and contrarian strategies presented in this thesis 
demonstrated that trading on indices performances worldwide might provide more evidences 
of market inefficiency when international investors follow countries’ indices performances. 
On the other hand, introducing the global contrarian strategies could add to the literature on 
stock market overreaction under the presumption that when investors react to unanticipated 
news, the price will initially be greater than it should be. There will be a subsequent price 
decline to the level justified by new information (De Bondt and Thaler, 1985).  
By examining the global momentum and contrarian strategies with countries' past indices 
performances, I have shown that both momentum and contrarian strategies are consistent in 
producing excess returns using data from 47 countries assuming that investors can switch 
back and forth from one countries to another in designing a global strategy.  
7.2 Summary 
In Chapter 4 I find that the global momentum strategies are consistently profitable on the 
average over the full sample period 1969-2014, and the most successful momentum strategy 
selects stocks based on their previous performances over 9 months and then holds the 
portfolio for the next 3 months. This strategy yields 3% per month (42.57% per year) with a 
t-statistic of 4.50 and a p-value of 0.00. However, these returns vary considerably from one 
market condition to another. It yields 1.77% per month (23.43% per year) in established 
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market, 2.17% per month (29.38% per year) in developed countries and 3.28% per month 
(47.29% per month) in emerging markets. More importantly, the momentum strategies 
remain on the average profitable in the period of post-globalisation but the optimum 
strategies generate a negative return. My evidences also stipulate that the momentum 
strategies' returns are on the average low with the overlapping approach. The optimum 
strategy selects stock based on their past 9 months’ performances and hold for 3 months it 
yields 0.95% per month (12.01% per year).  
After examining the 9-month/3-month strategy in different market states, I found that 
investors could achieve superior returns by adopting the momentum strategy after a bear 
phase; but there is a strong link between the rising market performances in bull market and 
the momentum profits. This strategy yields 2.65% per month (36.98% per year) during the 
bear market and 3.16% per (45.20% per year) in bull market. This indicates that the return(s) 
on the momentum strategy will depend upon speed of the falling and the rising market. More 
importantly, the momentum strategies’ returns are high when the bull market performance is 
relatively higher than the equivalent bear market in absolute value.  
In Chapter 5, I find that the contrarian strategies are highly profitable. The optimum strategy 
is the 48-month/60-month this strategy yields 0.83% per month (10.43 per year). The 
contrarian strategy generates return high as 1.38% per month (17.70% per year) in emerging 
market with the 60-month/ 48-month strategy. Developed countries' contributions are less 
significant, still a consistent contrarian’ return of 0.93% per month (11.72% per year) could 
be observed in developed countries with the 60-month/48-month strategy when the strategy 
skips a time lag between the portfolio formation period and the holding period. 
My evidences also instruct that the contrarian strategies' returns are on the average low with 
the overlapping approach. The optimum strategy selects stock based on their past 48 months’ 
performances and holds for 48 months it yields 0.55% per month (6.80% per year). The 
contrarian strategies with non-overlapping quintile portfolios are the most profitable. The 48-
month/60-month strategy generates a return as high as 0.71 per month (8.89% per year). 
More importantly, the contrarian strategies remain on the average profitable in the period 
post-1994 but the returns are not statistically significant on the average, which implies that 
the reversal effect survives the globalisation impact and indicates that the integration of 
equity markets together with the international correlation among markets do not synchronized 
the prices reversal effect around the world.  
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The contrarian strategies remain profitable in emerging countries, but I reiterate that on 
average they are less statistically significant with overlapping portfolios; the optimum 
strategy yields 0.71% per month (8.89% per year). Taken as a whole, these evidences indicate 
that the contrarian strategies yield on average higher return with the non-overlapping 
portfolio than the equivalent overlapping approaches for both deciles and quintiles portfolios 
and that the contrarian strategies are on the average considerably greater with deciles 
portfolios than quintiles portfolios. 
At a more general level, the results present the global contrarian strategy as a highly 
profitable strategy and indicate the need for considerable care in constructing and evaluating 
the global contrarian internationally. Moreover, my analysis takes on particular significance 
given the association between lagged market movement (share prices) and investor's 
optimism that appears among traders, generating increasing reversal effect (Siganos and 
Chelley-Steley, 2006), and also has direct implication for predicting and controlling trading 
costs associated with asset allocation strategies.  
It is important to reiterate that, the global momentum and contrarian strategies is profitable 
after accounting for transaction costs given that, on average, the contrarian strategies with 
non-overlapping portfolios are long-term strategies and result in a low turnover.  The 
optimum strategy generates a return of 10.40% per annum while the portfolios are rebalanced 
with 48 months’ intervals, and the optimum momentum strategy also result in a low turnover 
with 42.57% return per annum. Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), and Berkowitz, Logue and 
Noser (1988) estimate one-way transaction costs of 23 basis points for institutional investors 
suggesting that transaction cost of 0.5% per trade with a 6-month/6-month strategy is 
conservative. This implies an estimated transaction cost of 0.6% per annum which is not 
negligible, suggesting a contrarian profit of 9.8% per annum, and a momentum profit of 
41.97 which does not undermine the high profitability of these strategies. However, 
investment firms will have to demonstrate that they have executed at the best possible trade 
condition conformably with the European regulation. 
Furthermore, ETFs are easy to access and simple to use. They can achieve diversification 
through one trade, allowing access to different investment and cover a broad range of asset 
classes. They often have lower cost than many other type of investments funds helping 
investors to keep more of their earnings. For example, a world equity ETFs with 5% turnover 
rate might incur transaction cost amounting to just 0.4 basis points per year (Morningstar, 
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2016). ETF are flexible to investors’ needs, whether they want to invest in developed markets 
like US and UK, in emerging market like India and China or in commodity such as Oil and 
Gold. 
In chapter 6, I find a strong relation between variations in macroeconomic factor notably 
industrial production and the adjusted momentum return. The momentum strategies generate 
a risk adjusted return of 0.9% per month when I control for Fama and French risk with t-
statistic of 4.82% and a P-value of 0.00. When I control for market states risks, it generates 
1.31% per month with a t-statistic of 2.21 and a P-value of 0.02. However, the abnormal 
return disappears when I control for macroeconomic risk as the momentum generates 0.5% 
abnormal return per month with a t-statistic of 1.71 and a P-value of 0.241. The evidence is 
that industrial production tends to contribute significantly in explaining the momentum return 
with a coefficient of 1.05, a t-statistic of 3.46 and a P-value of 0.00 when I control for global 
risks factor. The effect persists when I control jointly for Fama and French risks, market 
states risk, and macroeconomic risk, where the momentum abnormal return is 0.5% per 
month with a t-statistic of 0.71 and a p-value of 4.481. This reveals that change in economy 
growth or in industry’s output strongly affects the momentum profit. However, abnormal 
return remains insignificant for every holding period.  Suggesting that macroeconomic risks 
are consistent in explaining the momentum strategy profits regardless of the of the strategy 
time horizon. 
The impact of macroeconomic risk factors on the global momentum profit holds in emerging 
countries, developed countries, established market, and globalization period, given that all the 
abnormal returns are not significant when I control jointly for Fama and French risk, market 
states risk and macroeconomic risks. This indicates that the findings are not limited to a 
specified sample.  
I also examine the impact of crisis on the momentum profit; referring to the possibility, that 
stock market could add as indicator of the state of the economy (Naes et al., 2011). My 
findings show that the abnormal momentum profits become insignificant return after 
controlling jointly for Fama and French risks market states risk and macroeconomic risk 
during crisis period the crisis and non-crisis period. The exceptionally momentum strategy 
generates significant abnormal when it is implemented during Banking crisis, it generates 
4.30% return per month with a t-statistic of 3.54 and a p-value of 0.00.  
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My findings strongly support that, industrial production contributes significantly in 
explaining the momentum return following business cycle expansion and the abnormal return 
become negative during contraction, in line with Chordia and Shivakumar (2002) who 
suggested that variation in momentum payoffs reflects time varying over the business cycle. 
These findings help deal with one of the fundamental issue in finance, the Efficient Market 
Hypothesis that suggests that excess returns cannot be earned using investment strategies 
based on historical shared price or other historical data (Fama, 1970). As the results suggest 
following macroeconomic risks could lead to additional return. Macroeconomic risks tend to 
explain the momentum profit therefore; global momentum profit could be seen as a 
compensation for international investors for bearing macroeconomic risk. 
I finally examine the role of global risk factor in explaining the global contrarian profit. The 
results show none or little relation between variation in global risk factors and the contrarian 
profit. The contrarian strategies generate a risk adjusted return of 0.6% per month when I 
control for Fama and French risk with t-statistic of 13.24 and a P-value of 0.00. When I 
control for market states risks, it generates 0.6% per month with a t-statistic of 6.30 and a P-
value of 0.00. However, the abnormal return disappears when I control for macroeconomic 
risk as the contrarian generates 1.0% abnormal return per month with a t-statistic 9.08 and a 
P-value of 0.00. The effect persists when I control jointly for Fama and French risks, market 
states risk, and macroeconomic risk, where the contrarian abnormal return is 1.00% per 
month with a t-statistic of 6.58 and a p-value of 0.00. This reveals that change in global risk 
does not explain the momentum profit. Of particular interest, the abnormal return remains 
significant for every holding period.  Suggesting global risks have no power in explaining the 
contrarian strategy profits regardless of the of the strategy time horizon. 
 The contrarian strategy remains profitable after adjusting for global risks in different market 
states. It generates a risk adjusted return of 1.4% per month with a t-statistic of 7.25 and a P-
value of 0.00. In emerging countries, in developed countries I find 0.4% abnormal return with 
a t-statistic of 3.29 and a P-value of 0.00, countries, in established market it generates 0.2% 
per month with a t-statistic of 1.74 and a P-value of 0.08, and during the globalization period 
it earns 1.7% per month with a t-statistic of 8.42 and a P-value of 0.00.  Given that all the 
abnormal returns are significant when I control jointly for Fama and French risk, market 
states risk and macroeconomic risks. This indicates that the findings are not limited to a 
specified sample.  
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I examine the impact of crisis on the contrarian profit; referring to the possibility, that stock 
market could add as indicator of the state of the economy (Naes et al., 2011). My findings 
show that the abnormal contrarian profits remain significant after controlling jointly for Fama 
and French risks market states risks and macroeconomic risks during crisis period and non-
crisis period. Exceptionally, the contrarian strategy generates a negative abnormal return 
when it is implemented during stock market crash -0.80% return per month with a t-statistic 
of -2.82 and a p-value of 0.00. My findings also strongly support that global risk do not 
contribute significantly in explaining the contrarian return following non-crisis period it 
generates 2.5% per month with a t-statistic of 15.92 and a P-value of 0.000. This strategy also 
generates positive abnormal return expansion (1.00% per month) with a t-statistic of 4.72 and 
a P-value of 0.00. However, the abnormal return becomes insignificant during contraction, in 
line with Chordia and Shivakumar (2002) who suggested that variation in momentum payoffs 
reflects time varying over the business cycle.  
For readers inclined to dismiss these findings at a global level, I offer a further check by 
examining whether global momentum profits and specific risks are related across regions (Emerging 
and developed) using global and regional risk factros. I test whether global momentum profits are 
explained by a single global risk factor or instead are due to nearly independent regional risk factors, 
and found no consistent relation between variations in Global Fama and French Risks factor 
and the momentum profit. To reiterate, the U.S. Fama and French has similar effect on the 
global momentum profit as the global Fama and French risk factors. The same, the contrarian 
strategy generates risk-adjusted profit of 0.016 with a t-statistic of 9.01 and a P-value of 
0.000 with the optimum strategy. When I control jointly for the Fama and French Five-
Factor, the contrarian profit remains highly profitable (0.013) with a t-statistic of 9.71 and a 
p-value of 0.000. Referring to regional risk I found that adjusting the contrarian strategy with 
global risk including the Fama and French Asia Pacific excluding Japan do not explain the 
contrarian profit in emerging market the adjusted contrarian profit is 0.012 with a t-statistic of 
6.44 and the p-value of 0.000. 
More importantly examining the impact of european risk factor on contrarian profit, I 
consider the European Fama and French Five-Factor, the Euribor: IOS and the TED Spread. I 
also consider the effect of all states and macroeconomic factors. The results indicates that the 
strategy generates a contrarian adjusted return of 0.005 per month with a t-statistic of 2.61 
and a P-value of 0.009, consistent with this thesis’s initial findings that global risk factors do 
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not explain the contrarian profit and indicate that contrarian investors cannot increase their 
profit following the credit or liquidity risk when trading on developed countries only. 
These findings also help deal with the fundamental issue in finance, the Efficient Market 
Hypothesis that suggests that excess returns cannot be earned using investment strategies 
based on historical shared price or other historical data (Fama, 1970). As the results suggest 
following macroeconomic risks could lead to additional return. Macroeconomic risks tend to 
explain the momentum profit consequently global momentum profit could be seen as a 
compensation for global macroeconomic risks. While the global contrarian profit is not 
necessary a compensation for contrarian investors bearing extra risks.  
7.3 Contribution 
This thesis main contribution relies of the fact that it provides evidences of the profitability of 
the global momentum and contrarian strategies worldwide. It explains how the profit of the 
momentum and contrarian strategies varies in different market states the extent to which the 
initial effect dissipates or ceases to affect the momentum and the contrarian strategies 
profitability. It presents the Global Momentum and Contrarian Strategies as highly profitable 
strategies and examines the role of global crisis in explaining the momentum and contrarian 
profits; the results are consistent between subsample periods. 
I therefore contribute to several stands in finance. First, I promote new momentum and 
contrarian strategies by suggesting the use of countries’ indices performances to momentum 
and contrarian portfolio selections. Investors can now move back and forth from one country 
to another in designing momentum or contrarian portfolios. My analysis includes a wider set 
of equity indices (47 countries indices), variety of parameters (3, 6, 9, and 12-month 
formation and holding periods for the momentum, and 36, 48, 60-month formation and 
holding periods for the contrarian), sub-periods’ analysis, and event-time analysis by sub-
period. These results contribute to the debate by reinforcing De Bondt and Thaler’s (1985) 
findings that claim that overreaction is predictive, and that adjustment of profits to the 
CAPM-model could not explain the abnormal returns. In addition, they show that portfolios 
based on market-adjusted excess returns do not systematically differ with respect to market 
value of equity. Challenging the weak form of the Efficient Market Hypothesis that suggests 
that excess returns cannot be earned in the long run by using investment strategies based on 
historical shared price or other historical data (Fama, 1970). 
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This thesis provides evidence of greater return reversal internationally consistent with 
Jordan’s (2012) study that suggested that contrarian strategies are internationally profitable, 
but reported return based on national indices of about 5.60% per year with earning above the 
risk-free rate. My findings also endow with a greater return than Malin and Bornholt's (2013) 
study that suggested 0.46% contrarian return per month (5.66% per year) in developed 
market and 0.68% per month (8.47 per year) in emerging market, and Richards's (1996) study 
that found 6.60% per year over 3 years holding period and 5.80% per year over 4 years.  
Even more interesting, studying the global momentum do not show evidence of return 
continuation among countries indices. However, I must point out that my evidences are 
different from Chan, Hameed, Tong’s (2000) study that suggested that momentum strategies 
are internationally profitable on the point of view US investor as they suggested that on 
average the momentum strategy generates 1% per month which is significantly lower than the 
average momentum return in this study (42.57% per annum). I also emphasise the point that 
investors earn extra returns by investing internationally as the global momentum generates a 
return of about three times higher than the return indicated on Jegadeesh and Titman (1993, 
2001). 
The thesis finally adds to the literature on the motivation behind the overreaction hypothesis 
by suggesting a highly profitable contrarian strategy. In line with the proposal that, if stock 
prices systematically overshoot, then their reversal should be predictable from past return 
data alone, with no use of any accounting data such as earnings.  
A direct implication of my findings is that international investors could beat the market using 
common investment strategy such as the global momentum and the global contrarian 
strategies. The global contrarian strategies profits are not compensation for risks. While the 
global momentum profit could be explained by global risks. International momentum 
investors could earn excess return by increasing their exposure to global risks. 
7.4 Limitations 
The evidences on the global momentum and contrarian strategies seen as independent and 
profitable strategies with respect to Fama and French risks, market state risks, and 
macroeconomic risks are remarkable in international equity market. Still, the main issue that 
remain is however, how the global momentum and contrarian strategies perform in other 
asset classes. The same trading with the global momentum and contrarian strategies requires 
investors to either invest in ETFs or in individual stock in the maner that replicated loser and 
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winner indices performances. The second investment approach might seem intricate for 
individual investors without siginificant knowledge of financial transaction. In addition, 
investing in individual stocks internationally implies that investor might sustain additional 
cost (Unknown) which are not discussed in this thesis. It also remains to be seen, whether 
both strategies might become independent risk factor in global asset pricing which are 
unresolved puzzle.  
Moreover, it might be more interesting to study a longer period dating back to the nineteenth 
century or the Victorian Era characterized by the rapid change development in almost every 
domain. This includes advances in scientific, technological and medical knowledge, change 
in population growth and location, which deeply change countries’ mood leading to 
optimism, economic boom and prosperity. 
A more complete analysis could examine the ability of the global momentum and contrarian 
to converge. Balvers and Wu (2006) suggested that technological progress in one country 
implies that the country has a competitive advantage that grows relatively fast as the 
technology is implemented leading to a momentum profitability for this country. When the 
technology is imitated in other countries, the production levels converge, causing reversion in 















Figure 1 Momentum Strategy Return in Event Time 
 
Fig 24 Shows the momentum returns, from December 1969 to January 2014. Note that the red line represents the average monthly return 





































































































































































































































Figure 2 Contrarian Strategies Periodical Brunt. 
 
Fig 27 Shows the returns on the contrarian portfolio based on 48-month formation with various holding period (1 to 60 month) at the end of 
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Table 3. 1 Monthly Return Characteristic of 47 Countries Indexes Price 1969-2014 
Panel A: Monthly return characteristics of developed countries  
Name              (ID) Start End Mean Std Skewness Kurtosis Shapiro-
Wilk 
Sig. 
USA                   (1) 31/12/1969 31/01/2014 0.54 0.04 -0.67 2.47 0.97 0.00 
JAPAN               (2) 31/12/1969 31/01/2014 0.62** 0.06 -0.02 0.67 0.10 0.06 
UK                      (4) 31/12/1969 31/01/2014 0.49 0.06 0.29 5.53 0.95 0.00 
Australia        (10) 31/12/1969 31/01/2014 0.40 0.07 -1.49 9.79 0.92 0.00 
France            (11) 31/12/1969 31/01/2014 0.53 0.07 -0.47 1.46 0.98 0.00 
Germany        (12) 31/12/1969 31/01/2014 0.58 0.06 -0.66 1.82 0.97 0.00 
Italy                (15) 31/12/1969 31/01/2014 0.21** 0.07 -0.16 0.63 0.10 0.08 
Canada           (20) 31/12/1969 31/01/2014 0.53 0.06 -0.89 3.54 0.96 0.00 
Hong Kong     (21) 31/12/1969 31/01/2014 0.85 0.10 -0.53 7.15 0.92 0.00 
Singapore      (23) 31/12/1969 31/01/2014 0.69 0.08 -0.52 5.92 0.93 0.00 
Spain              (24) 31/12/1969 31/01/2014 0.31 0.07 -0.53 2.14 0.97 0.00 
Switzerland   (25) 31/12/1969 31/01/2014 0.74 0.05 -0.40 1.33 0.98 0.00 
Belgium         (27) 31/12/1969 31/01/2014 0.51 0.06 -1.22 8.19 0.92 0.00 
Sweden         (29) 31/12/1969 31/01/2014 0.82 0.07 -0.49 1.38 0.98 0.00 
Austria           (30) 31/12/1969 31/01/2014 0.48 0.07 -0.98 6.83 0.92 0.00 
Ireland           (32) 31/12/1987 31/01/2014 0.18 0.07 -1.02 2.78 0.95 0.00 
Netherlands (33) 31/12/1969 31/01/2014 0.60 0.06 -0.82 2.76 0.96 0.00 
New Zealand (34) 31/12/1981 31/01/2014 0.37 0.07 -0.91 5.05 0.95 0.00 
Norway         (35) 31/12/1969 31/01/2014 0.64 0.08 -0.86 2.97 0.96 0.00 
Portugal        (37) 31/12/1987 31/01/2014 0.01 0.07 -0.42 1,80 0.98 0.00 
Denmark       (39) 31/12/1969 31/01/2014 0.82 0.06 -0.49 2.35 0.98 0.00 
Finland          (40) 31/12/1981 31/01/2014 0.92 0.09 -0.41 1.65 0.98 0.00 
Israel             (42) 31/12/1992 31/01/2014 0.29 0.07 -0.47 0.89 0.97 0.00 



















Table 3. 2 Monthly Return Characteristic of 47 Countries Indexes Price 1988-2014 
Panel B: Monthly return characteristics of Emerging countries  
China                 (3) 31/12/1992 31/01/2014 0.21 0.10 -0.00 1.53 0.98 .00 
Brazil                 (5) 31/05/1987 31/01/2014 0.95 0.15 -1.38 10.87 0.89 .00 
India                  (6) 31/12/1992 31/01/2014 0.54*** 0.09 -0.22 0.62 0.99 .20 
Korea                (7) 31/12/1987 31/01/2014 0.46 0.10 0.19 3.02 0.97 .00 
Russia               (8) 30/12/1994 31/01/2014 0.86 0.16 -1.19 6.03 0.93 .00 
Turkey              (9) 31/12/1987 31/01/2014 0.44 0.16 -0.03 1.13 0.99 .00 
Indonesia       (13) 31/12/1987 31/01/2014 0.62 0.13 0.18 5.21 0.92 .00 
South Africa   (14) 31/12/1992 31/01/2014 0.62 0.08 -0.90 2.48 0.96 .00 
Mexico           (16) 31/12/1987 31/01/2014 1.33 0.09 -0.99 3.49 0.95 .00 
Taiwan           (17) 31/12/1987 31/01/2014 0.33 0.10 -0.06 1.65 0.98 .00 
Thailand        (18) 31/12/1987 31/01/2014 0.39 0.11 -0.54 2.45 0.96 .00 
Argentina      (19) 31/12/1987 31/01/2014 0.88 0.14 0.27 3.92 0.94 .00 
Malaysia        (22) 31/12/1987 31/01/2014 0.50 0.08 -0.28 4.70 0.93 .00 
Chile               (26) 31/12/1987 31/01/2014 0.89 0.07 -0.59 2.50 0.97 .00 
Colombia      (28) 31/12/1992 31/01/2014 0.87 0.09 -0.43 1.20 0.98 .00 
Egypt             (31) 31/05/1994 31/01/2014 0.86 0.93 -0.12 1.41 0.99 .02 
Poland           (36) 31/12/1992 31/01/2014 0.84 0.13 0.50 5.79 0.94 .00 
CZECH Rep    (38) 31/12/1994 31/01/2014 0.55 0.09 -0.75 2.29 0.97 .00 
Hungary        (41) 30/12/1994 31/01/2014 0.65 0.11 -1.06 4.22 0.94 .00 
Pakistan        (43) 31/12/1992 31/01/2014 0.10 0.11 -1.24 7.52 0.91 .00 
SRI Lanka      (44) 31/12/1992 31/01/2014 0.35 0.10 0.58 3.30 0.95 .00 
Morocco       (45) 31/12/1994 31/01/2014 0.47 0.06 -0.11 1.15 0.99 .03 
Peru               (46) 31/12/1992 31/01/2014 0.95 0.09 -0.75 3.36 0.96 .00 
Jordan           (47) 31/12/1987 31/01/2014 0.03 0.054 -0.44 3.05 0.96 .00 
Average   0.61 0.14 -0.39 3.49 0.96 0.01 
This table reports the descriptive statistic and normality test of individual countries. The sample is from 1969 to 2014. I test whether the returns of 
the 23 developed and 24 Emerging markets indices prices are normally distributed through their skewness, kurtosis. I use the mean and standard 
deviation to compare the two sets of countries. I used the Shapiro-Wilk test to confirm the normality of the distribution. The results are ** 








Table 3. 3 Momentum and Fama and French Risk Factors 1969-2014 
Panel A. Descriptive Statistics 
 Obs Min Max Mean Std Skew Kur SW P-value 
ERM 517 -0.232 0.161 0.005 0.059 -0.547 2.000 4.954 0.000 
SMB 517 -0.167 0.223 0.002 0.031 0.614 6.815 7.269 0.000 
HML 517 -0.131 0.139 0.003 0.029 -0.015 2.596 5.763 0.000 
MKTRF 517 -0.212 0.127 0.001 0.043 -0.774 2.210 5.969 0.000 
Panel B. Correlation  
 MKTRF SMB HML 
MKTRF 1.0000   
SMB 0.1924 1.0000  
HML -0.2045 -0.2333 1.0000 
Panel C Variance Inflation Factor with MSCI World Index Excess Return 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
HML 1.090 0.919 
SMB 1.080 0.924 
MKTRF 1.070 0.936 
Mean VIF 1.080  
Panel D Variance Inflation Factor with excess return on US market 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
ERM 1.170 0.855 
HML 1.140 0.880 
SMB 1.120 0.896 
Mean VIF 1.140  
Panel E Serial correlation and heteroscedasticity 
 Serial correlation        Breusch-Pagan 
Variable LAG  AC PAC Q Prob>Q Prob>chi2 Chi2(1) 
MKTRF 1 0.116 0.116 7.023 0.008 0.850 0.040 
SMB 1 0.022 0.022 0.254 0.615   
HML 1 0.143 0.143 10.76 0.001   
This table reports the descriptive statistic, the correlation, the normality test, the variance inflation factor, Breusch-Pagan test for 
heteroscedasticity, and the standard Q test statistic for the time series of monthly value of excess return on the market (ERM), Small-Minus-
Big Return (SMB), High-Minus-Low Return (HML), Risk-Free Return Rate (RF) and the Momentum Factor (MF). The sample period 
ranges from January 1970 to December 2013. I test whether the variables series are normally distributed through their Skewness, kurtosis. I 
use the mean and standard deviation to compare the variable. I used the Shapiro-Wilk test to confirm the normality of the distribution. The 
results are ** statistically significant for p>0.05 and ***statistically significant for p>0.1. I also test for any sign of multicollinearity through 









Table 3. 4 Momentum Profit and Market State Factors 1969-2014 
Panel A Descriptive Statistic 
 Obs Min Max Mean Std Skew Kur SW P-value 
LIQ 517 -0.461 0.201 -0.031 0.064 -1.580 6.849 8.625 0.000 
DS 517 0.550 3.380 1.112 0.460 1.720 3.796 9.458 0.000 
TS 517 -0.106 0.143 0.003 0.031 0.349 2.076 4.957 0.000 
MSCI W 517 -0.211 0.133 0.006 0.043 -0.790 2.304 5.969 0.000 
Panel B Correlation  
 TS LIQ DS MSCIW 
TS 1.000    
LIQ 0.002 1.000   
DS 0.080 -0.099 1.000  
MKT 0.066 0.282 0.033 1.000 
Panel C Variance Inflation Factor 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
   
TS 1.010 0.990 
LIQ 1.100 0.909 
DS 1.020 0.980 
MKT 1.100 0.913 
Mean VIF 1.060  
Panel D serial correlation and heteroscedasticity 
 Serial correlation   Breusch-Pagan 
Variable LAG  AC PAC Q Prob>Q Prob>chi2 Chi2(1) 
TS 1 0.050 0.050 1.284 0.257 0.708 0.140 
LIQ 1 0.097 0.098 4.936 0.026   
DS 1 0.961 0.963 480.53 0.000   
MKT 1 0.110 0.110 6.3294 0.012   
This table reports the results of the descriptive statistic, the correlation, the normality test, of the variance inflation factor, the Breush-Pagan 
test and the standard Q test statistic for the time series of monthly value of the liquidity factor (LIQ), Business cycle (NBER M), Default 
spread ((DS), the Term spread (TS) and the MSCI world index indices price level (MKT). The sample period ranges from January 1970 to 
December 2013. I test whether the variables series are normally distributed through their Skewness, kurtosis. I use the mean and standard 
deviation to compare the variable. I used the Shapiro-Wilk test to confirm the normality of the distribution. The results are ** statistically 
significant for p>0.05 and ***statistically significant for p>0.1. I also test for sign of multicollinearity through the variance inflation factor 










Table 3. 5 Momentum and Macroeconomic Factor 1969-2014 
Panel A. Descriptive Statistics 
 Obs Min Max Mean Std Skew Kur SW P-value 
∆OP 517 -0.400 0.500 0.006 0.084 -0.394 4.510 8.106 0.000 
WVOL 517 -0.044 0.024 0.002 0.007 -1.200 0.214 7.793 0.000 
∆IP  517 0.003 0.039 0.007 0.004 3.586 20.385 11.131 0.000 
∆OP 517 -0.400 0.500 0.006 0.084 -0.394 4.510 8.106 0.000 
Panel B Correlation 
 WOP IP 
OP 1.000  
IP 0.065 1.000 
MKTVOL 0.042 -0.199 
Panel C VIF 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
∆IP 1.050 0.955 
WVOL 1.040 0.957 
∆OP 1.010 0.995 
Mean VIF 1.030  
Panel D serial correlation and Heteroscedasticity 
 Serial correlation  Breusch-Pagan 
Variable LAG  AC PAC Q Prob>Q Prob>chi2 Chi2(1) 
∆OP 1 0.200 0.200 20.745 0.000 0.667 0.180 
∆IP 1 0.355 0.355 65.376 0.000   
WVOL  1 0.635 0.637 209.95 0.000   
∆OP 1 0.200 0.200 20.745 0.000   
This table reports the results of the descriptive statistic, correlation coefficient, the normality test, of the variance inflation factor, Breusch-
Pagan test and the standard Q test for the time series of monthly value of, Oil price (∆OP), Market volatility (WVOL), and Industrial 
production (∆IP). The sample period ranges from January 1969 to December 2014. I test whether the variables series are normally 
distributed through their Skewness, kurtosis. I use the mean and standard deviation to compare the variable. I used the Shapiro-Wilk test to 
confirm the normality of the distribution. The results are ** statistically significant for p>0.05 and ***statistically significant for p>0.1. I 












Table 3. 6 Correlation on Risk Factors 1969-2014 
 MKTRF SMB HML TS LIQ DS MKT 
MKTRF 1.000       
SMB 0.192 1.000      
HML -0.205 -0.233 1.000     
TS 0.123 0.072 0.029 1.000    
LIQ 0.066 0.063 -0.036 0.002 1.000   
DS 0.042 0.106 -0.048 0.080 -0.099 1.000  
MKT 0.113 0.165 0.062 0.066 0.282 0.034 1.000 
∆OP -0.002 0.022 0.076 -0.136 -0.000 -0.089 0.018 
∆IP 0.096 -0.090 0.036 -0.110 0.069 -0.322 -0.031 
WVOL -0.192 0.056 -0.037 -0.008 -0.079 0.157 -0.074 
 ∆OP ∆IP WVOL     
∆OP 1.000       
∆IP 0.065 1.000      


















Table 3. 7 Variance Inflation Factor and Breusch-Pagan on Risk Factor 1969-2014 
Variable VIF 1/VIF  Breusch-Pagan test 
∆IP 1.18 0.849 chi2(1) Prob > chi2 
MKTRF 1.160 0.860 0.400 0.529 
DS 1.160 0.863  
MKT 1.150 0.872 
SMB 1.140 0.878 
HML 1.130 0.888 
WVOL 1.110 0.901 
LIQ 1.110 0.901 
TS 1.060 0.943 

























Table 4.1. 1 Momentum Returns for International Investor: Full sample 1969-2014 
Panel A Panel B 
J K= 3 6 9 12 K= 3 6 9 12 
3 Sell 0.42 0.50 0.36 0.45  0.40 0.29 0.30 0.49 




























6 Sell 0.43 0.28 0.11 0.43 -0.35 -0.04 -0.01 0.42 




























9 Sell -0.97 -0.21 0.08 0.18 -0.19 -0.16 0.17 0.36 




























12 Sell 1.15 0.72 0.17 0.43 0.84 0.12 0.00 0.58 




























This table reports the momentum strategies' returns implemented on 47 stock market indices. The sample is from 1969 to 2014. I form 
momentum portfolio (buy past winners and sell past losers) based on past performance of stock market indices. I use 4 different formations 
and holding periods. The winner portfolios, the loser portfolios, and the winner minus loser portfolios return are reported. The t-statistic are 












Table 4.1. 2 Momentum Returns for International Investors: Established Markets 1969-2014 
Panel A Panel B 
J K= 3 6 9 12 K= 3 6 9 12 
3 Sell 0.53 0.48 0.33 0.34  0.35 0.30 0.27 0.33 




























6 Sell 0.34 0.32 0.04 0.25 0.05 0.06 -0.01 0.19 




























9 Sell -0.51 -0.12 0.20 0.24 -0.10 -0.05 0.27 0.35 




























12 Sell 0.500 0.52 0.08 0.30 0.67 0.15 0.05 0.39 




























This table reports the momentum strategies' returns implemented on 18 established stock market indices. The sample is from 1969 to 2014. I 
form momentum portfolio (buy past winners and sell past losers) based on past performance of stock market indices. I use 4 different 
formations and holding periods. The winner portfolios, the loser portfolios, and the winner minus loser portfolios return are reported. The t-












Table 4.1. 3 Momentum Returns since Globalisation 1994-2014 
Panel A Panel B 
J K= 3 6 9 12 K= 3 6 9 12 
3 Sell 0.03 0.01 0.14 0.19  0.05 -0.09 0.07 0.21 




























6 Sell 0.04 0.11 -0.01 0.29 -0.17 -0.13 -0.04 0.30 




























9 Sell 1.61 0.36 0.28 0.43 -0.55 -0.07 0.16 0.10 




























12 Sell 1.34 0.14 -0.26 0.35 1.32 -0.23 -0.38 0.45 




























This table reports the momentum strategies' returns implemented on 47 stock market indices. The sample is from 1994 to 2014. I form 
momentum portfolio (buy past winners and sell past losers) based on past performance of stock market indices. I use 4 different formations and 
holding periods. The winner portfolios, the loser portfolios, and the winner minus loser portfolios return are reported. The t-statistic are 












Table 4.1. 4 Momentum Return in Developed Countries 1969-2014 
Panel A Panel B 
J K= 3 6 9 12 K 3 6 9 12 
3 Sell 0.48 0.37 0.27 0.31  0.27 0.19 0.22 0.30 




























6 Sell 0.38 0.23 0.00 0.19 0.05 -0.02 -0.00 0.15 




























9 Sell -0.83 -0.16 0.08 0.16 0.03 -0.07 0.17 0.32 




























12 Sell 0.48 0.15 -0.17 0.12 0.12 -0.34 -0.18 0.14 




























This table reports the momentum strategies' returns implemented on 23 stock market indices of developed countries. The sample is from 
1969 to 2014. I form momentum portfolio (buy past winners and sell past losers) based on past performance of stock market indices. I use 4 
different formations and holding periods. The winner portfolios, the loser portfolios, and the winner minus loser portfolios return are 












Table 4.1. 5 Momentum in Emerging Countries 1988-2014 
Panel A Panel B 
J K= 3 6 9 12       K= 3 6 9 12 
3 Sell 0.76 0.84 0.36 0.64  0.63 0.35 0.29 0.75 




























6 Sell 0.06 0.74 0.88 1.22 -0.77 0.43 0.81 1.25 




























9 Sell -1.14 0.78 0.53 0.75 0.60 0.31 0.69 0.95 



























12 Sell 3.20 1.99 1.38 1.36 2.37 1.20 0.87 1.51 





























This table reports the momentum strategies' returns implemented on 24 emerging stock market indices. The sample is from 1983 to 2014. I 
form momentum portfolio (buy past winners and sell past losers) based on past performance of stock market indices. I use 4 different 
formations and holding periods. The winner portfolios, the loser portfolios, and the winner minus loser portfolios return are reported. The t-












Table 4.1. 6 Momentum Returns with Overlapping Portfolios: Full sample 1969-2014 
Panel A Panel B 
J K= 3 6 9 12 K= 3 6 9 12 
3 Sell 0.43 0.41 0.29 0.40  0.47 0.34 0.29 0.47 




























6 Sell 0.28 0.18 0.14 0.34 0.21 0.10 0.17 0.39 




























9 Sell 0.14 0.05 0.17 0.36 -0.05 0.00 0.21 0.42 




























12 Sell 0.15 0.23 0.33 0.50 0.12 0.27 0.42 0.56 




























This table reports the momentum strategies' returns with overlapping portfolio implemented on 47 stock market indices. The sample is from 
1969 to 2014. I form momentum portfolio (buy past winners and sell past losers) based on past performance of stock market indices. I use 4 
different formations and holding periods. The winner portfolios, the loser portfolios, and the winner minus loser portfolios returns are 












Table 4.1. 7 Momentum Returns for International Investors: Established Markets 1969-2014 
Panel A Panel B 
J K= 3 6 9 12 K= 3 6 9 12 
3 Sell 0.48 0.45 0.31 0.33  0.38 0.34 0.27 0.35 




























6 Sell 0.37 0.23 0.15 0.22 0.32 0.14 0.13 0.22 




























9 Sell 0.11 0.04 0.08 0.17 0.01 -0.01 0.08 0.21 




























12 Sell 0.11 0.19 0.24 0.34 0.18 0.23 0.30 0.40 




























This table reports the momentum strategies' returns with overlapping portfolio implemented on 18 established stock market indices. The 
sample is from 1969 to 2014. I form momentum portfolio (buy past winners and sell past losers) based on past performance of stock market 
indices. I use 4 different formations and holding periods. The winner portfolios, the loser portfolios, and the winner minus loser portfolios 













Table 4.1. 8 Momentum Returns with overlapping portfolios since Globalisation 1994-2014 
Panel A Panel B 
J K= 3 6 9 12 K= 3 6 9 12 
3 Sell 0.18 0.01 0.02 0.12  0.14 -0.07 -0.00 0.16 




























6 Sell -0.13 -0.07 -0.09 0.07 -0.17 -0.12 -0.05 0.16 




























9 Sell 0.09 -0.08 0.01 0.17 -0.17 -0.12 0.04 0.21 




























12 Sell -0.01 -0.05 0.05 0.20 -0.14 -0.06 0.09 0.25 



























This table reports the momentum strategies' returns with overlapping portfolio implemented on 47 stock market indices. The sample is from 
1994 to 2014. I form momentum portfolio (buy past winners and sell past losers) based on past performance of stock market indices. I use 4 
different formations and holding periods. The winner portfolios, the loser portfolios, and the winner minus loser portfolios returns are 













Table 4.1. 9 Momentum Return with Overlapping Portfolios in Developed Countries 1969-
2014 
Panel A Panel B 
J K= 3 6 9 12 K= 3 6 9 12 
3 Sell 0.42 0.35 0.22 0.27  0.37 0.28 0.19 0.29 




























6 Sell 0.32 0.18 0.09 0.19 0.30 0.08 0.09 0.21 




























9 Sell 0.16 0.02 0.05 0.17 0.01 -0.07 0.06 0.20 




























12 Sell 0.09 0.13 0.20 0.32 0.08 0.16 0.28 0.38 




























This table reports the momentum strategies' returns with overlapping portfolio implemented on 23 developed countries stock market indices. 
The sample is from 1969 to 2014. I form momentum portfolios (buy past winners and sell past losers) based on past performance of stock 
market indices. I use 4 different formations and holding periods. The winner portfolios, the loser portfolios, and the winner minus loser 












Table 4.1. 10 Momentum Return with Overlapping Portfolios in Emerging Countries 1988-
2014 
Panel A Panel B 
J K= 3 6 9 12 K= 3 6 9 12 
3 Sell 0.55 0.55 0.42 0.52  0.74 0.41 0.41 0.67 
3 Buy 0.13 0.56 0.68 0.67 -0.01 0.70 0.71 0.68 
























6 Sell 0.57 0.47 0.55 0.75 0.40 0.44 0.59 0.85 
6 Buy 0.58 0.86 0.83 0.60 0.92 1.04 0.73 0.59 
























9 Sell 0.37 0.30 0.43 0.68 0.30 0.25 0.50 0.77 
9 Buy 0.69 0.58 0.44 0.23 0.53 0.49 0.32 0.07 
























12 Sell 0.82 0.73 0.74 0.81 0.66 00.61 0.77 0.82 



























This table reports the momentum strategies' returns with overlapping portfolio implemented on 23 emerging stock market indices. The 
sample is from 1987 to 2014. I form momentum portfolio (buy past winners and sell past losers) based on past performance of stock market 
indices. I use 4 different formations and holding periods. The winner portfolios, the loser portfolios, and the winner minus loser portfolios 

























(1) 30/09/1970  4.08 (21) 30/09/1985 10.18 (40) 31/12/1999 1.07 
(2) 30/06/1971 7.28 (22) 30/06/1986 2.57 (41) 29/09/2000 -1.75 
(3) 31/03/1972 0.46 (23) 31/03/1987 4.47 (42) 29/06/2001 6.15 
(4) 29/12/1972 7.66 (24) 31/12/1987 4.18 (43) 29/03/2002 6.13 
(5) 28/09/1973 6.09 (25) 30/09/1988 -6.37 (44) 31/12/2002 1.34 
(6) 28/06/1974 5.32 (26) 30/06/1989 11.317 (45) 30/09/2003 -1.66 
(7) 31/03/1975 -1.89 (27) 30/03/1990 -6.03 (46) 30/06/2004 6.26 
(8) 31/12/1975 7.83 (28) 31/12/1990 6.84 (47) 31/03/2005 5.23 
(9) 30/09/1976 2.45 (29) 30/09/1991 0.45 (48) 30/12/2005 1.48 
(10) 30/06/1977 9.26 (30) 30/06/1992 2.80 (49) 29/09/2006 2.13 
(11) 31/03/1978 0.41 (31) 31/03/1993 2.87 (50) 29/06/2007 5.07 
(12) 29/12/1978 -1.21 (32) 31/12/1993 -13.99 (51) 31/03/2008 3.05 
(13) 28/09/1979 5.25 (33) 30/09/1994 5.19 (52) 31/12/2008 -3.87 
(14) 30/06/1980 1.89 (34) 30/06/1995 0.74 (53) 30/09/2009 3.36 
(15) 31/03/1981 6.78 (35) 29/03/1996 -6.41 (54) 30/06/2010 3.39 
(16) 31/12/1981 -3.14 (36) 31/12/1996 6.99 (55) 31/03/2011 -0.31 
(17) 30/09/1982 3.85 (37) 30/09/1997 16.39 (56) 30/12/2011 -1.08 
(18) 30/06/1983 10.79 (38) 30/06/1998 5.57 (57) 28/09/2012 -0.90 
(19) 30/03/1984 0.51 (39) 31/03/1999 10.67 (58) 28/06/2013 2.46 
(20) 31/12/1984 2.98     
This table reports the average momentum returns, winner minus loser, portfolio in each 3 month following the formation period (9) with the 












Table 4.1. 12 Description of the Bear and Bull Phases 1969-2014 





Panel A: Bear Phase 
3 months 60 33.70786 -0.01970  
6 months 28 31.46067 -0.01415  
9 months 21 35.59322 -0.01132 0.026575 
12 months 11 25.00000 -0.01430  
 
Panel B: Bull phase 
3 months 118 66.2921 0.01361  
6 months 61 68.53932 0.01262  
9 months 38 64.40677 0.01282 0.031571 
12 months 33 75.00000 0.01089  
Table 13 shows the number of bear and bull market over the full sample period, their frequency, market performances in different bear and bull 
horizon (3, 6, 9, 12) between December 1969 and January 2014, and the average momentum profits accomplished after bull and bear markets 
with the optimum strategy (9-month/3-month). The bear phase (Panel A) is the periods when the market returns (MSCI World Index) is 
negative for 3, 6, 9, and 12 months before the test period and the bull state (Panel B) is when the market return is positive for 3, 6, 9, and 12 

















Table 4.2. 1 Contrarian Returns for International Investor: Full Sample 1969-2014 
Panel A Panel B 
J K= 36 48 60 K= 36 48 60 
3 6 Buy 0.67 0.78 0.83  0.62 0.74 0.77 






















48 Buy 0.46 0.79 0.81 0.43 0.80 0.77 






















60 Buy 0.92 0.76 1.09 0.77 0.70 1.08 






















This table reports the contrarian strategies' returns implemented on 47 stock market indices. The sample is from 1969 to 2014. I form 
contrarian portfolio (buy past losers and sell past winners) based on past performance of stock market indices. I use 3 different formations 
and holding periods. The winner portfolios, the loser portfolios, and the loser minus winner portfolios returns are reported. The t-statistics are 












Table 4.2. 2 Contrarian Returns for International Investors: Established Markets 1969-2014 
Panel A Panel B 
J K= 36 48 60 K= 36 48 60 
36 Buy 0.56 0.74 0.78  0.55 0.72 0.73 






















48 Buy 0.55 2.93 0.69 0.51 0.68 0.68 





















60 Buy 0.57 0.59 0.89 0.45 0.53 0.85 






















This table reports the contrarian strategies' returns implemented on 18 stock market indices. The sample is from 1969 to 2014. I form 
contrarian portfolio (buy past losers and sell past winners) based on past performance of stock market indices. I use 3 different formations 
and holding periods. The winner portfolios, the loser portfolios, and the loser minus winner portfolios returns are reported. The t-statistic are 












Table 4.2. 3 Contrarian Returns since Globalisation 1994-2014 
Panel A Panel B 
J K= 36 48 60 K= 36 48 60 
36 Buy 0.61 0.77 0.64  0.66 0.74 0.58 






















48 Buy 0.33 0.84 0.97 0.49 0.09 0.97 






















60 Buy 0.27 0.16 0.61 0.21 0.16 0.64 






















This table reports the contrarian strategies' returns implemented on 47 stock market indices. The sample is from 1994 to 2014. I form 
contrarian portfolio (buy past losers and sell past winners) based on past performance of stock market indices. I use 3 different formations 
and holding periods. The winner portfolios, the loser portfolios, and the loser minus winner portfolios returns are reported. The t-statistic are 












Table 4.2. 4 Contrarian Return in Developed Countries 1969-2014 
Panel A Panel B 
J K= 36 48 60 K= 36 48 60 
36 Buy 0.65 0.84 0.87  0.62 0.83 0.83 






















48 Buy 0.48 0.63 0.64 0.41 0.64 0.62 






















60 Buy 0.89 0.88 1.00 0.83 0.84 1.00 






















This table reports the contrarian strategies' returns implemented on 23 stock market indices of developed countries. The sample is from 1969 
to 2014. I form contrarian portfolio (buy past winners and sell past losers) based on past performance of stock market indices. I use 3 
different formations and holding periods. The winner portfolios, the loser portfolios, and the loser minus winner portfolios returns are 












Table 4.2. 5 Contrarian Return in Emerging countries 1988-2014 
Panel A Panel B 
J K= 36 48 60 K= 36 48 60 
36 Buy 0.57 0.29 0.29  0.64 0.15 0.27 























48 Buy 0.74 1.51 0.79 0.64 1.46 0.78 






















60 Buy 1.35 1.39 1.60 1.46 1.44 1.34 






















This table reports the contrarian strategies' returns implemented on 24 emerging stock market indices. The sample is from 1983 to 2014. I 
form contrarian portfolio (buy past losers and sell past winners) based on past performance of stock market indices. I use 3 different 
formations and holding periods. The winner portfolios, the loser portfolios, and the loser minus winner portfolios returns are reported. The t-











Table 4.2. 6 Contrarian Returns Developed and Emerging Markets Full Sample: 1969-2014 
Panel A Panel B 
J K= 36 48 60 K= 36 48 60 
36 Buy 0.73 0.79 0.78  0.00746 0.80 0.79 






















48 Buy 0.81 0.86 0.85 0.83 0.86 0.86 






















60 Buy 0.84 0.84 0.87 0.84 0.85 0.88 






















This table reports the contrarian strategies' returns with overlapping portfolio implemented on 47 stock market indices. The sample is from 
1969 to 2014. I form contrarian portfolio (buy past losers and sell past winners) based on past performance of stock market indices. I use 3 
different formations and holding periods. The winner portfolios, the loser portfolios, and the loser minus winner portfolios returns are 












Table 4.2. 7 Contrarian Returns for International Investors: Established Markets 1969-2014 
Panel A Panel B  
J K= 36 48 60 K= 36 48 60  
36 Buy 0.63 0.65 0.65  0.64 0.65 0.65  























48 Buy 0.67 0.69 0.68 0.68 0.69 0.70  























60 Buy 0.65 0.63 0.67 0.64 0.64 0.68  























This table reports the contrarian strategies' returns with overlapping portfolio implemented on 18 established stock market indices. The 
sample is from 1969 to 2014. I form contrarian portfolio (buy past losers and sell past winners) based on past performance of stock market 
indices. I use 3 different formations and holding periods. The winner portfolios, the loser portfolios, and the loser minus winner portfolios 












Table 4.2. 8 Contrarian Returns with overlapping portfolios since Globalisation 1969-2014 
Panel A Panel B 
J K= 36 48 60 K= 36 48 60 
36 Buy 0.67 0.83 0.89  0.68 0.84 0.89 






















48 Buy 0.80 0.96 0.96 0.82 0.96 0.96 






















60 Buy 0.97 1.01 0.97 0.99 1.01 0.98 






















This table reports the contrarian strategies' returns with overlapping portfolio implemented on 47 stock market indices. The sample is from 
1994 to 2014. I form contrarian portfolio (buy past losers and sell past winners) based on past performance of stock market indices. I use 3 
different formations and holding periods. The winner portfolios, the loser portfolios, and the loser minus winner portfolios returns are 












Table 4.2. 9 Contrarian Return with Overlapping Portfolios in Developed Countries 1969-
2014 
Panel A Panel B 
J K= 36 48 60 K= 36 48 60 
36 Buy 0.67 0.72 0.71  0.69 0.73 0.72 






















48 Buy 0.79 0.81 0.77 0.81 0.81 0.78 






















60 Buy 0.83 0.77 0.78 0.84 0.77 0.78 






















This table reports the contrarian strategies' returns with overlapping portfolio implemented on 23 developed countries stock market indices. 
The sample is from 1969 to 2014. I form contrarian portfolios (buy past losers and sell past winners) based on past performance of stock 
market indices. I use 3 different formations and holding periods. The winner portfolios, the loser portfolios, and the loser minus winner 











Table 4.2. 10 Contrarian Return with Overlapping Portfolios in Emerging Countries 1988-
2014 
 Panel A Panel B 
J K= 36 48 60 K= 36 48 60 
36 Buy 0.80 0.86 0.81  0.79 0.85 0.81 






















48 Buy 0.87 0.92 0.87 0.87 0.92 0.86 






















60 Buy 0.83 0.89 0.84 0.80 0.89 0.82 






















This table reports the contrarian strategies' returns with overlapping portfolio implemented on 23 emerging stock market indices. The sample 
is from 1987 to 2014. I form contrarian portfolio (buy past losers and sell past winners) based on past performance of stock market indices. I 
use 3 different formation and 3 different holding periods. The winner portfolios, the loser portfolios, and the loser minus winner portfolios 












Table 4.2. 11 Contrarian Returns Developed and Emerging Markets Full Sample: 1969-2014 
Panel A Panel B 
J K= 36 48 60 K= 36 48 60 
36 Buy 0.69 0.79 0.86  0.64 0.74 0.81 






















48 Buy 0.35 0.62 0.74 0.39 0.68 0.75 






















60 Buy 0.67 0.68 0.92 0.56 0.66 0.92 






















This table reports the contrarian strategies' returns implemented on 47 stock market indices. The sample is from 1969 to 2014. I form 
contrarian portfolio (buy past losers and sell past winners) based on past performance of stock market indices. I use 3 different formations 
and holding periods. The winner portfolios, the loser portfolios, and the loser minus winner portfolios returns are reported. The t-statistics are 












Table 4.2. 12 Contrarian Returns for International Investors: Established Markets 1969-2014 
Panel A Panel B 
J K= 36 48 60 K= 36 48 60 
36 Buy 0.49 0.65 0.75  0.47 0.66 0.73 






















48 Buy 0.42 0.60 0.63 0.42 0.61 0.64 






















60 Buy 0.60 0.68 0.88 0.54 0.67 0.88 






















This table reports the contrarian strategies' returns implemented on 18 stock market indices. The sample is from 1969 to 2014. I form 
contrarian portfolio (buy past losers and sell past winners) based on past performance of stock market indices. I use 3 different formations 
and holding periods. The winner portfolios, the loser portfolios, and the loser minus winner portfolios returns are reported. The t-statistic are 












Table 4.2. 13 Contrarian Returns since Globalisation 1994-2014 
Panel A Panel B 
J K= 36 48 60 K= 36 48 60 
36 Buy 0.47 0.62 0.42  0.50 0.55 0.36 






















48 Buy 0.41 0.82 0.93 0.48 0.82 0.93 






















60 Buy 0.33 0.19 0.64 0.23 0.15 0.61 






















This table reports the contrarian strategies' returns implemented on 47 stock market indices. The sample is from 1994 to 2014. I form 
contrarian portfolio (buy past losers and sell past winners) based on past performance of stock market indices. I use 3 different formations 
and holding periods. The winner portfolios, the loser portfolios, and the loser minus winner portfolios returns are reported. The t-statistic are 












Table 4.2. 14 Contrarian Return in Developed Countries 1969-2014 
Panel A Panel B 
J K= 36 48 60 K= 36 48 60 
36 Buy 0.51 0.72 0.81  0.52 0.74 0.80 






















48 Buy 0.50 0.66 0.68 0.50 0.68 0.70 






















60 Buy 0.63 0.73 0.88 0.62 0.73 0.89 






















This table reports the contrarian strategies' returns implemented on 23 stock market indices of developed countries. The sample is from 1969 
to 2014. I form contrarian portfolio (buy past winners and sell past losers) based on past performance of stock market indices. I use 3 
different formations and holding periods. The winner portfolios, the loser portfolios, and the loser minus winner portfolios returns are 












Table 4.2. 15 Contrarian Return in Emerging Countries 1988-2014 
Panel A Panel B 
J K= 36 48 60 K= 36 48 60 
36 Buy 0.76 0.55 0.65  0.74 0.44 0.55 






















48 Buy 0.72 1,08 0.43 0.51 0.98 0.43 






















60 Buy 1.02 0.85 0.01 1.26 0.99 0.98 






















This table reports the contrarian strategies' returns implemented on 24 emerging stock market indices. The sample is from 1987 to 2014. I 
form contrarian portfolio (buy past losers and sell past winners) based on past performance of stock market indices. I use 3 different 
formations and holding periods. The winner portfolios, the loser portfolios, and the loser minus winner portfolios returns are reported. The t-












Table 4.2. 16 Contrarian Returns for International Investor: Full Sample 1969-2014 
Panel A Panel B 
J K= 36 48 60 K= 36 48 60 
36 Buy 0.69 0.79 0.86  0.74 0.78 0.78 






















48 Buy 0.35 0.62 0.74 0.81 0.83 0.82 






















60 Buy 0.67 0.68 0.92 0.89 0.88 0.87 






















This table reports the contrarian strategies' returns with overlapping quintile portfolios implemented on 47 stock market indices. The sample 
is from 1969 to 2014. I form contrarian portfolio (buy past losers and sell past winners) based on past performance of stock market indices. I 
use 3 different formations and holding periods. The winner portfolios, the loser portfolios, and the loser minus winner portfolios returns are 












Table 4.2. 17 Contrarian Returns for International Investors: Established Markets 1969-2014 
Panel A Panel B 
J K= 36 48 60 K= 36 48 60 
36 Buy 0.66 0.68 0.69  0.67 0.68 0.69 






















48 Buy 0.70 0.71 0.71 0.70 0.72 0.71 






















60 Buy 0.74 0.74 0.73 0.74 0.74 0.73 






















This table reports the contrarian strategies' returns with overlapping quintiles portfolio implemented on 18 established stock market indices. 
The sample is from 1969 to 2014. I form contrarian portfolio (buy past losers and sell past winners) based on past performance of stock 
market indices. I use 3 different formations and holding periods. The winner portfolios, the loser portfolios, and the loser minus winner 












Table 4.2. 18 Contrarian Returns with Overlapping Quintiles Portfolios since Globalisation 
1994-2014 
Panel A Panel B 
J K= 36 48 60 K= 36 48 60 
36 Buy 0.57 0.71 0.76  0.58 0.71 0.77 






















48 Buy 0.70 0.83 0.83 0.72 0.83 0.84 






















60 Buy 0.89 0.93 0.89 0.90 0.93 0.89 






















This table reports the contrarian strategies' returns with overlapping quintile portfolios implemented on 47 stock market indices. The sample 
is from 1994 to 2014. I form contrarian portfolio (buy past losers and sell past winners) based on past performance of stock market indices. I 
use 3 different formations and holding periods. The winner portfolios, the loser portfolios, and the loser minus winner portfolios returns are 











Table 4.2. 19 Contrarian Return with overlapping portfolios in developed countries 1969-
2014 
Panel A Panel B 
J K= 36 48 60 K= 36 48 60 
36 Buy 0.67 0.71 0.71  0.69 0.72 0.72 






















48 Buy 0.00753 0.77 0.74 0.77 0.77 0.75 






















60 Buy 0.82 0.79 0.77 0.82 0.80 0.77 






















This table reports the contrarian strategies' returns with overlapping quintile portfolio implemented on 23 developed countries stock market 
indices. The sample is from 1969 to 2014. I form contrarian portfolios (buy past losers and sell past winners) based on past performance of 
stock market indices. I use 3 different formations and holding periods. The winner portfolios, the loser portfolios, and the loser minus winner 











Table 4.2. 20 Contrarian Return with Overlapping Portfolios in Emerging Countries 1988-
2014 
Panel A Panel B 
J K= 36 48 60 K= 36 48 60 
36 Buy 0.79 0.77 0.75  0.78 0.76 0.74 






















48 Buy 0.81 0.80 0.77 0.80 0.78 0.77 






















60 Buy 0.73 0.75 0.72 0.72 0.74 0.71 






















This table reports the contrarian strategies' returns with overlapping quintile portfolio implemented on 23 emerging stock market indices. The 
sample is from 1987 to 2014. I form contrarian portfolio (buy past losers and sell past winners) based on past performance of stock market 
indices. I use 3 different formation and 3 different holding periods. The winner portfolios, the loser portfolios, and the loser minus winner 










Table 4.2. 21 Description of the bear and bull phases 1969-2014 





Panel A: Bear Phase 
3-month 60 33.71 -1.97  
6-month 28 31.46 -1.42  
9-month 21 35.59 -1.13  
12-month 11 25.00 -1.43 0.25(3.04) 
 
Panel B: Bull phase 
3-month 118 66.29 1.36  
6-month 61 68.54 1.26  
9-month 38 64.41 1.28  
12-month 33 75.00 1.09 1.41(18.30) 
Table 34 shows the number of bear and bull market over the full sample period, their frequency, the market performances in different bear 
and bull horizon (3, 6, 9, 12) between December 1969 and January 2014, and the average contrarian profits realized after bull and bear 
markets with the optimum strategy (48-month/60-month) in the format month(year). The bear phase (Panel A) is the periods when market 
return (MSCI World Index) is negative for 3, 6, 9, and 12 months before the test period and the bull state (Panel B) is when the market return 













Table 4.2. 22 Seasonal-Difference in Cumulative Average Returns of the Contrarian 
Strategies 1969-2014 
J  Holding period returns                                          Yearly event time 
 1 3 6 9 12 Year2 Year3 Year4 Year5 
36 Sell 4.56 2.24 1.39 1.02 0.87 0.76 0.66 0.77 0.83 































48 Sell 3.26 2.52 -0.18 -0.39 0.48 0.87 0.46 0.79 0.81 































60 Sell 3.89 1.88 0.90 0.78 0.88 0.80 0.92 0.76 1.09 































This table reports the contrarian strategies' returns with deciles portfolios implemented on 47 stock market indices. The sample is from 1969 to 
2014. I form contrarian portfolio (buy past losers and sell past winners) based on past performance of stock market indices. I use 3 different 
formation and 8 holding periods (1, 3, 9, 6, 12, 24, 36, and 60 month). The winner portfolios, the loser portfolios, and the loser minus winner 











Table 4.3. 1 Fama and French Risks Impact on Global Momentum Profit 1969-2014 
Fama French Three factor with excess return on MSCI world index 
 Panel A: FF 3-Factors Model 
3-month 6-month 9-month 12-month 
αo 0.009*** 0.007*** 0.006*** 0.003*** 
 (4.82) (6.45) (5.95) (3.65) 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
MKTRF -0.002 -0.011 -0.002 0.031 
 (-0.04) (-0.37) (-0.09) (1.48) 
 0.965 0.713 0.925 0.138 
SMB -0.027 -0.106** -0.068* -0.092*** 
 (-0.42) (-2.34) (-1.68) (-2.87) 
 0.672 0.019 0.092 0.004 
HML -0.116* 0.016 -0.106*** -0.018 
 (-1.69) (0.33) (-2.91) (-0.58) 
 0.091 0.738 0.004 0.565 
Panel B: Fama French Three Factor with US Excess Market Return 
 Panel A: FF 3-Factors Model 
3-month 6-month 9-month 12-month 
αo 0.009*** 0.008*** 0.006*** 0.003*** 
 (4.79) (6.39) (5.94) (3.49) 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
ERM -0.025 -0.018 -0.016 0.018 
 (-0.54) (-0.60) (-0.67) (0.86) 
 0.588 0.546 0.504 0.391 
SMB -0.017 -0.103*** -0.066 -0.093*** 
 (-0.27) (-2.29) (-1.65) (-2.90) 
 0.788 0.022 0.100 0.004 
HML -0.127* 0.012 -0.114*** -0.018 
 (-1.82) (0.26) (-3.11) (-0.55) 
 0.068 0.798 0.002 0.579 
This table reports the regression result based on model (28). The returns of the momentum portfolio at time t and regressed on: ERM and 
MKTRF the excess market returns, HML (high minus low) the return to portfolio that is long on high book-to-market stocks and short on 
low book-to-market stocks in US, and  BMS (small minus big) returns to long-short portfolios constructed using size in US market. Panel A 
provide the results with the excess return based on MSCI world index, while panel B are based on US excess return. I estimate the 
parameters using the interactive version of the generalized method of moment’s estimation. I also account for time variation through time 
dummies. I request for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors based on Bartlett kernel (Newey-West) with 1 lags. I 
use the regression Alpha to measure the size of the abnormal return generated after adjusting for risk. The test statistics are reported in the 
parentheses and the p-value next. The results are* statistically significant at 10% for p<0.1, ** statistically significant at 5% for p<0.05 and 










Table 4.3. 2 Effect of Market State Risks on Global Momentum Profit 1969-2014 
 Parameter 
𝛼1 𝐿𝐼𝑄 𝐷𝑆 TS 𝑀𝐾𝑇 
3-Month 0.012** 0.025 -0.003 0.059 -0.021 
 (2.01) (0.67) (-0.48) (0.82) (-0.40) 
 0.045 0.502 0.629 0.412 0.686 
6-Month 0.010*** 0.020 -0.002 0.022 0.009 
 (3.00) (0.94) (-0.70) (0.48) (0.29) 
 0.003 0.347 0.486 0.633 0.773 
9-month 0.004* -0.017 0.000 0.020 -0.010 
 (1.78) (-0.95) (0.15) (0.60) (-0.40) 
 0.076 0.340 0.883 0.551 0.691 
12-month -0.001 -0.033** 0.002 0.047 0.012 
 (-0.31) (-2.07) (1.19) (1.93) (0.52) 
 0.759 0.038 0.236 0.054 0.606 
This table reports the regression result based on model (29). Where: 𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑡−1 is the liquidity factor at time t-1, 𝐷𝑆𝑡−1 the Default spread at 
time t-1, TS the Term spread at time t-1 and the 𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡−1 the MSCI world indices return at time t-1. I estimate the parameters using the 
interactive version of the generalized method of moment’s estimation. I also account for time variation through time dummies. I request for 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors based on Bartlett kernel (Newey-West) with 1 lags. I use the regression 
Alpha to measure the size of the abnormal return generated after adjusting for risk the R-square are also reported. I also report the 
autocorrelation coefficient of the residual, the GMM statistics are reported in the parentheses and the p-value next. The results are* 


















Table 4.3. 3 Effect of Macroeconomic Risk on Global Momentum Profits 1969-2014 
 Parameter 
𝛼1 ∆𝑂𝑃 ∆𝐼𝑃 𝑊𝑉𝑂𝐿 
3-Month 0.003 -0.006 0.455 0.989*** 
 (0.92) (-0.24) (1.09) (3.18) 
 0.356 0.807 0.274 0.001 
6-Month 0.002 -0.006 0.607** 0.669*** 
 (0.84) (-0.31) (2.13) (3.29) 
 0.400 0.760 0.033 0.001 
9-month 0.002 0.003 0.262 0.275* 
 (1.15) (0.18) (1.12) (1.80) 
 0.249 0.855 0.264 0.071 
12-month 0.001 -0.002 0.236 -0.008 
 (0.68) (-0.24) (1.32) (-0.07) 
 0.497 0.814 0.185 0.948 
This table reports the regression result based on model (30). Where, ∆𝑂𝑃𝑇−1, is the change in Oil price at time T-1, ∆⁡𝐼𝑃𝑇−1 the change in 
monthly value of the US Industrial production at time T-1, and  𝑊𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑇−1 the market volatility at time T-1 based on the MSCI world return. 
I estimate the parameters using the interactive version of the generalized method of moment’s estimation. I also account for time variation 
through time dummies. I request for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors based on Bartlett kernel (Newey-West) 
with 1 lags. I use the regression Alpha to measure the size of the abnormal return generated after adjusting for risk. R-squares are 
reported. The test statistics are reported in the parentheses and the p-value next. The results are* statistically significant at 10% for p<0.1, ** 



















Table 4.3. 4 Effect of Global Risk Factor on Global Momentum Profit 1969-2014 
 Model Mode2 Model3 Model4 
𝛼3 0.009*** 0.0131** 0.005 0.005 
 (4.82) (2.21) (1.17) (0.71) 
 0.000 0.027 0.241 0.481 
𝐿𝐼𝑄  0.026  0.016 
  (0.69)  (0.43) 
  0.489  0.670 
𝐷𝑆  -0.004  0.000 
  (-0.66)  (0.05) 
  0.509  0.959 
𝑇𝑆  0.071  0.088 
  (0.98)  (1.20) 
  0.327  0.232 
MKT  0.005  0.015 
  (0.09)  (0.29) 
  0.927  0.771 
∆𝑂𝑃   -0.003 -0.007 
   (-0.11) (-0.27) 
   0.911 0.784 
𝑊𝑉𝑂𝐿   0.325 0.326 
   (0.74) (0.72) 
   0.462 0.470 
∆𝐼𝑃   1.011*** 1.051*** 
   (3.27) (3.46) 
   0.001 0.001 
MKTRF -0.002 -0.020 -0.039 -0.049 
 (-0.04) (-0.42) (-0.78) (-1.00) 
 0.965 0.671 0.434 0.316 
𝑆𝑀𝐵 -0.027 -0.051 -0.011 -0.040 
 (-0.42) (-0.78) (-0.18) (-0.62) 
 0.672 0.433 0.860 0.538 
𝐻𝑀𝐿 -0.116* -0.143** -0.120* -0.151* 
 (-1.69) (-2.01) (-1.75) (-2.12) 
 0.091 0.045 0.079 0.034 
This table reports the regression result based on model (31). Where: the dependent variable are the returns of the momentum portfolio at 
time t and regressed on, 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 (high minus low) the return to portfolios that is long on high book-to-market stocks and short on low book-
to-market stocks in US, 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 (Small minus big) returns to long-short portfolios constructed using size in US market, the 𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑡−1 the 
liquidity factor at time t-1, 𝐷𝑆𝑡−1 the Default spread at time t-1, 𝑇𝑆𝑡−1 the Term spread at time t-1, 𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡−1 the MSCI world indices return t-
1, ∆𝑂𝑃𝑡−1, the change on monthly Oil price at time t-1, 𝑊𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑡−1 is the market volatility at time t-1, and  ∆𝐼𝑃𝑡−1⁡ is the change on monthly 
value of the US Industrial production at time t-1. I estimate the parameters using the interactive version of the generalized method of 
moment’s estimation. I also account for time variation through time dummies. I request for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent 
standard errors based on Bartlett kernel (Newey-West) with 1 lags. These regressions are based on model 1 to 4 specification. I use the 
regression Alpha to measure the size of the abnormal return generated after adjusting for risk. The test statistics are reported in the 
parentheses and the p-value next. The results are* statistically significant at 10% for p<0.1, ** statistically significant at 5% for p<0.05 and 








Table 4.3. 5 Global Risk Factor and Global Momentum Profit Seasonal Effect 1969-2014 
 3-Month 6-Month 9-Month 12-Month 
𝛼3 0.005 0.001 0.000 -0.004 
 (0.71) (0.20) (0.12) (-1.46) 
 0.481 0.840 0.901 0.144 
𝐿𝐼𝑄 0.016 0.021 -0.020 -0.031** 
 (0.43) (0.97) (-1.17) (-2.00) 
 0.670 0.332 0.243 0.046 
𝐷𝑆 0.000 0.002 0.002 0.003 
 (0.05) (0.45) (0.76) (1.50) 
 0.959 0.651 0.449 0.134 
𝑇𝑆 0.088 0.048 0.046 0.044 
 (1.20) (1.05) (1.31) (1.73) 
 0.232 0.295 0.189 0.083 
MKT 0.015 0.020 -0.005 0.025 
 (0.29) (0.61) (-0.21) (1.05) 
 0.771 0.542 0.836 0.292 
∆𝑂𝑃 -0.007 -0.004 0.017 0.003 
 (-0.27) (-0.24) (1.14) (0.31) 
 0.784 0.812 0.255 0.754 
𝑊𝑉𝑂𝐿 0.326 0.610** 0.207 0.294 
 (0.72) (2.05) (0.91) (1.67) 
 0.470 0.040 0.364 0.095 
∆𝐼𝑃 1.051*** 0.650*** 0.384** 0.092 
 (3.46) (2.94) (2.26) (0.68) 
 0.001 0.003 0.024 0.494 
MKTRF -0.050 -0.019 -0.014 0.039** 
 (-1.00) (-0.56) (-0.48) (1.88) 
 0.316 0.575 -0.48 0.060 
𝑆𝑀𝐵 -0.040 -0.101** -0.062 -0.119*** 
 (-0.62) (-2.16) (-1.55) (-3.58) 
 0.538 0.031 0.122 0.000 
𝐻𝑀𝐿 -0.151** 0.003 -0.108*** -0.028 
 (-2.12) (0.06) (-3.00) (-0.88) 
 0.034 0.956 0.003 0.379 
This table reports the regression result based on model (31). Where: the dependent variable R are the returns of the momentum portfolio (9-
month/3, 6, 9, 12-month) at time t and regressed on, 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 (high minus low) the return to portfolios that is long on high book-to-market 
stocks and short on low book-to-market stocks in US, the 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 (small minus big) returns to long-short portfolios constructed using size in 
US market, the 𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑡−1 the liquidity factor at time t-1, the 𝐷𝑆𝑡−1 the Default spread at time t-1, 𝑇𝑆𝑡−1 is the Term spread at time t-1, the 
𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡−1 the MSCI world indices return at time t-1, ∆𝑂𝑃𝑡−1, the monthly Oil price at time t-1, 𝑊𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑡−1 is the market volatility at time t-1, 
and ∆𝐼𝑃𝑡−1⁡ is the monthly value of the US Industrial production at time t-1. I estimate the parameters using the interactive version of the 
generalized method of moment’s estimation. I also account for time variation through time dummies. I request for heteroscedasticity and 
autocorrelation consistent standard errors based on Bartlett kernel (Newey-West) with 1 lags. I use the regression Alpha to measure the size 
of the abnormal return generated after adjusting for risk. The test statistics are reported in the parentheses and the p-value next. The results 







Table 4.3. 6 Effect of Global Risk Factors on Global Momentum Profit During Crisis Period 
 Currency Crisis Stock Market Crash Banking Crisis 
𝛼3 -0.025 -0.007 0.043*** 
 (-1.04) (-0.58) (3.54) 
 0.299 0.562 0.000 
𝐿𝐼𝑄 0.100** -0.027 0.019 
 (2.22) (-0.44) (0.30) 
 0.026 0.662 0.764 
𝐷𝑆 0.006 0.013 -0.028*** 
 (0.41) (1.49) (-3.44) 
 0.683 0.137 0.001 
𝑇𝑆 0.063 -0.104 0.001 
 (0.47) (-0.74) (0.01) 
 0.642 0.459 0.993 
MKT -0.267*** 0.038 0.042 
 (-2.90) (0.44) (0.50) 
 0.004 0.663 0.619 
∆𝑂𝑃 0.016 0.043 -0.091*** 
 (0.34) (1.09) (-2.68) 
 0.733 0.276 0.007 
𝑊𝑉𝑂𝐿 1.638 -0.198 0.174 
 (1.37) (-0.33) (0.38) 
 0.170 0.742 0.707 
∆𝐼𝑃 2.436*** 0.921* -0.118 
 (4.12) (1.89) (-0.20) 
 0.000 0.059 0.839 
MKTRF -0.084 -0.003 -0.010 
 (-0.86) (-0.04) (-0.13) 
 0.390 0.967 0.897 
𝑆𝑀𝐵 0.125 -0.004 0.215 
 (0.88) (-0.04) (1.32) 
 0.381 0.968 0.187 
𝐻𝑀𝐿 0.400** -0.150 -0.339** 
 (2.22) (-1.24) (-2.50) 
 0.027 0.214 0.012 
This table reports the regression result based on model (32). Where: the dependent variable R are the returns of the momentum portfolio 
during crisis periods at time t and regressed on, 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 (high minus low) the return to portfolios that is long on high book-to-market stocks 
and short on low book-to-market stocks in US, 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 (small minus big) returns to long-short portfolios constructed using size in US market, 
the 𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑡−1 the liquidity factor at time t-1, 𝐷𝑆𝑡−1 the Default spread at time t-1, 𝑇𝑆𝑡−1 the Term spread at time t-1, 𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡−1 the MSCI world 
indices return time t-1, ∆𝑂𝑃𝑡−1, the chance on monthly Oil price at time t-1, 𝑊𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑡−1 is the market volatility at time t-1, and ∆𝐼𝑃𝑡−1⁡ is the 
change on monthly value of the US Industrial production at time t-1. For detailed definition of the crisis period please see Appendix E4. I 
estimate the parameters using the interactive version of the generalized method of moments estimation. I also account for time variation 
through time dummies. I request for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors based on Bartlett kernel (Newey-West) 
with 1 lags.  I use the regression Alpha to measure the size of the abnormal return generated after adjusting for risk. The test statistics are 
reported in the parentheses and the p-value next. The results are* statistically significant at 10% for p<0.1, ** statistically significant at 5% 









Table 4.3. 7 Effect of Global Risks on Global Momentum Profit in Crisis Period (all crisis) 
 Model Mode2 Model3 Model4 
𝛼3 0.006** 0.020** 0.002 0.008 
 (2.42) (2.49) (0.44) (0.88) 
 0.016 0.013 0.659 0.377 
𝐿𝐼𝑄  0.028  0.017 
  (0.64)  (0.37) 
  0.523  0.710 
𝐷𝑆  -0.010  -0.005 
  (-1.61)  (-0.76) 
  0.107  0.446 
𝑇𝑆  0.027  0.042 
  (0.31)  (0.47) 
  0.756  0.638 
MKT  0.076  0.638 
  (1.16)  (1.22) 
  0.245  0.222 
∆𝑂𝑃   -0.000 -0.016 
   (-0.01) (-0.51) 
   0.991 0.613 
𝑊𝑉𝑂𝐿   0.367 0.447 
   (0.88) (1.03) 
   0.381 0.303 
∆𝐼𝑃   0.974** 0.975*** 
   (2.59) (2.60) 
   0.010 0.009 
MKTRF 0.009 -0.024 -0.021 -0.044 
 (0.19) (-0.46) (-0.38) (-0.80) 
 0.852 0.646 0.704 0.421 
𝑆𝑀𝐵 -0.000 -0.036 0.024 -0.018 
 (-0.01) (-0.47) (0.30) (-0.23) 
 0.996 0.639 0.763 0.820 
𝐻𝑀𝐿 -0.176** -0.235*** -0.178** -0.226*** 
 (-2.37) (-2.99) (-2.33) (-2.75) 
 0.018 0.003 0.020 0.006 
This table reports the regression result based on model (32). Where: the dependent variable R are the returns of the momentum portfolio 
during crisis periods (all crisis) at time t and regressed on, 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 (high minus low) the return to portfolios that is long on high book-to-
market stocks and short on low book-to-market stocks in US, 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 (small minus big) returns to long-short portfolios constructed using size 
in US market, the 𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑡−1 the liquidity factor at time t-1, 𝐷𝑆𝑡−1 the Default spread at time t-1, 𝑇𝑆𝑡−1 the Term spread at time t-1, 𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡−1 the 
MSCI world indices return at time t-1, ∆𝑂𝑃𝑡−1, the change on monthly Oil price at time t-1, 𝑊𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑡−1 is the market volatility at time t-1, 
and  ∆𝐼𝑃𝑡−1⁡ is the change on monthly value of the US Industrial production at time t-1. For detailed definition of the crisis period please see 
Appendix E4. Regression are based on model 1 to 4 specification. I estimate the parameters using the interactive version of the generalized 
method of moments estimation. I also account for time variation through time dummies. I request for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation 
consistent standard errors based on Bartlett kernel (Newey-West) with 1 lags. I use the regression Alpha to measure the size of the abnormal 
return generated after adjusting for risk. The test statistics are reported in the parentheses and the p-value next. The results are* statistically 










Table 4.3. 8 Effect of Global Risks on Global Momentum Profit During Non-Crisis Period 
 Model Mode2 Model3 Model4 
𝛼3 0.012*** 0.000 0.007 -0.005 
 (4.28) (0.01) (0.72) (-0.44) 
 0.000 0.996 0.472 0.663 
𝐿𝐼𝑄  -0.073  -0.086 
  (-1.22)  (-1.50) 
  0.221  0.134 
𝐷𝑆  0.018**  0.018** 
  (2.04)  (2.09) 
  0.042  0.037 
𝑇𝑆  0.171  0.236* 
  (1.20)  (1.69) 
  0.230  0.091 
MKT  -0.303***  -0.257** 
  (-2.96)  (-2.39) 
  0.003  0.017 
∆𝑂𝑃   0.014 0.011 
   (0.35) (0.28) 
   0.728 0.777 
𝑊𝑉𝑂𝐿   0.362 0.214 
   (0.22) (0.13) 
   0.830 0.900 
∆𝐼𝑃   1.194** 1.060** 
   (2.37) (2.04) 
   0.018 0.042 
MKTRF -0.089 -0.117 -0.107 -0.129 
 (-0.83) (-1.04) (-0.99) (-1.14) 
 0.407 0.301 0.320 0.256 
𝑆𝑀𝐵 -0.160 -0.072 -0.155 -0.089 
 (-1.27) (-0.59) (-1.26) (-0.75) 
 0.204 0.553 0.206 0.450 
𝐻𝑀𝐿 0.087 0.025 0.049 -0.035 
 (0.58) (0.17)) (0.34) (-0.24) 
 0.561 0.865 0.733 0.808 
This table reports the regression result based on model (32). Where: the dependent variable R are the returns of the momentum portfolio 
during non-crisis periods at time t and regressed on, 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 (high minus low) the return to portfolios that is long on high book-to-market 
stocks and short on low book-to-market stocks in US, 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 (small minus big) returns to long-short portfolios constructed using size in US 
market, the 𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑡−1 the liquidity factor at time t-1, 𝐷𝑆𝑡−1 the Default spread at time t-1, 𝑇𝑆𝑡−1 the Term spread at time t-1, 𝑀𝑆𝐶𝐼𝑊𝑡−1 the 
MSCI world indices price level that represent price levels at time t-1, ∆𝑂𝑃𝑡−1, the change on monthly Oil price at time t-1, 𝑊𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑡−1 is the 
market volatility at time t-1, and ∆𝐼𝑃𝑡−1⁡ is the change on monthly value of the US Industrial production at time t-1. For detailed definition 
of the crisis period please see Appendix E4. Non-criss period exclude all crisis periods from de sample 1969-2014. Regression are based on 
model 1 to 4 specification. I estimate the parameters using the interactive version of the generalized method of moments estimation. I also 
account for time variation through time dummies. I request for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors based on 
Bartlett kernel (Newey-West) with 1 lags. I use the regression Alpha to measure the size of the abnormal return generated after adjusting for 
risk. The test statistics are reported in the parentheses and the p-value next. The results are* statistically significant at 10% for p<0.1, ** 









Table 4.3. 9 Effect of Global Risks on Global Momentum Profit During Expansion Period 
 Model Mode2 Model3 Model4 
𝛼3 0.011*** -0.003 0.005 -0.006 
 (5.61) (-0.48) (0.89) (-0.82) 
 0.000 0.629 0.373 0.414  
𝐿𝐼𝑄  0.034  0.032 
  (0.73)  (0.69) 
  0.465  0.492 
𝐷𝑆  0.015**  0.013** 
  (2.32)  (1.97) 
  0.020  0.049 
𝑇𝑆  0.010  0.005 
  (0.11)  (0.06) 
  0.912  0.951 
MKT  -0.000  0.036 
  (-0.01)  (0.57) 
  0.995  0.568 
∆𝑂𝑃   -0.006 -0.012 
   (-0.20) (-0.38) 
   0.839 0.705 
𝑊𝑉𝑂𝐿   0.381 0.158 
   (0.54) (0.22) 
   0.591 0.826 
∆𝐼𝑃   1.314*** 1.260*** 
   (3.42) (3.21) 
   0.001 0.001 
MKTRF -0.072 -0.058 -0.082 -0.066 
 (-1.20) (-0.97) (-1.33) (-1.07) 
 0.228 0.334 0.183 0.284 
𝑆𝑀𝐵 -0.042 -0.040 -0.038 -0.049 
 (-0.62) (-0.59) (-0.58) (-0.73) 
 0.535 0.555 0.563 0.463 
𝐻𝑀𝐿 -0.147* -0.146* -0.137* -0.148* 
 (-1.79) (-1.78) (-1.69) (-1.83) 
 0.074 0.074 0.090 0.067 
This table reports the regression results based on Equation (33) Where: the dependent variable R are the returns of the momentum portfolio 
during expansion periods at time t and regressed on, 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 (high minus low) the return to portfolios that is long on high book-to-market 
stocks and short on low book-to-market stocks in US, 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 (small minus big) returns to long-short portfolios constructed using size in US 
market, the 𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑡−1 the liquidity factor at time t-1, 𝐷𝑆𝑡−1 the Default spread at time t-1, 𝑇𝑆𝑡−1 the Term spread at time t-1, 𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡−1 the MSCI 
world indices return at time t-1, ∆𝑂𝑃𝑡−1, the change on monthly Oil price at time t-1, 𝑊𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑡−1 is the market volatility at time t-1, and 
∆𝐼𝑃𝑡−1⁡ is the change on monthly value of the US Industrial production at time t-1. For detailed definition of the expansion period please see 
Appendix E4. Regression are based on model 1 to 4 specification. I estimate the parameters using the interactive version of the generalized 
method of moments estimation. I also account for time variation through time dummies. I request for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation 
consistent standard errors with based on Bartlett kernel (Newey-West) with 1 lags. I use the regression Alpha to measure the size of the 
abnormal return generated after adjusting for risk. The test statistics are reported in the parentheses and the p-value next. The results are* 









Table 4.3. 10 Effect of Global Risks on Global Momentum Profit During Contraction 
 Model Mode2 Model3 Model4 
𝛼3 -0.002 0.009 -0.013** -0.005 
 (-1.00) (0.79) (-2.12) (-0.38) 
 0.318 0.429 0.034 0.703 
𝐿𝐼𝑄  -0.095*  -0.072 
  (-1.78)  (-1.24) 
  0.076  0.215 
𝐷𝑆  -0.020***  -0.020*** 
  (-3.47)  (-3.76) 
  0.001  0.000 
𝑇𝑆  0.226*  0.271** 
  (1.68)  (2.07) 
  0.093  0.038 
MKT  -0.168*  -0.184** 
  (-1.85)  (-2.08) 
  0.064  0.038 
∆𝑂𝑃   0.015 0.007 
   (0.38) (0.24) 
   0.706 0.812 
𝑊𝑉𝑂𝐿   0.647 1.256*** 
   (1.32) (2.70) 
   0.186 0.007 
∆𝐼𝑃   0.012 -0.521 
   (0.03) (-1.28) 
   0.975 0.201 
MKTRF -0.036 -0.060 -0.051 -0.001 
 (-0.42) (-0.89) (-0.49) (-0.02) 
 0.677 0.375 0.627 0.985 
𝑆𝑀𝐵 -0.206 -0.074 -0.151 -0.237 
 (-1.36) (-0.54) (-0.92) (-1.47) 
 0.174 0.590 0.356 0.141 
𝐻𝑀𝐿 0.039 -0.134 0.028 -0.090 
 (0.29) (-1.08) (0.20) (-0.71) 
 0.769 0.282 0.842 0.477 
This table reports the regression result based on model (33). Where: the dependent variable R are the returns of the momentum portfolio 
during contraction periods at time t and regressed on, 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 (high minus low) the return to portfolios that is long on high book-to-market 
stocks and short on low book-to-market stocks in US, 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 (small minus big) returns to long-short portfolios constructed using size in US 
market, the 𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑡−1 the liquidity factor at time t-1, 𝐷𝑆𝑡−1 the Default spread at time t-1, 𝑇𝑆𝑡−1 the Term spread at time t-1, 𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡−1 the MSCI 
world indices return at time t-1, ∆𝑂𝑃𝑡−1, the change on monthly Oil price at time t-1, 𝑊𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑡−1 is the market volatility at time t-1, and 
∆𝐼𝑃𝑡−1⁡ is the change on monthly value of the US Industrial production at time t-1. Detailed definition of contraction period please see 
Appendix E4. Regressions are based on model 1 to 4 specification. I estimate the parameters using the interactive version of the generalized 
method of moments estimation. I also account for time variation through time dummies. I request for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation 
consistent standard errors based on Bartlett kernel (Newey-West) with 1 lags. I use the regression Alpha to measure the size of the abnormal 
return generated after adjusting for risk. The test statistics are reported in the parentheses and the p-value next. The results are* statistically 









Table 4.3. 11 Effect of Global Risks on Global Momentum Profit in Emerging Market 1988-
2014 
 Model Mode2 Model3 Model4 
𝛼3 0.008*** 0.023*** 0.003 0.012 
 (3.62) (3.68) (0.52) (1.52) 
 0.000 0.000 0.600 0.129 
𝐿𝐼𝑄  0.015  0.008 
  (0.38)  (0.20) 
  0.704  0.843 
𝐷𝑆  -0.015**  -0.010 
  (-2.49)  (-1.42) 
  0.013  0.156 
𝑇𝑆  0.066  0.080 
  (0.62)  (0.72) 
  0.536  0.470 
MKT  -0.124**  -0.095 
  (-2.15)  (-1.64) 
  0.032  0.102 
∆𝑂𝑃   -0.010 -0.009 
   (-0.45) (-0.40) 
   0.653 0.687 
𝑊𝑉𝑂𝐿   0.410 0.506 
   (0.74) (0.93) 
   0.458 0.355 
∆𝐼𝑃   1.361*** 1.043** 
   (3.29) (2.39) 
   0.001 0.017 
MKTRF -0.093* -0.118** -0.157** -0.141** 
 (-1.68) (-2.10) (-2.53) (-2.31) 
 0.093 0.036 0.011 0.021 
𝑆𝑀𝐵 -0.091 -0.038 -0.082 -0.037 
 (-1.16) (-0.53) (-1.07) (-0.51) 
 0.247 0.598 0.286 0.609 
𝐻𝑀𝐿 -0.110 -0.123 -0.139 -0.140 
 (-1.27) (-1.37) (-1.64) (-1.57) 
 0.204 0.170 0.102 0.116 
This table reports the regression result based on model (34) Where: the dependent variable R are the returns of the momentum portfolio in 
emerging market at time t and regressed on, 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 (high minus low) the return to portfolios that is long on high book-to-market stocks and 
short on low book-to-market stocks in US, 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 (small minus big) returns to long-short portfolios constructed using size in US market, the 
𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑡−1 the liquidity factor at time t-1, 𝐷𝑆𝑡−1 the Default spread at time t-1, 𝑇𝑆𝑡−1 the Term spread at time t-1, 𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡−1 the MSCI world 
indices return  at time t-1, ∆𝑂𝑃𝑡−1, the monthly Oil price at time t-1, 𝑊𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑡−1 is the market volatility at time t-1, and ∆𝐼𝑃𝑡−1⁡ is the monthly 
value of the US Industrial production at time t-1. Regressions are based on model 1 to 4 specification. I estimate the parameters using the 
interactive version of the generalized method of moments estimation. I also account for time variation through time dummies. I request for 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors based on Bartlett kernel (Newey-West) with 1 lags. I use the regression 
Alpha to measure the size of the abnormal return generated after adjusting for risk. The test statistics are reported in the parentheses and the 
p-value next. The results are* statistically significant at 10% for p<0.1, ** statistically significant at 5% for p<0.05 and ***statistically 









Table 4.3. 12 Effect of Global Risks on Global Momentum Profit in Developed Market 1969-
2014 
 Model Mode2 Model3 Model4 
𝛼3 0.006*** 0.003 0.000 -0.004 
 (3.77) (0.77) (0.08) (-0.75) 
 0.000 0.442 0.937 0.456 
𝐿𝐼𝑄  0.044  0.041 
  (1.14)  (1.07) 
  0.253  0.283 
𝐷𝑆  0.003  0.005 
  (0.70)  (1.17) 
  0.483  0.243 
𝑇𝑆  0.106*  0.117 
  (1.88)  (2.11) 
  0.060  0.035 
MKT  0.033  0.042 
  (0.71)  (0.92) 
  0.476  0.356 
∆𝑂𝑃   -0.023 -0.017 
   (-1.09) (-0.83) 
   0.275 0.409 
𝑊𝑉𝑂𝐿   0.663 0.541 
   (1.49) (1.15) 
   0.136 0.250 
∆𝐼𝑃   0.577** 0.707** 
   (2.08) (2.48) 
   0.038 0.013 
MKTRF -0.061 -0.069* -0.056 -0.071* 
 (-1.46) (-1.71) (-1.34) (-1.69) 
 0.144 0.088 0.181 0.090 
𝑆𝑀𝐵 -0.018 -0.054 -0.007 -0.048 
 (-0.32) (-0.94) (-0.13) (-0.84) 
 0.746 0.349 0.894 0.399 
𝐻𝑀𝐿 -0.176*** -0.196*** -0.161** -0.190*** 
 (-2.72) (-2.90) (-2.48) (-2.81) 
 0.007 0.004 0.013 0.005 
This table reports the regression result based on model (35). Where: the dependent variable R are the returns of the momentum portfolio in 
develop market at time t and regressed on, 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 (high minus low) the return to portfolios that is long on high book-to-market stocks and 
short on low book-to-market stocks in US, 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 (small minus big) returns to long-short portfolios constructed using size in US market, the 
𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑡−1 the liquidity factor at time t-1, 𝐷𝑆𝑡−1 the Default spread at time t-1, 𝑇𝑆𝑡−1 the Term spread at time t-1, 𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡−1 the MSCI world 
indices return at time t-1, ∆𝑂𝑃𝑡−1, the monthly Oil price at time t-1, 𝑊𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑡−1 is the market volatility at time t-1, and ∆𝐼𝑃𝑡−1⁡ is the monthly 
value of the US Industrial production at time t-1. Regressions are based on model 1 to 4 specification. I estimate the parameters using the 
interactive version of the generalized method of moments estimation. I account for time variation through time dummies. I request for 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors based on Bartlett kernel (Newey-West) with 1 lags. I use the regression 
Alpha to measure the size of the abnormal return generated after adjusting for risk. The test statistics are reported in the parentheses and the 
p-value next. The results are* statistically significant at 10% for p<0.1, ** statistically significant at 5% for p<0.05 and ***statistically 










Table 4.3. 13 Effect of Global Risks on Global Momentum Profit in Established Market 1969-
2014 
 Model Mode2 Model3 Model4 
𝛼3 0.007*** 0.009** 0.009*** 0.007 
 (4.98) (1.94) (2.81) (1.49) 
 0.000 0.052 0.005 0.137 
𝐿𝐼𝑄  0.050  0.048 
  (1.45)  (1.41) 
  0.148  0.158 
𝐷𝑆  -0.002  0.001 
  (-0.34)  (0.30) 
  0.734  0.765 
𝑇𝑆  0.074  0.089 
  (1.25)  (1.49) 
  0.213  0.135 
MKT  0.054  0.054 
  (1.12)  (1.14) 
  0.261  0.253 
∆𝑂𝑃   -0.023 -0.027 
   (-1.14) (-1.33) 
   0.255 0.183 
𝑊𝑉𝑂𝐿   -0.344 -0.289 
   (-0.97) (-0.76) 
   0.334 0.447 
∆𝐼𝑃   0.586** 0.684** 
   (2.17) (2.50) 
   0.030 0.012 
MKTRF -0.002 -0.029* -0.035 -0.059 
 (-0.06) (-0.68) (-0.80) (-1.35) 
 0.952 0.495 0.425 0.178 
𝑆𝑀𝐵 -0.040 -0.074 -0.023 -0.054 
 (-0.75) (-1.33) (-0.43) (-0.95) 
 0.451 0.183 0.666 0.343 
𝐻𝑀𝐿 -0.132** -0.161** -0.132 -0.159** 
 (-2.18) (-2.51) (-2.15) (-2.44) 
 0.029 0.012 0.032 0.015 
This table reports the regression result based on model (36) Where: the dependent variable R are the returns of the momentum portfolio in 
established market at time t and regressed on, 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 (high minus low) the return to portfolios that is long on high book-to-market stocks and 
short on low book-to-market stocks in US, 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 (small minus big) returns to long-short portfolios constructed using size in US market, the 
𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑡−1 the liquidity factor at time t-1, 𝐷𝑆𝑡−1 the Default spread at time t-1, 𝑇𝑆𝑡−1 the Term spread at time t-1, 𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡−1 the MSCI world 
indices price level that represent price levels at time t-1, ∆𝑂𝑃𝑡−1, the change on monthly Oil price at time t-1, 𝑊𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑡−1 is the market 
volatility at time t-1, ∆𝑂𝑃𝑡−1 the monthly oil price based world indices value at t-1, and ∆𝐼𝑃𝑡−1⁡ is the monthly value of the US Industrial 
production at time t-1. Regression are based on model 1 to 4 specification. I estimate the parameters using the interactive version of the 
generalized method of moments estimation. I also account for time variation through time dummies. I request for heteroscedasticity and 
autocorrelation consistent standard errors based on Bartlett kernel (Newey-West) with 1 lags. I use the regression Alpha to measure the size 
of the abnormal return generated after adjusting for risk. The test statistics are reported in the parentheses and the p-value next. The results 









Table 4.3. 14 Effect of Global Risks on Global Momentum Profit in Globalization 1994-2014 
 Model Mode2 Model3 Model4 
𝛼3 0.008*** 0.027*** 0.003 0.016 
 (3.53) (4.16) (0.61) (2.07) 
 0.000 0.000 0.539 0.039 
𝐿𝐼𝑄  0.030  0.023 
  (0.77)  (0.59) 
  0.439  0.552 
𝐷𝑆  -0.018***  -0.015** 
  (-2.89)  (-2.06) 
  0.004  0.040 
𝑇𝑆  0.290***  0.336*** 
  (3.07)  (3.41) 
  0.002  0.001 
MKT  -0.022  0.021 
  (-0.39)  (0.37) 
  0.696  0.712 
∆𝑂𝑃   0.013 0.015 
   (0.48) (0.57) 
   0.632 0.566 
𝑊𝑉𝑂𝐿   0.422 0.767 
   (0.74) (1.25) 
   0.460 0.210 
∆𝐼𝑃   1.189*** 0.807** 
   (2.77) (2.01) 
   0.006 0.044 
MKTRF -0.091 -0.151*** -0.181** -0.172*** 
 (-1.53) (-2.65) (-2.59) (-2.66) 
 0.127 0.008 0.010 0.008 
𝑆𝑀𝐵 -0.0235 -0.018 -0.037 -0.038 
 (-0.30) (-0.26) (-0.48) (-0.57) 
 0.764 0.794 0.633 0.569 
𝐻𝑀𝐿 -0.105 -0.183* -0.170* -0.219 
 (-1.16) (-1.94) (-1.92) (-2.42) 
 0.246 0.052 0.055 0.016 
This table reports the regression result based on model (37) Where: the dependent variable R are the returns of the momentum portfolio 
during the globalization periods at time t and regressed on, 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 (high minus low) the return to portfolios that is long on high book-to-
market stocks and short on low book-to-market stocks in US, 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 (small minus big) returns to long-short portfolios constructed using size 
in US market, the 𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑡−1 the liquidity factor at time t-1, 𝐷𝑆𝑡−1 the Default spread at time t-1, 𝑇𝑆𝑡−1 the Term spread at time t-1, 𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡−1 the 
MSCI world indices return at time t-1, ∆𝑂𝑃𝑡−1, the monthly Oil price at time t-1, 𝑊𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑡−1 is the market volatility at time t-1, and ∆𝐼𝑃𝑡−1⁡ is 
the monthly value of the US Industrial production at time t-1. Regression are based on model 1 to 4 specification. I estimate the parameters 
using the interactive version of the generalized method of moments estimation. I also account for time variation through time dummies. I 
request for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors based on Bartlett kernel (Newey-West) with 1 lags. I use the 
regression Alpha to measure the size of the abnormal return generated after adjusting for risk. Test statistics are reported in the parentheses 
and the p-value next. The results are* statistically significant at 10% for p<0.1, ** statistically significant at 5% for p<0.05 and 








Table 4.3. 15 Global Risks Impact on Excess Return of the Global Momentum 1969-2014 
 Model Mode2 Model3 Model4 
𝛼3 0.006*** 0.011* 0.001 0.002 
 (2.97) (1.87) (0.16) (0.24) 
 0.003 0.061 0.876 0.809 
𝐿𝐼𝑄  0.023  0.017 
  (0.62)  (0.44) 
  0.538  0.659 
𝐷𝑆  -0.005  -0.001 
  (-0.87)  (-0.18) 
  0.384  0.858 
𝑇𝑆  0.061  0.085 
  (0.84)  (1.14) 
  0.403  0.254 
MKT  0.009  0.019 
  (0.18)  (0.36) 
  0.859  0.715 
∆𝑂𝑃   -0.004 -0.008 
   (-0.18) (-0.33) 
   0.860 0.742 
𝑊𝑉𝑂𝐿   0.432 0.469 
   (0.98) (1.04) 
   0.327 0.297 
∆𝐼𝑃   0.100*** 1.035*** 
   (3.28) (3.44) 
   0.001 0.001 
MKTRF 0.003 -0.015 -0.030 -0.040 
 (0.06) (-0.33) (-0.61) (-0.83) 
 0.950 0.738 0.544 0.409 
𝑆𝑀𝐵 -0.024 -0.048 -0.007 -0.040 
 (-0.37) (-0.75) (-0.11) (-0.61) 
 0.709 0.451 0.909 0.541 
𝐻𝑀𝐿 -0.120* -0.155** -0.125* -0.160** 
 (-1.77) (-2.18) (-1.83) (-2.25) 
 0.077 0.029 0.067 0.024 
This table reports the regression result based on model (38) Where: the dependent variable 𝑅𝑡 − 𝑅𝐹𝑡 is the excess returns of the momentum 
portfolio at time t and regressed on, 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 (high minus low) the return to portfolios that is long on high book-to-market stocks and short on 
low book-to-market stocks in US, 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 (small minus big) returns to long-short portfolios constructed using size in US market, the 𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑡−1 
the liquidity factor at time t-1, 𝐷𝑆𝑡−1 the Default spread at time t-1, 𝑇𝑆𝑡−1 the Term spread at time t-1, 𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡−1 the MSCI world indices 
return at time t-1, ∆𝑂𝑃𝑡−1, the change on monthly Oil price at time t-1, 𝑊𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑡−1 is the market volatility at time t-1, and ∆𝐼𝑃𝑡−1⁡ is the 
change on monthly value of the US Industrial production at time t-1. Regression are based on model 1 to 4 specification. I estimate the 
parameters using the interactive version of the generalized method of moments estimation. I also account for time variation through time 
dummies. I request for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors based on Bartlett kernel (Newey-West) with 1 lags I 
use the regression Alpha to measure the size of the abnormal return generated after adjusting for risk. The test statistics are reported in the 
parentheses and the p-value next. The results are* statistically significant at 10% for p<0.1, ** statistically significant at 5% for p<0.05 and 








Table 4.4. 1 Fama and French Risks Impact on Global Contrarian Profit 1969-2014 
Fama and French Three Factor with Excess Return on MSCI World Index 
 Panel A: FF 3-Factors Model 
 36-month 48-month 60-month 
αo 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 
 (13.24) (13.11) (15.46) 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 
MKTRF 0.024* 0.010 0.012 
 (1.82) (0.87) (1.64) 
 0.069 0.382 0.100 
SMB -0.084*** -0.031* -0.001 
 (-3.08) (-1.74) (-0.10) 
 0.002 0.081 0.919 
HML -0.024 -0.01£ 0.016 
 (-1.15) (-0.69) (1.15) 
 0.248 0.493 0.249 
Panel B: Fama and French three Factor with US Excess Market Return 
 Panel A: FF 3-Factors Model 
 36-month 48-month 60-month 
αo 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 
 (12.93) (12.70) (16.00) 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 
ERM 0.029** 0.004 0.009 
 (2.14) (0.37) (1.21) 
 0.033 0.713 0.228 
SMB -0.090*** -0.031 -0.002 
 (-3.25) (-1.75) (-0.19) 
 0.001 0.079 0.853 
HML -0.016 -0.014 0.016 
 (-0.73) (-0.74) (1.11) 
 0.466 0.457 0.267 
This table reports the regression result based on model (39). Where: the dependent variable R are the returns of the contrarian portfolio at 
time t and regressed on, ERM and MKTRF the excess market returns, HML (high minus low) the return to portfolio that is long on high 
book-to-market stocks and short on low book-to-market stocks in US, and BMS (small minus big) returns to long-short portfolios 
constructed using size in US market. Panel A provide the results with the excess return based on MSCI world index, while panel B are based 
on US excess return. I estimate the parameters using the interactive version of the generalized method of moments estimation. I also account 
for time variation through time dummies. I request for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors based on Bartlett 
kernel (Newey-West) with 1 lags. I use the regression Alpha to measure the size of the abnormal return generated after adjusting for risk. 
The test statistics are reported in the parentheses and the p-value next. The results are* statistically significant at 10% for p<0.1, ** 










Table 4.4. 2 Markets States Risks Impact on Global Contrarian Profit 1969-2014 
 Parameter 
𝛼1 LIQ DS TS MKT 
36-Month 0.009*** 0.012 -0.002** 0.008 0.004 
 (7.54) (1.34) (-2.14) (0.50) (0.36) 
 0.000 0.181 0.032 0.616 0.720 
48-Month 0.007*** 0.010 -0.006 0.005 0.008 
 (7.04) (1.36) (-1.64) (0.38) (0.75) 
 0.000 0.173 0.100 0.700 0.453 
60-month 0.007*** -0.002 -0.002*** -0.003 0.011 
 (9.02) (-0.32) (-3.16) (-0.28) (1.46) 
 0.000 0.750 0.002 0.782 0.145 
This table reports the regression result based on model (40). Where: 𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑡−1 is the liquidity factor at time t-1, 𝐷𝑆𝑡−1 the Default spread at 
time t-1, TS the Term spread at time t-1 and the𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡−1 the MSCI world indices return at time t-1. I estimate the parameters using the 
interactive version of the generalized method of moments estimation. I also account for time variation through time dummies. I request for 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors based on Bartlett kernel (Newey-West) with 1 lags. I use the regression 
Alpha to measure the size of the abnormal return generated after adjusting for risk the R-square are also reported. I also report the 
autocorrelation coefficient of the residual, the GMM statistics are reported in the parentheses and the p-value next. The results are* 




















Table 4.4. 3 Effect of Macroeconomic Risk on Global Contrarian Profits 1969-2014 
 Parameter 
𝛼1 ∆OP ∆IP MKVOL 
36-Month 0.011*** 0.006 -0.619*** -0.014 
 (11.92) (0.95) (-6.23) (-0.21) 
 0.000 0.341 0.000 0.835 
48-Month 0.010*** 0.008 -0.673*** 0.076 
 (9.18) (1.55) (-5.28) (1.19) 
 0.000 0.122 0.000 0.233 
60-month 0.008*** -0.007** -0.367*** 0.019 
 (9.08) (-2.00) (-3.36) (0.37) 
 0.000 0.045 0.001 0.713 
This table reports the regression result based on model (41) Where: ∆𝑂𝑃𝑇−1, is the change in Oil price at time T-1, ∆⁡𝐼𝑃𝑇−1 the change in 
monthly value of the US Industrial production at time T-1 and  𝑀𝐾𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑇−1 the market volatility at time T-1 based on the MSCI world 
return. I estimate the parameters using the interactive version of the generalized method of moments estimation. I also account for time 
variation through time dummies. I request for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors based on Bartlett kernel 
(Newey-West) with 1 lags. I use the regression Alpha to measure the size of the abnormal return generated after adjusting for risk. The 
test statistics are reported in the parentheses and the p-value next. The results are* statistically significant at 10% for p<0.1, ** statistically 




















Table 4.4. 4 Effect of Global Risk Factor on Global Contrarian Profits 1969-2014 
 Model Mode2 Model3 Model4 
𝛼3 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 
 (13.24) (6.30) (9.08) (6.58) 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
𝐿𝐼𝑄  0.014*  0.006 
  (1.86)  (0.88) 
  0.063  0.382 
𝐷𝑆  -0.001  -0.000 
  (-1.09)  (-0.17) 
  0.275  0.865 
𝑇𝑆  0.004  0.0105 
  (0.32)  (0.76) 
  0.752  0.444 
MKT  0.015  0.009 
  (1.34)  (0.85) 
  0.180  0.398 
∆𝑂𝑃   0.009* 0.009* 
   (1.76) (1.69) 
   0.078 0.092 
𝑊𝑉𝑂𝐿   -0.686*** -0.639*** 
   (-5.16) (-4.75) 
   0.000 0.000 
∆𝐼𝑃   0.080 0.078 
   (1.23) (1.06) 
   0.220 0.290 
MKTRF 0.024 0.011 -0.455 -0.456 
 (1.82) (1.04) (-0.44) (-0.45) 
 0.069 0.297 0.656 0.651 
𝑆𝑀𝐵 -0.084*** -0.040** -0.026 -0.033* 
 (-3.08) (-2.11) (-1.48) (-1.76) 
 0.002 0.035 0.139 0.078 
𝐻𝑀𝐿 -0.024 -0.020 -0.025 -0.031 
 (-1.15) (-1.11) (-1.37) (-1.68) 
 0.248 0.265 0.171 0.093 
This table reports the regression result based on model (42). Where: the dependent variable R are the returns of the contrarian portfolio at 
time t and regressed on, 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 (high minus low) the return to portfolios that is long on high book-to-market stocks and short on low book-
to-market stocks in US, 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 (small minus big) returns to long-short portfolios constructed using size in US market, the 𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑡−1 the 
liquidity factor at time t-1, 𝐷𝑆𝑡−1 the Default spread at time t-1, 𝑇𝑆𝑡−1 the Term spread at time t-1, 𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡−1 the MSCI world indices return t-
1, and ∆𝑂𝑃𝑡−1, the chance on monthly Oil price at time t-1, 𝑊𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑡−1 is the market volatility at time t-1, and  ∆𝐼𝑃𝑡−1⁡ is the change on 
monthly value of the US Industrial production at time t-1. I estimate the parameters using the interactive version of the generalized method 
of moments estimation. I also account for time variation through time dummies. I request for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation 
consistent standard errors based on Bartlett kernel (Newey-West) with 1 lags. These regressions are based on model 1 to 4 specification. I 
use the regression Alpha to measure the size of the abnormal return generated after adjusting for risk. The test statistics are reported in the 
parentheses and the p-value next. The results are* statistically significant at 10% for p<0.1, ** statistically significant at 5% for p<0.05 and 









Table 4.4. 5 Global Risk Factor and Global Contrarian Profit Seasonal Effect 1969-2014 
 36-Month 48-Month 60-Month 
𝛼3 0.012*** 0.010*** 0.009**** 
 (8.65) (6.58) (8.68) 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 
𝐿𝐼𝑄 0.011 0.006 -0.002 
 (1.36) (0.88) (-0.41) 
 0.175 0.382 0.681 
𝐷𝑆 -0.001 -0.000 -0.002** 
 (-0.69) (-0.17) (-2.58) 
 0.489 0.865 0.010 
𝑇𝑆 0.026 0.0105 -0.008 
 (1.55) (0.76) (-0.72) 
 0.120 0.444 0.470 
MKT -0.002 0.009 0.013 
 (-0.17) (0.85) (1.57) 
 0.862 0.398 0.117 
∆𝑂𝑃 0.010 0.009* -0.009 
 (1.54) (1.69) (-2.57) 
 0.123 0.092 0.010 
𝑊𝑉𝑂𝐿 -0.572*** -0.639*** -0.298*** 
 (-4.99) (-4.75) (-2.82) 
 0.000 0.000 0.005 
∆𝐼𝑃 -0.020 0.078 -0.036 
 (-0.28) (1.06) (-0.65) 
 0.777 0.290 0.513 
MKTRF -0.004 -0.005 0.002 
 (-0.33) (-0.45) (0.24) 
 0.744 0.651 0.812 
𝑆𝑀𝐵 -0.080*** -0.033* 0.004 
 (-2.88) (-1.76) (0.36) 
 0.004 0.078 0.721 
𝐻𝑀𝐿 -0.042* -0.031* 0.011* 
 (-1.93) (-1.68) (0.75) 
 0.054 0.093 0.455 
This table reports the regression result based on model (42). Where: the dependent variable R are the returns of the contrarian portfolio (9-
month/3, 6, 9, 12-month) at time t and regressed on, 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 (high minus low) the return to portfolios that is long on high book-to-market 
stocks and short on low book-to-market stocks in US, 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 (small minus big) returns to long-short portfolios constructed using size in US 
market, the 𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑡−1 the liquidity factor at time t-1, 𝐷𝑆𝑡−1 the Default spread at time t-1, 𝑇𝑆𝑡−1 the Term spread at time t-1, 𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡−1 the MSCI 
world indices return at time t-1, ∆𝑂𝑃𝑡−1, the monthly Oil price at time t-1, 𝑊𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑡−1 is the market volatility at time t-1, and ∆𝐼𝑃𝑡−1⁡ is the 
monthly value of the US Industrial production at time t-1. I estimate the parameters using the interactive version of the generalized method 
of moments estimation. I also account for time variation through time dummies. I request for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation 
consistent standard errors based on Bartlett kernel (Newey-West) with 1 lags. I use the regression Alpha to measure the size of the abnormal 
return generated after adjusting for risk. The test statistics are reported in the parentheses and the p-value next. The results are* statistically 







Table 4.4. 6 Effect of Global Risk Factors on Global Contrarian Profit During Crisis Period 
1969-2010 
 Currency Crisis Stock Market Crash Banking Crisis 
𝛼3 0.042*** -0.008*** 0.014*** 
 3.05 -2.82 5.37 
 0.002 0.005 0.000 
𝐿𝐼𝑄 -0.019** 0.003 0.015 
 -2.17 0.32 1.04 
 0.030 0.751 0.296 
𝐷𝑆 -0.035** 0.010*** -0.003** 
 (-2.58) (5.13) (-2.15) 
 0.010 0.000 0.031 
𝑇𝑆 0.032 -0.018 -0.009 
 (0.89) (-0.74) (-0.370 
 0.371 0.462 0.709 
MKT 0.014 0.012 0.032 
 (0.48) (0.70) (1.73) 
 0.633 0.483 0.083 
∆𝑂𝑃 0.009 0.017* -0.019*** 
 (0.84) (1.65) (-2.14) 
 0.399 0.099 0.032 
𝑊𝑉𝑂𝐿 0.774** -0.377*** -0.441** 
 (1.89) (-2.93) (-2.46) 
 0.059 0.003 0.014 
∆𝐼𝑃 0.134 0.2543309 0.1068137 
 (0.49) (2.43) (0.95) 
 0.623 0.015 0.343 
MKTRF -0.068*** -0.026 0.009 
 (-4.92) (-1.52) (0.59) 
 0.000 0.129 0.553 
𝑆𝑀𝐵 -0.053 -0.039** 0.022 
 (-1.47) (-1.81) (0.58)  
 0.143 0.070 0.559 
𝐻𝑀𝐿 -0.058 -0.094*** -0.044 
 (-1.18) (-4.15) (-1.56) 
 0.238 0.000 0.119 
This table reports the regression result based on model (44). Where: the dependent variable R are the returns of the contrarian portfolio 
during crisis periods at time t and regressed on, 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 (high minus low) the return to portfolios that is long on high book-to-market stocks 
and short on low book-to-market stocks in US, 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 (small minus big) returns to long-short portfolios constructed using size in US market, 
the 𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑡−1 the liquidity factor at time t-1, 𝐷𝑆𝑡−1 the Default spread at time t-1, 𝑇𝑆𝑡−1 the Term spread at time t-1, 𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡−1 the MSCI world 
indices return time t-1, ∆𝑂𝑃𝑡−1, the chance on monthly Oil price at time t-1, 𝑊𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑡−1 is the market volatility at time t-1, and ∆𝐼𝑃𝑡−1⁡ is the 
change on monthly value of the US Industrial production at time t-1.For detailed definition of the crisis period please see Appendix E4. I 
estimate the parameters using the interactive version of the generalized method of moments estimation. I also account for time variation 
through time dummies. I request for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors based on Bartlett kernel (Newey-West) 
with 1 lags.  I use the regression Alpha to measure the size of the abnormal return generated after adjusting for risk. The test statistics are 
reported in the parentheses and the p-value next. The results are* statistically significant at 10% for p<0.1, ** statistically significant at 5% 









Table 4.4. 7 Effect of Global Risks on Global Contrarian Profit in Crisis Period 1969-2010 (all 
crisis) 
 Model Mode2 Model3 Model4 
𝛼3 0.005*** 0.001 0.008**** 0.001 
 (8.25) (0.37) (5.67) (0.38) 
 0.000 0.710 0.000 0.701 
𝐿𝐼𝑄  0.0140  0.010 
  (1.33)  (1.04) 
  0.185  0.299 
𝐷𝑆  0.004**  0.005*** 
  (2.29)  (3.14) 
  0.022  0.002 
𝑇𝑆  -0.021  0.001 
  (-1.06)  (0.06) 
  0.290  0.954 
MKT  0.048***  0.040*** 
  (3.16)  (2.75) 
  0.002  0.006 
∆𝑂𝑃   0.001 0.005 
   (0.12) (0.56) 
   0.903 0.574 
𝑊𝑉𝑂𝐿   -0.399*** -0.303** 
   (-2.85) (-2.22) 
   0.004 0.026 
∆𝐼𝑃   0.254*** 0.336*** 
   (2.93) (3.54) 
   0.003 0.000 
MKTRF 0.010 0.017 -0.006 -0.006 
 (0.71) (1.18) (-0.51) (-0.45) 
 0.478 0.237 0.610 0.654 
𝑆𝑀𝐵 -0.052** -0.069*** -0.032 -0.046** 
 (-2.32) (-3.08) (-1.39) (-2.04) 
 0.020 0.002 0.165 0.041 
𝐻𝑀𝐿 -0.060*** -0.077*** -0.064*** -0.079*** 
 (-2.71) (-3.64) (-3.10) (-4.02) 
 0.007 0.000 0.002 0.000 
This table reports the regression result based on model (43) Where: the dependent variable R are the returns of the contrarian portfolio 
during crisis periods (all crisis) at time t and regressed on, 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 (high minus low) the return to portfolios that is long on high book-to-
market stocks and short on low book-to-market stocks in US, 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 (small minus big) returns to long-short portfolios constructed using size 
in US market, the 𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑡−1 the liquidity factor at time t-1, 𝐷𝑆𝑡−1 the Default spread at time t-1, 𝑇𝑆𝑡−1 the Term spread at time t-1, 𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡−1 the 
MSCI world indices return at time t-1, ∆𝑂𝑃𝑡−1, the change on monthly Oil price at time t-1, 𝑊𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑡−1 is the market volatility at time t-1, 
and  ∆𝐼𝑃𝑡−1⁡ is the change on monthly value of the US Industrial production at time t-1. For detailed definition of the crisis period please see 
Appendix E4. Regression are based on model 1 to 4 specification. I estimate the parameters using the interactive version of the generalized 
method of moments estimation. I also account for time variation through time dummies. I request for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation 
consistent standard errors based on Bartlett kernel (Newey-West) with 1 lags. I use the regression Alpha to measure the size of the abnormal 
return generated after adjusting for risk. The test statistics are reported in the parentheses and the p-value next. The results are* statistically 









Table 4.4. 8 Effect of Global Risks on Global Contrarian Profit During Non-Crisis Period 1969-
2010 
 Model Mode2 Model3 Model4 
𝛼3 0.006*** 0.019*** 0.014*** 0.025** 
 (9.63) (12.24) (11.66) (15.92) 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
𝐿𝐼𝑄  -0.004  -0.001 
  (-0.34)  (-0.07) 
  0.736  0.941 
𝐷𝑆  -0.01***  -0.014*** 
  (-9.37)  (-10.18) 
  0.000  0.000 
𝑇𝑆  0.001  -0.004 
  (0.07)  (-0.19) 
  0.948  0.852 
MKT  -0.018  -0.013 
  (-0.99)  (-0.83) 
  0.321  0.406 
∆𝑂𝑃   0.009 0.009 
   (1.43) (1.38) 
   0.151 0.167 
𝑊𝑉𝑂𝐿   -1.037*** -0.959*** 
   (-7.11) (-8.31) 
   0.000 0.000 
∆𝐼𝑃   -0.221** -0.193** 
   (-2.24) (-2.07) 
   0.025 0.038 
MKTRF 0.025 0.020 0.019 0.019 
 (1.49) (1.18) (1.23) (1.24) 
 0.136 0.238 0.220 0.215 
𝑆𝑀𝐵 0.005 0.033 0.005 0.026 
 (0.24) (1.49) (0.26) (1.29) 
 0.813 0.137 0.797 0.198 
𝐻𝑀𝐿 0.092*** 0.099*** 0.057** 0.065*** 
 (3.46) (4.26) (2.25) (2.92) 
 0.001 0.000 0.024 0.004 
This table reports the regression result based on model (43). Where: the dependent variable R are the returns of the contrarian portfolio 
during non-crisis periods at time t and regressed on, 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 (high minus low) the return to portfolios that is long on high book-to-market 
stocks and short on low book-to-market stocks in US, 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 (small minus big) returns to long-short portfolios constructed using size in US 
market, the 𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑡−1 the liquidity factor at time t-1, 𝐷𝑆𝑡−1 the Default spread at time t-1, 𝑇𝑆𝑡−1 the Term spread at time t-1, 𝑀𝑆𝐶𝐼𝑊𝑡−1 the 
MSCI world indices price level that represent price levels at time t-1, ∆𝑂𝑃𝑡−1, the change on monthly Oil price at time t-1, 𝑊𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑡−1 is the 
market volatility at time t-1, and ∆𝐼𝑃𝑡−1⁡ is the change on monthly value of the US Industrial production at time t-1. For detailed definition 
of the crisis period please see Appendix E4. Non-criss period exclude all crisis periods from de sample 1969-2010. Regression are based on 
model 1 to 4 specification. I estimate the parameters using the interactive version of the generalized method of moments estimation. I also 
account for time variation through time dummies. I request for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors based on 
Bartlett kernel (Newey-West) with 1 lags. I use the regression Alpha to measure the size of the abnormal return generated after adjusting for 
risk. The test statistics are reported in the parentheses and the p-value next. The results are* statistically significant at 10% for p<0.1, ** 








Table 4.4. 9 Effect of Global Risks on Global Contrarian Profit during Expansion Period 1969-
2014 
 Model Mode2 Model3 Model4 
𝛼3 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.011*** 0.010*** 
 (14.68) (3.23) (7.77) (4.72) 
 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 
𝐿𝐼𝑄  0.009  0.004 
  (1.19)  (0.50) 
  0.236  0.616 
𝐷𝑆  0.002  0.001 
  (1.06)  (0.79) 
  0.290  0.432 
𝑇𝑆  0.008  0.007 
  (0.43)  (0.40) 
  0.665  0.691 
MKT  -0.002  0.006 
  (-0.16)  (0.40) 
  0.875  0.686 
∆𝑂𝑃   0.006 0.006 
   (0.84) (0.87) 
   0.400 0.382 
𝑊𝑉𝑂𝐿   -0.676*** -0.665*** 
   (-3.67) (-3.59) 
   0.000 0.000 
∆𝐼𝑃   -0.028 -0.007 
   (-0.31) (-0.08) 
   0.758 0.938 
MKTRF -0.005 -0.004 -0.010 -0.008 
 (-0.38) (-0.28) (-0.73) (-0.64) 
 0.705 0.783 0.465 0.525 
𝑆𝑀𝐵 -0.018 -0.023 -0.022 -.028 
 (-0.94) (-1.18) (-1.15) (-1.40) 
 0.349 0.236 0.249 0.161 
𝐻𝑀𝐿 -0.023 -0.027 -0.034* -0.040* 
 (-1.12) (-1.36) (-1.66) (-1.92) 
 0.261 0.174 0.096 0.055 
This table reports the regression results based on Equation (44). Where: the dependent variable R are the returns of the contrarian portfolio 
during expansion periods at time t and regressed on, 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 (high minus low) the return to portfolios that is long on high book-to-market 
stocks and short on low book-to-market stocks in US, 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 (small minus big) returns to long-short portfolios constructed using size in US 
market, the 𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑡−1 the liquidity factor at time t-1, 𝐷𝑆𝑡−1 the Default spread at time t-1, 𝑇𝑆𝑡−1 the Term spread at time t-1, 𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡−1 the MSCI 
world indices return at time t-1, ∆𝑂𝑃𝑡−1, the change on monthly Oil price at time t-1, 𝑊𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑡−1 is the market volatility at time t-1, and 
∆𝐼𝑃𝑡−1⁡ is the change on monthly value of the US Industrial production at time t-1. For detailed definition of the expansion period please see 
Appendix E4. Regression are based on model 1 to 4 specification. I estimate the parameters using the interactive version of the generalized 
method of moments estimation. I also account for time variation through time dummies. I request for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation 
consistent standard errors with based on Bartlett kernel (Newey-West) with 1 lags. I use the regression Alpha to measure the size of the 
abnormal return generated after adjusting for risk. The test statistics are reported in the parentheses and the p-value next. The results are* 









Table 4.4. 10 Effect of Global Risks on Global Contrarian Profit during Contraction 1969-2014 
 Model Mode2 Model3 Model4 
𝛼3 0.001 0.004** 0.006*** 0.003 
 (1.58) (1.95) (3.74) (0.74) 
 0.114 0.051 0.000 0.458 
𝐿𝐼𝑄  0.015  0.016 
  (1.28)  (1.62) 
  0.202  0.105 
𝐷𝑆  -0.000  0.002 
  (-0.32)  (0.95) 
  0.745  0.340 
𝑇𝑆  0.003  0.009 
  (0.13)  (0.41) 
  0.898  0.685 
MKT  0.029**  0.020 
  (1.94)  (1.44) 
  0.052  0.151 
∆𝑂𝑃   0.009 0.010 
   (1.05) (1.03) 
   0.292 0.303 
𝑊𝑉𝑂𝐿   -0.378*** -0.341*** 
   (-3.97) (-3.27) 
   0.000 0.001 
∆𝐼𝑃   0.027 0.092 
   (0.30) (1.04) 
   0.766 0.299   
MKTRF 0.034** 0.032* 0.011 -0.002 
 (2.08) (1.80) (0.65) (-0.11) 
 0.037 0.071 0.517 0.911 
𝑆𝑀𝐵 -0.121*** -0.138*** -0.075* -0.093* 
 (-3.37) (-3.27) (-1.86) (-2.08) 
 0.001 0.001 0.063 0.037 
𝐻𝑀𝐿 0.016 -0.001 0.002 -0.006 
 (0.62) (-0.04) (0.05) (-0.22) 
 0.535 0.970 0.957 0.824 
This table reports the regression result based on model (44). Where: the dependent variable R are the returns of the contrarian portfolio 
during contraction periods at time t and regressed on, 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 (high minus low) the return to portfolios that is long on high book-to-market 
stocks and short on low book-to-market stocks in US, 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 (small minus big) returns to long-short portfolios constructed using size in US 
market, the 𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑡−1 the liquidity factor at time t-1, 𝐷𝑆𝑡−1 the Default spread at time t-1, 𝑇𝑆𝑡−1 the Term spread at time t-1, 𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡−1 the MSCI 
world indices return at time t-1, ∆𝑂𝑃𝑡−1, the change on monthly Oil price at time t-1, 𝑊𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑡−1 is the market volatility at time t-1, and 
∆𝐼𝑃𝑡−1⁡ is the change on monthly value of the US Industrial production at time t-1. Regressions are based on model 1 to 4 specification. For 
detailed definition of the contraction period please see Appendix E4. For the contraction period, all expansion periods are excluded from the 
sample 1969-2014 I estimate the parameters using the interactive version of the generalized method of moments estimation. I also account 
for time variation through time dummies. I request for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors based on Bartlett 
kernel (Newey-West) with 1 lags. I use the regression Alpha to measure the size of the abnormal return generated after adjusting for risk. 
The test statistics are reported in the parentheses and the p-value next. The results are* statistically significant at 10% for p<0.1, ** 









Table 4.4. 11 Effect of Global Risks on Global Contrarian Profit in Emerging Market 1988-
2014 
 Model Mode2 Model3 Model4 
𝛼3 0.007*** 0.014*** 0.010*** 0.014*** 
 (10.18) (9.95) (8.21) (7.25) 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
𝐿𝐼𝑄  -0.008  -0.009 
  (-0.98)  (-1.03) 
  0.328  0.304 
𝐷𝑆  -0.007***  -0.005*** 
  (-5.70)  (-3.36) 
  0.000  0.001 
𝑇𝑆  -0.002  0.001 
  (-0.11)  (0.03) 
  0.911  0.976 
MKT  0.038***  0.039*** 
  (2.69)  (2.75) 
  0.007  0.006 
∆𝑂𝑃   0.001 0.000 
   (0.18) (0.04) 
   0.854 0.967 
𝑊𝑉𝑂𝐿   -0.404*** -0.311*** 
   (-3.41) (-2.97) 
   0.001 0.003 
∆𝐼𝑃   0.359*** 0.158* 
   (4.07) (1.68) 
   0.000 0.093 
MKTRF 0.019 0.012 -0.007 0.000 
 (0.98) (0.73) (-0.39) (0.01) 
 0.329 0.464 0.698 0.992 
𝑆𝑀𝐵 -0.088*** -0.056* -0.069** -0.057* 
 (-2.64) (-1.81) (-2.28) (-1.86) 
 0.008 0.070 0.023 0.063 
𝐻𝑀𝐿 -0.041 -0.056*** -0.046** -0.057*** 
 (-1.63) (-2.99) (-2.01) (-2.71) 
 0.104 0.003 0.045 0.007 
This table reports the regression result based on model (45). Where: the dependent variable R are the returns of the contrarian portfolio in 
emerging market at time t and regressed on, 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 (high minus low) the return to portfolios that is long on high book-to-market stocks and 
short on low book-to-market stocks in US, 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 (small minus big) returns to long-short portfolios constructed using size in US market, the 
𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑡−1 the liquidity factor at time t-1, 𝐷𝑆𝑡−1 the Default spread at time t-1, 𝑇𝑆𝑡−1 the Term spread at time t-1, 𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡−1 the MSCI world 
indices return  at time t-1, ∆𝑂𝑃𝑡−1, the monthly Oil price at time t-1, 𝑊𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑡−1 is the market volatility at time t-1, and ∆𝐼𝑃𝑡−1⁡ is the monthly 
value of the US Industrial production at time t-1. Regressions are based on model 1 to 4 specification. I estimate the parameters using the 
interactive version of the generalized method of moments estimation. I also account for time variation through time dummies. I request for 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors based on Bartlett kernel (Newey-West) with 1 lags. I use the regression 
Alpha to measure the size of the abnormal return generated after adjusting for risk. The test statistics are reported in the parentheses and the 
p-value next. The results are* statistically significant at 10% for p<0.1, ** statistically significant at 5% for p<0.05 and ***statistically 









Table 4.4. 12 Effect of Global Risks on Global Contrarian Profit in Developed Market 1969-
2014 
 Model Mode2 Model3 Model4 
𝛼3 0.006*** 0.004*** 0.007*** 0.004*** 
 (16.37) (4.77) (8.16) (3.69) 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
𝐿𝐼𝑄  0.016**  0.016** 
  (2.15)  (2.06) 
  0.031  0.040 
𝐷𝑆  0.002**  0.002** 
  (2.48)  (2.14) 
  0.013  0.032 
𝑇𝑆  0.024*  0.022* 
  (1.85)  (1.69) 
  0.065  0.091 
MKT  0.007  0.007 
  (0.67)  (0.69) 
  0.505  0.492 
∆𝑂𝑃   -0.006 -0.005 
   (-1.01) (-0.88) 
   0.315 0.380 
𝑊𝑉𝑂𝐿   -0.062 -0.042 
   (-0.73) (-0.44) 
   0.463 0.659 
∆𝐼𝑃   -0.033 0.026 
   (-0.55) (0.38) 
   0.579 0.706   
MKTRF -0.001 0.000 -0.002 -0.003 
 (-0.12) (0.00) (-0.22) (-0.32) 
 0.903 1.000 0.824 0.752 
𝑆𝑀𝐵 -0.050*** -0.066*** -0.045*** -0.059*** 
 (-2.26) (-2.94) (-2.04) (-2.61) 
 0.024 0.003 0.041 0.009 
𝐻𝑀𝐿 -0.031 -0.042** -0.025 -0.036* 
 (-1.51) (-2.22) (-1.20) (-1.83) 
 0.131 0.027 0.231 0.067 
This table reports the regression result based on model (46). Where: the dependent variable R are the returns of the contrarian portfolio in 
develop market at time t and regressed on, 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 (high minus low) the return to portfolios that is long on high book-to-market stocks and 
short on low book-to-market stocks in US, 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 (small minus big) returns to long-short portfolios constructed using size in US market, the 
𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑡−1 the liquidity factor at time t-1, 𝐷𝑆𝑡−1 the Default spread at time t-1, 𝑇𝑆𝑡−1 the Term spread at time t-1, 𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡−1 the MSCI world 
indices return at time t-1, ∆𝑂𝑃𝑡−1, the monthly Oil price at time t-1, 𝑊𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑡−1 is the market volatility at time t-1, and ∆𝐼𝑃𝑡−1⁡ is the monthly 
value of the US Industrial production at time t-1. Regressions are based on model 1 to 4 specification. I estimate the parameters using the 
interactive version of the generalized method of moments estimation. I account for time variation through time dummies. I request for 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors based on Bartlett kernel (Newey-West) with 1 lags. I use the regression 
Alpha to measure the size of the abnormal return generated after adjusting for risk. The test statistics are reported in the parentheses and the 
p-value next. The results are* statistically significant at 10% for p<0.1, ** statistically significant at 5% for p<0.05 and ***statistically 









Table 4.4. 13 Effect of Global Risks on Global Contrarian Profit in Established Market 1969-
2014 
 Model Mode2 Model3 Model4 
𝛼3 0.005*** 0.003*** 0.005*** 0.002* 
 (13.71) (2.93) (5.14) (1.74) 
 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.082 
𝐿𝐼𝑄  0.009  0.008 
  (1.34)  (1.33) 
  0.180  0.182 
𝐷𝑆  0.002**  0.003*** 
  (2.04)  (2.97) 
  0.041  0.003   
𝑇𝑆  0.008  0.013 
  (0.72)  (1.14) 
  0.471  0.252 
MKT  0.003  0.006 
  (0.39)  (0.68) 
  0.700  0.499 
∆𝑂𝑃   -0.005 -0.004 
   (-1.11) (-0.87) 
   0.265 0.386 
𝑊𝑉𝑂𝐿   -0.037 -0.072 
   (-0.36) (-0.69) 
   0.717 0.490 
∆𝐼𝑃   0.082 0.166*** 
   (1.63) (2.78) 
   0.104 0.006 
MKTRF -0.012 -0.011 -0.012 -0.016** 
 (-1.44) (-1.36) (-1.51) (-2.02) 
 0.151 0.174 0.131 0.043 
𝑆𝑀𝐵 -0.029** -0.036*** -0.025* -0.032** 
 (-2.26) (-2.68) (-1.93) (-2.45) 
 0.024 0.007 0.054 0.014 
𝐻𝑀𝐿 -0.019 -0.028* -0.018 -0.031** 
 (-1.32) (-1.93) (-1.21) (-2.16) 
 0.186 0.054 0.227 0.030 
This table reports the regression result based on model (47). Where: the dependent variable R are the returns of the contrarian portfolio in 
established market at time t and regressed on, 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 (high minus low) the return to portfolios that is long on high book-to-market stocks and 
short on low book-to-market stocks in US, 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 (small minus big) returns to long-short portfolios constructed using size in US market, the 
𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑡−1 the liquidity factor at time t-1, 𝐷𝑆𝑡−1 the Default spread at time t-1, 𝑇𝑆𝑡−1 the Term spread at time t-1, 𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡−1 the MSCI world 
indices price level that represent price levels at time t-1, ∆𝑂𝑃𝑡−1, the change on monthly Oil price at time t-1, 𝑊𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑡−1 is the market 
volatility at time t-1, ∆𝑂𝑃𝑡−1 the monthly oil price based world indices value at t-1, and ∆𝐼𝑃𝑡−1⁡ is the monthly value of the US Industrial 
production at time t-1. Regression are based on model 1 to 4 specification. I estimate the parameters using the interactive version of the 
generalized method of moments estimation. I also account for time variation through time dummies. I request for heteroscedasticity and 
autocorrelation consistent standard errors based on Bartlett kernel (Newey-West) with 1 lags. I use the regression Alpha to measure the size 
of the abnormal return generated after adjusting for risk. The test statistics are reported in the parentheses and the p-value next. The results 









Table 4.4. 14 Effect of Global Risks on Global Contrarian Profit in Globalization 1994-2014 
 Model Mode2 Model3 Model4 
𝛼3 0.004*** 0.012*** 0.010*** 0.017*** 
 (6.01) (6.29) (7.59) (8.42) 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
𝐿𝐼𝑄  -0.013  -0.014 
  (-1.20)  (-1.41) 
  0.229  0.159 
𝐷𝑆  -0.008***  -0.007*** 
  (-4.59)  (-4.84) 
  0.000  0.000 
𝑇𝑆  -0.003  -0.018 
  (-0.14)  (-0.95) 
  0.891  0.344 
MKT  -0.001  -0.015 
  (-0.10)  (-1.35) 
  0.922  0.176 
∆𝑂𝑃   0.006 0.000 
   (0.96) (0.00) 
   0.339 0.998 
𝑊𝑉𝑂𝐿   -0.680*** -0.577*** 
   (-5.45) (-5.20) 
   0.000 0.000 
∆𝐼𝑃   0.128 -0.158 
   (1.36) (-1.43) 
   0.173 0.153 
MKTRF 0.024 0.016 -0.029* -0.003 
 (1.44) (1.14) (-1.78) (-0.21) 
 0.151 0.254 0.075 0.835 
𝑆𝑀𝐵 -0.071** -0.027 -0.004 -0.004 
 (-1.98) (-0.82) (-0.11) (-0.14) 
 0.048 0.412 0.911 0.892 
𝐻𝑀𝐿 0.069* 0.032 0.045 0.034 
 (1.87)   (0.84) (1.33) (1.11) 
 0.061 0.398 0.182 0.266 
This table reports the regression result based on model (48). Where: the dependent variable R are the returns of the contrarian portfolio 
during the globalization periods at time t and regressed on, 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 (high minus low) the return to portfolios that is long on high book-to-
market stocks and short on low book-to-market stocks in US, 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 (small minus big) returns to long-short portfolios constructed using size 
in US market, the 𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑡−1 the liquidity factor at time t-1, 𝐷𝑆𝑡−1 the Default spread at time t-1, 𝑇𝑆𝑡−1 the Term spread at time t-1, 𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡−1 the 
MSCI world indices return at time t-1, ∆𝑂𝑃𝑡−1, the monthly Oil price at time t-1, 𝑊𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑡−1 is the market volatility at time t-1, and ∆𝐼𝑃𝑡−1⁡ is 
the monthly value of the US Industrial production at time t-1. Regression are based on model 1 to 4 specification. I estimate the parameters 
using the interactive version of the generalized method of moments estimation. I also account for time variation through time dummies. I 
request for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors based on Bartlett kernel (Newey-West) with 1 lags. I use the 
regression Alpha to measure the size of the abnormal return generated after adjusting for risk. Test statistics are reported in the parentheses 
and the p-value next. The results are* statistically significant at 10% for p<0.1, ** statistically significant at 5% for p<0.05 and 










Table 4.4. 15 Global Risks Impact on Contrarian Strategy Excess Return 1969-2014 
 Model Mode2 Model3 Model4 
𝛼3 0.001*** 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.006*** 
 (3.77) (4.71) (5.37) (4.98) 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
𝐿𝐼𝑄  0.015*  0.008 
  (1.93)  (1.05) 
  0.053  0.296 
𝐷𝑆  -0.003***  -0.018*** 
  (-3.19)  (-2.01) 
  0.001  0.044 
𝑇𝑆  0.007  0.011 
  (0.59)  (0.91) 
  0.555  0.361 
MKT  0.018*  0.011 
  (1.76)  (1.01) 
  0.078  0.315 
∆𝑂𝑃   0.007 0.003 
   (1.37) (0.70) 
   0.171 0.486 
𝑊𝑉𝑂𝐿   -0.502*** -0.404*** 
   (-4.73) (-3.65) 
   0.000 0.000 
∆𝐼𝑃   0.087 0.020 
   (1.43) (0.29) 
   0.152 0.771 
MKTRF 0.023** 0.019** 0.008 0.008 
 (2.33) (2.09) (0.85) (0.89) 
 0.020 0.036 0.396 0.376 
𝑆𝑀𝐵 -0.016 -0.025** -0.012 -0.019 
 (-0.91) (-1.29) (-0.66) (-1.01) 
 0.365 0.196 0.509 0.314 
𝐻𝑀𝐿 -0.018 -0.032* -0.029 -0.035* 
 (-1.00) (-1.82) (-1.60) (-1.95) 
 0.319 0.069 0.109 0.051 
This table reports the regression result based on model (49). Where: the dependent variable 𝑅𝑡 − 𝑅𝐹𝑡 is the excess returns of the contrarian 
portfolio at time t and regressed on, 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 (high minus low) the return to portfolios that is long on high book-to-market stocks and short on 
low book-to-market stocks in US, 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 (small minus big) returns to long-short portfolios constructed using size in US market, the 𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑡−1 
the liquidity factor at time t-1, 𝐷𝑆𝑡−1 the Default spread at time t-1, 𝑇𝑆𝑡−1 the Term spread at time t-1, 𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡−1 the MSCI world indices 
return at time t-1, ∆𝑂𝑃𝑡−1, the change on monthly Oil price at time t-1, 𝑊𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑡−1 is the market volatility at time t-1, and ∆𝐼𝑃𝑡−1⁡ is the 
change on monthly value of the US Industrial production at time t-1. Regression are based on model 1 to 4 specification. I estimate the 
parameters using the interactive version of the generalized method of moments estimation. I also account for time variation through time 
dummies. I request for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors based on Bartlett kernel (Newey-West) with 1 lags I 
use the regression Alpha to measure the size of the abnormal return generated after adjusting for risk. The test statistics are reported in the 
parentheses and the p-value next. The results are* statistically significant at 10% for p<0.1, ** statistically significant at 5% for p<0.05 and 










Table 4.5. 1 Effect of Global Fama and French Three-Factor on Global Momentum 1990-2014 
 Model Mode2 Model3 Model4 
𝛼3 0.005*** 0.010**** 0.011*** 0.010*** 
 11.05 10.34 9.14 3.54 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
𝐿𝐼𝑄  0.004  0.040 
  0.52  1.28 
  0.606  0.200 
𝐷𝑆  -0.006***  -0.001 
  -6.22  -0.49 
  0.000  0.621 
𝑇𝑆  0.017  0.195** 
  1.03  2.57 
  0.304  0.010 
MKT  0.005  0.089* 
  0.44  1.86 
  0.661  0.063 
∆𝑂𝑃   0.010** 0.010 
   1.97 1.22 
   0.049 0.223 
𝑊𝑉𝑂𝐿   -0.750*** -0.512*** 
   -5.86 -3.25 
   0.000 0.001 
∆𝐼𝑃   0.128 0.037 
   1.57 0.25 
   0.115 0.804 
MKTRF 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 1.25 1.29 -0.83 -0.94 
 0.210 0.196 0.409 0.347 
𝑆𝑀𝐵 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 
 0.69 1.38 0.42 -1.45 
 0.492 0.167 0.677 0.147 
𝐻𝑀𝐿 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001** 
 -0.65 -1.65 -1.36 -2.26 
 0.518 0.100 0.172 0.024 
This table reports the regression result based on model (50). Where: the dependent variable are the returns of the global momentum portfolio 
at time t and regressed on global Fama and French tree-factor: 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 (high minus low) the return to portfolios that is long on high book-to-
market stocks and short on low book-to-market stocks in US, 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 (Small minus big) returns to long-short portfolios constructed using size 
in US market, the 𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑡−1 the liquidity factor at time t-1, 𝐷𝑆𝑡−1 the Default spread at time t-1, 𝑇𝑆𝑡−1 the Term spread at time t-1, 𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡−1 the 
MSCI world indices return t-1, ∆𝑂𝑃𝑡−1, the change on monthly Oil price at time t-1, 𝑊𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑡−1 is the market volatility at time t-1, and  
∆𝐼𝑃𝑡−1⁡ is the change on monthly value of the US Industrial production at time t-1. I estimate the parameters using the interactive version of 
the generalized method of moment’s estimation. I also account for time variation through time dummies. I request for heteroscedasticity and 
autocorrelation consistent standard errors based on Bartlett kernel (Newey-West) with 1 lags. These regressions are based on model 1 to 4 
specification. I use the regression Alpha to measure the size of the abnormal return generated after adjusting for risk. The test statistics are 
reported in the parentheses and the p-value next. The results are* statistically significant at 10% for p<0.1, ** statistically significant at 5% 









Table 4.5. 2 Effect of Global Fama and French Five-Factor on Global Momentum Profit 1990-
2014 
 Model Mode2 Model3 Model4 
𝛼3 0.005*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.014*** 
 11.30 10.53 9.37 8.69 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
𝐿𝐼𝑄  0.005  0.003 
  0.68  0.46 
  0.494  0.647 
𝐷𝑆  -0.006***  -0.004*** 
  -6.22  -2.82 
  0.000  0.005 
𝑇𝑆  0.014  0.010 
  0.93  0.70 
  0.350  0.483 
MKT  -0.004  -0.011 
  -0.37  -0.94 
  0.714  0.346 
∆𝑂𝑃   0.008 0.006 
   1.63 1.05 
   0.103 0.293 
𝑊𝑉𝑂𝐿   -0.698*** -0.616*** 
   -5.61 -5.11 
   0.000 0.000 
∆𝐼𝑃   0.116 0.004 
   1.40 0.04 
   0.163 0.968 
MKTRF -0.000 -0.000 -0.000** -0.000** 
 -0.84 -1.17 -2.42 -2.26 
 0.404 0.242 0.016 0.024 
𝑆𝑀𝐵 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 
 -0.28 0.31 -0.63 0.05 
 0.779 0.758 0.529 0.959 
𝐻𝑀𝐿 0.001** 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 2.06 0.89 0.78 0.60 
 0.039 0.376 0.436 0.547 
RMW -0.001* -0.001* -0.001** -0.001** 
 -1.68 -1.65 -1.97 -1.98 
 0.094 0.098 0.049 0.048 
CMA -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 -4.11 -3.71 -2.90 -2.93 
 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.003 
This table reports the regression result based on model (51). Where: the dependent variable are the returns of the global momentum portfolio 
at time t and regressed on the Fama and French Five-Factor: 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 (high minus low) the return to portfolios that is long on high book-to-
market stocks and short on low book-to-market stocks in US, 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 (Small minus big) returns to long-short portfolios constructed using size 
in the world market, 𝑅𝑀𝑊𝑡 (Robust Minus Weak) is the average return on the two robust operating profitability portfolios minus the 
average return on the two weak operating profitability portfolios, 𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑡 (Conservative Minus Aggressive) is the average return on the two 
conservative investment portfolios minus the average return on the two aggressive investment portfolios the 𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑡−1 the liquidity factor at 
time t-1, 𝐷𝑆𝑡−1 the Default spread at time t-1, 𝑇𝑆𝑡−1 the Term spread at time t-1, 𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡−1 the MSCI world indices return t-1, ∆𝑂𝑃𝑡−1, the 
change on monthly Oil price at time t-1, 𝑊𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑡−1 is the market volatility at time t-1, and  ∆𝐼𝑃𝑡−1⁡ is the change on monthly value of the US 
Industrial production at time t-1. I estimate the parameters using the interactive version of the generalized method of moment’s estimation. I 
also account for time variation through time dummies. I request for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors based 
on Bartlett kernel (Newey-West) with 1 lags. These regressions are based on model 1 to 4 specification. I use the regression Alpha to 
measure the size of the abnormal return generated after adjusting for risk. The test statistics are reported in the parentheses and the p-value 
next. The results are* statistically significant at 10% for p<0.1, ** statistically significant at 5% for p<0.05 and ***statistically significant at 






Table 4.5. 3 Effect of Fama and French Asia Pacific Excluding Japan on Emerging Momentum 
Profit in Emerging Market 1990-2014 
 Model Mode2 Model3 Model4 
𝛼3 0.003 0.034*** 0.003 0.026** 
 0.74 3.18 0.34 2.11 
 0.462 0.001 0.737 0.035 
𝐿𝐼𝑄  0.090  0.078 
  1.62  1.40 
  0.106  0.163 
𝐷𝑆  -0.031***  -0.022* 
  -2.91  -1.70 
  0.004  0.089 
𝑇𝑆  0.208  0.259 
  1.32  1.63 
  0.186  0.103 
MKT  -0.274**  -0.288*** 
  -2.45  -2.60 
  0.014  0.009 
∆𝑂𝑃   0.050 0.063 
   0.97 1.35 
   0.332 0.177 
𝑊𝑉𝑂𝐿   -0.258 -0.230 
   -0.31 -0.26 
   0.760 0.799 
∆𝐼𝑃   1.832** 1.128 
   2.31 1.56 
   0.021 0.118 
MKTRF -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 
 -0.33 -0.65 -1.30 -1.20 
 0.742 0.519 0.193 0.232 
𝑆𝑀𝐵 0.000 0.001 -0.000 0.001 
 0.20 0.80 -0.30 0.62 
 0.844 0.423 0.762 0.535 
𝐻𝑀𝐿 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 0.66 0.94 0.91 0.94 
 0.511 0.345 0.361 0.345 
This table reports the regression result based on model (52) Where: the dependent variable Mom are the returns of the momentum portfolio 
in emerging market at time t and regressed on the Fama and French three-factor excluding Japan: 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 (high minus low) the return to 
portfolios that is long on high book-to-market stocks and short on low book-to-market stocks in US, 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 (small minus big) returns to long-
short portfolios constructed using size in US market, the 𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑡−1 the liquidity factor at time t-1, 𝐷𝑆𝑡−1 the Default spread at time t-1, 𝑇𝑆𝑡−1 
the Term spread at time t-1, 𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡−1 the MSCI world indices return  at time t-1, ∆𝑂𝑃𝑡−1, the monthly Oil price at time t-1, 𝑊𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑡−1 is the 
market volatility at time t-1, and ∆𝐼𝑃𝑡−1⁡ is the monthly value of the US Industrial production at time t-1. Regressions are based on model 1 
to 4 specification. I estimate the parameters using the interactive version of the generalized method of moments estimation. I also account 
for time variation through time dummies. I request for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors based on Bartlett 
kernel (Newey-West) with 1 lags. I use the regression Alpha to measure the size of the abnormal return generated after adjusting for risk. 
The test statistics are reported in the parentheses and the p-value next. The results are* statistically significant at 10% for p<0.1, ** 








Table 4.5. 4 Effect of European Fama and French Five-Factor, TED and EURIBOR: OIS Spread 
on Momentum Profit in Developed Market 1999-2014 
 Model Mode2 Model3 Model4 Model5 Model6 Model7 
𝛼3 0.005** 0.006** 0.002 0.005 0.007* -0.003 0.002 
 2.46 2.37 0.78 1.08 1.78 -0.59 0.36 
 0.014 0.018 0.435 0.280 0.075 0.552 0.716 
𝑇𝐸𝐷  -0.016  -0.019   -0.006 
  -0.67  -0.89   -0.37 
  0.502  0.373   0.715 
EOIS   1.334***  1.436***  1.242*** 
   4.04  3.47  3.67 
   0.000  0.001  0.000 
𝐷𝑆    0.001 -0.006  -0.005 
    0.05 -1.67  -1.15 
    0.963 0.095  0.252 
𝑇𝑆    0.208*** 0.193***  0.192*** 
    3.88 3.66  3.73 
    0.000 0.000  0.000 
MKT    -0.003 -0.001  -0.005 
    -0.07 -0.02  -0.12 
    0.947 0.983  0.901 
∆𝑂𝑃      -0.028 0.021 
      -1.54 1.08 
      0.124 0.281 
𝑊𝑉𝑂𝐿      0.979* 0.550 
      1.90 1.07 
      0.057 0.284 
∆𝐼𝑃      0.360 0.046 
      1.30 0.17 
      0.195 0.865 
MKTRF -0.001** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001** -0.001** -0.001** -0.001*** 
 -2.34 -2.36 -2.48 -2.31 -2.36 -2.32 -2.05 
 0.019 0.018 0.013 0.021 0.018 0.021 0.041 
𝑆𝑀𝐵 -0.001 -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.002** -0.002** -0.001 -0.002** 
 -1.47 -3.26 -3.50 -2.45 -2.44 -1.48 -2.23 
 0.143 0.001 0.000 0.014 0.015 0.140 0.025 
𝐻𝑀𝐿 -0.002** -0.003** -0.003** -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.002** -0.003*** 
 -2.06 -2.75 -2.37 -3.29 -2.75 -2.05 -2.87 
 0.040 0.006 0.018 0.001 0.006 0.040 0.004 
RMW 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 
 0.02 -0.63 -0.42 -0.53 -0.21 -0.09 -0.46 
 0.980 0.529 0.676 0.596 0.834 0.926 0.649 
CMA 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.003* 0.002 0.001 0.002 
 0.60 1.36 1.23 1.76 1.52 0.61 1.49 
 0.551 0.173 0.218 0.078 0.128 0.543 0.136 
This table reports the regression result based on model (53). Where: the dependent variable R are the returns of the momentum portfolio in 
develop market at time t and regressed on, 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 (high minus low) the return to portfolios that is long on high book-to-market stocks and short on 
low book-to-market stocks in US, 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 (small minus big) returns to long-short portfolios constructed using size in US market, the 𝐸𝑂𝐼𝑆𝑡−1  
(EURIBOR:OIS Spread ) is the difference between the rate at which European banks lend to each other (ERIBOR) and the overnight’ risk free’ 
swap rate (EONIA) among the same banks a 3 month period, 𝑇𝐸𝐷𝑡−1 Spread or the difference between the London Interbank Offered Rate 
(Libor) and the 3-month Treasury Bill at time t-1, 𝐷𝑆𝑡−1 the Default spread at time t-1, 𝑇𝑆𝑡−1 the Term spread at time t-1, 𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡−1 the MSCI 
world indices return at time t-1, ∆𝑂𝑃𝑡−1, the monthly Oil price at time t-1, 𝑊𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑡−1 is the market volatility at time t-1, and ∆𝐼𝑃𝑡−1⁡ is the 
monthly value of the US Industrial production at time t-1. Regressions are based on model 1 to 4 specification. I estimate the parameters using 
the interactive version of the generalized method of moments estimation. I account for time variation through time dummies. I request for 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors based on Bartlett kernel (Newey-West) with 1 lags. I use the regression Alpha to 
measure the size of the abnormal return generated after adjusting for risk. The test statistics are reported in the parentheses and the p-value next. 





Table 4.6. 1 Effect of Global Fama and French Three-Factor on Global Contrarian Profit 1990-
2014 
 Model Mode2 Model3 Model4 
𝛼3 0.005*** 0.010*** 0.009*** 0.016*** 
 13.82 9.54 8.66 9.01 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
𝐿𝐼𝑄  0.000  -0.031 
  0.03  -1.55 
  0.974  0.121 
𝐷𝑆  -0.005***  -0.010*** 
  -4.74  -5.43 
  0.000  0.000 
𝑇𝑆  -0.005  -0.014 
  -0.37  -0.23 
  0.712  0.817 
MKT  0.020**  0.020 
  2.10  0.50 
  0.036  0.614 
∆𝑂𝑃   -0.006* -0.006 
   -1.81 -1.20 
   0.071 0.232 
𝑊𝑉𝑂𝐿   -0.591*** -0.336** 
   -4.30 -2.34 
   0.000 0.019 
∆𝐼𝑃   0.014 -0.283*** 
   0.20 -3.05 
   0.845 0.002 
MKTRF 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 
 1.34 -0.47 -0.83 0.28 
 0.179 0.638 0.404 0.778 
𝑆𝑀𝐵 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 
 0.09 -0.23 -0.61 0.55 
 0.927 0.816 0.545 0.580 
𝐻𝑀𝐿 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 0.14 -1.02 -0.72 -1.23 
 0.887 0.307 0.473 0.219 
This table reports the regression result based on model (54). Where: the dependent variable are the returns of the global momentum portfolio 
at time t and regressed on Global Fama and French Three-Factor: 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 (high minus low) the return to portfolios that is long on high book-
to-market stocks and short on low book-to-market stocks in US, 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 (Small minus big) returns to long-short portfolios constructed using 
size in US market, the 𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑡−1 the liquidity factor at time t-1, 𝐷𝑆𝑡−1 the Default spread at time t-1, 𝑇𝑆𝑡−1 the Term spread at time t-1, 
𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡−1 the MSCI world indices return t-1, ∆𝑂𝑃𝑡−1, the change on monthly Oil price at time t-1, 𝑊𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑡−1 is the market volatility at time t-
1, and  ∆𝐼𝑃𝑡−1⁡ is the change on monthly value of the US Industrial production at time t-1. I estimate the parameters using the interactive 
version of the generalized method of moment’s estimation. I also account for time variation through time dummies. I request for 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors based on Bartlett kernel (Newey-West) with 1 lags. These regressions are 
based on model 1 to 4 specification. I use the regression Alpha to measure the size of the abnormal return generated after adjusting for risk. 
The test statistics are reported in the parentheses and the p-value next. The results are* statistically significant at 10% for p<0.1, ** 









Table 4.6. 2 Effect of Global Fama and French Five-Factor on Global Contrarian Profit 1990-
2014 
 Model Mode2 Model3 Model4 
𝛼3 0.005*** 0.011*** 0.009*** 0.013*** 
 12.88 9.24 8.79 9.71 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
𝐿𝐼𝑄  0.001  0.001 
  0.21  0.12 
  0.834  0.908 
𝐷𝑆  -0.006***  -0.005*** 
  -4.75  -3.91 
  0.000  0.000 
𝑇𝑆  -0.006  -0.003 
  -0.37  -0.23 
  0.713  0.821 
MKT  0.018*  0.016 
  1.70  1.64 
  0.090  0.101 
∆𝑂𝑃   -0.006* -0.007* 
   -1.82 -1.77 
   0.069 0.077 
𝑊𝑉𝑂𝐿   -0.558*** -0.418*** 
   -4.15 -3.12 
   0.000 0.002 
∆𝐼𝑃   0.023 -0.152* 
   0.33 -1.91 
   0.742 0.057 
MKTRF -0.000 -0.000* -0.000 -0.000 
 -0.86 -1.95 -1.55 -1.51 
 0.389 0.051 0.121 0.132 
𝑆𝑀𝐵 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 -1.00 -1.08 -1.27 -0.99 
 0.317 0.278 0.205 0.321 
𝐻𝑀𝐿 0.000* 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 1.68 0.62 0.43 0.11 
 0.092 0.533 0.666 0.912 
RMW -0.001 -0.001* -0.000 -0.000 
 -1.62 -1.80 -1.29 -1.39 
 0.105 0.072 0.195 0.164 
CMA -0.001** -0.001** -0.000 -0.000 
 -2.41 -2.05 -1.16 -1.26 
 0.016 0.040 0.248 0.208 
This table reports the regression result based on model (55). Where: the dependent variable are the returns of the global momentum portfolio 
at time t and regressed on the Fama and Frech Five-Factor: 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 (high minus low) the return to portfolios that is long on high book-to-
market stocks and short on low book-to-market in the global market, 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 (Small minus big) returns to long-short portfolios constructed 
using size in global market, the 𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑡−1 the liquidity factor at time t-1, 𝐷𝑆𝑡−1 the Default spread at time t-1, 𝑇𝑆𝑡−1 the Term spread at time t-
1, 𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡−1 the MSCI world indices return t-1, ∆𝑂𝑃𝑡−1, the change on monthly Oil price at time t-1, 𝑊𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑡−1 is the market volatility at time 
t-1, and  ∆𝐼𝑃𝑡−1⁡ is the change on monthly value of the US Industrial production at time t-1. I estimate the parameters using the interactive 
version of the generalized method of moment’s estimation. I also account for time variation through time dummies. I request for 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors based on Bartlett kernel (Newey-West) with 1 lags. These regressions are 
based on model 1 to 4 specification. I use the regression Alpha to measure the size of the abnormal return generated after adjusting for risk. 
The test statistics are reported in the parentheses and the p-value next. The results are* statistically significant at 10% for p<0.1, ** 







Table 4.6. 3 Effect of Fama and French Asia Pacific Excluding Japan on Contrarian Profit in 
Emerging Market 1990-2014 
 Model Mode2 Model3 Model4 
𝛼3 0.005*** 0.011*** 0.005*** 0.012*** 
 10.85 7.87 4.80 6.44 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
𝐿𝐼𝑄  -0.014  -0.011 
  -1.34  -1.11 
  0.179  0.265 
𝐷𝑆  -0.006***  -0.009*** 
  -4.93  -5.61 
  0.000  0.000 
𝑇𝑆  -0.010  -0.009 
  -0.55  -0.49 
  0.582  0.621 
MKT  -0.025**  -0.030** 
  -2.18  -2.24 
  0.029  0.025 
∆𝑂𝑃   0.002 0.003 
   0.30 0.52 
   0.763 0.604 
𝑊𝑉𝑂𝐿   0.010 0.119 
   0.12 1.34 
   0.908 0.181 
∆𝐼𝑃   -0.097 -0.248*** 
   -0.94 -2.76 
   0.345 0.006 
MKTRF -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 -1.27 -1.31 -1.08 -0.72 
 0.204 0.191 0.282 0.469 
𝑆𝑀𝐵 0.000 0.001** 0.000 0.001*** 
 1.32 2.25 1.30 2.66 
 0.188 0.025 0.194 0.008 
𝐻𝑀𝐿 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000* 
 2.45 2.17 2.10 1.92 
 0.014 0.030 0.035 0.054 
This table reports the regression result based on model (56) Where: the dependent variable Mom are the returns of the momentum portfolio 
in emerging market at time t and regressed on the Fama and French Three-Factor excluding Japan: 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 (high minus low) the return to 
portfolios that is long on high book-to-market stocks and short on low book-to-market stocks in Asia Pacific countries excluding Japan, 
𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 (small minus big) returns to long-short portfolios constructed using size in US market, the 𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑡−1 the liquidity factor at time t-1, 
𝐷𝑆𝑡−1 the Default spread at time t-1, 𝑇𝑆𝑡−1 the Term spread at time t-1, 𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡−1 the MSCI world indices return  at time t-1, ∆𝑂𝑃𝑡−1, the 
monthly Oil price at time t-1, 𝑊𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑡−1 is the market volatility at time t-1, and ∆𝐼𝑃𝑡−1⁡ is the monthly value of the US Industrial production 
at time t-1. Regressions are based on model 1 to 4 specification. I estimate the parameters using the interactive version of the generalized 
method of moments estimation. I also account for time variation through time dummies. I request for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation 
consistent standard errors based on Bartlett kernel (Newey-West) with 1 lags. I use the regression Alpha to measure the size of the abnormal 
return generated after adjusting for risk. The test statistics are reported in the parentheses and the p-value next. The results are* statistically 








Table 4.6. 4 Effect of European Fama and French Factor, TED and EURIBOR: OIS on 
Contrarian Profit in Developed Market 1999-2014 
 Model Mode2 Model3 Model4 Model5 Model6 Model7 
𝛼3 0.006*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.009*** 0.005*** 
 12.37 7.27 5.96 3.19 3.32 10.07 2.61 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.009 
𝑇𝐸𝐷  0.004  0.001   0.063 
  0.91  0.22   0.86 
  0.361  0.827   0.392 
EOIS   -0.013  0.009  0.144 
   -0.15  0.08  0.73 
   0.883  0.932  0.467 
𝐷𝑆    0.000 0.000  0.002 
    0.28 0.18  1.29 
    0.779 0.857  0.198 
𝑇𝑆    0.019 0.018  0.002 
    1.08 1.06  0.13 
    0.279 0.288  0.899 
MKT    0.031** 0.031**  0.022* 
    2.44 2.42  1.73 
    0.015 0.015  0.084 
∆𝑂𝑃      -0.010** -0.000 
      -2.41 -0.01 
      0.016 0.995 
𝑊𝑉𝑂𝐿      -0.434** -0.328** 
      -5.24 -3.70 
      0.000 0.000 
∆𝐼𝑃      0.076 0.144 
      1.05 1.34 
      0.294 0.181 
MKTRF 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 1.42 1.46 1.57 1.34 1.39 0.81 0.68 
 0.156 0.143 0.116 0.181 0.164 0.421 0.497 
𝑆𝑀𝐵 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 1.00 0.98 0.96 0.03 0.05 0.87 0.08 
 0.318 0.329 0.338 0.975 0.957 0.386 0.938 
𝐻𝑀𝐿 -0.001** -0.001** -0.001** -0.001** -0.001*** -0.001** -0.001*** 
 -2.04 -3.55 -3.29 -4.38 -4.04 -2.90 -3.87 
 0.041 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.000 
RMW -0.001** -0.001** -0.001* -0.001** -0.001** -0.001* -0.001** 
 -2.37 -2.09 -1.92 -2.35 -2.25 -1.94 -2.25 
 0.018 0.037 0.055 0.019 0.024 0.052 0.025 
CMA -0.000* -0.001** -0.001* -0.001** -0.001** -.001 -0.001 
 -1.83 -2.46 -2.34 -2.06 -2.00 -0.89 -1.12 
 0.067 0.014 0.019 0.040 0.045 0.372 0.263 
This table reports the regression result based on model (57). Where: the dependent variable Mon are the returns of the momentum portfolio in 
develop market at time t and regressed on Fama and French Europe: 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 (high minus low) the return to portfolios that is long on high book-to-
market stocks and short on low book-to-market stocks in the region, 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 (small minus big) returns to long-short portfolios constructed using 
size in the region,⁡𝑅𝑀𝑊𝑡  (Robust Minus Weak) is the average return on the two robust operating profitability portfolios minus the average return 
on the two weak operating profitability portfolios, 𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑡 (Conservative Minus Aggressive) is the average return on the two conservative 
investment portfolios minus the average return on the two aggressive investment portfolios, 𝐸𝑂𝐼𝑆𝑡−1  (EURIBOR:OIS Spread ) is the difference 
between the rate at which European banks lend to each other (ERIBOR) and the overnight’ risk free free’ swap rate (EONIA) among the same 
banks a 3 month period, 𝑇𝐸𝐷𝑡−1 Spread or the difference between the London Interbank Offered Rate (Libor) and the 3-month Treasury Bill at 
time t-1, at time t-1, 𝐷𝑆𝑡−1 the Default spread at time t-1, 𝑇𝑆𝑡−1 the Term spread at time t-1, 𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡−1 the MSCI world indices return at time t-1, 
∆𝑂𝑃𝑡−1, the monthly Oil price at time t-1, 𝑊𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑡−1 is the market volatility at time t-1, and ∆𝐼𝑃𝑡−1⁡ is the monthly value of the US Industrial 
production at time t-1. Regressions are based on model 1 to 4 specification. I estimate the parameters using the interactive version of the 
generalized method of moments estimation. I account for time variation through time dummies. I request for heteroscedasticity and 
autocorrelation consistent standard errors based on Bartlett kernel (Newey-West) with 1 lags. I use the regression Alpha to measure the size of the 
abnormal return generated after adjusting for risk. The test statistics are reported in the parentheses and the p-value next. The results are* 
statistically significant at 10% for p<0.1, ** statistically significant at 5% for p<0.05 and ***statistically significant at 1% for p<0.01. 
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The study will continue  compute the variance  and the T statistic, at the  end of the  holding period 
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return  for the winners 
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computed for the  K
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The next step is to 
compute the 
momentum  strategies 
return (winners minus 
losers)
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computing the 
variance  and the T 
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the 6 months holding 
period
This strategy  repeat the 
process N times
through the sample
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formation and the 
holding period trhough 
the sample we select 
for N times the 
resulting total average 
return  for the winners 
and the losers 
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The study will continue 
by computing the 
variance  and the T 
statistic, at the  end of 
the sample time period
This study  repeats the 
process  through the 
market states (bear and bull 
phases)  time periods
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8.2 Appendix A2  
6/6 Momentum strategy Breakdown structure 
File: monthly returns (𝑟𝑖,𝑡) for each country (i) at month (t); multi-periods return (𝑅𝑖,𝑗) for 
each country (i) in (j) months.  
1. Count the number of the countries = 𝑁𝑐 
2. Divide by 10 
3. Round to the nearest integer = 𝑁𝑝 
4. Store, (that will be number of the winners and the losers in the winners and losers' 
portfolios). 
5. Start at country i = 1, month t =1 
6. Calculate sum of 6 monthly return𝑅1,6= 𝑟1,1 + 𝑟1,2 + ...+𝑟1,6 
7. Go back to 5 continue with country i=2 
8. Calculate sum of 6 monthly return 𝑅2,6= 𝑟2,1 + 𝑟2,2 + ...+𝑟2,6 
9. When all countries are finished, sum 6 monthly return   𝑅𝑁𝑐,6= sum last country  
10. Rank sum 6 monthly return =𝑅1,6,𝑅2,6,...,𝑅𝑁𝑐,6 
11. Select countries in 1,...,𝑁𝑝 (top 10%) or  winners (𝑤1, 𝑤2,...,𝑤𝑁𝑝) and store 
12. Select countries in 𝑁𝑐 - 𝑁𝑝,..., 𝑁𝑐 (bottom 10%)or losers (𝐿1, 𝐿2,..., 𝐿𝑁𝑝) and store 
13. Start at winner1(w1), month t = 7 
14. Calculate winner 1 average of 6 monthly return in the holding period (t = 7 to t = 
12)𝑅𝑤1,6= [𝑟𝑤1,7 + 𝑟𝑤1,8 + ...+𝑟𝑤1,12]/6 
15. Go back to back to 13 continue with winner 2 (w2) 
16. Calculate winner 2 average of 6 monthly return in the holding period (t = 7 to t = 
12)𝑅𝑤2,6= [𝑟𝑤2,7 + 𝑟𝑤2,8 + ...+𝑟𝑤2,12]/6 
17.  When all winners are finished sum 6 monthly return =  𝑅𝑤𝑁𝑃,6 = sum last winner 
18. Calculate winners' portfolio (top 10%) average monthly return for the holding period 
(t = 7 to t = 12),𝑅𝑊,1 = [𝑅𝑤1,6+𝑅𝑤2,6+…+𝑅𝑤𝑁𝑃,6]/𝑁𝑝 
19. Go back to 13 start with Loser1(L1), month 7 
20. Calculate Loser 1 average of 6 monthly return in the holding period (t = 7 to t = 12) 
𝑅𝐿1,6= [𝑟𝐿1,7 + 𝑟𝐿1,8 + ...+𝑟𝐿1,12]/6 
21. Go back to 13 continue with Loser2 (L2), month t = 7 
22. Calculate Loser 2 sum of 6 monthly return in the holding period (t = 7 to t = 12) 
𝑅𝐿2,6= [𝑟𝐿2,7 + 𝑟𝐿2,8 + ...+𝑟𝐿2,12]/6 
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23. When all Losers are finished sum 6 monthly return =  𝑅𝐿𝑁𝑃,6 = sum last Loser 
24. Calculate Losers' portfolio (bottom 10%) average monthly return for the holding 
period (t = 7 to t = 12),  𝑅𝐿,1 = [𝑅𝐿1,6+𝑅𝐿2,6+…+𝑅𝐿𝑁𝑃,6]/𝑁𝑝 
25. store 
26. Go back to month t = 7 
27. Start at country i = 1, month t = 7 
28. Calculate sum of 6 monthly return (month t = 7 to t = 12) for country i = 1 
𝑅1,6= 𝑟1,7 + 𝑟1,8 + ...+𝑟1,12 
29. Go back to 27 continue with country i=2-month t = 7 
30. Calculate sum of 6 monthly return (month 7 to 12) = 𝑅2,6= 𝑟2,7 + 𝑟2,8 + ...+𝑟2,12 
31. When all countries are finished sum 6 monthly return,  𝑅𝑁𝑐,6= sum last country  
32. repeat step 10 to 24 
33. Store 
34. Then repeat the formation and the holding period analysis through the sample period 
(N times) between 1969-2014 
35. When all the winner portfolios are constructed, average monthly return of the holding 
period of the last winner is 𝑅𝑤,𝑁 
36. When all loser portfolios are constructed, average monthly return of the holding 
period of the last loser is 𝑅𝐿,𝑁 
37. Store 
38. Calculate the average return of the winners' portfolio as of end of the sample period as 
𝐴𝑅𝑤 = sum of all𝑅𝑤,𝑇 divide by (N) the number of the winner 6-month/6-month 
portfolios constructed over 1969-2014; where  
 (T =1…N)𝐴𝑅𝑤= [𝑅𝑤,1+𝑅𝑤,2+…𝑅𝑤,𝑁]/N 
39. Calculate the average return of the Losers portfolios as of end of the sample period as 
𝐴𝑅𝐿 = sum of all 𝑅𝐿,𝑇 divide by (N) the number of the Losers 6-month/6-month 
portfolios constructed over 1969-2014; where (T =1… N)𝐴𝑅𝐿= [𝑅𝐿,1+𝑅𝐿,2+…𝑅𝐿,𝑁]/N 
40. Calculate the average momentum return as of end of period as𝐴𝑅𝑤 - 𝐴𝑅𝐿 
41. Calculate the variance 
𝑆𝑀
2 = [∑ (𝑅𝑤 − 𝐴𝑅𝑤)











8.3 Appendix A3  
MATLAB Programming 
The winners and the loser’s portfolios are constructed using MATLAB Programming; The 
Script files are provided in appendix 3 to 6. I also construct portfolios that skip one month 
between the formation and the holding period to evaluate the possibility that the momentum 
profits may arise because of the lead-lag relationship in indices prices in conformity with 
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993). To increase the power of the tests this, study finally constructs 
overlapping portfolios where the momentum portfolio in a given month holds stocks ranked 
in any of the previous six ranking months (Jegadeesh and Titman 2001). 
The MATLAB Programming (Teamwork and training) that the study is referring to was 
organize in order to design a robust programme to compute and analyse the momentum and 
contrarian strategies returns in the course of this study.  I am therefore grateful to Dr Natalia 
Bailey at the School of Economics and Finance who were involved in the design of the initial 
momentum flowchart (Appendix 1), the momentum strategy breakdown structure (Appendix 
2) and the training in MATLAB programming by providing useful review comments and 
technical check during the progress of this study. More importantly I are delighted to reiterate 


















%% Initial setup 
r = xlsread('C:\Alain2\matdata.xlsx','Sheet3','b4:x532'); 
%r = xlsread('C:\Local\My Documents_QMUL\Alain2\matdata.xlsx','Sheet2','b4:av532'); % Load actual return 
data 
N=size(r,2); % number of countries: 47 
T=size(r,1); % number of periods: 552 (1969-2014 monthly) 
t_start=1; % Start of formation period 
per_for=9; % J month calculation 
per_hold=3; % K month calculation 
p=(1:9)/10; % prob. for quantile code; Cut the returns of all countries into 10 (Deciles); if divided into 5 then 














% Adjustment of dataset to include all stock indices available at time t_for 
r_adj=r(t_for:t_for+per_for+per_hold-1,:); % returns for formation and holding period (if you skip a month for 






B=-991*ones(size(r_adj,1),1);     




% Formation Period 
r_for=r_adj1(1:per_for,:); % returns for formation period 
N_adj=size(r_for,2); 
ID=1:size(r_for,2); % ID of N countries in each period  
R=cumsum(r_for,1); % Cumulative monthly returns 
a_R=([ID; R(end,:)])'; % R matrix appended to ID and transposed 
s_C=sortrows(a_R,2); % Ranked 6m returns (lowest to highest) 
q = quantile(s_C(:,2),p); % Cut the returns of all countries into 10 (Deciles); if divided into 5 then 
% command becomes: quantile(s_C(:,2),(1:4)/5)    
s_Cl=s_C(:,2); 
s_Cl(s_Cl>q(1,1))=0; % Select Losers 
R_Cl = s_Cl(~all(s_Cl == 0,2),:); 
ID_l=s_C(1:size(R_Cl,1),1); % ID of losers 
no_l=size(ID_l,1); % Number of losers 
 
s_Cw=s_C(:,2); 
s_Cw(s_Cw<q(1,end))=0; % Select Winners 
R_Cw = s_Cw(~all(s_Cw == 0,2),:); 
ID_w=s_C(size(s_C,1)-size(R_Cw,1)+1:end,1); % ID of winners 
no_w=size(ID_w,1); % Number of winners 
 
% Holding Period 
t_hold=1+per_for; % to skip one period you will have 2+per_for 
 
rl_hold=r_adj1(t_hold:t_hold+per_hold-1,ID_l'); % returns of losers for holding period 
m_rl=mean(rl_hold,1); % average returns of losers over holding period 
l_p=mean(m_rl,2); % average loser portfolio return 
 
rw_hold=r_adj1(t_hold:t_hold+per_hold-1,ID_w'); % returns of winners for holding period 
m_rw=mean(rw_hold,1); % average returns of winners over holding period 
w_p=mean(m_rw,2); % average winner portfolio return 
 













sto_l_p=sto_l_p(~all(sto_l_p == 0,2),:); 
sto_w_p=sto_w_p(~all(sto_w_p == 0,2),:); 
sto_mom=sto_mom(~all(sto_mom == 0,2),:); 
sto_no_l=sto_no_l(~all(sto_no_l == 0,2),:); 
sto_no_w=sto_no_w(~all(sto_no_w == 0,2),:); 
sto_N_adj=sto_N_adj(~all(sto_N_adj == 0,2),:); 
 
a_l_p=sum(sto_l_p,1)/size(sto_l_p,1); % Average return on losers portfolios 
a_w_p=sum(sto_w_p,1)/size(sto_w_p,1); % Average return on winners portfolios 
 
























8.5 Appendix A5  




%% Initial setup 
r = xlsread('C:\Alain2\matdata.xlsx','Sheet4','b3:y315'); 
%r = xlsread('C:\Local\My Documents_QMUL\Alain2\matdata.xlsx','Sheet2','b4:av532'); % Load actual return 
data 
N=size(r,2); % number of countries: 47 
T=size(r,1); % number of periods: 552 (1969-2014 monthly) 
t_start=1; % Start of formation period 
per_for=9; % J month calculation 
per_hold=3; % K month calculation 
p=(1:9)/10; % prob. for quantile code; Cut the returns of all countries into 10 (Deciles); if divided into 5 then 














% Adjustment of dataset to include all stock indices available at time t_for 
r_adj=r(t_for:t_for+per_for+per_hold,:); % returns for formation and holding period (if you skip a month for 






B=-991*ones(size(r_adj,1),1);     




% Formation Period 
r_for=r_adj1(1:per_for,:); % returns for formation period 
N_adj=size(r_for,2); 
ID=1:size(r_for,2); % ID of N countries in each period  
R=cumsum(r_for,1); % Cumulative monthly returns 
a_R=([ID; R(end,:)])'; % R matrix appended to ID and transposed 
s_C=sortrows(a_R,2); % Ranked 6m returns (lowest to highest) 
q = quantile(s_C(:,2),p); % Cut the returns of all countries into 10 (Deciles); if divided into 5 then 
% command becomes: quantile(s_C(:,2),(1:4)/5)    
s_Cl=s_C(:,2); 
s_Cl(s_Cl>q(1,1))=0; % Select Losers 
R_Cl = s_Cl(~all(s_Cl == 0,2),:); 
ID_l=s_C(1:size(R_Cl,1),1); % ID of losers 
no_l=size(ID_l,1); % Number of losers 
 
s_Cw=s_C(:,2); 
s_Cw(s_Cw<q(1,end))=0; % Select Winners 
R_Cw = s_Cw(~all(s_Cw == 0,2),:); 
ID_w=s_C(size(s_C,1)-size(R_Cw,1)+1:end,1); % ID of winners 
no_w=size(ID_w,1); % Number of winners 
 
% Holding Period 
t_hold=2+per_for; % to skip one period you will have 2+per_for 
 
rl_hold=r_adj1(t_hold:t_hold+per_hold-1,ID_l'); % returns of losers for holding period 
m_rl=mean(rl_hold,1); % average returns of losers over holding period 
l_p=mean(m_rl,2); % average loser portfolio return 
 
rw_hold=r_adj1(t_hold:t_hold+per_hold-1,ID_w'); % returns of winners for holding period 
m_rw=mean(rw_hold,1); % average returns of winners over holding period 
w_p=mean(m_rw,2); % average winner portfolio return 
 













sto_l_p=sto_l_p(~all(sto_l_p == 0,2),:); 
sto_w_p=sto_w_p(~all(sto_w_p == 0,2),:); 
sto_mom=sto_mom(~all(sto_mom == 0,2),:); 
sto_no_l=sto_no_l(~all(sto_no_l == 0,2),:); 
sto_no_w=sto_no_w(~all(sto_no_w == 0,2),:); 
sto_N_adj=sto_N_adj(~all(sto_N_adj == 0,2),:); 
 
a_l_p=sum(sto_l_p,1)/size(sto_l_p,1); % Average return on losers portfolios 
a_w_p=sum(sto_w_p,1)/size(sto_w_p,1); % Average return on winners portfolios 
 
























8.6 Appendix A6  




%% Initial setup 
r = xlsread('C:\Alain2\matdata.xlsx','Sheet3','b4:av532'); 
%r = xlsread('C:\Local\My Documents_QMUL\Alain2\matdata.xlsx','Sheet2','b4:av532'); % Load actual return 
data 
N=size(r,2); % number of countries: 47 
T=size(r,1); % number of periods: 552 (1969-2014 monthly) 
t_start=1; % Start of formation period 
per_for=9; % J month calculation 
per_hold=3; % K month calculation 
p=(1:9)/10; % prob. for quantile code; Cut the returns of all countries into 10 (Deciles); if divided into 5 then 














% Adjustment of dataset to include all stock indices available at time t_for 
r_adj=r(t_for:t_for+per_for+per_hold-1,:); % returns for formation and holding period (if you skip a month for 






B=-991*ones(size(r_adj,1),1);     




% Formation Period 
r_for=r_adj1(1:per_for,:); % returns for formation period 
N_adj=size(r_for,2); 
ID=1:size(r_for,2); % ID of N countries in each period  
R=cumsum(r_for,1); % Cumulative monthly returns 
a_R=([ID; R(end,:)])'; % R matrix appended to ID and transposed 
s_C=sortrows(a_R,2); % Ranked 6m returns (lowest to highest) 
q = quantile(s_C(:,2),p); % Cut the returns of all countries into 10 (Deciles); if divided into 5 then 
% command becomes: quantile(s_C(:,2),(1:4)/5)    
s_Cl=s_C(:,2); 
s_Cl(s_Cl>q(1,1))=0; % Select Losers 
R_Cl = s_Cl(~all(s_Cl == 0,2),:); 
ID_l=s_C(1:size(R_Cl,1),1); % ID of losers 
no_l=size(ID_l,1); % Number of losers 
 
s_Cw=s_C(:,2); 
s_Cw(s_Cw<q(1,end))=0; % Select Winners 
R_Cw = s_Cw(~all(s_Cw == 0,2),:); 
ID_w=s_C(size(s_C,1)-size(R_Cw,1)+1:end,1); % ID of winners 
no_w=size(ID_w,1); % Number of winners 
 
% Holding Period 
t_hold=1+per_for; % to skip one period you will have 2+per_for 
 
rl_hold=r_adj1(t_hold:t_hold+per_hold-1,ID_l'); % returns of losers for holding period 
m_rl=mean(rl_hold,1); % average returns of losers over holding period 
l_p=mean(m_rl,2); % average loser portfolio return 
 
rw_hold=r_adj1(t_hold:t_hold+per_hold-1,ID_w'); % returns of winners for holding period 
m_rw=mean(rw_hold,1); % average returns of winners over holding period 
w_p=mean(m_rw,2); % average winner portfolio return 
 













sto_l_p=sto_l_p(~all(sto_l_p == 0,2),:); 
sto_w_p=sto_w_p(~all(sto_w_p == 0,2),:); 
sto_mom=sto_mom(~all(sto_mom == 0,2),:); 
sto_no_l=sto_no_l(~all(sto_no_l == 0,2),:); 
sto_no_w=sto_no_w(~all(sto_no_w == 0,2),:); 
sto_N_adj=sto_N_adj(~all(sto_N_adj == 0,2),:); 
 
a_l_p=sum(sto_l_p,1)/size(sto_l_p,1); % Average return on losers portfolios 
a_w_p=sum(sto_w_p,1)/size(sto_w_p,1); % Average return on winners portfolios 
 
























8.7 Appendix A7 




%% Initial setup 
r = xlsread('C:\Alain2\matdata.xlsx','Sheet3','b4:x532'); 
%r = xlsread('C:\Local\My Documents_QMUL\Alain2\matdata.xlsx','Sheet2','b4:av532'); % Load actual return 
data 
N=size(r,2); % number of countries: 47 
T=size(r,1); % number of periods: 552 (1969-2014 monthly) 
t_start=1; % Start of formation period 
per_for=9; % J month calculation 
per_hold=3; % K month calculation 
p=(1:9)/10; % prob. for quantile code; Cut the returns of all countries into 10 (Deciles); if divided into 5 then 














% Adjustment of dataset to include all stock indices available at time t_for 
r_adj=r(t_for:t_for+per_for+per_hold,:); % returns for formation and holding period (if you skip a month for 






B=-991*ones(size(r_adj,1),1);     




% Formation Period 
r_for=r_adj1(1:per_for,:); % returns for formation period 
N_adj=size(r_for,2); 
ID=1:size(r_for,2); % ID of N countries in each period  
R=cumsum(r_for,1); % Cumulative monthly returns 
a_R=([ID; R(end,:)])'; % R matrix appended to ID and transposed 
s_C=sortrows(a_R,2); % Ranked 6m returns (lowest to highest) 
q = quantile(s_C(:,2),p); % Cut the returns of all countries into 10 (Deciles); if divided into 5 then 
% command becomes: quantile(s_C(:,2),(1:4)/5)    
s_Cl=s_C(:,2); 
s_Cl(s_Cl>q(1,1))=0; % Select Losers 
R_Cl = s_Cl(~all(s_Cl == 0,2),:); 
ID_l=s_C(1:size(R_Cl,1),1); % ID of losers 
no_l=size(ID_l,1); % Number of losers 
 
s_Cw=s_C(:,2); 
s_Cw(s_Cw<q(1,end))=0; % Select Winners 
R_Cw = s_Cw(~all(s_Cw == 0,2),:); 
ID_w=s_C(size(s_C,1)-size(R_Cw,1)+1:end,1); % ID of winners 
no_w=size(ID_w,1); % Number of winners 
 
% Holding Period 
t_hold=2+per_for; % to skip one period you will have 2+per_for 
 
rl_hold=r_adj1(t_hold:t_hold+per_hold-1,ID_l'); % returns of losers for holding period 
m_rl=mean(rl_hold,1); % average returns of losers over holding period 
l_p=mean(m_rl,2); % average loser portfolio return 
 
rw_hold=r_adj1(t_hold:t_hold+per_hold-1,ID_w'); % returns of winners for holding period 
m_rw=mean(rw_hold,1); % average returns of winners over holding period 
w_p=mean(m_rw,2); % average winner portfolio return 
 













sto_l_p=sto_l_p(~all(sto_l_p == 0,2),:); 
sto_w_p=sto_w_p(~all(sto_w_p == 0,2),:); 
sto_mom=sto_mom(~all(sto_mom == 0,2),:); 
sto_no_l=sto_no_l(~all(sto_no_l == 0,2),:); 
sto_no_w=sto_no_w(~all(sto_no_w == 0,2),:); 
sto_N_adj=sto_N_adj(~all(sto_N_adj == 0,2),:); 
 
a_l_p=sum(sto_l_p,1)/size(sto_l_p,1); % Average return on losers portfolios 
a_w_p=sum(sto_w_p,1)/size(sto_w_p,1); % Average return on winners portfolios 
 
























9 Appendix B 
9.1 Appendix B1  





%% Initial setup 
r = xlsread('C:\Alain3\matdata.xlsx','Sheet2','b4:av532'); 
%r = xlsread('C:\Local\My 
Documents_QMUL\Alain2\matdata.xlsx','Sheet2','b4:av532'); % Load actual 
return data 
N=size(r,2); % number of countries: 47 
T=size(r,1); % number of periods: 552 (1969-2014 monthly) 
t_start=1; % Start of formation period 
per_for=36; % 36 month calculation 
per_hold=36; % 36 month calculation 
p=(1:9)/10; % prob. for quantile code; Cut the returns of all countries 
into 10 (Deciles); if divided into 5 then command becomes: 














% Adjustment of dataset to include all stock indices available at time 
t_for 
r_adj=r(t_for:t_for+per_for+per_hold-1,:); % returns for formation and 
holding period (if you skip a month for holding period you need an extra 
element on T dimension) 
for i=1:N; 
if r_adj(1,i)==-999 
       r_adj(:,i)=-991; 
end 
end 
B=-991*ones(size(r_adj,1),1);     
r_adj1 = r_adj(:,~all(r_adj == repmat(B,1,N),1)); 
 
% Formation Period 
r_for=r_adj1(1:per_for,:); % returns for formation period 
N_adj=size(r_for,2); 
ID=1:size(r_for,2); % ID of N countries in each period  
R=cumsum(r_for,1); % Cumulative monthly returns 
a_R=([ID; R(end,:)])'; % R matrix appended to ID and transposed 
s_C=sortrows(a_R,2); % Ranked 6m returns (lowest to highest) 
q = quantile(s_C(:,2),p); % Cut the returns of all countries into 10 
(Deciles); if divided into 5 then 




s_Cl(s_Cl>q(1,1))=0; % Select Losers 
R_Cl = s_Cl(~all(s_Cl == 0,2),:); 
ID_l=s_C(1:size(R_Cl,1),1); % ID of losers 
no_l=size(ID_l,1); % Number of losers 
 
s_Cw=s_C(:,2); 
s_Cw(s_Cw<q(1,end))=0; % Select Winners 
R_Cw = s_Cw(~all(s_Cw == 0,2),:); 
ID_w=s_C(size(s_C,1)-size(R_Cw,1)+1:end,1); % ID of winners 
no_w=size(ID_w,1); % Number of winners 
 
% Holding Period 
t_hold=1+per_for; % to skip one period you will have 2+per_for 
 
rl_hold=r_adj1(t_hold:t_hold+per_hold-1,ID_l'); % returns of losers for 
holding period 
m_rl=mean(rl_hold,1); % average returns of losers over holding period 
l_p=mean(m_rl,2); % average loser portfolio return 
 
rw_hold=r_adj1(t_hold:t_hold+per_hold-1,ID_w'); % returns of winners for 
holding period 
m_rw=mean(rw_hold,1); % average returns of winners over holding period 
w_p=mean(m_rw,2); % average winner portfolio return 
 











sto_l_p=sto_l_p(~all(sto_l_p == 0,2),:); 
sto_w_p=sto_w_p(~all(sto_w_p == 0,2),:); 
sto_con=sto_con(~all(sto_con == 0,2),:); 
sto_no_l=sto_no_l(~all(sto_no_l == 0,2),:); 
sto_no_w=sto_no_w(~all(sto_no_w == 0,2),:); 
sto_N_adj=sto_N_adj(~all(sto_N_adj == 0,2),:); 
 
a_l_p=sum(sto_l_p,1)/size(sto_l_p,1); % Average return on losers portfolios 
a_w_p=sum(sto_w_p,1)/size(sto_w_p,1); % Average return on winners 
portfolios 
 















9.2 Appendix B2  





%% Initial setup 
r = xlsread('C:\Alain3\matdata.xlsx','Sheet4','b4:av532'); 
%r = xlsread('C:\Local\My 
Documents_QMUL\Alain2\matdata.xlsx','Sheet2','b4:av532'); % Load actual 
return data 
N=size(r,2); % number of countries: 47 
T=size(r,1); % number of periods: 552 (1969-2014 monthly) 
t_start=1; % Start of formation period 
per_for=36; % 36 month calculation 
per_hold=36; % 36 month calculation 
p=(1:9)/10; % prob. for quantile code; Cut the returns of all countries 
into 10 (Deciles); if divided into 5 then command becomes: 














% Adjustment of dataset to include all stock indices available at time 
t_for 
r_adj=r(t_for:t_for+per_for+per_hold,:); % returns for formation and 
holding period (if you skip a month for holding period you need an extra 
element on T dimension) 
for i=1:N; 
if r_adj(1,i)==-999 
       r_adj(:,i)=-991; 
end 
end 
B=-991*ones(size(r_adj,1),1);     
r_adj1 = r_adj(:,~all(r_adj == repmat(B,1,N),1)); 
 
% Formation Period 
r_for=r_adj1(1:per_for,:); % returns for formation period 
N_adj=size(r_for,2); 
ID=1:size(r_for,2); % ID of N countries in each period  
R=cumsum(r_for,1); % Cumulative monthly returns 
a_R=([ID; R(end,:)])'; % R matrix appended to ID and transposed 
s_C=sortrows(a_R,2); % Ranked 6m returns (lowest to highest) 
q = quantile(s_C(:,2),p); % Cut the returns of all countries into 10 
(Deciles); if divided into 5 then 
% command becomes: quantile(s_C(:,2),(1:4)/5)    
s_Cl=s_C(:,2); 
s_Cl(s_Cl>q(1,1))=0; % Select Losers 
R_Cl = s_Cl(~all(s_Cl == 0,2),:); 
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ID_l=s_C(1:size(R_Cl,1),1); % ID of losers 
no_l=size(ID_l,1); % Number of losers 
 
s_Cw=s_C(:,2); 
s_Cw(s_Cw<q(1,end))=0; % Select Winners 
R_Cw = s_Cw(~all(s_Cw == 0,2),:); 
ID_w=s_C(size(s_C,1)-size(R_Cw,1)+1:end,1); % ID of winners 
no_w=size(ID_w,1); % Number of winners 
 
% Holding Period 
t_hold=2+per_for; % to skip one period you will have 2+per_for 
 
rl_hold=r_adj1(t_hold:t_hold+per_hold-1,ID_l'); % returns of losers for 
holding period 
m_rl=mean(rl_hold,1); % average returns of losers over holding period 
l_p=mean(m_rl,2); % average loser portfolio return 
 
rw_hold=r_adj1(t_hold:t_hold+per_hold-1,ID_w'); % returns of winners for 
holding period 
m_rw=mean(rw_hold,1); % average returns of winners over holding period 
w_p=mean(m_rw,2); % average winner portfolio return 
 











sto_l_p=sto_l_p(~all(sto_l_p == 0,2),:); 
sto_w_p=sto_w_p(~all(sto_w_p == 0,2),:); 
sto_con=sto_con(~all(sto_con == 0,2),:); 
sto_no_l=sto_no_l(~all(sto_no_l == 0,2),:); 
sto_no_w=sto_no_w(~all(sto_no_w == 0,2),:); 
sto_N_adj=sto_N_adj(~all(sto_N_adj == 0,2),:); 
 
a_l_p=sum(sto_l_p,1)/size(sto_l_p,1); % Average return on losers portfolios 
a_w_p=sum(sto_w_p,1)/size(sto_w_p,1); % Average return on winners 
portfolios 
 
















9.3 Appendix B3  





%% Initial setup 
r = xlsread('C:\Alain3\matdata.xlsx','Sheet2','b4:av532'); 
%r = xlsread('C:\Local\My 
Documents_QMUL\Alain2\matdata.xlsx','Sheet2','b4:av532'); % Load actual 
return data 
N=size(r,2); % number of countries: 47 
T=size(r,1); % number of periods: 552 (1969-2014 monthly) 
t_start=1; % Start of formation period 
per_for=36; % 6 month calculation 
per_hold=36; % 6 month calculation 
p=(1:9)/10; % prob. for quantile code; Cut the returns of all countries 
into 10 (Deciles); if divided into 5 then command becomes: 














% Adjustment of dataset to include all stock indices available at time 
t_for 
r_adj=r(t_for:t_for+per_for+per_hold-1,:); % returns for formation and 
holding period (if you skip a month for holding period you need an extra 
element on T dimension) 
for i=1:N; 
if r_adj(1,i)==-999 
       r_adj(:,i)=-991; 
end 
end 
B=-991*ones(size(r_adj,1),1);     
r_adj1 = r_adj(:,~all(r_adj == repmat(B,1,N),1)); 
 
% Formation Period 
r_for=r_adj1(1:per_for,:); % returns for formation period 
N_adj=size(r_for,2); 
ID=1:size(r_for,2); % ID of N countries in each period  
R=cumsum(r_for,1); % Cumulative monthly returns 
a_R=([ID; R(end,:)])'; % R matrix appended to ID and transposed 
s_C=sortrows(a_R,2); % Ranked 6m returns (lowest to highest) 
q = quantile(s_C(:,2),p); % Cut the returns of all countries into 10 
(Deciles); if divided into 5 then 
% command becomes: quantile(s_C(:,2),(1:4)/5); decile (1:9)/10    
s_Cl=s_C(:,2); 
s_Cl(s_Cl>q(1,1))=0; % Select Losers 
R_Cl = s_Cl(~all(s_Cl == 0,2),:); 
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ID_l=s_C(1:size(R_Cl,1),1); % ID of losers 
no_l=size(ID_l,1); % Number of losers 
 
s_Cw=s_C(:,2); 
s_Cw(s_Cw<q(1,end))=0; % Select Winners 
R_Cw = s_Cw(~all(s_Cw == 0,2),:); 
ID_w=s_C(size(s_C,1)-size(R_Cw,1)+1:end,1); % ID of winners 
no_w=size(ID_w,1); % Number of winners 
 
% Holding Period 
t_hold=1+per_for; % to skip one period you will have 2+per_for 
 
rl_hold=r_adj1(t_hold:t_hold+per_hold-1,ID_l'); % returns of losers for 
holding period 
m_rl=mean(rl_hold,1); % average returns of losers over holding period 
l_p=mean(m_rl,2); % average loser portfolio return 
 
rw_hold=r_adj1(t_hold:t_hold+per_hold-1,ID_w'); % returns of winners for 
holding period 
m_rw=mean(rw_hold,1); % average returns of winners over holding period 
w_p=mean(m_rw,2); % average winner portfolio return 
 











sto_l_p=sto_l_p(~all(sto_l_p == 0,2),:); 
sto_w_p=sto_w_p(~all(sto_w_p == 0,2),:); 
sto_con=sto_con(~all(sto_con == 0,2),:); 
sto_no_l=sto_no_l(~all(sto_no_l == 0,2),:); 
sto_no_w=sto_no_w(~all(sto_no_w == 0,2),:); 
sto_N_adj=sto_N_adj(~all(sto_N_adj == 0,2),:); 
 
a_l_p=sum(sto_l_p,1)/size(sto_l_p,1); % Average return on losers portfolios 
a_w_p=sum(sto_w_p,1)/size(sto_w_p,1); % Average return on winners 
portfolios 
 

















9.4 Appendix B4  





%% Initial setup 
r = xlsread('C:\Alain3\matdata.xlsx','Sheet2','b4:532'); 
%r = xlsread('C:\Local\My 
Documents_QMUL\Alain2\matdata.xlsx','Sheet2','b4:av532'); % Load actual 
return data 
N=size(r,2); % number of countries: 47 
T=size(r,1); % number of periods: 552 (1969-2014 monthly) 
t_start=1; % Start of formation period 
per_for=36; % 36 month calculation 
per_hold=36; % 36 month calculation 
p=(1:9)/10; % prob. for quantile code; Cut the returns of all countries 
into 10 (Deciles); if divided into 5 then command becomes: 














% Adjustment of dataset to include all stock indices available at time 
t_for 
r_adj=r(t_for:t_for+per_for+per_hold,:); % returns for formation and 
holding period (if you skip a month for holding period you need an extra 
element on T dimension) 
for i=1:N; 
if r_adj(1,i)==-999 
       r_adj(:,i)=-991; 
end 
end 
B=-991*ones(size(r_adj,1),1);     
r_adj1 = r_adj(:,~all(r_adj == repmat(B,1,N),1)); 
 
% Formation Period 
r_for=r_adj1(1:per_for,:); % returns for formation period 
N_adj=size(r_for,2); 
ID=1:size(r_for,2); % ID of N countries in each period  
R=cumsum(r_for,1); % Cumulative monthly returns 
a_R=([ID; R(end,:)])'; % R matrix appended to ID and transposed 
s_C=sortrows(a_R,2); % Ranked 6m returns (lowest to highest) 
q = quantile(s_C(:,2),p); % Cut the returns of all countries into 10 
(Deciles); if divided into 5 then 
% command becomes: quantile(s_C(:,2),(1:4)/5)    
s_Cl=s_C(:,2); 
s_Cl(s_Cl>q(1,1))=0; % Select Losers 
R_Cl = s_Cl(~all(s_Cl == 0,2),:); 
365 
 
ID_l=s_C(1:size(R_Cl,1),1); % ID of losers 
no_l=size(ID_l,1); % Number of losers 
 
s_Cw=s_C(:,2); 
s_Cw(s_Cw<q(1,end))=0; % Select Winners 
R_Cw = s_Cw(~all(s_Cw == 0,2),:); 
ID_w=s_C(size(s_C,1)-size(R_Cw,1)+1:end,1); % ID of winners 
no_w=size(ID_w,1); % Number of winners 
 
% Holding Period 
t_hold=2+per_for; % to skip one period you will have 2+per_for 
 
rl_hold=r_adj1(t_hold:t_hold+per_hold-1,ID_l'); % returns of losers for 
holding period 
m_rl=mean(rl_hold,1); % average returns of losers over holding period 
l_p=mean(m_rl,2); % average loser portfolio return 
 
rw_hold=r_adj1(t_hold:t_hold+per_hold-1,ID_w'); % returns of winners for 
holding period 
m_rw=mean(rw_hold,1); % average returns of winners over holding period 
w_p=mean(m_rw,2); % average winner portfolio return 
 











sto_l_p=sto_l_p(~all(sto_l_p == 0,2),:); 
sto_w_p=sto_w_p(~all(sto_w_p == 0,2),:); 
sto_con=sto_con(~all(sto_con == 0,2),:); 
sto_no_l=sto_no_l(~all(sto_no_l == 0,2),:); 
sto_no_w=sto_no_w(~all(sto_no_w == 0,2),:); 
sto_N_adj=sto_N_adj(~all(sto_N_adj == 0,2),:); 
 
a_l_p=sum(sto_l_p,1)/size(sto_l_p,1); % Average return on losers portfolios 
a_w_p=sum(sto_w_p,1)/size(sto_w_p,1); % Average return on winners 
portfolios 
 

















9.5 Appendix B5  





%% Initial setup 
r = xlsread('C:\Alain3\matdata.xlsx','Sheet2','b4:av532'); 
%r = xlsread('C:\Local\My 
Documents_QMUL\Alain2\matdata.xlsx','Sheet2','b4:av532'); % Load actual 
return data 
N=size(r,2); % number of countries: 47 
T=size(r,1); % number of periods: 552 (1969-2014 monthly) 
t_start=1; % Start of formation period 
per_for=36; % 36 month calculation 
per_hold=36; % 36 month calculation 
p=(1:4)/5; % prob. for quantile code; Cut the returns of all countries into 
10 (Deciles); if divided into 5 then command becomes: 














% Adjustment of dataset to include all stock indices available at time 
t_for 
r_adj=r(t_for:t_for+per_for+per_hold-1,:); % returns for formation and 
holding period (if you skip a month for holding period you need an extra 
element on T dimension) 
for i=1:N; 
if r_adj(1,i)==-999 
       r_adj(:,i)=-991; 
end 
end 
B=-991*ones(size(r_adj,1),1);     
r_adj1 = r_adj(:,~all(r_adj == repmat(B,1,N),1)); 
 
% Formation Period 
r_for=r_adj1(1:per_for,:); % returns for formation period 
N_adj=size(r_for,2); 
ID=1:size(r_for,2); % ID of N countries in each period  
R=cumsum(r_for,1); % Cumulative monthly returns 
a_R=([ID; R(end,:)])'; % R matrix appended to ID and transposed 
s_C=sortrows(a_R,2); % Ranked 6m returns (lowest to highest) 
q = quantile(s_C(:,2),p); % Cut the returns of all countries into 10 
(Deciles); if divided into 5 then 
% command becomes: quantile(s_C(:,2),(1:4)/5)    
s_Cl=s_C(:,2); 
s_Cl(s_Cl>q(1,1))=0; % Select Losers 
R_Cl = s_Cl(~all(s_Cl == 0,2),:); 
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ID_l=s_C(1:size(R_Cl,1),1); % ID of losers 
no_l=size(ID_l,1); % Number of losers 
 
s_Cw=s_C(:,2); 
s_Cw(s_Cw<q(1,end))=0; % Select Winners 
R_Cw = s_Cw(~all(s_Cw == 0,2),:); 
ID_w=s_C(size(s_C,1)-size(R_Cw,1)+1:end,1); % ID of winners 
no_w=size(ID_w,1); % Number of winners 
 
% Holding Period 
t_hold=1+per_for; % to skip one period you will have 2+per_for 
 
rl_hold=r_adj1(t_hold:t_hold+per_hold-1,ID_l'); % returns of losers for 
holding period 
m_rl=mean(rl_hold,1); % average returns of losers over holding period 
l_p=mean(m_rl,2); % average loser portfolio return 
 
rw_hold=r_adj1(t_hold:t_hold+per_hold-1,ID_w'); % returns of winners for 
holding period 
m_rw=mean(rw_hold,1); % average returns of winners over holding period 
w_p=mean(m_rw,2); % average winner portfolio return 
 











sto_l_p=sto_l_p(~all(sto_l_p == 0,2),:); 
sto_w_p=sto_w_p(~all(sto_w_p == 0,2),:); 
sto_con=sto_con(~all(sto_con == 0,2),:); 
sto_no_l=sto_no_l(~all(sto_no_l == 0,2),:); 
sto_no_w=sto_no_w(~all(sto_no_w == 0,2),:); 
sto_N_adj=sto_N_adj(~all(sto_N_adj == 0,2),:); 
 
a_l_p=sum(sto_l_p,1)/size(sto_l_p,1); % Average return on losers portfolios 
a_w_p=sum(sto_w_p,1)/size(sto_w_p,1); % Average return on winners 
portfolios 
 

















9.6 Appendix B6  





%% Initial setup 
r = xlsread('C:\Alain3\matdata.xlsx','Sheet4','b4:av532'); 
%r = xlsread('C:\Local\My 
Documents_QMUL\Alain2\matdata.xlsx','Sheet2','b4:av532'); % Load actual 
return data 
N=size(r,2); % number of countries: 47 
T=size(r,1); % number of periods: 552 (1969-2014 monthly) 
t_start=1; % Start of formation period 
per_for=36; % 36 month calculation 
per_hold=36; % 36 month calculation 
p=(1:4)/5; % prob. for quantile code; Cut the returns of all countries into 
10 (Deciles); if divided into 5 then command becomes: 














% Adjustment of dataset to include all stock indices available at time 
t_for 
r_adj=r(t_for:t_for+per_for+per_hold,:); % returns for formation and 
holding period (if you skip a month for holding period you need an extra 
element on T dimension) 
for i=1:N; 
if r_adj(1,i)==-999 
       r_adj(:,i)=-991; 
end 
end 
B=-991*ones(size(r_adj,1),1);     
r_adj1 = r_adj(:,~all(r_adj == repmat(B,1,N),1)); 
 
% Formation Period 
r_for=r_adj1(1:per_for,:); % returns for formation period 
N_adj=size(r_for,2); 
ID=1:size(r_for,2); % ID of N countries in each period  
R=cumsum(r_for,1); % Cumulative monthly returns 
a_R=([ID; R(end,:)])'; % R matrix appended to ID and transposed 
s_C=sortrows(a_R,2); % Ranked 6m returns (lowest to highest) 
q = quantile(s_C(:,2),p); % Cut the returns of all countries into 10 
(Deciles); if divided into 5 then 
% command becomes: quantile(s_C(:,2),(1:4)/5)    
s_Cl=s_C(:,2); 
s_Cl(s_Cl>q(1,1))=0; % Select Losers 
R_Cl = s_Cl(~all(s_Cl == 0,2),:); 
369 
 
ID_l=s_C(1:size(R_Cl,1),1); % ID of losers 
no_l=size(ID_l,1); % Number of losers 
 
s_Cw=s_C(:,2); 
s_Cw(s_Cw<q(1,end))=0; % Select Winners 
R_Cw = s_Cw(~all(s_Cw == 0,2),:); 
ID_w=s_C(size(s_C,1)-size(R_Cw,1)+1:end,1); % ID of winners 
no_w=size(ID_w,1); % Number of winners 
 
% Holding Period 
t_hold=2+per_for; % to skip one period you will have 2+per_for 
 
rl_hold=r_adj1(t_hold:t_hold+per_hold-1,ID_l'); % returns of losers for 
holding period 
m_rl=mean(rl_hold,1); % average returns of losers over holding period 
l_p=mean(m_rl,2); % average loser portfolio return 
 
rw_hold=r_adj1(t_hold:t_hold+per_hold-1,ID_w'); % returns of winners for 
holding period 
m_rw=mean(rw_hold,1); % average returns of winners over holding period 
w_p=mean(m_rw,2); % average winner portfolio return 
 











sto_l_p=sto_l_p(~all(sto_l_p == 0,2),:); 
sto_w_p=sto_w_p(~all(sto_w_p == 0,2),:); 
sto_con=sto_con(~all(sto_con == 0,2),:); 
sto_no_l=sto_no_l(~all(sto_no_l == 0,2),:); 
sto_no_w=sto_no_w(~all(sto_no_w == 0,2),:); 
sto_N_adj=sto_N_adj(~all(sto_N_adj == 0,2),:); 
 
a_l_p=sum(sto_l_p,1)/size(sto_l_p,1); % Average return on losers portfolios 
a_w_p=sum(sto_w_p,1)/size(sto_w_p,1); % Average return on winners 
portfolios 
 
















9.7 Appendix B7  





%% Initial setup 
r = xlsread('C:\Alain3\matdata.xlsx','Sheet2','b4:av532'); 
%r = xlsread('C:\Local\My 
Documents_QMUL\Alain2\matdata.xlsx','Sheet2','b4:av532'); % Load actual 
return data 
N=size(r,2); % number of countries: 47 
T=size(r,1); % number of periods: 552 (1969-2014 monthly) 
t_start=1; % Start of formation period 
per_for=36; % 6 month calculation 
per_hold=36; % 6 month calculation 
p=(1:4)/5; % prob. for quantile code; Cut the returns of all countries into 
10 (Deciles); if divided into 5 then command becomes: 














% Adjustment of dataset to include all stock indices available at time 
t_for 
r_adj=r(t_for:t_for+per_for+per_hold-1,:); % returns for formation and 
holding period (if you skip a month for holding period you need an extra 
element on T dimension) 
for i=1:N; 
if r_adj(1,i)==-999 
       r_adj(:,i)=-991; 
end 
end 
B=-991*ones(size(r_adj,1),1);     
r_adj1 = r_adj(:,~all(r_adj == repmat(B,1,N),1)); 
 
% Formation Period 
r_for=r_adj1(1:per_for,:); % returns for formation period 
N_adj=size(r_for,2); 
ID=1:size(r_for,2); % ID of N countries in each period  
R=cumsum(r_for,1); % Cumulative monthly returns 
a_R=([ID; R(end,:)])'; % R matrix appended to ID and transposed 
s_C=sortrows(a_R,2); % Ranked 6m returns (lowest to highest) 
q = quantile(s_C(:,2),p); % Cut the returns of all countries into 10 
(Deciles); if divided into 5 then 
% command becomes: quantile(s_C(:,2),(1:4)/5); decile (1:9)/10    
s_Cl=s_C(:,2); 
s_Cl(s_Cl>q(1,1))=0; % Select Losers 
R_Cl = s_Cl(~all(s_Cl == 0,2),:); 
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ID_l=s_C(1:size(R_Cl,1),1); % ID of losers 
no_l=size(ID_l,1); % Number of losers 
 
s_Cw=s_C(:,2); 
s_Cw(s_Cw<q(1,end))=0; % Select Winners 
R_Cw = s_Cw(~all(s_Cw == 0,2),:); 
ID_w=s_C(size(s_C,1)-size(R_Cw,1)+1:end,1); % ID of winners 
no_w=size(ID_w,1); % Number of winners 
 
% Holding Period 
t_hold=1+per_for; % to skip one period you will have 2+per_for 
 
rl_hold=r_adj1(t_hold:t_hold+per_hold-1,ID_l'); % returns of losers for 
holding period 
m_rl=mean(rl_hold,1); % average returns of losers over holding period 
l_p=mean(m_rl,2); % average loser portfolio return 
 
rw_hold=r_adj1(t_hold:t_hold+per_hold-1,ID_w'); % returns of winners for 
holding period 
m_rw=mean(rw_hold,1); % average returns of winners over holding period 
w_p=mean(m_rw,2); % average winner portfolio return 
 











sto_l_p=sto_l_p(~all(sto_l_p == 0,2),:); 
sto_w_p=sto_w_p(~all(sto_w_p == 0,2),:); 
sto_con=sto_con(~all(sto_con == 0,2),:); 
sto_no_l=sto_no_l(~all(sto_no_l == 0,2),:); 
sto_no_w=sto_no_w(~all(sto_no_w == 0,2),:); 
sto_N_adj=sto_N_adj(~all(sto_N_adj == 0,2),:); 
 
a_l_p=sum(sto_l_p,1)/size(sto_l_p,1); % Average return on losers portfolios 
a_w_p=sum(sto_w_p,1)/size(sto_w_p,1); % Average return on winners 
portfolios 
 

















9.8 Appendix B8  





%% Initial setup 
r = xlsread('C:\Alain3\matdata.xlsx','Sheet2','b4:532'); 
%r = xlsread('C:\Local\My 
Documents_QMUL\Alain2\matdata.xlsx','Sheet2','b4:av532'); % Load actual 
return data 
N=size(r,2); % number of countries: 47 
T=size(r,1); % number of periods: 552 (1969-2014 monthly) 
t_start=1; % Start of formation period 
per_for=36; % 36 month calculation 
per_hold=36; % 36 month calculation 
p=(1:4)/5; % prob. for quantile code; Cut the returns of all countries into 
10 (Deciles); if divided into 5 then command becomes: 














% Adjustment of dataset to include all stock indices available at time 
t_for 
r_adj=r(t_for:t_for+per_for+per_hold,:); % returns for formation and 
holding period (if you skip a month for holding period you need an extra 
element on T dimension) 
for i=1:N; 
if r_adj(1,i)==-999 
       r_adj(:,i)=-991; 
end 
end 
B=-991*ones(size(r_adj,1),1);     
r_adj1 = r_adj(:,~all(r_adj == repmat(B,1,N),1)); 
 
% Formation Period 
r_for=r_adj1(1:per_for,:); % returns for formation period 
N_adj=size(r_for,2); 
ID=1:size(r_for,2); % ID of N countries in each period  
R=cumsum(r_for,1); % Cumulative monthly returns 
a_R=([ID; R(end,:)])'; % R matrix appended to ID and transposed 
s_C=sortrows(a_R,2); % Ranked 6m returns (lowest to highest) 
q = quantile(s_C(:,2),p); % Cut the returns of all countries into 10 
(Deciles); if divided into 5 then 
% command becomes: quantile(s_C(:,2),(1:4)/5)    
s_Cl=s_C(:,2); 
s_Cl(s_Cl>q(1,1))=0; % Select Losers 
R_Cl = s_Cl(~all(s_Cl == 0,2),:); 
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ID_l=s_C(1:size(R_Cl,1),1); % ID of losers 
no_l=size(ID_l,1); % Number of losers 
 
s_Cw=s_C(:,2); 
s_Cw(s_Cw<q(1,end))=0; % Select Winners 
R_Cw = s_Cw(~all(s_Cw == 0,2),:); 
ID_w=s_C(size(s_C,1)-size(R_Cw,1)+1:end,1); % ID of winners 
no_w=size(ID_w,1); % Number of winners 
 
% Holding Period 
t_hold=2+per_for; % to skip one period you will have 2+per_for 
 
rl_hold=r_adj1(t_hold:t_hold+per_hold-1,ID_l'); % returns of losers for 
holding period 
m_rl=mean(rl_hold,1); % average returns of losers over holding period 
l_p=mean(m_rl,2); % average loser portfolio return 
 
rw_hold=r_adj1(t_hold:t_hold+per_hold-1,ID_w'); % returns of winners for 
holding period 
m_rw=mean(rw_hold,1); % average returns of winners over holding period 
w_p=mean(m_rw,2); % average winner portfolio return 
 











sto_l_p=sto_l_p(~all(sto_l_p == 0,2),:); 
sto_w_p=sto_w_p(~all(sto_w_p == 0,2),:); 
sto_con=sto_con(~all(sto_con == 0,2),:); 
sto_no_l=sto_no_l(~all(sto_no_l == 0,2),:); 
sto_no_w=sto_no_w(~all(sto_no_w == 0,2),:); 
sto_N_adj=sto_N_adj(~all(sto_N_adj == 0,2),:); 
 
a_l_p=sum(sto_l_p,1)/size(sto_l_p,1); % Average return on losers portfolios 
a_w_p=sum(sto_w_p,1)/size(sto_w_p,1); % Average return on winners 
portfolios 
 















10 Appendix C 
10.1 Appendix C1 
 
Table 4.3.16 Effect of Fama and French Risks on Momentum Profit with Newey West 
Procedure 1969-2014 
 Panel A: FF 3-Factors Model 
3-month 6-month 9-month 12-month 
αo 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.008** 0.004*** 
 (3.58) (4.66) (4.57) (2.64) 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.009 
MKTRF -0.036 -0.029 -0.016 0.030 
 (-0.67) (-0.78) (-0.50) (1.29) 
 0.501 0.433 0.619 0.199 
SMB -0.068 -0.118** -0.079 -0.097*** 
 (-0.81) (-2.26) (-1.64) (-2.76) 
 0.416 0.024 0.101 0.006 
HML -0.116 0.009 -0.062 0.009 
 (-1.51) (0.17) (-1.27) (0.23) 
 0.132 0.865 0.203 0.821 
R2/Adj-R2 0.550/-0.030 1.350/0.770 0.950/0.360 1.590/1.000 
This table reports the regression result based on model (28). Where: the dependent variable R are the returns of the momentum portfolio at 
time t and regressed on, MKTRF the excess market returns on MSCI world index, HML (high minus low) the return to portfolio that is long 
on high book-to-market stocks and short on low book-to-market stocks in US, and BMS (small minus big) returns to long-short portfolios 
constructed using size in US market. I estimate the parameters using the Newey West procedure. I use the regression Alpha to measure the 
size of the abnormal return generated after adjusting for risk. The Newey adjusted t-statistics are reported in the parentheses and the p-value 
next. The R-squares are also reported. The results are* statistically significant at 10% for p<0.1, ** statistically significant at 5% for p<0.05 













10.2 Appendix C2  
 
Table 4.3.17 Effect of Fama and French Risk on Momentum Profit with Newey West 
Procedure Estimation and Time Variation 1969-2014 
 Panel A: FF 3-Factors Model 
3-month 6-month 9-month 12-month 
αo 0.020 0.028*** 0.037*** 0.030*** 
 (1.60) (3.76) (5.11) (14.39) 
 0.110 0.000 0.000 0.000 
MKTRF -0.052 -0.025 0.004 0.046** 
 (-1.00) (-0.74) (0.15) (2.25) 
 0.318 0.458 0.880 0.025 
SMB -0.023 -0.079* -0.044 -0.076** 
 (-0.32) (-1.70) (-1.27) (-2.59) 
 0.745 0.090 0.206 0.010 
HML -0.091 0.032 -0.072* -0.017 
 (-1.23) (0.62) (-1.87) (-0.50) 
 0.221 0.537 0.062 0.620 
R2/Adj-R2 16.550/ 8.560 34.930/28.670 38.240/32.260 38.860/ 32.910 
This table reports the regression result based on equation (28). Where, the dependent variable R are the returns of the momentum portfolio at 
time t and regressed on, MKTRF the excess market returns (based on MSCI world index), HML (high minus low) the return to portfolio that 
is long on high book-to-market stocks and short on low book-to-market stocks in US, BMS (small minus big) returns to long-short portfolios 
constructed using size in US market and the time dummy. I estimate the parameters using the Newey West procedure. I also account for 
time variation through time dummy. I use the regression Alpha to measure the size of the abnormal return generated after adjusting for risk. 
The Newey adjusted t-statistics are reported in the parentheses and the p-value next. The results are* statistically significant at 10% for 




















10.3 Appendix C3 
 
Table 4.3.18 Effect of Market State Pactor on Momentum Profit with Newey West Procedure 
1969-2014 
 Parameter 
𝛼1 𝐿𝐼𝑄 𝐷𝑆 TS 𝑀𝐾𝑇 R2/Adj-R2 
3-Month 0.018** 0.102 0.029 -0.007 -0.017 0.830/0.060 
 (2.24) (1.17) (0.62) (-1.06) (-0.26)  
 0.025 0.241 0.534 0.291 0.793  
6-Month 0.016*** 0.047 0.013 -0.005 0.018 0.670/-0.110 
 (2.81) (0.81) (0.55) (-1.14) (2.81)  
 0.005 0.416 0.584 0.254 0.005  
9-month 0.009** 0.024 -0.010 -0.002 -0.009 0.210/ -0.580 
 (2.16) (0.60) (-0.48) (-0.59) (-0.28)  
 0.031 0.546 0.633 0.553 0.777  
12-month 0.003 0.026 -0.034* -0.000 0.002 0.870/0.080 
 (0.84) (0.92) (-1.77) (-0.16) (0.06)  
 0.402 0.359 0.078 0.869 0.952  
This table reports the regression result based on model (29). Where: 𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑡−1 is the liquidity factor at time t-1, 𝐷𝑆𝑡−1 the Default spread at 
time t-1, TS the Term spread at time t-1 and the𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡−1 the MSCI world indices price level and represent price levels at time t-1. I estimate 
the parameters using the Newey West procedure. I use the regression Alpha to measure the size of the abnormal return generated after 
adjusting for risk the R-squares are also reported. The Newey adjusted t-statistics are reported in the parentheses and the p-value next. The 














10.4 Appendix C4 
 
Table 4.3.19 Effect of Market State Factor on Momentum Profit with Newey West Procedure 
Estimation and Time Variation 1969-2014 
 Parameter 
 𝛼1 𝐿𝐼𝑄 𝐷𝑆 TS 𝑀𝐾𝑇 R
2/Adj-R2 
3-Month 0.019 0.080 0.041 0.002 -0.035 16.610/ 8.430 
 (1.01) (0.97) (0.84) (0.15) (-0.55)  
 0.315 0.335 0.399 0.882 0.580  
6-Month 0.030*** 0.020 0.024 -0.001 0.026 34.500/ 28.050 
 (2.69) (0.41) (1.04) (-0.19) (0.72)  
 0.007 0.683 0.300 0.846 0.475  
9-month 0.031*** -0.015 -0.000 0.007 0.008 37.950/31.800 
 (3.32) (-0.44) (-0.00) (1.23) (0.28)  
 0.001 0.662 0.997 0.219 0.778  
12-month 0.020*** 0.004 -0.022 0.008** 0.004 38.530/32.400 
 (3.77) (0.18) (-1.41) (2.02) (0.18)  
 0.000 0.856 0.158 0.044 0.860  
This table reports the regression result based on model (29). Where: 𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑡−1 is the liquidity factor at time t-1, 𝐷𝑆𝑡−1 the Default spread at 
time t-1, TS the Term spread at time t-1 and the 𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡−1 the MSCI world index price level and represent price levels at time t-1 and the time 
dummy. I estimate the parameters using the Newey West procedure. I also account for time variation through time dummy I use the 
regression Alpha to measure the size of the abnormal return generated after adjusting for risk the R-squares are also reported. The Newey 
adjusted t-statistics are reported in the parentheses and the p-value next. The results are* statistically significant at 10% for p<0.1, ** 













10.5 Appendix C5 
 
Table 4.3.20. Effect of Macroeconomic Risk Factor on Momentum Profit with Newey west 
Procedure 1969-2014 
 Parameter 
 𝛼1 ∆𝑂𝑃 ∆𝐼𝑃 𝑊𝑉𝑂𝐿 R
2/Adj-R2 
3-Month 0.005 -0.014 0.908 0.391 1.650/ 0.011 
 (1.02) (-0.48) (2.54) (0.70)  
 0.310 0.633 0.012 0.486  
6-Month 0.004 -0.021 0.548 0.572 1.550/ 0.970 
 (1.26) (-0.93) (2.51) (1.60)  
 0.209 0.354 0.012 0.111  
9-month 0.004 -0.016 0.276 0.327 0.750/0.160 
 (1.62) (-0.86) (1.58) (1.17)  
 0.106 0.388 0.114 0.243  
12-month 0.0008 -0.010 0.204 0.344 0.650/ 0.060 
 (0.37) (-0.84) (1.29) (1.45)  
 0.712 0.402 0.197 0.148  
This table reports the regression result based on model (30). Where: ∆𝑂𝑃𝑡−1, is the change in Oil price at time t-1,∆⁡𝐼𝑃𝑡−1 the change in the 
monthly value of the US Industrial production at time t-1 and  𝑊𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑡−1 the market volatility at time t-1 based on the MSCI world indices 
price level. I estimate the parameters using the Newey West procedure. I use the regression Alpha to measure the size of the abnormal 
return generated after adjusting for risk. The R-squares are reported. The Newey adjusted t-statistics are reported in the parentheses and 
the p-value next. The results are* statistically significant at 10% for p<0.1, ** statistically significant at 5% for p<0.05 and ***statistically 













10.6 Appendix C6 
 
Table 4.3.21. Effect of Macroeconomic Risk Factors on Momentum Profit with Newey West 
Procedure Estimation and Time Variation 1969-2014  
  Parameter 
𝛼1 ∆𝑂𝑃 ∆𝐼𝑃 𝑊𝑉𝑂𝐿 R
2/Adj-R2 
3-Month 0.012 0.002 0.770** 0.774 17.290/9.370 
 (0.91) (0.07) (2.28) (1.17)  
 0.365 0.947 0.023 0.244  
6-Month 0.023*** -0.005 0.300 0.075** 34.800/28.530 
 (2.75) (-0.23) (1.37) (2.08)  
 0.006 0.821 0.170 0.038  
9-month 0.037*** -0.007 -0.038 0.271 37.820/31.800 
 (4.99) (-0.45) (-0.22) (0.70)  
 0.000 0.653 0.826 0.487  
12-month 0.028*** -0.004 -0.178 54.247* 38.400/32.400 
 (8.13) (-0.35) (-1.29) (1.83)  
 0.000 0.726 0.196 0.068  
This table reports the regression result based on model (30). Where: ∆𝑂𝑃𝑡−1 is the change in Oil price at time t-1,⁡∆𝐼𝑃𝑡−1 the change in the 
monthly value of the US Industrial production at time t-1 and  𝑊𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑡−1 the market volatility at time t-1 based on the MSCI world indices 
price level and time dummy. I estimate the parameters using the Newey West procedure. I account for time variation with time dummy. I 
use the regression Alpha to measure the size of the abnormal return generated after adjusting for risk the R-squares are also reported. 
The Newey adjusted t-statistics are reported in the parentheses and the p-value next. The results are* statistically significant at 10% for 














10.7 Appendix C7 
 
Table 4.3.22 Seasonal Effect of Global Risk Factor on Momentum Profit with Newey Procedure 
and Time Variation 1969-2014 
 3-Month 6-Month 9-Month 12-Month 
𝛼3 0.000 0.020* 0.030*** 0.017*** 
 (0.02) (1.71) (2.93) (2.66) 
 0.980 0.089 0.004 0.008 
𝐿𝐼𝑄 0.036 0.024 -0.000 -0.022 
 (0.73) (1.02) (-0.02) (-1.34) 
 0.463 0.308 0.980 0.181 
𝐷𝑆 0.009 0.003 0.005 0.007 
 (0.80) (0.40) (0.97) (1.57) 
 0.426 0.693 0.331 0.117 
𝑇𝑆 0.116 0.039 -0.008 0.007 
 (1.37) (0.82) (-0.23) (0.27) 
 0.170 0.412 0.818 0.786 
MKT -0.017 0.036 0.018 0.009 
 (-0.25) (0.93) (0.64) (0.34) 
 0.802 0.354 0.524 0.734 
∆𝑂𝑃 0.014 -0.003 -0.002 0.000 
 (0.52) (-0.14) (-0.14) (0.01) 
 0.604 0.890 0.892 0.991 
𝑊𝑉𝑂𝐿 0.750 0.782** 0.283 0.709 
 (1.12) (2.09) (0.71) (2.33) 
 0.264 0.037 0.477 0.020 
∆𝐼𝑃 0.924*** 0.336 0.012 -0.142 
 (2.72) (1.46) (0.07) (-1.00) 
 0.007 0.144 0.946 0.319 
MKTRF -0.070 -0.025 0.006 0.051 
 (-1.30) (-0.71) (0.22) (2.55) 
 0.195 0.477 0.829 0.011 
𝑆𝑀𝐵 -0.032 -0.101 -0.054 -0.091 
 (-0.42) (-2.04) (-1.47) (-2.89) 
 0.673 0.042 0.143 0.004 
𝐻𝑀𝐿 -0.100 0.022 -0.070 -0.009 
 -1.21 (0.39) (-1.73) (-0.27) 
 0.226 0.700 0.083 0.784 
R2/Adj-R2 18.410/ 9.240 36.090/ 28.880 38.570/31.590 40.530/33.730 
This table reports the regression result based on model (31). Where: the dependent variable R are the returns of the momentum portfolio (9-
month/3, 6, 9, 12-month) at time t and regressed on, 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 (high minus low) the return to portfolios that is long on high book-to-market 
stocks and short on low book-to-market stocks in US, 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 (small minus big) returns to long-short portfolios constructed using size in US 
market, the 𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑡−1 the liquidity factor at time t-1, 𝐷𝑆𝑡−1 the Default spread at time t-1, 𝑇𝑆𝑡−1 the Term spread at time t-1, 𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡−1 the MSCI 
world indices price level that represent price levels at time t-1, ∆𝑂𝑃𝑇−1, the change in monthly Oil price at time t-1, 𝑊𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑡−1 is the market 
volatility at time t-1, 𝑂𝑃𝑡−1, and ∆𝐼𝑃𝑡−1⁡ is the change in the monthly value of the US Industrial production at time t-1. I estimate the 
parameters using the Newey West procedure. I use the regression Alpha to measure the size of the abnormal return generated after adjusting 
for risk. I. The Newey t-statistics are reported in the parentheses and the p-value next. The results are* statistically significant at 10% for 
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Table 4.3.23 Effect of Global Risk Factors on Momentum Profit with Newey West Procedure and 
Time variation 1969-2014 
 Model Mode2 Model3 Model4 
𝛼3 0.020 0.020 0.012 0.000 
 (1.60) (1.09) (0.94) (0.02) 
 0.110 0.278 0.350 0.980 
𝐿𝐼𝑄  0.041  0.036 
  (0.84)  (0.73) 
  0.404  0.463 
𝐷𝑆  0.001  0.001 
  (0.09)  (0.80) 
  0.931  0.426 
𝑇𝑆  0.093  0.116 
  (1.12)  (1.37) 
  0.263  0.170 
MKT  -0.025  -0.017 
  (-0.38)  (-0.25) 
  0.704  0.802 
∆𝑂𝑃   0.006 0.014 
   (0.23) (0.52) 
   0.816 0.604 
𝑊𝑉𝑂𝐿   0.700 0.751 
   (1.04) (1.12) 
   0.298 0.264 
∆𝐼𝑃   0.794** 0.92*** 
   (2.39) (2.72) 
   0.017 0.007 
MKTRF -0.052 -0.060 -0.056 -0.070 
 (-1.00) (-1.14) (-1.04) (-1.30) 
 0.318 0.253 0.299 0.195 
𝑆𝑀𝐵 -0.023 -0.028 -0.021 -0.032 
 (-0.32) (-0.38) (-0.29) (-0.42) 
 0.745 0.703 0.775 0.673 
𝐻𝑀𝐿 -0.091 -0.092 -0.100 -0.100 
 (-1.23) (-1.14) (-1.31) (-1.21) 
 0.221 0.255 0.189 0.226 
R2/Adj-R2 16.550/ 8.560 24.770/17.040 17.680/9.220 18.410/9.240 
This table reports the regression result based on model (17). Where: the dependent variable R are the returns of the momentum portfolio 
during the globalization periods at time t and regressed on, 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 (high minus low) the return to portfolios that is long on high book-to-
market stocks and short on low book-to-market stocks in US, 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 (small minus big) returns to long-short portfolios constructed using size 
in US market, the 𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑡−1 the liquidity factor at time t-1, 𝐷𝑆𝑡−1 the Default spread at time t-1, 𝑇𝑆𝑡−1 the Term spread at time t-1, 𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡−1 the 
MSCI world indices price level that represent price levels at time t-1, ∆𝑂𝑃𝑡−1, the change in monthly Oil price at time t-1, 𝑊𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑡−1 is the 
market volatility at time t-1, ∆𝐼𝑃𝑡−1⁡ is the change in the monthly value of the US Industrial production at time t-1 and time dummy. 
Regression are based on model 1 to 4 specification. I estimate the parameters using the Newey West procedure. I account for time variation 
through time dummy I use the regression Alpha to measure the size of the abnormal return generated after adjusting for risk. The Newey t-
statistics are reported in the parentheses and the p-value next. The results are* statistically significant at 10% for p<0.1, ** statistically 
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Table 4.3.24. Crisis Role on Momentum Profit with Newey West Procedure and Time 
Variation and Crisis Dummy 1969-2014 
 Currency Crisis Stock Market C Banking Crisis Business cycle 
𝛼3 0.002 0.001 -0.001 -0.027 
 (0.12) (0.04) (0.04) (-1.62) 
 0.903 0.966 0.966 0.106 
Dummy -0.001 -0.021 -0.003 -0.042*** 
 (-0.05) (-1.07) (-0.21) (-3.41) 
 0.957 0.286 0.834 0.001 
𝐿𝐼𝑄 0.035 0.035 0.035 0.020 
 (0.85) (0.70) (0.70) (0.40) 
 0.396 0.485 0.485 0.689 
𝐷𝑆 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.020* 
 (0.76) (0.71) (0.71) (1.89) 
 0.447 0.477 0.477 0.060 
𝑇𝑆 0.114 0.114 0.114 0.111 
 (1.40) (1.23) (1.23) (1.31) 
 0.162 0.221 0.221 0.192 
MKT -0.015 -0.015 -0.015 -0.040 
 (-0.24) (-0.20) (-0.20) (-0.58) 
 0.809 0.840 0.840 0.562 
∆𝑂𝑃 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.023 
 (0.47) (0.49) (0.49) (0.87) 
 0.635 0.623 0.623 0.383 
𝑊𝑉𝑂𝐿 0.840 0.840 0.840 0.505 
 (1.04) (1.17) (1.17) (0.73) 
 0.298 0.244 0.244 0.465 
∆𝐼𝑃 0.899** 0.899** 0.899** 0.696* 
 (2.43) (2.58) (2.58) (1.94) 
 0.016 0.010 0.010 0.053 
MKTRF -0.065 -0.065 -0.065 -0.069 
 (-1.08) (-1.13) (-1.13) (-1.27) 
 0.280 0.259 0.259 0.204 
𝑆𝑀𝐵 -0.028 -0.028 -0.028 -0.045 
 (-0.34) (-0.36) (-0.36) (-0.55) 
 0.737 0.719 0.719 0.584 
𝐻𝑀𝐿 -0.094 -0.094 -0.094 -0.073 
 (-1.08) (-1.12) (-1.12) (-0.87) 
 0.279 0.263 0.263 0.387 
R2/Adj-R2 17.780/8.410 17.780/8.410 17.780/8.410 19.970/11.160 
This table reports the regression result based on model (32). Where: the dependent variable R are the returns of the momentum portfolio 
during crisis periods or during the contraction periods at time t and regressed on, 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 (high minus low) the return to portfolios that is long 
on high book-to-market stocks and short on low book-to-market stocks in US, 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 (small minus big) returns to long-short portfolios 
constructed using size in US market, the 𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑡−1 the liquidity factor at time t-1, 𝐷𝑆𝑡−1 the Default spread at time t-1, 𝑇𝑆𝑡−1 the Term spread 
at time t-1, 𝐾𝑇𝑡−1 the MSCI world indices price level that represent price levels at time t-1, ∆𝑂𝑃𝑡−1, the change in monthly Oil price at time 
t-1, 𝑊𝑣𝑜𝑙 is the market volatility at time t-1, I  added a crisis dummy and ∆𝐼𝑃𝑡−1⁡ is the change in the monthly value of the US Industrial 
production at time t-1. I estimate the parameters using the Newey West procedure. I also account for time variation through time dummy. I 
use the regression Alpha to measure the size of the abnormal return generated after adjusting for risk. The Newey t-statistics are reported in 
the parentheses and the p-value next. The results are* statistically significant at 10% for p<0.1, ** statistically significant at 5% for p<0.05 
and ***statistically significant at 1% for p<0.01. 
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Table 4.3.25 Effect of Global Risk Factor on Momentum Profit in Globalization Period with 
Newey Procedure and Time Variation 1994-2014 
 Model Mode2 Model3 Model4 
𝛼3 0.008 0.019 -0.002 0.004 
 (0.77) (1.36) (-0.18) (0.25) 
 0.444 0.177 0.854 0.801 
𝐿𝐼𝑄  0.034  0.029 
  (0.67)  (0.57) 
  0.507  0.566 
𝐷𝑆  -0.014  -0.008 
  (-0.98)  (-0.51) 
  0.326  0.610 
𝑇𝑆  0.242**  0.267** 
  (2.41)  (2.56) 
  0.017  0.011 
MKT  -0.077  -0.078 
  (-1.03)  (-0.99) 
  0.305  0.326 
∆𝑂𝑃   0.024 0.029 
   (0.75) (1.06) 
   0.453 0.290 
𝑊𝑉𝑂𝐿   1.594* 1.770* 
   (1.91) (2.20) 
   0.058 0.029 
∆𝐼𝑃   0.594 0.438 
   (1.31) (0.98) 
   0.192 0.330 
MKTRF -0.159** -0.166*** -0.169** -0.172*** 
 (-2.57) (-2.66) (-2.48) (-2.72) 
 0.011 0.008 0.014 0.007 
𝑆𝑀𝐵 -0.060 -0.061 -0.109 -0.111 
 (-0.70) (-0.70) (-1.20) (-1.26) 
 0.484 0.484 0.231 0.211 
𝐻𝑀𝐿 -0.087 -0.090 -0.121 -0.115 
 (-0.86) (-0.77) (-1.15) (-0.97) 
 0.393 0.443 0.253 0.335 
R2/Adj-R2 23.810/ 16.040 27.610/18.560 25.910/17.090 29.840/19.820 
This table reports the regression result based on model (37). Where: the dependent variable R are the returns of the momentum portfolio 
during the globalization periods at time t and regressed on, 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 (high minus low) the return to portfolios that is long on high book-to-
market stocks and short on low book-to-market stocks in US, 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 (small minus big) returns to long-short portfolios constructed using size 
in US market, the 𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑡−1 the liquidity factor at time t-1, 𝐷𝑆𝑡−1 the Default spread at time t-1, 𝑇𝑆𝑡−1 the Term spread at time t-1, 𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡−1 the 
MSCI world indices price level that represent price levels at time t-1, ∆𝑂𝑃𝑡−1, the monthly Oil price at time t-1, 𝑊𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑇−1 is the market 
volatility at time t-1, ∆𝑂𝑃𝑡−1 the change in monthly oil price based world indices value at t-1, and ∆𝐼𝑃𝑡−1⁡ is the change in monthly value of 
the US Industrial production at time t-1. Regression are based on model 1 to 4 specification. I estimate the parameters using the Newey West 
procedure. I use the regression Alpha to measure the size of the abnormal return generated after adjusting for risk. The Newey t-statistics are 
reported in the parentheses and the p-value next. The results are* statistically significant at 10% for p<0.1, ** statistically significant at 5% 
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Table 4.3.226 Effect of Global Risk Factor on Momentum Profit in Developed Market with 
Newest Procedure 1969-2014 
 Model Mode2 Model3 Model4 
𝛼3 0.020 0.018 0.012 0.001 
 (1.61) (1.14) (0.92) (0.07) 
 0.107 0.257 0.360 0.944 
𝐿𝐼𝑄  0.041  0.037 
  (0.89)  (0.79) 
  0.376  0.428 
𝐷𝑆  0.002  0.008 
  (0.27)  (0.94) 
  0.788  0.347 
𝑇𝑆  0.135*  0.153** 
  (1.92)  (2.16) 
  0.056  0.031 
MKT  -0.007  -0.003 
  (-0.11)  (-0.05) 
  0.910  0.962 
∆𝑂𝑃   -0.011 -0.002 
   (-0.43) (-0.08) 
   0.666 0.937 
𝑊𝑉𝑂𝐿   1.029* 1.087* 
   (1.72) (1.85) 
   0.086 0.065 
∆𝐼𝑃   0.586** 0.731** 
   (1.98) (2.39) 
   0.048 0.017 
MKTRF -0.070 -0.082* -0.067 -0.084* 
 (-1.50) (-1.74) (-1.41) (-1.76) 
 0.135 0.083 0.160 0.079 
𝑆𝑀𝐵 0.006 -0.008 0.004 -0.014 
 (0.10) (-0.12) (0.06) (-0.21) 
 0.917 0.905 0.954 0.831 
𝐻𝑀𝐿 -0.094 -0.101 -0.001 -0.102 
 (-1.50) (-1.50) (-1.48) (-1.48) 
 0.135 0.134 0.141 0.139 
R2/Adj-R2 15.010/6.870 16.120/7.300 16.180/7.570 17.640/8.390 
This table reports the regression result based on model (35). Where: the dependent variable R are the returns of the momentum portfolio in 
develop market at time t and regressed on, 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 (high minus low) the return to portfolios that is long on high book-to-market stocks and 
short on low book-to-market stocks in US, 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 (small minus big) returns to long-short portfolios constructed using size in US market, the 
𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑡−1 the liquidity factor at time t-1, 𝐷𝑆𝑡−1 the Default spread at time t-1, 𝑇𝑆𝑡−1 the Term spread at time t-1, 𝑀𝐾𝑇 the MSCI world indices 
price level that represent price levels at time t-1, ∆𝑂𝑃𝑡−1, the change in monthly Oil price at time t-1, 𝑊𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑡−1 is the market volatility at 
time t-1, ∆𝐼𝑃𝑡−1⁡ is the change in monthly value of the US Industrial production at time t-1 and time dummy. Regression are based on model 
1 to 4 specification. I estimate the parameters using the Newey West procedure. I use the regression Alpha to measure the size of the 
abnormal return generated after adjusting for risk. The Newey t-statistics are reported in the parentheses and the p-value next. The results 
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Table 4.3.27 Effect of global risk factor on momentum profit in emerging market with Newey 
procedure and time variation 1988-2014 
 Model Mode2 Model3 Model4 
𝛼3 -0.038 0.003 -0.044 -0.020 
 (-1.46) (0.09) (-1.62) (-0.53) 
 0.146 0.930 0.107 0.596 
𝐿𝐼𝑄  0.068  0.059 
  (0.89)  (0.76) 
  0.375  0.447 
𝐷𝑆  -0.036  -0.021 
  (-1.33)  (-0.78) 
  0.183  0.433 
𝑇𝑆  -0.063  -0.037 
  (-0.30)  (-0.18) 
  0.762  0.860 
MKT  -0.386***  -0.368*** 
  (-3.05)  (-2.95) 
  0.003  0.004 
∆𝑂𝑃   0.048 0.035 
   (0.85) (0.66) 
   0.395 0.513 
𝑊𝑉𝑂𝐿   0.834 1.218 
   (0.60) (0.90) 
   0.551 0.371 
∆𝐼𝑃   1.948* 1.332 
   (1.83) (1.37) 
   0.069 0.172 
MKTRF -0.171* -0.176* -0.218* -0.204* 
 (-1.70) (-1.76) (-1.98) (-1.88) 
 0.090 0.079 0.049 0.061 
𝑆𝑀𝐵 -0.224* -0.121 -0.239* -0.146 
 (-1.75) (-0.92) (-1.86) (-1.09) 
 0.082 0.359 0.064 0.276 
𝐻𝑀𝐿 -0.057 0.045 -0.116 0.010 
 (-0.38) (0.26) (-0.74) (0.05) 
 0.703 0.792 0.461 0.956 
R2/Adj-R2 19.450/11.480 0.2413/ 15.390 21.790/13.100 25.230/15.670 
This table reports the regression result based on model (34). Where: the dependent variable R are the returns of the momentum portfolio in 
emerging market at time t and regressed on, 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 (high minus low) the return to portfolios that is long on high book-to-market stocks and 
short on low book-to-market stocks in US, 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 (small minus big) returns to long-short portfolios constructed using size in US market, the 
𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑡−1 the liquidity factor at time t-1, 𝐷𝑆𝑡−1 the Default spread at time t-1, 𝑇𝑆𝑡−1 the Term spread at time t-1, 𝑀𝑆𝐶𝐼𝑊𝑡−1 the MSCI world 
indices price level that represent price levels at time t-1, 𝑊𝑂𝑃𝑡−1, the monthly Oil price at time t-1, 𝑊𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑡−1 is the market volatility at time 
t-1, ∆𝑂𝑃𝑡−1 the monthly oil price based world indices value at t-1, ∆𝐼𝑃𝑡−1⁡ is the monthly value of the US Industrial production at time t-1 
and time dummy. Regression are based on model 1 to 4 specification. I estimate the parameters using the Newey West procedure. I use the 
regression Alpha to measure the size of the abnormal return generated after adjusting for risk. The Newey t-statistics are reported in the 
parentheses and the p-value next. The results are* statistically significant at 10% for p<0.1, ** statistically significant at 5% for p<0.05 and 
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Table 4.3.28 Effect of Fama and French risk on Momentum Profit OLS Estimation 
Panel A: Fama French Three-Factor with US excess Return 1969-2014 
 Panel A: FF 3-Factors Model 
3-month 6-month 9-month 12-month 
αo 0.010*** 0.009*** 0.008*** 0.004*** 
 (4.42) (6.10) (5.96) (3.31) 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 
ERM -0.042 -0.034 -0.017 0.023 
 (-0.79) (-0.92) (-0.57) (0.91) 
 0.430 0.361 0.572 0.363 
SMB -0.062 -0.113** -0.076* -0.098*** 
 (-0.81) (-2.09) (-1.77) (-2.66) 
 0.421 0.037 0.077 0.008 
HML -0.124 0.003 -0.065 0.0001 
 (-1.52) (0.05) (-1.43) (0.29) 
 0.128 0.959 0.154 0.772 
R2/Adj-R2 0.580/ -0.000 1.390/0.810 0.960/0.370 1.490/0.900 
Panel B: Fama French Three factor with MSCI world excess return  
 Panel A: FF 3-Factors Model 
3-month 6-month 9-month 12-month 
αo 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.008*** 0.004*** 
 (4.37) (6.06) (5.95) (3.43) 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 
MKTRF -0.036 -0.029 -0.016 0.030 
 (-0.67) (-0.78) (-0.51) (1.16) 
 0.501 0.434 0.608 0.248 
SMB -0.068 -0.118** -0.079* -0.097*** 
 (-0.90) (-2.22) (-1.85) (-2.66) 
 0.369 0.027 0.065 0.008 
HML -0.012 0.009 -0.062 0.009 
 (-1.46) (0.17) (-1.39) (0.24) 
 0.146 0.866 0.165 0.809 
R2/Adj-R2 0.550/-0.030 1.350/ 0.770 0.950/ 0.360 1.590/ 1.000 
AR (1) 0.183 0.091 0.120 -4.930 
This table reports the regression result based on model (28). Where: the dependent variable R are the returns of the momentum portfolio at 
time t and regressed on, ERM the excess market returns on the US market, MKTRF the excess return on MSCI world index HML (high 
minus low) the return to portfolio that is long on high book-to-market stocks and short on low book-to-market stocks in US, and BMS (small 
minus big) returns to long-short portfolios constructed using size in US market. I estimate the parameters using OLS regression. I use the 
regression Alpha to measure the size of the abnormal return generated after adjusting for risk. The t-statistics are reported in the parentheses 
and the p-value next. The R-squares are also reported. The results are* statistically significant at 10% for p<0.1, ** statistically significant at 
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Table 4.3.29 Effect of Market State Risk Factor on Momentum Profit OLS Estimation 1969-
2014 
 Parameter 
𝛼1 𝐿𝐼𝑄 𝐷𝑆 TS 𝑀𝐾𝑇 R
2/Adj-R2 AR (1) 
3-Month 0.018*** 0.102 0.029 -0.007 -0.017 0.83/0.06 0.495 
 (2.96) (1.37) (0.77) (-1.36) (-0.30)   
 0.003 0.171 0.440 0.174 0.763   
6-Month 0.015*** 0.047 0.013 -0.005 0.018 0.670/ -0.110 0.691 
 (3.60) (0.89) (0.51) (-1.39) (0.47)   
 0.000 0.372 0.611 0.166 0.636   
9-month 0.009*** 0.024 0.572 -0.002 -0.009 0.210/ -0.580 0.715 
 (2.69) (0.57) (-0.48) (-0.67) (-0.28)   
 0.007 0.572 0.633 0.503 0.778   
12-month 0.003 0.026 -0.034* -0.000 0.002 0.870/ 0.080 0.700 
 (1.06) (0.74) (-1.90) (-0.18) (0.06)   
 0.290 0.461 0.058 0.857 0.953   
This table reports the regression result based on model (29). Where: 𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑡−1 is the liquidity factor at time t-1, 𝐷𝑆𝑡−1 the Default spread at 
time t-1, TS the Term spread at time t-1 and the𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡−1 the return MSCI world indices price at time t-1. I estimate the parameters using 
OLS regression. I use the regression Alpha to measure the size of the abnormal return generated after adjusting for risk the R-squares are 
also reported. I also report the autocorrelation coefficient of the residual, the t-statistics are reported in the parentheses and the p-value next. 
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Table 4.3.30 Effect of Macroeconomic risk factors on Momentum Profit with OLS Estimation 
 Parameter 
𝛼1 ∆𝑂𝑃 ∆𝐼𝑃 𝑊𝑉𝑂𝐿 R
2/Adj-R2 AR (1) 
3-Month 0.005 -0.014 0.908*** 0.391 1.650/1.080 0.481 
 (1.04) (-0.51) (2.92) (0.70)   
 0.298 0.611 0.004 0.484   
6-Month 0.004 -0.021 0.548** 0.572 1.550/ 0.970 0.6832 
 (1.33) (-1.09) (2.51) (1.47)   
 0.183 0.274 0.013 0.143   
9-month 0.004* -0.016 0.276 0.327 0.750/0.160 0.707 
 (1.67) (-1.03) (1.57) (1.04)   
 0.096 0.304 0.117 0.297   
12-month 0.001 -0.010 0.204 34.413 0.650/0.060 0.710 
 (0.36) (-0.77) (1.36) (1.28)   
 0.716 0.440 0.176 0.202   
This table reports the regression result based on model (30). Where: ∆𝑂𝑃𝑡−1 is the change in Oil price at time T-1,⁡∆𝐼𝑃𝑡−1 the change in 
monthly value of the US Industrial production at time t-1 and  𝑊𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑡−1 the market volatility at time t-1 based on the MSCI world indices 
price level. I estimate the parameters using OLS regression. I use the regression Alpha to measure the size of the abnormal return 
generated after adjusting for risk, the R-squares are reported. I also report the autocorrelation coefficient of the residual the t-statistics are 
reported in the parentheses and the p-value next. The results are* statistically significant at 10% for p<0.1, ** statistically significant at 5% 
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Table 4.3.31. Seasonal Effect of Global Risk Factor on the Momentum Profit OLS Estimation  
 3-Month 6-Month 9-Month 12-Month 
𝛼3 0.000 0.020 0.000*** 0.017 
 (0.02) (1.58) (2.66) (1.50) 
 0.981 0.115 0.008 0.134 
𝐿𝐼𝑄 0.036 0.024 -0.000 -0.022 
 (0.92) (0.97) (-0.02) (-1.34) 
 0.360 0.331 0.983 0.182 
𝐷𝑆 0.009 0.003 0.005 0.007 
 (0.86) (0.43) (1.00) (1.50) 
 0.393 0.670 0.317 0.134 
𝑇𝑆 0.116 0.039 -0.008 0.007 
 (1.54) (0.84) (-0.22) (0.22) 
 0.124 0.402 0.825 0.825 
MKT -0.017 0.036 0.018 0.009 
 (-0.30) (1.01) (0.66) (0.38) 
 0.767 0.314 0.509 0.704 
∆𝑂𝑃 0.014 -0.003 -0.002 0.000 
 (0.50) (-0.18) (-0.15) (0.01) 
 0.614 0.856 0.881 0.991 
𝑊𝑉𝑂𝐿 0.751 0.782* 0.283 0.709** 
 (1.01) (1.70) (0.78) (2.32) 
 0.315 0.090 0.436 0.021 
∆𝐼𝑃 0.924*** 0.336 0.012 -0.142 
 (2.61) (1.52) (0.07) (-0.97) 
 0.009 0.129 0.945 0.334 
MKTRF -0.070 -0.025 0.006 0.051** 
 (-1.25) (-0.73) (0.21) (2.24) 
 0.213 0.463 0.832 0.026 
𝑆𝑀𝐵 -0.032 -0.101** -0.001 -0.001*** 
 (-0.40) (-2.05) (-1.40) (-2.80) 
 0.688 0.041 0.163 0.005 
𝐻𝑀𝐿 -0.100 0.022 -0.070* -0.009 
 (-1.20) (0.42) (-1.72) (-0.27) 
 0.231 0.674 0.086 0.785 
R2/Adj-R2 18.410/9.240 36.09/28.880 38.570/31.590 40.530/33.730 
This table reports the regression result based on model (31). Where: the dependent variable R are the returns of the momentum portfolio (9-
month/3, 6, 9, 12-month) at time t and regressed on, 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 (high minus low) the return to portfolios that is long on high book-to-market 
stocks and short on low book-to-market stocks in US, 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 (small minus big) returns to long-short portfolios constructed using size in US 
market, the 𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑡−1 the liquidity factor at time t-1, 𝐷𝑆𝑡−1 the Default spread at time t-1, 𝑇𝑆𝑡−1 the Term spread at time t-1, 𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡−1 the MSCI 
world indices price level that represent price levels at time t-1, ∆𝑂𝑃𝑡−1, the change in monthly Oil price at time t-1, 𝑊𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑡−1 is the market 
volatility at time t-1, ∆𝐼𝑃𝑡−1⁡ is the monthly change in the value of the US Industrial production at time t-1. I estimate the parameters using 
OLS regression. I use the regression Alpha to measure the size of the abnormal return generated after adjusting for risk. The Newey t-
statistics are reported in the parentheses and the p-value next. The results are* statistically significant at 10% for p<0.1, ** statistically 






11 Appendix D 
11.1 Appendix D1  
Table 4.4.16. Effect of Global Risk Factors on Loser Profit with GMM Estimation Time 
Variation 
 Model Mode2 Model3 Model4 
𝛼3 0.008*** 0.013*** 0.009*** 0.012*** 
 (16.73) (11.48) (7.08) (7.66) 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
𝐿𝐼𝑄  0.002  0.002 
  (0.19)  (0.18) 
  0.851  0.856 
𝐷𝑆  -0.004***  -0.004*** 
  (-4.52)  (-3.56) 
  0.000  0.000 
𝑇𝑆  0.002  0.003 
  (0.11)  (0.23) 
  0.914  0.817 
MKT  0.031***  0.031** 
  (2.41)  (2.38) 
  0.016  0.017 
∆𝑂𝑃   0.011* 0.007 
   (1.96) (1.33) 
   0.050 0.184 
𝑊𝑉𝑂𝐿   -0.097 0.034 
   (-0.64) (0.23) 
   0.525 0.815 
∆𝐼𝑃   0.119 0.022 
   (1.56) (0.26) 
   0.119 0.791 
MKTRF 0.009 0.004 0.003 0.003 
 (0.69) (0.32) (0.25) (0.26) 
 0.491 0.751 0.804 0.793 
𝑆𝑀𝐵 -0.045*** -0.055*** -0.045*** -0.058*** 
 (-2.77) (-3.30) (-2.76) (-3.38) 
 0.006 0.001 0.006 0.001 
𝐻𝑀𝐿 -0.053*** -0.068*** -0.057*** -0.067*** 
 (-2.68) (-3.58) (-3.09) (-3.50) 
 0.007 0.000 0.002 0.000 
This table reports the regression result based on model (31). Where: the dependent variable R are the returns of the contrarian portfolio 
during the globalization periods at time t and regressed on, 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 (high minus low) the return to portfolios that is long on high book-to-
market stocks and short on low book-to-market stocks in US, 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 (small minus big) returns to long-short portfolios constructed using size 
in US market, the 𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑡−1 the liquidity factor at time t-1, 𝐷𝑆𝑡−1 the Default spread at time t-1, 𝑇𝑆𝑡−1 the Term spread at time t-1, 𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡−1 the 
MSCI world indices price level that represent price levels at time t-1, ∆𝑂𝑃𝑡−1, the change in monthly Oil price at time t-1, 𝑊𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑡−1 is the 
market volatility at time t-1, ∆𝐼𝑃𝑡−1⁡ is the change in the monthly value of the US Industrial production at time t-1 and time dummy. 
Regression are based on model 1 to 4 specification. I estimate the parameters using the Newey West procedure. I account for time variation 
through time dummy I use the regression Alpha to measure the size of the abnormal return generated after adjusting for risk. The Newey t-
statistics are reported in the parentheses and the p-value next. The results are* statistically significant at 10% for p<0.1, ** statistically 







11.2 Appendix D2 
Table 4.4.17. Effect of Global Risk Factor on Winner Profit with GMM Method and Time 
variation 1969-2014 
 Model Mode2 Model3 Model4 
𝛼3 0.002*** 0.004*** -0.001 0.001 
 (5.57) (4.90) (-1.53) (0.53) 
 0.000 0.000 0.127 0.594 
𝐿𝐼𝑄  -0.022***  -0.022*** 
  (-2.96)  (-2.94) 
  0.003  0.003 
𝐷𝑆  -0.002***  -0.002*** 
  (-3.86)  (-3.69) 
  0.000  0.000 
𝑇𝑆  -0.011  -0.008 
  (-1.00)  (-0.74) 
  0.318  0.459 
MKT  0.022**  0.026*** 
  (2.50)  (3.05) 
  0.012  0.002 
∆𝑂𝑃   0.008 0.006 
   (1.81) (1.48) 
   0.070 0.138 
𝑊𝑉𝑂𝐿   0.417*** 0.454*** 
   (3.80) (4.21) 
   0.000 0.000 
∆𝐼𝑃   0.099** 0.048 
   (1.97) (0.87) 
   0.049 0.383 
MKTRF 0.008 0.010 0.014 0.016* 
 (0.87) (1.13) (1.55) (1.75) 
 0.387 0.259 0.121 0.080 
𝑆𝑀𝐵 -0.018 -0.009 -0.018 -0.015 
 (-1.10) (-0.57) (-1.14) (-0.94) 
 0.273 0.571 0.254 0.349 
𝐻𝑀𝐿 -0.004 -0.009 -0.005 -0.008 
 (-0.26) (-0.66) (-0.42) (-0.63) 
 0.795 0.511 0.678 0.531 
This table reports the regression result based on model (31). Where: the dependent variable R are the returns of the contrarian portfolio 
during the globalization periods at time t and regressed on, 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 (high minus low) the return to portfolios that is long on high book-to-
market stocks and short on low book-to-market stocks in US, 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 (small minus big) returns to long-short portfolios constructed using size 
in US market, the 𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑡−1 the liquidity factor at time t-1, 𝐷𝑆𝑡−1 the Default spread at time t-1, 𝑇𝑆𝑡−1 the Term spread at time t-1, 𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡−1 the 
MSCI world indices price level that represent price levels at time t-1, ∆𝑂𝑃𝑡−1, the monthly Oil price at time t-1, 𝑊𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑇−1 is the market 
volatility at time t-1, ∆𝑂𝑃𝑡−1 the change in monthly oil price based world indices value at t-1, and ∆𝐼𝑃𝑡−1⁡ is the change in monthly value of 
the US Industrial production at time t-1. Regression are based on model 1 to 4 specification. I estimate the parameters using the GMM 
method. I use the regression Alpha to measure the size of the abnormal return generated after adjusting for risk. The test statistics are 
reported in the parentheses and the p-value next. The results are* statistically significant at 10% for p<0.1, ** statistically significant at 5% 





12 Appendix E 
12.1 Appendix E1 
 
Serial correlation 
I then proceed with the Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test for heteroscedasticity to test if the 
estimated variance of the residuals from the model dependent on the values of the 
independent variables. The Breusch-Pagan test for conditional heteroscedasticity tests the 
null hypothesis of homoscedasticity. If the Chi Squared value is significant with p-value 
below an appropriate threshold (e.g. p<0.005) then the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity is 
rejected and heteroscedasticity assumed. 


















12.2 Appendix E2 
Autocorrelation 
I also test for serial correlation (autocorrelation) among the variable using the standard Q test 
statistic in STATA. If the test statistic is significant with p-value below an appropriate 
threshold (e.g. p<0.005) then the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation is rejected and the 
serial correlation present at range specified is assumed. 
H0: Residuals are serially uncorrelated (no q order autocorrelation) 



















12.3 Appendix E3 
GMM Estimation Method 
To test if the momentum profit can be explained by Fama and French risk, I regress the 
momentum return on Fama and French risk factors. I estimate the model using the interactive 
version of the generalized method of moments estimation. The model is a two-step GMM 
estimator to allow us to obtain parameter estimates based on the initial weight matrix, 
compute a new weight matrix based on those estimates, and then estimates the parameters 
based on that weight matrix. The instruments include the variable lists and the constant but I 
also account for time variation through time dummies. I specify weight matrix (wmatrix) type 
hac kernel to request for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors 
based on Bartlett kernel (Newey-West) with 1 lags. The choice of this matrix also allow us to 
control for non-normality. Using the linear combinations to fit my model, I type my equation 
as: 
gmm (Momentum return -{xb: Variable list}-{b0}), instruments (instrumental variables) 
wmatrix (hac bartlett 1) 
For example, my estimation for Fama and French risks is written as follow: 
gmm (MO-{xb: ERM SMB HML}-{b0}), instruments (ERM SMB HML TIME DUMMY) 
wmatrix (hac bartlett 1) 
where gmm is the GMM command, MO is the momentum return, ERM the excess market 
returns, HML (high minus low) the return to portfolio that is long on high book-to-market 
stocks and short on low book-to-market stocks in US, BMS (small minus big) returns to long-
short portfolios constructed using size in US market and TIME DUMMY (the time’s 
dummies variables). ERM, SMB, HML and the time dummies are also the instruments for 
equation 1, the dummy variable are considered endogenous while other variables (ERM, 
SMB, and HML) are exogenous. The programme automatically includes the constant term b0 






12.4 Appendix E4 
Variable Definition 
Price Risk Variable 
Symbol Variable Definition  Source ID 
ERM Excess Return on 
the Market 
ERM (or Rm-RF) is the excess return on the market. It is 
calculated as the value-weight return on all NYSE, AMEX, and 
NASDAQ stocks (from CRSP) minus the one-month Treasury 
bill rate from Ibbotson, Associates, Ken French's web site 
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/Data_Li





MKTRF Excess Return on 
the MSCI world 
market 
MKTRF (or %∆MSCIW - RF) is the excess return on the 
market. It is calculated as the value-weight return of the MSCI 
World index minus the one-month Treasury bill rate 
Own calculation  
SMB Small-Minus-Big 
Return 
SMB (Small Minus Big) is the average return on the three small 
portfolios minus the average return on the three big portfolios, 
SMB =1/3 (Small Value + Small Neutral + Small Growth)- 1/3 
(Big Value + Big Neutral + Big Growth).  
SMB for July of year t to June of t+1 include all NYSE, AMEX, 
and NASDAQ stocks for which market equity data for 
December of t-1 and June of t, and (positive) book equity data 







Average return on the two value portfolios minus the average 
return on the two growth portfolios. HML=1/2(small value + 
Big Value -1/2(small Growth + Big Growth), from Ken French's 













Market state variable 
Symbol Variable Definition  Source ID 
LIQ liquidity factor 
(PS_LEVEL) 
Pastor-Stambaugh Level of Aggregate Liquidity (non-traded 
factor). PS_LEVEL basically correspond to equation numbers 
(5) in the published (JPE, 2003) version of the paper "Liquidity 
Risk and Expected Stock Returns".  
WRDS Library: ff 
Files: Liq_ps 
TS The term spread difference between the average yield of Treasury bonds with 
more than 20 years to maturity and the average yield of T-bills 
that mature in three months.  
TS(t) = LGB(t) – TB(t-1), LGB(t) is the return on a portfolio of 
long-term government bonds obtained from WRSD; TB(t-1) is 




LGB  LGB is the Index Level Associate with 20-year bond return 
(B20) obtained from the Center for Research in securities prices 
data files  
WRDS Library: Crspa 
File: cti 
TB  TB is Index Level Associate with the 90 Day bill returns 






DS Default Spread Difference between the average yield of bonds rated BAA by 
Moody’s and the average yield of bonds with a Moody’s rating 
of AAA. based upon the Federal Reserve Board’s H.15 release 
that contains selected interest rate for U.S. 
Own calculation  
AAA Moody’s Aaa Bon 
rate 
Average yield of bonds rated AAA, based upon the Federal 
Reserve Board’s H.15 release that contains selected interest rate 
for U.S. 
WRDS Library: frb 
File: rates 
BAA Moody’s Baa Bon 
rate 
Average yield of bonds with a Moody’s rating of BAA, based 
upon the Federal Reserve Board’s H.15 release that contains 
selected interest rate for U.S. 




Market Indices Value-weighted MSCI world index prices level DataStream Mnemonic: TRVS1MB 
Code: S31ovJ 
∆MKT Market return ∆MKTt = ln(Pt)-ln(Pt-1), where Pt is the MSCI World index 
price at time t and Pt-1 is the world index prices at time t-1  








Symbol Variable Definition or Source Source ID 
OP Oil price Producer price index crude petroleum series 
obtain from the bureau of Labor Statistics 
Bureau of Labour Statistics U.S. 
department of Labor Online available 
fromhttp://data.bls.gov/pdq/SurveyOutpu
tServlet 
Crude petroleum - WPU0561 
VOL Historical Volatility Monthly standard deviation of daily returns 
(22 trading days per month).  
Own calculation  
IP Industrial Production Total Industrial Production and 
Manufacturing Production index (SDDS+) 
   





∆IP Percent change 
Industrial production 
Monthly differences in the logarithm of the 
industrial production indexes ∆IP = ln(IPt)-
ln(IPt-1), IPt is the industrial production 
index level at time t and IPt-1 is the 
industrial production index level at time t-1 
Own calculation  
∆OP Percent change Oil 
Price 
Monthly differences in the logarithm of the 
producer price index crude petroleum series 
(obtain from the bureau of Labor Statistics, 
U.S. department of Labor,) 
∆OP = ln(OPt)-ln(OPt-1), OPt is the 
producer price index level at time t and OPt-
1 is the producer price index level at time t-1 










Symbol Variable Definition  Source ID 
NBER Business cycle  Business cycle series is an interpretation of US 
Business Cycle Expansions and Contractions data 
provided by The National Bureau of Economic 
Research (NBER) is composed of dummy variables 
that represent periods of expansion (1) and recession 
(0). 
Online available from 
http://www.nber.org/cycles/cyclesmain.html 
 
CC Currency crisis Annual depreciation versus the US dollar (or relevant 
anchor currency, historically the UK pound, the French 
franc, or German DM and presently the euro) of 15 
percent or more. It is composed of dummy variables 
that represent periods of depreciation (1) and normal 
period (0) 




SMC Stock Market 
crisis 
Stock market crisis series is based on the 
bestselling This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of 
Financial Folly by Carmen M. Reinhart & Kenneth S. 
Rogoff. Using data developed by Reinhart and Rogoff. 
It maps the cyclical history of financial crisis since 
1810. it is composed of dummy variables that represent 
periods of crashes (1) and normal periods (0) 






BC Banking crisis Banking crisis are mark by two types of events: (1) 
bank runs that lead to the closure, merging, or takeover 
by the public sector of one or more financial 
institutions; (2) if there are no runs, the closure, 
merging, takeover or large-scale government assistance 
of an important financial institutions. It is composed of 
dummy variables that represent periods of crisis (1) 
and normal period (0) 











Symbol Variable Definition  Source ID 
Euribo Euribor  Euribor if the rate at which Euro interbank term deposits are offered by one 
prime bank to another prime bank within the EMU zone is calculated at 11:00 
a.m. (CET) for spot value (T+2). The choice of banks quoting for Euribor is 
based on market criteria. These banks have been selected to ensure that the 
diversity of the euro money market is adequately refelected. Thereby making 
Euribor an efficient and representative benchmark. 





Eonia Eonia Eonia (Euro OverNight Index Average) is the effective overnight reference 
rate for the euro. It is computed as a weighted averge of all overnight 
unsecured lending transactions in the interbank market, undertaken in the 
European Union and European Free Trade Association (EFTA) countries. The 
European Central Bank is the calculation Agent for Eonia. 





EOIS EURIBOR: OIS 
Spread 
It is the difference between the rate at which European banks lend to 
eachother (EURIBOR) and the overnight 'risk free' swap rate (EONIA) among 
the same banks a 3-month period. EURIBOR (Euro InterBank Offered Rate) 
is an average of the rate each bank in the 43-member 'prime bank' panel 
reports that it would offer to the other banks. EONIA (Euro OverNight Index 
Average) is the average of swaps conducted between a 22-member panel at 




TED TED Spread It is the difference between the LIBOR (London Interbank Offered Rate) and 
the 3 Month Treasury Bill.  
Own calculation  
Libor Libor It is the average interbank interest rate at which a selection of banks on the 
London money market are prepared to Lend to one another. Libor comes in 7 
manurities (from overnight to 12 months) and in 5 different currencies. The 
official Libor interest rates are announced once per working day at around 
11:45 a.m. In the past, the BBA/IAE published LIBOR rates for 5 more 
currencies (Swedish hrona, Danish krone, Canadian dollar, Australian dollar 
and New Zealand dollar) and 8 more maturities (2 weeks, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 
11 months). 






13 Appendix F 
13.1 Appendix F1 
Figure 3 Fama and French Risk  
Note: Each point corresponds to the average monthly entry of each individual Fama and French factors (ERM is the excess return on US 
































































13.2 Appendix F2 
Figure 4 Excess Return on US market Distribution of Entry of the Historical Values 
 
Note: Kernel density. The red line represents the expected normal density and the black line is the distribution density. Each point 

































13.3 Appendix F3 
Figure 5 MSCI world Index Excess Return Distribution of Historical Values 
 
Note: Kernel density. The red line represents the expected normal density and the black line is the excess in MSCI world indices distribution 
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13.4 Appendix F4 
Figure 6 Distribution of Entry of the Historical Value of the SMB Factor 
 
Note: Kernel density. The red line represents the expected normal density and the black line is the SMB distribution density. Each point 

































13.5 Appendix F5 
Figure 7 Distribution of Entry of the Historical Value of the HML Factor 
 
Note: Kernel density. The red line represents the expected normal density and the black line is the HML distribution density. Each point 


































13.6 Appendix F6 
Figure 8 Residual and Fitted Values Plot Fama and French 3-Factor Model 
 
Note: Figure 8 indicates the plots of the absolute of the residual Residual (vertical line) against the fitted values (horizontal line) after 






























13.7 Appendix F7 
Figure 9 Residual Plot of the Fama and French 3-Factor Model 
 
Note: Figure 9 shows the trend that corresponds to the average monthly entry of the residual after regressing the momentum return on the 































13.8 Appendix F8 
Figure 10 Scatter plot of Market State factor 
 
Note: Each point corresponds to the average monthly entry of each individual market state factors (Liquidity, term spread, default spread, 


























































































13.9 Appendix F9 
Figure 11 Distribution of Entry of the Historical Value of The Liquidity Factor 
 
Note: Kernel density. The dotted line represents the expected normal density and the black line is the distribution density. Each point 

































13.10 Appendix F10 
Figure 12 Distribution of Entry of the Vistorical value of the Default Spread Factor 
 
Note: Kernel density. The dotted line represents the expected normal density and the black line is the distribution density. Each point 































13.11 Appendix F11 
Figure 13 Distribution of Entry of the Historical Value of the Term Spread Factor 
 
Note: Kernel density. The dotted line represents the expected normal density and the black line is the distribution density. Each point 
































13.12 Appendix F12 
Figure 14 Distribution of Entry of the Historical Value of the Return 
 
Note: Kernel density. The dotted line represents the expected normal density and the black line is the distribution density. Each point 
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13.13 Appendix F13 
Figure 15 Residual Plot Market State Factor (heteroscedasticity) 
 
Note: Figure 6 indicates the plots of the absolute value of the residual (vertical linee) against the fitted values (horizontal line) after 




























13.14 Appendix F14 
Figure 16 Residual Plot Market State Factor (Autocorrelation) 
 
Note: Figure 14 shows the trend that corresponds to the average monthly entry of the residual after regressing the momentum return on the 






























13.15 Appendix F15 
Figure 17 Scatter Plot of Macroeconomic Variables 
 
Note: Each point corresponds to the average monthly entry of each individual macroeconomic variable (Oil price, industrial 







































































13.16 Appendix F16 
Figure 18 Distribution of Entry of the Historical Values of Oil Price 
 
Note: Kernel density. The dotted line represents the expected normal density and the black line is the distribution density. Each 

































13.17 Appendix F17 
Figure 19 Distribution of Entry of the Historical Value of the Change on Industrial Production 
 
Note: Kernel density. The dotted line represents the expected normal density and the black line is the distribution density. Each point 



































13.18 Appendix F18 
Figure 20 Distribution of Entry of the Historical Value of the Change on World Market 
Volatility 
 
Note: Kernel density. The dotted line represents the expected normal density and the black line is the distribution density. Each point 






































13.19 Appendix F19 
Figure 21 Distribution of Entry of the Historical Value of the Liquidity Factor 
 
Note: Kernel density. The dotted line represents the expected normal density and the black line is the distribution density. Each point 

































13.20 Appendix F20 
Figure 22 Residual Plot Macroeconomic Variable 
 
Note: Figure 20 indicates the plots of the absolute value of the residual (vertical linee) against the fitted values (horizontal line) after 



























13.21 Appendix F21 
Figure 23 Residual Plot Macroeconomic Variable 
 
Note: Figure 21 shows the trend that corresponds to the average monthly entry of the residual after regressing the momentum return on the 




























13.22 Appendix F22 
Figure 24 Residual plot Fama and Frech, Market Etate and Economic Variables 
 
Note: Figure 22 indicates the plots of the absolute value of the residual (vertical linee) against the fitted values (horizontal line) after 
the momentum return regress on the Fama and French, market state and macroeconomic factors over the study period 1969-2014 




























13.23 Appendix F23 
Figure 25 Residual Plot Fama and French risk, Market State and Macroeconomic Variables 
 
Note: Figure 21 shows the trend that corresponds to the average monthly entry of the residual after regressing the momentum return on the 






















14 Appendix G 
14.1 Appendix G1 
Summary Momentum Literature Survey 
Date Author Contribution Limitation 
1993 Jegadeesh and Titman Strategies generate significant and positive abnormal return between 1965 and 1989 and are profitable 
for 3 to 12 month holding period. When considering the optimum portfolio of 6-month formation and 6-
month holding period, the momentum strategy appears to be consistently profitable and can generate a 
profit of up to 1% as the winner portfolios keep winning and significantly outperform loser portfolios. 
They suggested that this result cannot be explained by systematic 
risk or delay in stock price reaction to common factors. However, 
this study was conducted on individual stocks. 
1995 Grinblatt, Titman, and 
Wermers 
Examined the extent to which mutual funds purchase stocks based on their past returns as well as their 
tendency to exhibit herding behaviour. They found significant evidences suggesting that large number of 
mutual funds earned positive risk-adjusted abnormal returns and that 77% of mutual were momentum 
investors, they tend to buy past winners, but there is little evidence to suggest that these funds 
systematically sell past losers. They also reiterated that mutual funds that use the momentum strategy 
tended to perform better than others did and that there is little evidence to suggest that funds tended to 
buy and sell the same stocks at the same time. 
This study is Limited to mutual fund. The paper characteriszes some 
of the investmentstartegies of mutual funds and anlyse hoe these 
strategies relate to realized performance. 
1998 Conrad and Kaul Studied the momentum strategies in the US NYSE and AMEX stock market with methods similar to Lo 
and Mackinlay (1990), and Lehmann (1990) from 1926 to 1989. The study decomposed securities’ 
profits into two components, the cross-sectional variation and time-varying components with different 
formation and holding periods. They tested 120 trading strategies and found that 50% of them generate 
significant profits, they suggested that, on average both momentum and contrarian strategies were 
equally profitable respectively at medium-term (3 to 12 months) and short-term (1week to 1 month) and 
long-term (3 to 5 years) but they made the exception in for 1926-1947 period. They also demonstrated 
that the success of the momentum and contrarian strategies can also be attributed to the variation in mean 
returns.  
Their results indicated that, event of random walk the momentum 
and contrarian strategies can still be profitable. This remains to be 
tested at a global level.  
1999 Moskowitz and 
Crinblatt 
Studied industries momentum while ranking their data into twenty different industries groups. They 
found that the momentum strategies do not generate significant profit for individual industry. However, 
when the strategies buy the winners and sell the losers industries they tend to be significantly profitable. 
They also found that, in the short term the industry momentum seems to be stronger than the stock 
momentum and that the momentum profit persists in the medium term but dissipate after 12 months. 
Furthermore, they suggested that, industries factor have undeniable impact on the momentum strategy 
profitability. 
The paper study the momentum strategies in individual stock, with a 
focus on individual and randow industries. Their result indicated 
industry-based strategies is the more profitate. However, the study 
did not incated how this could be use by international investor. 
2001 Jegadeesh and Titman Reviewed the evidence of price earnings momentum and found that there is a substantial evidence to 
prove that stocks that perform well or badly over a 3 to 12-month period tend to continue to perform well 
or badly over the next 3 to 12 months. They suggested that the strategies that make use of this type of 
phenomenon are consistently profitable in the United States and most developed markets. They 
examined the returns of the winner and loser stocks in the month 13 to 60 and found that, the cumulative 
returns of momentum portfolio are negative, which is consistent with the behavioural theories. They 
advocate that there are substantial evidences to confirm that firm’s and market characteristics can 
determine momentum strength but the profit size issue from these factors depend on the extent to which 
they are incorporated in the firm or the market activities. 




Date Author Contribution Limitation 
2004 George and Hung Adopted a different approach; they studied the momentum strategy with an investment strategy named 
“52-week high”. The strategy longs the winners and sorts the losers based on their previous month’s 
prices divided by their past 12 months’ highest price. They found that this strategy could generate higher 
momentum return compare to the Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) and the Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999) 
strategies. After controlling for the size effect, the bid-ask bounce, and exclude the January return they 
found that the strategy profitability is two times the profit of previous momentum trading strategies, they 
concluded that, the 52-week high strategy predicts investors’ perception of the Losers and winners. 




  Risk Based Explanation of the Momentum and Contrarian profits  
Date Author Contribution Limitation 
2002 Goetzmam and Massa Found that investors that consistently react to daily price perform at least as well as the factors based on 
stock market return and that momentum investor flows are more strongly related to returns, which 
confirms and displays a positive correlation between investment decision of the purchase momentum 
investors and sales contrarians and the same day return.  
Nevertheless, the study was done on two years’ data only, with a 
restricted number of mutual funds. 
2006 Sadka Decomposes liquidity risk into variable and fixed components and found that the variable component is 
priced with an annual premium of about 6.5% in the context of momentum and post-earnings 
announcement, which indicates that liquidity risk, can explain between 40% and 80% of the cross-
sectional variation of expected momentum and post-earnings announcement portfolio returns. He 
suggested that a substantial part of momentum returns can be viewed as compensation for unexpected 
variations in the aggregate ratio of informed traders to noise traders and the quality of information 
possessed. 
The study did not examine the process by which noise and informed 








Date Author Contribution Limitation 
2008 Schumaker and Hsinchun Suggested that, a strategy using both quantitative strategy and a full set of financial news articles 
would have a great return. Using one-week portfolio formation they were able to make 20.79 percent 
return and only 4.54 percent return with the contrarian over five weeks holding period and concluded 
that and hybrid strategy were more appropriate.  
The study did not specify which proportion of each strategies is 
required for and optimum portfolio of momentum and contrarian 
strategy. 
2008 Roberto et al. Found a second effect momentum, which, offsets and indeed dominated the reversal after the initial 1-
week reversal. They suggested that the longer-run momentum results do not extend to 1-week 
momentum, that the market’s reactions to price movements without public news are not categorically 
different to price movement with public news, and that uncertainty is not related to momentum in 1-
week returns. 
A more completed study could provide supporting evidences of 
the second effect momentum internationally. 
2009 Bulkley and Nawosah Suggested that momentum might be rationale explained as a consequence of the cross-sectional 
variation of unconditional expected returns. Stocks with relatively high unconditional expected returns 
will on average outperform in both the portfolio formation and in the subsequent holding period. they 
evaluate this explanation by first removing unconditional expected returns for each stock from raw 
returns and then testing for momentum in the resulting series. They measure the unconditional 
expected return on each stock as its mean return in the whole sample period and find that the 
momentum effect disappears in demeaned returns. 
The study is country specific and based on individual stock. 
2010 Asem and Tiam Investigated the effects of market reversals on momentum profits in accordance with asymmetric 
momentum profits in the down and the up markets. Their results indicate that, momentum profits are 
higher for up markets when the market continue to go up than when the market states change. The 
momentum profit tends to be larger when the market goes down as the mean momentum profit 
decreases from 2.09% per month when the market continues in UP states and to -0.01% when they 
transition DOWN. They suggested that these results are consistent with the effect of market transitions 
on momentum profits. 
The study did not consider the momentum strategy as a global 
cordonated and generalised phenomenon, which could be done 
following the world market trend instead. 
2011 Kelsey, Kozhan and Pang Examined whether uncertainty is an asymmetry in momentum returns, with a model that includes three 
types of traders: arbitragers, uncertainty adverse traders and momentum traders, on bonds and stocks. 
They investigated separately winner and loser momentum returns on firms with different levels of 
uncertainty and suggested that momentum effect is stronger and more likely to last for losers with a 
greater level of uncertainty and that asymmetry between negative and positive momentum returns are 
more profound during the crisis periods. 
The study did not examine the cultural on the risk perception. Be 
cause even in period of some investors in different countries might 
be more prone to risk or incertainty than others. 
2013 Dobrynskaya Studied the risk-based explanation of the momentum strategies internationally. He showed that the 
performance of past winners and past losers is asymmetric in states of the global market upturns and 
downturns, that the winners have higher downside market betas and lower upside market betas or risks 
than the losers and that the past winners are compensated by higher returns. More importantly while 
studying the momentum strategy between 1984 and 2013 he found that the global momentum had on 
average 13 percent per annum and suggested that the profitability of this strategy cannot be explained 
by the conventional risk measures (standard deviation, skewness or market beta) as they are all similar 
for the portfolio considered. His study includes additional indexes a year after their appearance but did 
not report what effect new entries have on the profitability of the global momentum and consequently 
their impact on they risk-based explanation of the momentum strategy 
This paper did not consider the momentum strategy as a global 
cordonated and generalised phenomenon, which could be done 





  Firms Specific Risk Factors  
Date Author Contribution Limitation 
1991 Chan, Hamao and 
Lakonishok 
Studied the cross-sectional differences in returns on Japanese stocks relative to Earnings Yield, Size, 
Book to market ratio, and cash flow yield from 1971 to 1988 and they found a considerable impact of the 
book to market ratio and cash flow yield on the expected returns in the Japanese market. That high E/P 
stocks outperform low E/P stocks with a difference of 0.40% per month between the top and the bottom 
quartiles. Small stocks achieve substantially higher returns than large stocks, with difference of 0.97% 
per month between the two extreme groups. Firms with large positive book to market ratios earn a 
premium of 1.10% over firms with low, positive book to market. The difference between the two 
extreme groups for the cash flow yield variable is 0.79%. They suggested that these results were 
consistent with the US findings of Jade, Keim, and Westerfield (1989). 
Their findings are limited to the Japanese Market. 
2002 Chordia and Shivakumar Studied the importance of common factors and firm-specific information as source of momentum profit 
they divided the sample period into two economic environments: expansionary and recessionary periods. 
They examined the payoffs to momentum strategies in each of the environments and demonstrated that 
the profit on momentum strategies were explained by common macroeconomic variables that were 
related to the business cycle. The results of their analysis suggested that the momentum strategy payoffs 
are positive only during the expansionary periods when the marginal utility of returns it is likely to be 
lower. Even more each of the post war expansionary periods had positive momentum payoffs and the 
overall momentum payoffs are negative during recession. 
A more completed study could examine the performance of the 
momentum in expansionary and recessionary periods globaly. 
2007 Sagi and Seasholes Tested whether firms’ specific attributes predict future expected return, they examined how firms’ 
specific attributes can be used to create “enhanced momentum strategies”. They found that momentum 
strategies that use firms with high revenue growth volatility. Low cost, or valuable growth options 
outperform traditional momentum strategies by approximately 5% per year. 
The study is based on individual stock. 
2013 Hirshleifer, Hsu, and Li Examined the relation between innovative efficiency firm’s ability to generate patent and patent citations 
per dollar of research and development investment, and subsequent operative performance as well as 
stock returns. They found   evidences that some firms’ factors and market conditions, which may not be 
complimentary for the momentum strategies in one period, can be useful in different periods or in 
different market conditions. The strategies on average remain profitable even though some analysis 
always fail to validate this argument. 
The aggregate effect of firm’s ability to generate patent and patent 
citations per dollar of research and development investment, and 
subsequent operative performance as well as stock returns. Could 
have significant impact on the world economy. One might be 
curious to know how does it affect the global momentum 
profitability?  
2014 Liu and Zhang Examined whether momentum is connected to economic fundamental, using US stock market data and 
the neoclassical theory of investment as their fundamental starting point. They matched average livered 
investment returns to average stock returns across momentum portfolios, they found that for price 
momentum, the winner-minus-loser deciles has a small error (alpha) of 0.30% per month, which is only 
2.65% of the average winner-minus-loser return of 1.26%. In addition, the mean absolute error across the 
deciles is 0.07%, which is 6.69% of the average deciles return of 1.03%. For earning momentum, the 
winner-minus loser decile has an alpha of -0.076%, which is 10.86 % of the average winner-minus-loser 
return of 0.705%. The mean absolute error across the deciles is 0.052%, which is only 4.12% of the 
average deciles return of 1.271%. The expected investment-to-capital growth is the most important 
component of momentum. Even more, they found that prices momentum starts at 1.665% per month in 
the first month after portfolio formation, fall to 1.095% in month six, converge to zero in month ten, and 
turn negative afterward. They suggested that managers align investment policies properly with the cost of 
capital, and that momentum might be consistent with this alignment, as their result did not prove 
rationality. 
This paper did not explain the rationality behind manager’s action 
with regard to alignment of investment policies. The might be 




  Seasonality Effect  
Date Author Contribution Limitation 
2003 Oknev and White Studied the profitability of the momentum strategies in foreign exchange markets and found that during 
the seventies and eighties the momentum strategies were highly profitable and continue throughout the 
nineties. They suggested that the momentum profits are not due to compensation for bearing time 
varying risk premium. 
The study did not take into consideration the how change in market 
conditions could affect the size of the return on foreign exchange 
markets. 
2004 Grinblatt and Moskowiz Tax, avoidance behaviour drives much of the relation between past returns and expected returns in 
December and January while using a parsimonious stock ranking system derived from simple Fama-
MacBeth cross-sectional regressions in their analysis. They claimed that seasonality is associated with 
past returns, and that when effective capital gains tax rates are expected to decrease the contrarian 
strategies become relatively less profitable. Similarly, when expected tax-code changes favour capital 
loss deferral, the opposite occurs. In such case, contrarian strategies become more profitable. 
The test was conducted on the US stocks only while the tax system 
differs from one country to another. 
2005 Shen, Szakmary and 
Sharma 
Suggested that, the profitability of the momentum strategy generated in the short term tends to continue 
after December 1987. Nevertheless, after further analysis of the momentum phenomenon in the 
international market they found that there was no evidence to suggest that the profitability of the 
contrarian strategies persist in the long term. 
The study contructed the momentum strategy with individual stock 
and did not examine the momentum as a global strategy. 
2005 Levy and Post Pointed out that there are practical considerations that reduce the likelihood of successful momentum 
strategies. First, the momentum strategies are likely to require high turnover of shareholdings with the 
effect that transaction cost are high. Second, the momentum effect is strong among small capitalisation 
stocks. Small capitalisation stocks tend to be illiquid, which makes high turnover impossible. Third, most 
of the return available from momentum strategies comes from taking short positions in poorly 
performing share.  
Some of the featuere find in this study could test at a regional or 
global level, example, one could test if the global momentum 
strategy could be explained by illiquidity and trade volume 
2006 Cooper, McConnell, and 
Ovtchinnikow 
Tested whether, stock market returns in January are good predictors of returns over the next 11 months, 
whether it is reflection of investor sentiment. They claimed that the other January effect is not explained 
by investors’ sentiment and that stock returns are surprisingly robust predictors of the market returns 
over the following 11 months. Given, that when the Centre for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) 
value-weighted Market returns (VW) in January is positive, the VW market return over the next 11 
months’ average is 14.8%. When the VW market return in January is negative, the VW market return 
over the next 11 months’ averages is 2.92% and that the result cannot be explained by the presidential 
cycle in stock returns. 
It is defficult to draw a conclusion with their, for example the 
January effect might explanation other investment sentiment, one 







Date Author Contribution Limitation 
2009 Asness et al. Studied the profitability of the momentum strategies across eight diverse market and asset classes and 
found that the momentum profits were consistent across asset classes. They suggested that common 
global risk characterized with a three-factor model could explain the momentum profit, and that global 
funding liquidity risk is a partial source of these patterns. They claimed that these findings present a 
challenge to existing behavioural and rational asset pricing theories that largely focus on US equities. 
The channenge is that 8 countries individually are less like to 
represent the whole world, further study across region might 
provide different results. 
2010 Gupta, Locke, and 
Scrimgeour 
Investigated whether the industrial momentum and 52- week high momentum returns are superior to 
conventional momentum returns as claimed by Moskowiz and Grinblatt (1999), George, and Hwang 
(2004) and whether these returns are consistent under different approaches on a global basis. They 
found that for the industry momentum the highest profitability is observed in the Indian stock market 
with average monthly return of 0.60% above market. The return in the US market is comparatively 
lower, vis-à-vis other markets, but still profitable with a market excess return of 0.32% compared to 
0.43% in the US stock market as suggested by Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999). Those returns are 
negative for all countries except Japan, suggesting a reversal pattern in the loser portfolio. Both the 
industry and 52-week high strategies generate positive returns but neither is greater than the 
conventional momentum strategy as the traditional momentum strategy using three portfolio and value-
weighted CAR approach is 0.58% compared to 38% for the 52-week high momentum. 
This paper maintly focus on individual countries and industries, 





2011 Lui et al.  Studied the 52-week high momentum strategy in 20 major stock markets and found that the 52-week 
high momentum effect is robust in international markets. then out of twenty markets present evidence 
of a profitable 52-week high with ten having significantly positive profits. They also showed from the 
portfolio of cross-sectional regression analyses that the George and Hwang (2004) industry momentum 
effect is weaker after controlling for the 52-week high momentum effect. However, they also 
demonstrated that although the returns of these momentum strategies are highly correlated, the George 
and Hwang (2004) conditional momentum profits still exist. 
The study do not say whether the momentum profit remains 
following the same pattern with risk factors. 
2012 Menkhoff Investigated the momentum strategies in foreign exchange market from January 1976 to January 2010. 
Compared to the stock market, the foreign exchange markets are more liquid and feature high 
transaction volumes and low transaction cost, they are populated with very large number of 
sophisticated professional investors, and there are no natural short-selling constraints that prevent the 
shorting of past loser assets to fully implement momentum strategies. The study’s main contribution 
was to examine the economic anatomy of the momentum profits in the foreign exchange market. They 
started by forming currency portfolios where an investor is long in currencies with high past excess 
returns or winners short in currencies with low past excess returns or losers, they then considered the 
exchange rate in dollar. They found that these strategies yield high unconditional average excess 
returns of up to 10% per year, in contrast to explanation based on systematic risk. They also found 
evidence for under and overreaction in long-horizon momentum returns. They suggested that, cross-
sectional currency momentum has very different properties from the widelystudied carry trade and is 
not highly correlated with returns of benchmark technical trading rules; however, there seems to be 
very effective limits to arbitrage that prevent momentum strategies from being easily exploitable in 
currency markets. As in Jegadeesh and Titman (2001), they found some evidence of return 
continuation and subsequent reversals over longer horizons of up to 36 months which is consistent with 
the under- and the overreaction hypothesis. They suggested that momentum effect in different asset 
classes might share a common source. 
The paper did not examine if the origine of these sources have 
cross-sectional difference, in which case momentum might not be 
profitable in all place at the same time and momentum investors 




  Momentum in the Bond Market  
Date Author Contribution Limitation 
2005 Gebhart Examined the relation between momentum in equities and corporate bonds. They claimed that, there is 
no evidence of momentum among investment grade corporate bonds. Instead, they suggested that 
corporate bonds under-react to information in past equity prices about changing default risk and indicated 
a significant reversal as winner’s bonds over a three to twelve-month period underperform bonds that are 
losers over the same period by about 1% over the subsequent 12 months. Furthermore, the reversals 
appear to be the strongest among the riskiest bonds. They also found that there is a significant 
momentum spill over from equities to bond of the same firm. Firms earning high or low equity returns 
over the previous 3 to 12 months earn high or low bond returns over the next 3 to 12 months. Bonds of 
winners’ portfolios outperform bonds of loser portfolios by approximately 1% over the following 12 
months. However, this thesis examines the return base on month-end bid prices instead of the transaction 
prices. 
The study found that there is a significant momentum spill over 
from equities to bond of the same firm. This can also be tested 
international to if there is disparities among countries. 
 
 
  Momentum Strategies International Evidence  
Date Author Contribution Limitation 
1998 Rouswenhorst He examined 12 European countries with an international portfolio that include The United Kingdom, 
the Switzerland, Sweden, Spain, Norway, The Netherlands, Italy, Germany, France, Denmark, Belgium, 
and Austria from 1980 to 1995 and found similar pattern. He found that the momentum strategies are as 
well as profitable in Europe as in United States, that the past winners outperformed the past losers by 
about 1% per month in the medium term and that the return continuation is present in all the countries 
after considering the firms’ sizes.  
However, the study did not examine whether international investors 
could take advantage of the momentum strategies in both market. 
1999 Schireck et al. Studied all major companies listed on the FSE from 1961 to 1991 and found that the momentum and 
contrarian strategies appeared to beat a passive approach that invested in the market index. They 
suggested that factors such as beta, risk, or firm size do not easily account for the results because several 
strategies require limited trading, that the implementation costs are modest which implies that the results 
are economically meaningful. From the behavioural finance point of view, they found that the results for 
Germany matched the findings for the United States even though equity markets are organized very 
differently and even though there are profound differences in the social, cultural, and economic 
environment. They pointed out the fact that general traits in human behaviour and psychology could 
overcome these differences and ultimately drive the speculative dynamics of asset prices in the world 
financial markets. 
However, they did not explore other market as the US and the 







Date Author Contribution Limitation 
1999 Fung Studied the contrarian strategy in the Hong Kong’s Heng Sang Index (HSI) while using winners and 
losers’ portfolios formation period of 2 years. He found that, the loser portfolio significantly 
outperforms the winner portfolios by almost 10% a year. Which is significantly different from the 
approximately 8% reported by De Bondt and Thaler (1985) in the US equity market. However, the 
study reported different characteristics for the Hong Kong market, which include his difference in stock 
market capitalisation, high liquidity, the presence of a legal system and an accounting system, his 
similarity to the western standard, the dominance of mutual funds. Furthermore, Hong Kong market is 
also characterised by the fact that in most studies (the up-tick rule for short-selling was abolish after 25 
March 1996 in Hong Kong), selling some of the winner portfolios may be difficult if not impossible.  
However, the study did not explain how international investors 
could take advantage of these characteristics while moving his 
momentum portfolio between the Hong Kong markets and other 
markets to consistently profit from the global momentum and 
contrarian strategy. 
2000 Chan et al. Studied the profitability of the momentum strategies internationally the formed momentum portfolios 
based on past stocks’ returns of individual stock market indices successively and examined whether 
theses strategies are useful for country selection. They examine how the profitability of international 
momentum sytraties is affected by exchange rate movement. Considering a US investor who 
implements momentum strategy that involves buying british stocks when the value of British stocks 
increase (in terms of U.S dollars). They found that the value of investor portfolio depends on how the 
equity and currency market affect each other. For example, if British pounds tends to appreciate 
following arise in the british equity market, the U.S. investor profits when he liquidates the british 
stock portfolio and convert to U.S. dollars. Similarly, if the value of British stocks tends to increase 
following british pound appreciation, the U.S. investor also profits. In both case, they suggested that 
the momentum profits do not come from return continuation in the equity market but from the 
interdependence between the currency and equity market. They also emphasised the link between 
momentum profit and trading volume and suggested that significant portion of the profit come from 
emerging markets as emerging markets are more predictable given the low liquidity. 
The study was conducted with individual stocks, a global 
momentum could also be tested using countries indices. And the 
risk based explanation of the profit could refer to global risk factor 
2002 Hameed and Kusnadi Investigated the profitability of the momentum investment strategy in six Asian stock markets 
(Thailand, Taiwan, Korea, Singapore, Malaysia and Hong). They found that the momentum investment 
strategies do not yield significant momentum profits. They suggested that a diversified country-neutral 
strategy generates small but statistically significant returns of 0.37% per month over six month holding 
period and between 1981 and 1994 but after controlling for size and turnover they found that the 
country neutral profit dissipates. They concluded that factors that contribute to momentum 
phenomenon in the United State are not widespread in the Asian markets and that countries specifics 
characteristics effect are diversifiable internationally.  
However, the study was limited to Asian stock market and did not 
include the contribution of other markets, as the momentum tends 









Date Author Contribution Limitation 
2002 Liu and Ni Studied the stock-return behaviour in the Chinese stock market. They found that short-term contrarian 
and intermediate-term momentum generate significant profits. After further analysis the suggested, that 
overreaction to firm-specifics information is the single source of short-term contrarian profits that, 
momentum profits are not distinct in the medium term, which is explained by the dominance of 
overreaction effect. They also reported that negative cross-serial correlation contributes to the 
momentum profits that large firms tend to lead small firms in holding periods 1 to 8 weeks, while the 
small firms lead large firms in the holding periods 12 to 26 weeks. They reported that with value-
weighted portfolio strategies, the momentum profits become more distinct because of the unique lead-
lag structure in China as the large firms lead the small firms in short horizon while the small firms lead 
the large firms in relatively longer horizon. 
However, the study used the “A” shares, which are only accessible 
to local investors in China and did not said if the unique lead-lag 
effect can be seen as a sign to predict future momentum and 
contrarian profit. 
2003 Hurn and Pavlov Examined the momentum strategies in the Australian market, they analysed 200 stocks as the small 
were characterised by low liquidity issues; they established the existence of short to medium-term 
momentum. They found that momentum strategies yield significant profit of about 4.79% to 13% for 
the yearly holding period and they suggested that the result are even stronger for portfolio based within 
individual industries. 
They advocated that these figures were consistent with the 
momentum in stock returns reported in international markets and 
that the contrarian strategy does not provide significant abnormal 
return over the same time-period but the result was only applicable 
on the Australian markets, as it does not give any indication of the 
worldwide momentum profitability. 
2003 Former and Marhuenda found sign of momentum and contrarian effects in the Spanish stock market. They concluded that 
momentum strategies could be profitable on the 12-month basis and that contrarian strategies offered 
profitable opportunities over 60-month periods but their analysis was restricted to the Spanish market 
and did not explore the global perspective.Momentum and contrarian strategies seem to be more 
effective where the degree of the market sensitivity is considered, Narajo and Porter (2010) studied the 
sources of cross-country co-movement of momentum returns across developed and emerging markets. 
They found that country-neutral momentum returns are significantly correlated across countries, the 
correlation is time varying and that co-movement among industries cannot explain the co-movement of 
country-neutral momentum returns  
but the study did not explain how international investor could take 
advantage of the country-neutral momentum returns correlation 
effect. 
2004 Griffin et al. Extended jegadeesh and Titman (1993), Chan et al. (1996) study in the U.S in a global setting in 40 
market for price momentum and 34 for earning momentum by analysing several key issues: the 
separated the long-side positions from the short-side positions; the interaction between price earnings 
momentum, the relation between individual countries nonentum strategies across markets; and 
momentum’s sensitivity to global market condition, extreme events, and seasonolity. They Provided 
practical perspective for price and earnings momentum investing from 1975 to February 1995 in 
individual countries stock market internationally. They found that, momentum is potentially useful 
even for investors who are only able to take long positions. They also suggested that, ignoring 
transactions cost, an investor investing 1$ in European securities in 1975 would have earned $15.06 in 
low past 6-month return securities, as compared to $66.01 in market indices, or $192.66 in high past 
return securities as price and earnings momentum profits are large and positive on a global basis. 
However, Griffin et al.’s (2004) portfolio construction follows 
Chan et al. (1996) approach and is based on the performance of 
individual stocks within countries indices. And do not claim to test 
a global strategy nor considering the momentum as a global 
coordinate and generalize phenomenon. They attempt to show that 
price and earnings momentum profits are large and positive on a 
global basis result in countries comparison. Still, they did not 
explain why these return differences occur during this period and 






Date Author Contribution Limitation 
2005 Gebhart Examined the relation between momentum in equities and corporate bonds. They claimed that, there is 
no evidence of momentum among investment grade corporate bonds. Instead, they suggested that 
corporate bonds under-react to information in past equity prices about changing default risk and indicated 
a significant reversal as winner’s bonds over a three to twelve-month period underperform bonds that are 
losers over the same period by about 1% over the subsequent 12 months. Furthermore, the reversals 
appear to be the strongest among the riskiest bonds. They also found that there is a significant 
momentum spill over from equities to bond of the same firm. Firms earning high or low equity returns 
over the previous 3 to 12 months earn high or low bond returns over the next 3 to 12 months. Bonds of 
winners’ portfolios outperform bonds of loser portfolios by approximately 1% over the following 12 
months. 
However, this thesis examines the return base on month-end bid 
prices instead of the transaction prices. 
2008 Mclnish et al. Studied the sort-term momentum strategies in Asian pacific countries while taking into account the 
effects of trading activity, size/value characteristics, and asymmetric investor responses to news on stock 
market in Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia, Hong Kong, Korea, Taiwan, and Japan from 1990 to 2000. 
They provided evidences of trading strategies based on past price performance for 1, 2 and 4 weeks. 
They suggested that, trading strategies based on past price patterns are not effectively profitable in most 
pacific Basin markets and that trading strategies, that combining both winners and losers are not 
consistently profitable over a week, that in 5 out of seven countries, winners display price reversal 
patterns.However, they found that momentum profits are profitable only in Japan and Hong Kong. For 
the Japanese market, the results indicate that the winner stocks earn significant returns after adjusting for 
three-factor risk (0.30% per week for the traded stocks and 0.20% for the low volume). Which, are 
statistically significant and which contradict the findings of Lee and Swaminathan (2000) in United State 
that suggested that past volume helps to reconcile intermediate-horizon under-reaction and long-horizon 
overreaction effects.  
he study did not test whether by combining momentum and 
contrarian, international investors will be able to generate 
consistent profit in Asian pacific countries and therefore 
worldwide. 
2008 Naughton Examined the momentum and strategies in Shanghai Stock Exchange, while considering the effect of 
trading volume in portfolio formation. They used different formation and holding periods; they 
discovered that momentum strategy can be profitable in the short-term and can provide long horizon 
positive returns in the Shanghai stock market between 1995 and 2005. They suggested that, investors 
could generate superior returns by investing in strategies unrelated to market movements. The same past 
trading volume does not provide a strong link between momentum and value strategies, as they did not 
find any clear pattern in stock returns between high volume portfolio and low volume portfolios.  
However, they recorded that around earning announcement the 
momentum strategies earn high short-term returns but did not 
explain if this is linked to the country characteristics. 
2010 Griffin et al. investigated the common perception that emerging equity markets are widely thought to be places of 
substantial trading profits and weak- and semi-strong-form market inefficiencies when compared to 
developed markets. They examined the short-term reversal, and momentum strategies, and found that 
short-term reversal, and momentum strategies earn similar returns in emerging and developed markets. 
The study did not establish when and while the momentum and 
contrarian strategies alter in these markets and whether there are 
similitude and divergence in the momentum and reversal behaviour 






Date Author Contribution Limitation 
2015 Avramov et al. Examined the role of liquidity for arbitrage, they examine the systematic relation between variation in 
market liquidity and the strength of the momentum anomaly. They found that the effect goes in the 
opposite direction. The evidence is that momentum profits are large (weak) when the market are highly 
liquid (illiquid). One standard deviation increase in aggregate maret illiquidity reduces the momentum 
profits by 0.87 per month, over the 1928-2011 period. To examine the predictive role of market 
illiquididity in explaining temporal variation in momentum payoffs the consider a time-series regression 
were the predictive variable include three aggregate measure of market condition in the prior month. This 
include the level of market illiquidity, the state of market return, the aggregate market volatility, the also 
include the Fama-French three factors and hey found that there is an identical predictive effect of the 
lagged market state variable on the profitability of the momentum strategy. Earning momentum payoffs 
are significantly lower following periods of low market liquidity, reducing market valuation, reducing 
market valuations and high market volatility. Their findings on the predictive effect of market illiquidity 
on momentum payoffs remains unchanged when they control for various measures of the 
macroeconomy. The liquidity is also robust to, and partially subsumes the recent evidence that 
momentum payoffs depend on enter-temporal variation in investor sentiment, as documented by 
stambaugh et al. (2012). When they extend the analysis to non-U.S. such Japan and ten countries 
establishing the Eurozone, they found similar evidence of significant time-variation in momentum 
payoffs in relation to market illiquidity. 
The study was conducted with individual stocks, a global 
momentum could also be tested using countries indices. And the 
risk based explanation of the profit could refer to global risk factor 
2016 Narayan and Phan Examined the profitability of the momentum strategies in Islamic stocks. They controlled for stock 
characteristics, the state of the market, and the seasonal patterns and found that momentum strategies 
work for Islamic stocks, but are characteristic-dependent. They show that up and down phases of the 
market offer different degree of profitability and the risks factors do explain momentum profits. 
The study was limited to Islamic stocks and specific countries and 
most Islamic countries have different regard to interest on capital 











  Momentum Trading Strategies during Financial Crisis  
1999 Choe et al. Tested whether foreign investors’ activities affect stock return in Korea from November 30, 1996 to the 
end of 1997, period that match with the Asian crisis they used order and trade data and found that there 
are strong evidences of positive feedback trading and herding by foreign investors before the period of 
Korea’s economic crisis. They recorded that, during the crisis period, herding falls and positive feedback 
trading by foreign investors mostly disappears. They suggested that, there were no evidence of 
destabilizing effect of the foreign investors on the Korea stock market over their study period as the 
market adjusted quickly and efficiently to large sales by foreign investors. These sales were not followed 
by negative abnormal returns. 
but the study did not extend this analysis to other equity market, to 
show whether adjustment process and speed is consistent across 
markets worldwide or it is just a feature of the Korean market. 
2003 Otchere and Chan Txamined the overreaction phenomenon in the Hong Kong market from March 1996 to June 1998, which 
included the pre- and the post-Asian financial crisis and found that Hong Kong market overreacted to 
information prior to the Asian financial crisis period. They found that the overreaction tends to be more 
evident for winners than the losers. They also found evidence of the overreaction in the pre-financial crisis 
period but reported that abnormal return obtained by exploiting such phenomenon are economical 
insignificant after considering transaction cost. However, they indicated that after accounting for size 
effect, and the day-of-week effect, the results appear to be very significant. They advocated that the 
Chinese culture may have significant impact on investors’ view of the market, as they tend to perceive 
risks differently and are less risk adverse and less likely to overreact. 
This study did not show how this particular feature of the Chinese 
market could help international momentum and contrarian investors 
in global portfolio allocation. 
2007 Muga and Santania Examined the characteristics of the momentum effect in the Spanish stock market, with particular 
emphasis on the time stability aspect. The results reveal that there was not significant momentum during 
the 1990’s that did not prove to be time-stable, since it had begun to fade by September 1997 coinciding 
with the pick of the stock market crisis. The momentum has been associated with small-size/ high-
turnover stocks. The relation with size appears to be consistent with slow diffusion of information, as 
suggested by Hong et al. (2000). 
 These analyses could be extended to other markets worldwide. 
2012 Chen et al. Studied the momentum and the contrarian trading strategies in the Chinese stock market from 1995 to 
2010. They examined the performance of the trading strategies following different markets states and 
found that contrarian strategies are more profitable down market, especially after 2007 during the 
economic downturn. They suggested that market conditions are good predictors of the size of the 
contrarian profit. They also found that no significant profit is generated from both strategies in the 
medium term, they reiterated that, for practitioners and investors in general, these results provide good 
forecasting indicator especially during the post-crisis period. After consideration of the microstructure 
effect on the one to two-month formation and holding periods they found that the contrarian strategies 
generate on average 0.2% per week and even greater in `up’ market.  







14.2 Appendix G2 
 
Contrarian Literature Survey 
  Contrarian Trading and Profitability  
Date Author Contribution Limitation 
1964 Keynes He suggested that the day-to-day fluctuations in the profits of existing investments is obviously transitory and 
non-significant character, and tends to have an altogether excessive, and even an absurd, influence on the 
market 
the main principle is to go contrary to the general opinion. If 
everyone agreed about its merit, the investment is to dear and 
therefore become unattractive. 
1981 Shiller Investigated the excess volatility issue; he revised the Miller-Modigliani view of the stock prices and defined 
it as a constraint on the likelihood function of a price-dividend sample. He suggested that, at least over the 
last century, dividends simply do not vary enough to justify observed aggregate price movements. 
He results remain strongly conclusive and serve as a 
benchmark for many more research on return reversal 
1981 Kleidon Found that stock price movements are strongly correlated with the following year's earnings changes he 
suggested a clear pattern of overreaction in spite of the observed trendiness of dividends, and reiterated that 
investors tend to attach disproportionate importance to short-run economic developments. 
With regard the overreaction to the averreaction hypothesis 
this study was conclusive. But might need empirical test 
international.  
1982 Kahneman Suggested that in revising their beliefs, individuals tend to overweight recent information and underweight 
prior information. People seem to make predictions according to simple matching rule such as the predicted 
value is selected so that the standing of the case in the distribution of outcomes matches its standing in the 
distribution of impressions. This rule-of-thumb was named the representativeness heuristic, as it violates the 
basic statistical principal that the extremeness of predictions should be moderated given the concept of 
predictability. 
overweighting recent information and underweighting prior 
information go against the overreaction hypotheisis because 
in overreaction investor do not statistically weigth in any 
information but instinctively overreact to new information. 
1982 Arrow Suggested that the work of Kahneman and Tversky materializes the accurate excessive reaction of investors 
to current information which is characterized in all the securities and future markets. Two specific examples 
of the research to which Arrow (1982) was referring are the excess volatility of security prices and the price 
earnings ratio anomaly. 
He findings appear to be conclusive folling empirical research 
on excess volatility. 
1982 Dreman An alternative behavioural explanation for the anomaly based on investor overreaction is what Basu called 
the "price-ratio" hypothesis. Companies with very low P/E are thought to be temporarily "undervalued" 
because investors become excessive pessimistic after a series of bad earnings reports or other bad news. Once 
future earnings turn out to be better than the unreasonably forecasts, the price adjusts. Inversely companies 
with very high P/E are thought to be "overvalued," before falling in price 
Conclusive, but the study focus on individual country only. 
1985 De Bondt and Thaler Study was undertaken to investigate the possibility that both market behaviour and the psychology of 
individual decision making are related by more than just appearance while referring to investor’s 
overreaction, which, is the hub of contrarian strategies.They suggested that, the term overreaction carries an 
implicit comparison to some degree of reaction that is considered appropriate. They attributed the appropriate 
reaction to one of which has a well-established norm of probability revision problems for which Bayes' rule 
prescribes the correct reaction to new information of how individuals actually respond to new data while 
referring to Kahneman et al., (1982) findings. 
The study was conducted with individual stocks, the 
overreaction hypothesis could also be tested at a global level 







Date Author Contribution Limitation 
1988 Dreman suggested that the gentlest peer pressure could lead us to bad decision, even when the facts are 
straightforward and easy to distinguish. When the reality is complex and the situation is hard to read, "Social 
reality" the consensus of the group, no matter how unbelievable, can take a grip on the mind, and turn strong, 
rational, independent people into sheep. The psychological findings on group peer behaviour provide only a 
part of the answer. Investors, even professionals, are victim of important logical psychological failings. These 
psychological pressures affect decisions under conditions of uncertainty in a very predictable manner in the 
market place. The bottom line is that these powerful forces lead most people to make the same mistakes 
repeatedly. Understanding them is the best protection against flying with the crowd, and perhaps profiting 
from their mistakes instead. Dreman suggested that despite what many economist and financial theorists 
assume that, people are not good intuitive statisticians, particularly under difficult conditions. They do not 
calculate likelihood properly when making investment decisions, which, causes consistent errors.  
It remains to understand why such mistakes occur so 
frequently. Once their nature is understood, a study can then 
explain how the contrarian strategies are anchored upon these 
intuitive statistical limitations. 
1982 Kahneman and Tversky suggested the most common of the cognitive biases call the "representativeness". They show that it is a 
natural human tendency to draw analogies and see identical situations where none exists. In the market, this 
means labelling two market environments, as the same when the actual resemblance is superficial. When 
people are providing with a little information and they tend to pull out a picture they are familiars with, 
though it may only remotely represent the current situation. 
 
1998 Dreman recorded that in five trading days the Dow fell 742 points, culminating with 508 points decline on Black 
Monday, October 19. This wiped out almost $1 trillion of value, and many investors taking this heuristically 
shortcut cowered in cash, were caught up in the false parallel between 1987 and 1929. In recounting how 
often crashes occurred, Victor Niederhoffer, noted that after the panic of 1837 "Prices dropped to zero." he 
reiterated that the panic of 1857 was much more severe, but do not say whether in the latter panic sellers 
actually had to pay buyers to carry away their stocks or bonds. So crash and depression were not 
identical.Dreman (1998) established that, most buyers of hot IPOs in the 1980s and 1990s focused on the 
individual story and forgot that over 80% of these issues had dropped in price after the 1962 and 1968 market 
breaks. Here again, the prior probabilities, although essential, were ignored. 
However, it is essential to reiterate that impact of 
psychological pressure apply to investors worldwide 









  Anchoring and Hindsight Biases  
Date Author Contribution Limitation 
1998 Dreman suggests that an investor in 1977 might have thought a price of $91 was too high for cascade 
Communications, a leader in PC networking, and that $80 was more appropriate. However, Cascade 
Communications was grossly overvalued at $91 and dropped to $22 before recovering modestly. The final 
bias is interesting. In looking back at past mistakes, researchers have found that, people believe that each 
error could have been seen much more clearly, if only they had not been wearing dark or rose-coloured 
glasses. The inevitability of what happened seems obvious in retrospect. "Hindsight" bias seriously impairs 
proper assessment of past errors and significantly limits what can be learned from experience. 
I find that the implications of cognitive biases are enormous, 
in investment. The tendency to underestimate or ignore prior 
probabilities in decision-making is undoubtedly the most 
significant problem of intuitive prediction for investors. 
  Contrarian Strategies and Investor Overreaction Hypothesis  
Date Author Contribution Limitation 
1998 Dreman Investors Overreaction Hypothesis predicts that after earnings or other surprises, investments previously 
considered to be "best" underperformed, while those considered being "worst" significantly outperformed, as 
both regress towards a average valuation. The hypothesis also states that the maximum price swing is 
produced by negative surprise on "best" stocks and positive surprises on "worst." On the other hand, positive 
surprise on favoured stocks and negative surprise on out-of-favour stocks reinforcing events corroborate the 
market's opinion of these stocks and have a lesser impact on price movements than event-triggers. The 
overreaction hypothesis holds that even without the occurrence of an event trigger, the "best" and "worst" 
investments regress towards the market average. Because the Investor Overreaction Hypothesis is based on 
psychological principles, it is likely to apply in other markets and in field outside of investments and 
economics where risk and uncertainty exist. The Investor Overreaction Hypothesis makes these predictions: 
best stocks underperform the market, while "worst" stocks outperform. For long periods; Positive surprise 
boost "worst" stocks significantly more than they do "best" stocks; Negative surprise knock "best" stocks 
down much more than "worst" stocks; There are two distinct categories of surprise: "event triggers" (positive 
surprise on "worst" stocks, and negative surprises on "best"), and "reinforcing events" (negative surprise on 
"worst" stocks and positive surprises on "best"). Event triggers result in much larger price movements than 
do reinforcing events; the differences will be significant only in the extreme quintiles, with minimal impact 
on the 60% of stocks in the middle. The hypothesis states that overreaction occurs before the announcement 
of an earnings or other surprise. A correction of the previous overreaction occurs after the surprise. "Best" 
stocks move lower relative to market while "worst" stock move higher, for a relatively long time following a 
surprise. This may fall as commandants for contrarians, but it can be remembered that, all five predictions of 
the investor overreaction hypothesis have been confirmed earlier to a high level of statistical probability. 
It is necessary to make a distinction between a contrarian 
strategy and other trading strategies. The risk on contrarian 
strategy is measured as the risk on a value investment 
strategy. The payoff on a contrarian investment strategy is 
therefore often referred to as a value premium. The contrarian 
strategy premium will be positive as long as the loser or the 
value indices yields a higher return than the winner indices or 








  Types of Contrarian Strategies  
Date Author Contribution Limitation 
1994 Lakonishok Argue that the expectations of futures stock return are an extrapolation of the past stock performance without 
taking into account the mean reversion effect. The implication is that past stock performance will be 
replicated in the future which are prompt to naive investor but the contrarian will always bet against this 
belief and therefore will buy the losers' stocks and sells the winners' 
This approach of the contrarian investing requires stock 
market overreaction as investors will become exceptionally 
excited about previous winner stocks, and thus bid their 
prices up till these winner stocks become overpriced and 
trade above their fundamental values (Barberis and Thaler, 
2002). Correspondingly, investors will also overreact to 
previous poor performing stock and therefore oversell the 
previous loser stocks until they become under-priced and 
trade below their fundamental values. When the overreaction 
is corrected, poor performing stock adjust to high return while 
well performing stock have a low return.  
1998 Dreman A second contrarian investment is known as the valuation measure strategy. This strategy includes analysis 
based on different ratios (share price or book and market value) that proxy for past performance or 
alternatively disclose information about market expectation. But the basic idea remains the same. Contrarian 
investment strategies suggest that loser stocks should be chosen on criteria such as poor past performance 
versus good past performance and inversely 
It is therefore expected that the two types of contrarian 
strategies should perform well given that the two strategies 













  Contrarian Investment Strategies Based on Prior Returns  
Date Author Contribution Limitation 
1985 De Bondt Provided evidence of the anomaly of the price reversal in the US stock market. Their study was inspired by 
the behavioural psychology of Kahneman and Tversky (1982) that suggested that people tend to overweight 
recent information and underweight past data when dealing with probability revision. With reference to the 
stock market, they suggested that people behaviour would imply that the market would overreact to 
unexpected information or news, causing stock price to be mispriced from their fundamental values and then 
reverts in the futures, which make stock price reversal predictable from past returns. They reported that 
paradoxically, long-term past losers outperform long-term past winners over the subsequent three to five 
years’ period. The losing stock earned about 0.694% per month more than the winners did over three years 
on the US stock market from 1926 to 1982, and suggested that the profitability of the contrarian strategies 
can be associated with investor’s overreaction. They also demonstrated that risks measured, as betas could 
not explain why past losers after portfolio formation make higher excess returns. 
The study was conducted on U.S. Stock only. 
1987 De Bondt Re-evaluated the overreaction hypothesis with regards to the time-varying risk premium and the market 
efficiency. They accounted for Chan's suggestions and estimated betas in the test period as opposed to the 
formation period. They found that the losers' portfolios are subject to higher beta than the winners' portfolio 
but they suggested that differences in betas sizes alone could not explain the losers' portfolio superior return. 
The study was conducted on U.S. stock only 
1988 Chan Suggested alternative explanation of the overreaction hypothesis. He put forward the risk-based explanation 
of the return generated by contrarian strategy as the risk of the winner and the loser's stocks change over 
time. Using the same sample as De Bondt and Thaler (1985), he found a considerable change in betas from 
the formation to the holding period but suggested that the change in betas alone cannot explain the losers' 
portfolio excess return. 
At a more general level it might possible to the loser’s 
excess return if one is dealing macro data which are easy to 
observe, therefore a global strategy could be advantageous. 
1990 Jeegadesh Studied a reversal strategy that buys losers and sell winners based on their prior-monthly returns and holds 
them for one month over 1934 to 1987. They found that the contrarian strategy generated a profit of about 
1.99% per month and 1.75% percent per month outside January, which appears striking and suggests to 
which extent security return can be predictable. 
The study was conducted with individual stock and the 
results are countries specific. 
1990 Zarowin Suggested that the losers tend to be small and that small firms outperform large firms   
1990 Lehmann Found that contrarian strategies portfolios chosen on the basis of the price changes during one-week exhibit 
contrarian behaviour in the following week. A relatively good performance of one week tends to be followed 
by a relatively bad performance the next week, and vice versa. Using securities listed on the New York and 
the American Stock Exchange from 1962, he found that the weekly mean return of the two one-week 
portfolio strategies were of opposite sign, and the mean return of the winner's portfolio were about one-half 
the magnitude of the mean return of the loser's portfolio. The sample correlation of the weekly return of the 
one-week portfolio strategies were large and positive (0.851) for the full-week strategy and 0.873 for the 
four-day strategy. A short position in the winner's portfolio had a large negative correlation with a long 
position in the loser's portfolio 
The study did not specify if these findings could be relevant 






Date Author Contribution Limitation 
1990 Lo and Mackinlay studied the contrarian strategies while using US market weekly data from 1962 to 1987 and found that the 
average weekly long-short profit generated by the contrarian strategy over the sample periods for all stocks is 
$1.69 with the average weekly long-short position of $152. In contrast, the sample of small stocks yields an 
expected profit of $4.53 per week, but required only $209 long and short each week. They divided the 
contrarian return into three aspects. In the first part, they identified the of-diagonals of auto covariance matrix 
also known as the cross-auto correlation among stock components. In a simple term it is the difference of 
autocorrelation amongst stock in a portfolio between the past and the current period. Which is also called 
lead-lag effect. When the lead-lag relation is positive, Lo and Mackinlay explain that, the short-term stock 
return reversal with a regular pattern is a consequence of the delayed reaction to common factor and not 
investor overreaction to news or stock prices as suggested by De Bondt and Thaler (1985). This imply that 
the contrarian strategies’ profits result from the investor’s overreaction to news and related information. The 
second aspect in explaining the return reversal is related to the auto correlation of individual stock during 
different periods. They assume that the negative autocorrelation show positive contribution to the contrarian 
strategy returns and can explain the market overreaction. Lo and Mackinlay concluded that stock return’s 
time varying are good predictors of the contrarian portfolio return. The third aspect is the cross-sectional 
variation of the expected return of individual stocks. They found evidences of the volatility-clustering 
phenomenon that shows that large stocks return tended to lead small stocks with the lead lag effect, which, 
tend to have negative effect on the contrarian strategies return. 
Overall findings contradict the traditional behavioural finance 
hypothesis as suggested by De Bondt and Thaler (1985) and 
Lehmann (1990). 
1990 Jegadeesh  He suggested that the negative first-order serial correlation in monthly stock returns is highly significant and 
found that the difference between the risk-adjusted excess return on the extreme deciles portfolios is 2.49% 
per month over the period 1934 to 1987, 2.20% per month excluding January, and 4.37 % per month when 
the month of January is considered separately. It is also found that the difference between the risk-adjusted 
excess returns on the extreme deciles portfolios formed based on one-month lagged return is 1.99% per 
month over the sample period and 1.75% percent per month outside January. 
However, Jegadeesh and Titman (1995) suggested that the 
cross-sectional analysis of profit was not good indicator for 
investor overreaction to news. By analysing firm-specific 
characteristics, they found that short-term contrarian profit 
could be explained by investor’s overreaction to firm-specific 
information. 
1992 Chopra Investigated stock return overreaction on the NYSE stock returns from 1926 to 1986 with monthly and 
annually returns. Their method included event time-varying betas created on an estimate market 
compensation per unit beta risk basis, which, is relatively smaller compared to the Sharp-Lintner model 
adopted by Ball and Kothari (1989), they found that the losers outperform the winners by approximately 
0.542% per month on annual return and 0.792% per month on monthly returns. They also demonstrated that 
size alone could not explain the contrarian return. They suggested that a mutual consideration of size, prior 
return and beta could explain the contrarian return to avoid omitted variable bias. 
There is significant evidence today to demonstrate that size 
and, prior return and beta alone can not explain the contrarian 
return, their impact might vary from one market to anaother. 
1994 Lakonishok defined two categories of stocks those with bad past performances or value stocks and those with better past 
performance or glamour. They claimed that value stocks have been undervalued and glamour stocks have 
been overvalued. They then defined a contrarian strategy that buys values stock and sells glamour stocks 
based on whether the stocks have a high book-to-market, a high sales growth in the past and low price 
relative to cash flow and earnings. They found that, for a five year holding period between 1963 and 1990 
value stocks could generate an excess of 0.83 to 0.916% per month compared to the glamour stocks and that 
the result cannot be explained by systematic risk. 
 but, the study was conducted on US stock only and did not 






Date Author Contribution Limitation 
1995 Clare and Thomas Studied the reversal strategies in the UK market using 1000 stocks from 1955 to 1990. they examine the 
Overreaction Hypothesis. They found that losers outperform winners by approximately 0.142% per month. 
After controlling for firm size, they suggested that the overreaction hypothesis is linked to the size effect. 
The study focus on individual country. 
1996 Chan et al. Complimented De Bondt and Thaler ‘s (1985) findings. They suggested that stock price over- or under-react 
to information and that winners and loser often show reversal patterns, which are consistent with the 
overreaction hypothesis. 
Their findings are conclusive and support the overreaction 
hypothesis, which, however is not the only agument put 
forward to explain return reversal in equity market. 
2002 Kulpman re-evaluated the overreaction hypothesis with regards to the time-varying risk premium and the market 
efficiency. They accounted for Chan's suggestions and estimated betas in the test period as opposed to the 
formation period. They found that the losers' portfolios are subject to higher beta than the winners' portfolio 
but they suggested that differences in betas sizes alone could not explain the losers' portfolio superior return. 
The study is country specific. 
2007 Galariotis et al. Found evidences of contrarian profitability in the London Stock Exchange listed stocks from 1964 to 2005. 
Using 64 strategies for 6531 stocks and controlling for key potential explanations of the strategies' 
profitability, they found that, the lowest size quintile outperforms the highest size quintile by a figure ranging 
from 0.7% per month for the 60-month formation period to 1.84% per month. They suggested that for each of 
the holding periods there is a clear tendency for returns to rise as the market capitalization falls. 
The study focus on UK stock market only. 
2009 Li et al. Studied value and growth stocks in UK stock market from July 1969 to June 2006 and found that growth 
portfolio has low mean return of 0.81% per month, that the value portfolio has high mean returns of 1.39% 
per month, and that the value premium is 0.57% per month. They suggested that superior return or value 
premium of value stocks in UK are a result of high return volatility between 1963 and 2006. 
The study focus on individual country 
2010 Dissanaike and Kim-
Ham 
Studied the reversal strategies while referring to the residual income model. They used variety of variables to 
form contrarian portfolio, ranging from book-to-market, cash flow-to-price, earnings-to-price and past 
returns, to more sophisticated measures based on the Ohlson model and residual income model. They found 
that, most of the portfolio formation methods based on raw and size-adjusted returns yield economically 
important contrarian profits. They suggested that, the raw returns portfolios fall from 1.689% per month in 
the test period year 1 to 0.778% per month in test period year 2 and finally to 0.049% per month in test 
period year 3and suggested that book-to-market based contrarian model outperform the contrarian strategies 
based on accounting information. However, these studies were solely based on UK market. 
Wu and Li (2011) did not explore whether this could apply at 
a global level when using countries' indices. 
2011 Wu and Li Investigated whether long-term contrarian performance on the UK market is driven low-priced stock and 
found that contrarian performance at low, middle, low price levels is positive. The suggested that low-priced 
stock are not fully responsible for contrarian performance and that the findings were consistent with the 
overreaction hypothesis.  
Low-priced stock effect might have in aggregate a significant 
impact on the overall indice performance. I anticipate that 
similar effect could be observe internationaly. Therefore, 
could also explain the global momentum strategy. 
2016 Doan et al. examine the coexistence of momentum and contrarian strategies in the Australian equity market from 1992 to 
201. They found that contrarian strategies prevail in the intermediate and long-term. They show that short-
term contrarian strategies significantly outperform the simple buy-and-hold strategy of investing in the 
market index. the Australian mining sector undermines the momentum performances but enhance the 
contrarian strategies profitability.  
However, their analysis was based on Australian stocks solely 
and the momentum and contrarian profits could not be 




  Contrarian Strategies in Emerging Markets  
Date Author Contribution Limitation 
1999 Choe et al. Evidences of contrarian strategies were also reported in emerging market: Choe et al. (1999) tested whether 
foreign investor activities affect stock return in Korea from November 30, 1996 to the end of 1997, period 
that matches with the Asian crisis. They used order and trade data, and found that there are strong evidences 
of positive feedback trading and herding by foreign investors before during the period of Korea’s economic 
crisis. They recorded that during the crisis period, herding falls, and positive feedback trading by foreign 
investors mostly disappears. They suggested that there was no evidence of destabilizing effect of the foreign 
investors on the Korea stock market over their study period as the market adjusted quickly and efficiently to 
large sales by foreign investors. These sales were not followed by negative abnormal returns. They suggested 
that the losers earn about 0.068% per month more than the winner for institutional order before the Korean 
crisis. 
However, the study did not extend this analysis to other 
equity market, to show whether adjustment process and speed 
are consistent across markets worldwide or it is just a feature 
of the Korean market. 
2002 Kang et al. Studied the contrarian strategy in China using stock prices from the period of January 1993 to January 2000, 
testing methods similar to Lo and Mackinlay (1990), and found that there is a significant abnormal return for 
some short and medium term contrarian strategies. They reported up to 0.744% return for portfolio formed 
based on previous 1-week returns and held for 1-week and suggested that it was associated with overreaction 
to firm specific information in short term. In addition, they discovered that there was not a distinctive effect 
in medium term, which was explained by the dominance of overreaction effect. 
 but they were able to demonstrate that the negative cross-
serial correlation can lead to contrarian profits. However, 
their analysis was based on data only accessible by local 
investors. 
2003 Otchere and Chan Examined the overreaction phenomenon in the Hong Kong market from March 1996 to June 1998 that 
includes the pre- and the post-Asian financial crisis and found that Hong Kong market overreacted to 
information prior to the Asian financial crisis period. They also found that the overreaction tends to be more 
evident for winners than the losers. They also found evidence of the overreaction in the pre-financial crisis 
period but reported that abnormal return obtained by exploiting such phenomenon are economically 
insignificant after considering transaction cost (0.124% per month). However, they indicated that after 
accounting for size effect and the day-of-week effect, the results appear to be very significant. They 
advocated that the Chinese culture may have significant impact on investors’ view of the market as they tend 
to perceive risk differently and are less risk averse and less likely to overreact but this study did not show 
how this particular feature of the Chinese market could help international momentum and contrarian 
investors in global portfolio allocation. 
They advocated that the Chinese culture may have significant 
impact on investors’ view of the market as they tend to 
perceive risk differently and are less risk averse and less 
likely to overreact but this study did not show how this 
particular feature of the Chinese market could help 
international momentum and contrarian investors in global 
portfolio allocation. 
2012 Chen et al. Studied the contrarian trading strategies in the Chinese stock market from 1995 to 2010. They examined the 
performance of the trading strategies following different markets states and found that contrarian strategies 
are profitable following down market especially during the economic downturn. They suggested that market 
conditions are good predictors of the size of the contrarian profit. In addition, they found that no significant 
profit is generated from both strategies in the medium term. They reiterated that, for practitioners and 
investors in general, these results provide good forecasting indicator especially during the post-crisis period. 
After consideration of the microstructure effect on the one-to-two-month formation and holding periods they 
found that the contrarian strategy generates on average approximately 0.8% per month and even greater in 
`up’ market.  
However, the study indicated that these results may not apply 








  Contrarian Strategies International Evidences  
Date Author Contrarian Limitation 
2012 Jordan Examined the profitability of the long-term contrarian strategy using 81 years of data from 1925 to 2005and found that the 
contrarian based on 36 month holding period generate approximately 0.492% return per month when analysing 8 countries and 
even greater 0.586 per month for 16 countries. He reported that the long-term contrarian anomaly disappears when time-
varying alpha are considered. He suggested that the benefits from the trades on long-term reversal do not go against a strategy 
based on diversification, but the method used in the construction of the losers and winners' portfolios and the test are based on 
25% lowest (losers) and the 25% top (winners) or adjust for return.  
However, He reported contrarian results 
based on monthly stocks performance of 
8 and 16 countries only.   
2013 Malin and Bornholt Studied the profitability of the contrarian strategies on international equity markets from January 1970 to January 2011, using 
recent short-term performance (monthly). They proposed the late-stage strategy that buys long-term losers with relatively good 
recent short-term performances and sells long-term winners with relative poor recent short-term performances. They found that, 
with the 60-month formation period in developed countries, past long-term losers gain an average of 1.31% per month over the 
6-month holding period and that long-term winner’s gain an average of only 0.86% per month over the same period. The 
difference between long-term losers and long-term winners is 0.46% per month with a t-statistic of 2.28. In emerging countries, 
the strongest pure contrarian profit using 60-month formation and 6-month holding period generate 0.68% per month with a t-
statistic of 1.69. They also found that, for the late-stage strategies in developed countries the contrarian strategy generated 
0.58% per month with a t-statistic of 2.48. In emerging market, they reported a return of 1.24% per month with a t-statistic of 
2.47. They suggested that, the late-stage strategy is consistently more profitable than the traditional pure contrarian strategy. 
They suggested that the late-state strategies it provides significant evidences of reversal in long-term returns for both the 
developed and the emerging markets. 
but the study did not look at the 
contrarian strategy as a global and 
generalize phenomenon following 
different market state (bear and bull) and 
did not test whether the short-term 
contrarian is also profitable. 
1989 Zarowin Examined firm’s stock over 36 months relative to extreme earning years and found that the poorest earners do outperform the 
best earners. He was able to demonstrate that when poor earners are matched with good earners, there is not substantial 
evidence to suggest that the factor responsible for the overreaction phenomenon is the size and not investor’s overreaction to 
earnings, this argument reject De Bondt and Thaler (1985) suggestion.  
However, the study made use of market 
adjusted excess return and not risk 
adjusted and did not examine the long-
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